Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant pled guilty to a drug possession charge and completed his term of imprisonment in 2008. Before the expiration of his four year term of supervised release, defendant pled guilty to new charges in 2012 and was sentenced to 150 months in prison. The district court that presided over his previous drug conviction revoked defendant's supervised-release term and sentenced him to the statutory maximum of 36 months in prison, to run consecutive to the 150 months imposed for the new charges. Defendant appealed. The court held that 18 U.S.C. 3624(e), which provides that “[a] term of supervised release does not run during any period in which [a] person is imprisoned in connection with a conviction for a Federal, State, or local crime,” does not toll a supervised-release term during a period of pretrial detention if the defendant is later convicted of the charges on which he is held and receives credit toward his sentence for the time served in pretrial detention. Therefore, because the district court lacked jurisdiction to revoke defendant's term of supervised release and to impose a further period of incarceration, the court vacated the district court's order revoking the supervised-release term and sentencing defendant to 36 months’ imprisonment. View "United States v. Marsh" on Justia Law

Defendants Thaxton Young, Jesse Young, and Gerry Burnett challenged their convictions for conspiring to distribute heroin in Washington, D.C. Defendants raised numerous issues on appeal. The court concluded that the district court should not have based Burnett's sentence, in part, on conduct that occurred before he joined the conspiracy. Because the error was plain where Burnett would have been sentenced to a lower base offense level, the court reversed and remanded for resentencing. The court affirmed the judgments of convictions and sentence in all other respects. View "United States v. Burnett" on Justia Law

Defendants Williams, Edwards, and Bowman appealed their convictions for participating in a cocaine distribution scheme. Defendants challenged their convictions on multiple grounds. The court held that the district court erred in admitting portions of Agent Bevington’s lay opinion testimony and that this error was not harmless. Therefore, the court reversed Williams’s conviction and remanded his case to the district court for further proceedings. The court did not reach Williams’s other challenges to his conviction other than to hold that the district court did not err in denying his motion for a judgment of acquittal. The court affirmed the remaining judgments of conviction. View "United States v. Williams" on Justia Law

Defendants Martinez Vega and Cuevas, affiliated with a left-wing guerilla group called FARC, were indicted with more than 50 other individuals for conspiring to commit crimes associated with the importation, manufacture, and distribution of cocaine into the United States. After defendants' extradition to the United States, defendants were convicted for violating 21 U.S.C. 812, 952, 959, 960, and 963. The district court then sentenced Martinez Vega and Cuevas to 330 and 348 months’ imprisonment, respectively. The court concluded that the proffered circumstantial evidence is sufficient to support the jury's guilty verdicts; the district court did not err where the mens rea jury instructions unambiguously and accurately reflected the state of the law; and defendants' failure to show any prejudice, let alone substantial prejudice, is fatal to their prosecutorial misconduct claim. The court vacated Martinez Vega’s sentence and remanded to the district court for resentencing in view of the legally required elements for a “manager or supervisor” enhancement where the district court failed to make the required findings on the second and third elements. The court affirmed in all other respects. View "United States v. Vega" on Justia Law

After defendant was found guilty of the lesser-included offense of possession with intent to distribute a detectable amount of PCP, he appealed the denial of his motion to suppress. The court concluded that defendant was seized when the officer touched him and instructed him to "hold on" and defendant complied. In this case, no reasonable person in defendant’s position and subject to the officer's directives would have believed that he was free to go on about his business. The Government asserts that defendant walked quickly toward a certain neighborhood, made furtive gestures, and recognized the police. Based on the facts on the record, the court concluded that the officers had no reasonable, articulable suspicion justifying their stop of defendant. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "United States v. Castle" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of conspiring with her boyfriend to extort money from a prominent doctor with whom defendant had previously had an affair. The district court denied defendant's ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, holding that defendant was not prejudiced by trial counsel’s failure to introduce expert testimony on battered woman syndrome. The district court therefore did not need to (and did not) decide whether counsel’s performance was constitutionally deficient. The court concluded, however, that defendant was prejudiced by trial counsel’s failure to introduce expert testimony on battered woman syndrome. In this case, the duress instruction would have given jurors a legal basis upon which to vote not guilty, and the expert testimony on battered woman syndrome would have supported both elements of defendant’s duress defense. The factors here add up to a reasonable probability that the jury would have had a reasonable doubt respecting guilt if expert testimony on battered woman syndrome had been presented at defendant’s trial. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for the district court to decide whether counsel was constitutionally deficient in failing to present such testimony. View "United States v. Nwoye" on Justia Law

Defendants Knight and Thorpe were convicted of charges related to the kidnapping and burglary of a couple. The U.S. Attorney’s Office in the District of Columbia prosecutes both federal offenses and most D.C. Code offenses. It may prosecute combined federal and D.C. Code charges in either U.S. District Court or D.C. Superior Court. The court concluded that there was no Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. 3161(b), violation. In this case, because the January arrests were for D.C. Code offenses, those arrests did not trigger the Speedy Trial Act’s 30-day clock. Therefore, the court affirmed as to the Speedy Trial Act issue. The court affirmed Thorpe's sentence and concluded that his sentence was procedurally and substantively reasonable. Finally, the court remanded for the district court to address Knight’s and Thorpe’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel in the first instance. View "United States v. Knight" on Justia Law

Defendants plead guilty to conspiracy to interfere with commerce by robbing a liquor store in violation of the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. 1951. Defendants argued that undercover police officers instigated the use of firearms in the reverse sting operation leading to their arrest. The court concluded that the district court did not err in applying the five-level enhancement under USSG 2B3.1(b)(2) for possession of a firearm where the actual possession of a firearm is not a prerequisite to application of the enhancement for inchoate offenses, such as the robbery conspiracy in this case. Furthermore, the record amply supports the district court’s finding that defendants intended that firearms would be possessed during the robbery and that such possession was reasonably foreseeable. The court agreed with defendants, however, that the case must be remanded for the district court to address whether the alleged police introduction of firearms into the conspiracy was sentencing entrapment. Finally, the court found no merit in defendant Hopkins' other challenges. View "United States v. McKeever" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of possessing with intent to distribute twenty-eight grams or more of cocaine base and possession of a firearm by a felon. On appeal, defendant challenged his sentence. The court concluded that the district court clearly erred in considering, as an aggravating factor, evidence that defendant was involved in an unrelated gunfight. The court could not conclude that the consideration of the evidence did not have a substantial and injurious effect or influence on defendant's sentence. Accordingly, because the error was not harmless, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Kpodi" on Justia Law

Appellant, convicted of six counts of bank robbery and one count of attempted bank robbery, appealed the denial of his 28 U.S.C. 2255(a) motion based on the ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC). Appellant contends that his booking photograph was obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment, and had his counsel moved to suppress it, there wouldn’t have been sufficient evidence to sustain a conviction. Because the FBI had probable cause to arrest him for bank robbery, appellant’s Fourth Amendment argument for suppression is not meritorious and, therefore, his ineffective assistance of counsel claim fails. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Stubblefield" on Justia Law