Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendants plead guilty to conspiracy to interfere with commerce by robbing a liquor store in violation of the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. 1951. Defendants argued that undercover police officers instigated the use of firearms in the reverse sting operation leading to their arrest. The court concluded that the district court did not err in applying the five-level enhancement under USSG 2B3.1(b)(2) for possession of a firearm where the actual possession of a firearm is not a prerequisite to application of the enhancement for inchoate offenses, such as the robbery conspiracy in this case. Furthermore, the record amply supports the district court’s finding that defendants intended that firearms would be possessed during the robbery and that such possession was reasonably foreseeable. The court agreed with defendants, however, that the case must be remanded for the district court to address whether the alleged police introduction of firearms into the conspiracy was sentencing entrapment. Finally, the court found no merit in defendant Hopkins' other challenges. View "United States v. McKeever" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of possessing with intent to distribute twenty-eight grams or more of cocaine base and possession of a firearm by a felon. On appeal, defendant challenged his sentence. The court concluded that the district court clearly erred in considering, as an aggravating factor, evidence that defendant was involved in an unrelated gunfight. The court could not conclude that the consideration of the evidence did not have a substantial and injurious effect or influence on defendant's sentence. Accordingly, because the error was not harmless, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Kpodi" on Justia Law

Appellant, convicted of six counts of bank robbery and one count of attempted bank robbery, appealed the denial of his 28 U.S.C. 2255(a) motion based on the ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC). Appellant contends that his booking photograph was obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment, and had his counsel moved to suppress it, there wouldn’t have been sufficient evidence to sustain a conviction. Because the FBI had probable cause to arrest him for bank robbery, appellant’s Fourth Amendment argument for suppression is not meritorious and, therefore, his ineffective assistance of counsel claim fails. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Stubblefield" on Justia Law

Appellants contend that the district court erred in denying their motions to suppress, relying on the court's subsequent decision in United States v. Glover. In Glover, the court reiterated the distinction drawn by the Supreme Court between two of the grounds for suppression of wiretap evidence under 18 U.S.C. 2515. The court held that a wiretap order is "insufficient on its face," where it fails to identify the Justice Department official who approved the underlying application, as required by Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. 2518(4)(d). Accordingly, the court reversed the denial of the motions to suppress. The court otherwise affirmed the judgment, concluding that appellants' remaining contentions are meritless. View "United States v. Scurry" on Justia Law

Under a deferred prosecution agreement (DPA), the government formally initiates prosecution but agrees to dismiss all charges if the defendant abides by negotiated conditions over a prescribed period of time. This case arises from the interplay between the operation of a DPA and the running of time limitations under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. 3161-3174. In this case, after Fokker voluntarily disclosed its potential violation of federal sanctions and export control laws, the company and the government entered into an 18-month DPA, during which Fokker would continue cooperation with federal authorities and implementation of a substantial compliance program. In accordance with the DPA, the government filed criminal charges against the company, together with a joint motion to suspend the running of time under the Act pending assessment of the company’s adherence to the agreement’s conditions. The court held that the Act confers no authority in a court to withhold exclusion of time pursuant to a DPA based on concerns that the government should bring different charges or should charge different defendants. Therefore, the court vacated the district court’s denial of the joint motion to exclude time under the Act. The court granted the government’s petition for a writ of mandamus and remanded for further proceedings. View "United States v. Fokker Servs. B.V." on Justia Law

Defendant was sentenced to a four-year prison term for violating a condition of his supervised release. The district judge then revoked defendant's term of supervised release and imposed a 30-month term of imprisonment for the original offense that was to run consecutive to the four-year sentence. The court concluded that the district court committed plain error by erroneously invoking the Sentencing Guidelines in effect at the time of sentencing and imposing the revocation term as consecutive to rather than concurrent with the new sentence. Accordingly, the court vacated the post-revocation sentence as violating the Ex Post Facto Clause and remanded for resentencing. View "United States v. Head" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction for multiple counts of drug crimes resulting from his role in a phencyclidine (PCP) distribution ring. Defendant raised multiple challenges to his conviction, almost all of which are without merit. The court addressed two arguments in full. First, the court rejected defendant's claim that the government failed to adequately authenticate and prove chain of custody for the samples tested at the DEA laboratory and used to show defendant's constructive possession of the PCP; and second, the court rejected defendant's claim that the district court erred in admitting portions of a DEA Investigator's testimony as a summary witness where any such error was harmless. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Mitchell" on Justia Law

Defendant was indicted for firearms offenses. In this appeal, the United States challenges the district court's order suppressing defendant's statements to agents of the Secret Service, and barring the government from introducing items recovered from the car he illegally parked near the National Mall. The court concluded that the government carried its burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that defendant's statements were voluntary within the meaning of the Due Process Clause. In this case, the agents did not use coercive conduct, the interview lasted less than an hour, the agents asked straightforward questions in conversational tones, and the agents made no threats or promises. Therefore, the district court erred in suppressing physical evidence derived from his statements. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment and remanded for the district court to reconsider Miranda v. Arizona’s applicability. View "United States v. Hallford" on Justia Law

Sixteen defendants were indicted for charges related to their involvement in a conspiracy to run a large-scale and violent narcotics-distribution business centered in Washington D.C. Many of the indicted defendants pleaded guilty to the charges, while the others went to trial in two separate groups. The Group One trial culminated in guilty verdicts and substantial sentences for each defendant. Group Two consisted of five defendants: Deon Oliver, Franklin Seegers, Kenneth Simmons, James Alfred, and Ronald Alfred. Keith McGill was indicted of charges related to his participation in the same conspiracy and joined the Group Two defendants. The jury found Oliver, Simmons, James Alfred, Ronald Alfred, and McGill guilty on all counts and found Seegers guilty on seven of the charged counts. The six Group Two defendants appealed. The court concluded that the evidence was sufficient to convict on all of the challenged counts; the court rejected most of the claims of error or find that the alleged errors were harmless under the appropriate standard of review; the court reversed the convictions on two counts against Seegers, however, and the court also remanded to the district court to determine whether any of defendants’ conspiracy convictions must be vacated because of a Confrontation Clause violation; certain of McGill’s sentencing arguments have merit, moreover, and the court remanded for examination of claims by Simmons and Ronald Alfred that they received ineffective assistance of counsel before the district court. View "United States v. McGill" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to making false statements to government authorities, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1001(a)(2). Plaintiff was told by her managers at Blackhawk to certify that Blackhawk guards had received training that they had not in fact received, thereby enabling Blackhawk to charge more for each guard’s services. As part of her sentence, she was jointly and severally liable for $442,330 in restitution. But, the district court also expressed a clear intention that the actual restitution amount should be much smaller, perhaps as little as $0. A federal court had already entered judgment against Blackhawk for more than $1 million. And the district court said, in sentencing defendant, that she would not be on the hook at all if Blackhawk paid its fine. Even in the absence of such a payment, defendant would only have to pay “at a rate of not less than $50 each month.” In 2013, defendant found out that the Treasury Department had seized tax refunds due her and that it had acted under the Treasury Offset Program (TOP), 31 U.S.C. 3716, 3720A. Defendant then filed a Motion for Clarification or Modification of Supervised Release in the sentencing court, asking that the tax refunds be returned and future seizures stopped. At the first hearing, the district court vacated defendant’s sentence, stating that it had not anticipated or intended that she be subject to such a harsh sentence. At the second and third hearings, the district court entertained further arguments about the resentencing. At the fourth hearing, the district court reimposed its original sentence. The court held that the sentence manifested a clerical error which the district court should have corrected. The court also held that, in light of the necessary corrections in the sentence, the district court’s refusal to remedy the TOP collection was error. Accordingly, the court remanded for the district court to require the government to return defendant's tax refunds and to cease withholding payments. View "United States v. Hughes" on Justia Law