Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

The case centers on a defendant who was indicted on two counts: unlawful possession of a firearm by a drug user and making a false statement during the purchase of a firearm. The indictment alleged that, on specific dates in 2022, the defendant, as an unlawful user of marijuana and cocaine, possessed multiple firearms and falsely represented on a federal form that he was not an unlawful user or addict of a controlled substance. The evidence included the defendant’s admissions of regular drug use, his possession of firearms during the same period, and his acknowledgment that he was not prescribed any controlled substances. Additional evidence established that, at the time of a firearm purchase, he smelled of marijuana, and a subsequent search uncovered both a loaded pistol and marijuana in his vehicle. Drug tests confirmed recent use of marijuana and cocaine.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Iowa denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss, rejected his claims that the statutes were unconstitutionally vague, and found him guilty on both counts in a bench trial based on stipulated facts. The court concluded that the statutory terms were not vague as applied to the defendant, given his admissions and the explicit warning on the federal form. The court also held that the statute prohibiting firearm possession by drug users was consistent with historical tradition and deferred ruling on the as-applied Second Amendment challenge until trial evidence was complete. The defendant was sentenced to concurrent terms of imprisonment.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit vacated the conviction for unlawful possession of a firearm by a drug user under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3) and remanded for the district court to reassess the defendant’s as-applied Second Amendment challenge in light of intervening circuit precedent. The appellate court affirmed the district court’s decision on all other issues, including the conviction for making a false statement under 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(1)(A). View "United States v. Ledvina" on Justia Law

Benjamin Higgerson was originally sentenced to 78 months in prison and ten years of supervised release after pleading guilty to possession of child pornography. Following his release, he repeatedly violated the terms of his supervised release, including failing to seek approved employment, missing restitution payments, and skipping sex offender treatment sessions. The United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa revoked his supervised release twice, each time imposing nine months of imprisonment and a new nine-year term of supervised release. Upon beginning his third term, Higgerson failed to report to a designated homeless shelter and did not check in with his probation officer, resulting in further Grade C violations.After these violations, the district court conducted a third revocation hearing. The government requested a sentence above the guideline range due to Higgerson’s repeated noncompliance. Higgerson’s counsel argued for a lower sentence, citing his lack of housing. The district court imposed an 18-month sentence of imprisonment and a subsequent nine-year term of supervised release, with conditions including a residential reentry center placement. Higgerson did not object to the factors considered at sentencing.On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, Higgerson argued that the district court improperly considered “promoting respect for the law,” a factor excluded from revocation sentencing under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e). The Eighth Circuit applied plain error review, in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Esteras v. United States, which prohibits consideration of “respect for the law” in revocation sentences. The Eighth Circuit found no clear or obvious reliance on the excluded factor and concluded that the district court’s reasoning focused on deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation. The appellate court affirmed the district court’s judgment, holding that the sentence was not substantively unreasonable. View "United States v. Higgerson" on Justia Law

A citizen of the Ivory Coast immigrated to the United States as a child refugee and later became a lawful permanent resident. As an adult, he was convicted in North Dakota of robbery, a Class B felony, for brandishing a gun and menacing others during a theft. The Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings, charging him with removability based on two convictions for crimes involving moral turpitude and for the robbery conviction, which it classified as an aggravated felony for attempted theft.The Immigration Judge initially found the individual removable for the moral-turpitude convictions but determined he was eligible for cancellation of removal, concluding that the North Dakota robbery statute was overbroad compared to the federal definition of theft. The Department appealed, and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) disagreed, finding the statute not facially overbroad and instructing the Immigration Judge to apply the “realistic probability” test to determine if the statute was applied to conduct beyond the generic federal definition. On remand, the Immigration Judge found the petitioner failed to show a realistic probability that the statute covered nongeneric conduct and ordered removal. The BIA dismissed the appeal, upholding the order.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed only the legal and constitutional claims, as required by statute. It held that North Dakota’s robbery statute is not unambiguously broader than the federal generic definition of attempted theft and that the petitioner had not demonstrated North Dakota actually prosecutes robbery based on conduct beyond that definition. Thus, the court found the robbery conviction to be an aggravated felony, rendering the petitioner ineligible for cancellation of removal, and denied the petition for review. View "Banyee v. Bondi" on Justia Law

A seven-year-old child, J.F., died from malnutrition and an infection caused by untreated head lice while living in a house on the Red Lake Indian Reservation in Minnesota. The home was shared by Sharon Rosebear, her husband, their son Derrick’s five children, and, starting in 2021, her son Julius and his five children, including J.F. The house lacked running water, but free showers and medical care were available nearby. Rosebear regularly provided food for Derrick’s children but not for Julius’s, including J.F., who was often kept home from school due to chronic head lice. In the days before J.F.’s death, Julius left his children in Rosebear’s care, and she acknowledged being responsible for them during that time. J.F. ultimately died on December 25, 2022. The autopsy revealed severe malnutrition and a prolonged lice infestation.The United States District Court for the District of Minnesota presided over Rosebear’s trial. The jury found her guilty of felony child neglect under the Major Crimes Act, which incorporates applicable Minnesota law. The district court denied Rosebear’s motion for acquittal or a new trial and sentenced her to 15 months in prison and two years of supervised release. Rosebear argued both that the evidence was insufficient to prove she was J.F.’s caretaker and that her sentence exceeded the state’s mandatory maximum under Minnesota’s sentencing guidelines, in violation of the Major Crimes Act and Supreme Court precedents.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the conviction and sentence. The court held that sufficient evidence supported the jury’s finding that Rosebear was J.F.’s caretaker and had willfully deprived her of food and medical care. The court also held that the Major Crimes Act requires sentencing within the statutory minimum and maximum penalties set by state law, but not adherence to state sentencing guidelines; instead, the federal sentencing guidelines apply, as long as the sentence does not exceed the state statute’s maximum. View "United States v. Rosebear" on Justia Law

Law enforcement uncovered a large-scale fentanyl distribution conspiracy involving multiple individuals transporting fentanyl pills from Phoenix, Arizona, to the Twin Cities. The conspirators concealed pills inside stuffed animals and shipped them as birthday gifts, taking measures to evade detection. Da’Shawn Domena participated by coordinating, receiving, and delivering packages he knew contained fentanyl. Police intercepted some packages, but others were shipped undetected. A search of Domena’s apartment revealed fentanyl pills and other evidence linking him to the conspiracy. Domena admitted his involvement, specifically acknowledging the receipt and distribution of multiple packages containing fentanyl.The United States District Court for the District of Minnesota accepted Domena’s guilty plea to conspiracy to distribute 400 grams or more of fentanyl, an offense carrying a statutory minimum sentence of 120 months under 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(b)(1)(A), 846. Despite being eligible for safety-valve relief under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f), which could have avoided the mandatory minimum, Domena chose not to cooperate with the government. The Presentence Investigation Report found him responsible for 30.8 kilograms of fentanyl and calculated a lower guidelines range, but the statutory minimum controlled. At sentencing, Domena argued that the mandatory minimum violated the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment, citing his minor role, lack of criminal history, absence of violence, and personal struggles. The district court rejected this argument, referencing existing Eighth Circuit precedent.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed Domena’s Eighth Amendment challenge de novo. The court held that the mandatory minimum sentence was not grossly disproportionate to the crime and did not violate the Eighth Amendment. The court emphasized that circuit precedent consistently upholds mandatory minimum sentences for drug offenses and found Domena’s arguments unpersuasive. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the sentence imposed by the district court. View "United States v. Domena" on Justia Law

A man engaged in sexually explicit exchanges with a 13-to-14-year-old girl, during which he solicited and received images and videos depicting the minor’s genitalia and acts of self-penetration with a sex toy. His communications included explicit language suggesting rough and anal sex and requesting increasingly graphic content. After he received sexually explicit media from the minor, he was arrested and charged with several offenses, including sexual exploitation of a minor, receipt and possession of child pornography, and transfer of obscene material to a minor. He ultimately pled guilty to the receipt of child pornography.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa applied a four-level sentence enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2G2.1(b)(4)(A), reasoning that the material he received depicted sadistic or masochistic conduct or other depictions of violence, specifically the minor’s self-penetration with a foreign object. The court sentenced him to 240 months in prison. The defendant appealed, contending that the enhancement did not apply because the victim was not prepubescent, used a sex toy rather than another object, and appeared to experience sexual pleasure rather than pain.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the district court’s factual findings for clear error and its application of the Sentencing Guidelines de novo. The appellate court held that, under its precedent including United States v. Starr, acts of self-penetration by a minor with a foreign object constitute "violence" under the guideline, regardless of the minor’s age, the type of object, or whether the minor experienced pain. The appellate court affirmed the district court’s judgment, upholding the four-level enhancement. View "United States v. Vannausdle" on Justia Law

Patrick J. Newcomer was serving supervised release for two separate federal convictions related to burglary of a Post Office and possession of a firearm by a felon. After completing his prison terms and beginning supervised release, he was again convicted in state court of two counts of burglary and possession of a firearm by a prohibited person. These new convictions constituted violations of his federal supervised release conditions.Following Newcomer’s state convictions, the United States District Court for the District of Nebraska revoked his supervised release for both federal cases. The court imposed 24 months’ imprisonment for each federal conviction, to run concurrently, and ordered these terms to be served after his state sentences. Additionally, the district court imposed two terms of supervised release—12 months each—set to run consecutively upon his release from imprisonment. Newcomer appealed, arguing that under 18 U.S.C. § 3624(e), the new terms of supervised release should run concurrently.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the legality of the district court’s revocation sentence de novo. It held that 18 U.S.C. § 3624(e) governs only the commencement of original supervised release terms and does not apply to supervised release imposed following revocation. Instead, 18 U.S.C. § 3583 provides the relevant authority, permitting a district court to impose additional supervised release upon revocation, and does not require such terms to run concurrently. The Eighth Circuit found that the district court acted within its discretion in imposing consecutive supervised release terms and affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Newcomer" on Justia Law

Darrick Ferguson pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of federal law. At the time of sentencing, Ferguson had three prior felony convictions, one of which was under Arkansas law for delivery of a controlled substance—specifically, cocaine. The district court determined that all three prior convictions, including the Arkansas drug conviction, qualified as predicate offenses for an enhanced sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), which mandates a minimum sentence for individuals with three or more prior convictions for “serious drug offenses.” Ferguson was sentenced to 180 months’ imprisonment.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas found that Ferguson’s Arkansas conviction qualified as a serious drug offense under the ACCA. Ferguson appealed, contending that the Arkansas statute under which he was convicted criminalizes a broader range of cocaine isomers than are covered by the federal Controlled Substances Act, and therefore, his conviction should not count as a predicate offense for ACCA purposes.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed de novo whether Ferguson’s Arkansas conviction qualified as a predicate offense under the ACCA. Applying the categorical approach, the court held that the Arkansas statute criminalizes all cocaine isomers, while the federal law only covers specific ones. Because the Arkansas statute is broader and punishes conduct not included in the federal definition, Ferguson’s conviction does not qualify as a predicate offense under the ACCA. The Eighth Circuit vacated Ferguson’s sentence and remanded the case for resentencing without the ACCA enhancement. The court did not address Ferguson’s argument regarding his burglary conviction since the drug conviction was dispositive. View "United States v. Ferguson" on Justia Law

Robbie Dean Fetters was convicted by a jury in 2011 of several serious offenses, including being a felon in possession of a firearm, using or carrying a firearm in furtherance of a drug crime, conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine, distribution of methamphetamine, and possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine. Following his conviction, the United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa imposed a downward-variant sentence of 320 months’ imprisonment and five years of supervised release. Fetters later developed multiple significant medical conditions, such as cirrhosis, diabetes, and complications with a feeding tube, and is classified by the Bureau of Prisons as a Level Three chronic care inmate.In 2020, Fetters sought compassionate release from the district court, arguing that his health issues warranted a reduction in his sentence. The district court denied the motion, finding that he did not establish that the sentencing factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) supported release. In 2024, Fetters renewed his motion for compassionate release, emphasizing the progression and severity of his medical conditions. Again, the United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa denied the request, concluding that his medical needs, while serious, did not amount to “extraordinary and compelling reasons” for release and that the Bureau of Prisons could provide adequate care.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial for abuse of discretion. The appellate court held that the district court properly exercised its broad discretion, considered both the guideline and BOP definitions of “terminal illness,” and thoroughly evaluated Fetters’s health and criminal history. The court further found that the district court appropriately weighed the § 3553(a) factors and did not err in denying compassionate release. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "United States v. Fetters" on Justia Law

An 11-year-old child, L.D., was placed in foster care with Trina Mae Johnson. Over a period of fifteen months, Johnson inflicted severe abuse on L.D., including physical torture, starvation, denial of medical care, and psychological torment. The abuse resulted in significant weight loss, untreated injuries, and lasting trauma. Johnson concealed the abuse, enlisted others in her household to participate, and intimidated L.D. into silence. The abuse came to light when Johnson brought L.D. to a youth shelter, prompting an investigation by child services and the FBI.Johnson and several co-defendants were indicted on charges of child torture, child neglect, child endangerment, and assaulting a minor with a dangerous weapon in both federal and Minnesota state law violations. Some co-defendants pleaded guilty, while Johnson’s sister went to trial. Johnson was unable to accept a plea agreement because it was contingent on both sisters pleading guilty. She ultimately pleaded guilty without an agreement. The United States District Court for the District of Minnesota sentenced Johnson to 216 months in prison, after considering the relevant sentencing factors and victim impact statements. The sentence was below the government’s recommendation but above the prior plea offer.On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, Johnson argued that the district court judge’s direct, sympathetic comments to L.D. at sentencing demonstrated judicial bias and violated her due process right to an impartial tribunal. The Eighth Circuit applied plain error review, noting Johnson did not object to the judge’s comments at sentencing or seek recusal. The court held that the judge’s empathetic remarks to the victim did not display deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible. Finding no plain error or due process violation, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "United States v. Johnson" on Justia Law