Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant was charged with possession of a machinegun and unlawful possession of an assault rifle. The government appealed the district court's suppression of evidence gained after police entered defendant's residence without a warrant. The court concluded that suppression based on the officers’ warrantless entry was improper. In this case, the body-camera video shows that, based on defendant's behavior, the officers’ belief he consented to their entry was objectively reasonable. Although defendant did not affirmatively express consent to the officers’ entry, he also did not try to close the front door, or protest when the officers followed him into the house. Moreover, when an officer asked if he could step into the house to talk with defendant, defendant immediately opened the screen door wider with one hand, and walked inside with his back to the officers. Therefore, the court concluded that an objectively reasonable officer could interpret that series of actions as an invitation to enter. The court also concluded that the Leon good faith exception does not apply in this case where the officers' conduct - a protective sweep in the absence of an arrest or reasonable suspicion of dangerous individuals - was clearly illegal; and the court remanded to the district court to determine whether the independent source doctrine applies. View "United States v. Rodriguez" on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to receiving child pornography and was sentenced to 240 months in prison. The court concluded that the district court did not err by imposing a sentencing enhancement for obstruction of justice under USSG 3C1.1 because defendant coached her daughter, the victim, and advised her daughter not to reveal defendant's involvement in the abuse; the district court did not err by denying defendant's request for an acceptance of responsibility under USSG 3E1.1 where defendant had numerous opportunities to admit her role in the abuse and accept responsibility, and lied repeatedly during those interviews; and, in imposing the statutory maximum sentence, the district court appropriately considered the relevant factors and that any error regarding the obstruction of justice enhancement or acceptance of responsibility reduction would be harmless. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Jensen" on Justia Law

Petitioner pleaded guilty to conspiring to distribute crack cocaine and was sentenced to 180 months in prison. Petitioner then filed a pro se motion to vacate his sentence under 28 U.S.C. 2255, but the district court denied the motion. Petitioner filed his section 2255 motion five months after the one-year statute of limitations expired. The court concluded that equitable tolling is not applicable in this case where petitioner failed to establish that he diligently pursued the rights protected by section 2255 relief. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "English v. United States" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed the denial of his motions to reduce his sentence under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2). In this case, the district court did not determine whether defendant's untimely notice of appeal was the result of excusable neglect or good cause. The government argues that this appeal is untimely under Fed. R. App. P. 4(b). Defendant argues that the district court implicitly granted him a thirty day extension for excusable neglect or good cause under Rule 4(b)(4) when it docketed his late notice of appeal. The court remanded to the district court to address the issue. View "United States v. Starks" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to possession of child pornography and was sentenced to 97 months in prison. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion by imposing enhancements for "sadistic" material under USSG 2G2.2(b)(4) and for "use of a computer" under USSG 2G2.2(b)(6) where defendant indisputably used a computer to morph and possess images that were "per se sadistic" under Eighth Circuit precedent; the district court did not abuse its discretion in applying a five-level enhancement under USSG 2G2.2(b)(5) because defendant engaged in a pattern of activity involving the sexual abuse or exploitation of a minor; the district court considered the 18 U.S.C. 3533(a) factors and set forth a reasoned basis for its sentence; and the mitigating evidence did not outweigh the damage that has been done and the unique nature of the conduct involved in this case. Accordingly, the court concluded that the district court did not abuse its substantial sentencing discretion in imposing a within-guidelines sentence and affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Burns" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed her conviction for two counts of conspiracy to distribute a controlled substance, and one count of attempted witness tampering. The court concluded that the district court did not plainly err by joining the conspiracy charges with the witness-tampering charge where the charges were interrelated. The court also concluded that the evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of witness tampering where the context of the case supports the conclusion that defendant's statement that "snitches get stitches" would cause a reasonable person in the witness's position to fear bodily injury, and defendant's First Amendment rights were not infringed upon. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Colhoff" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to receiving child pornography and admitted that he was previously adjudicated guilty as a juvenile of a sexual offense involving a minor. On appeal, defendant appealed his sentence and a special condition of supervised release. The court concluded that, under United States v. Woodard, the district court did not err by holding that defendant's juvenile adjudication qualifies as a prior conviction under 18 U.S.C. 2252(b)(1). The court also concluded that, given the circumstances of defendant's crime, it was not plain error for the district court to prohibit defendant's internet access by banning his use of internet-connected computing devices. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Gauld" on Justia Law

Defendant, originally adjudicated a juvenile delinquent for assault of a federal officer, appealed the district court's imposition of a combination of official detention and juvenile delinquent supervision following revocation of his prior supervision term. Defendant argues that the total combined term of detention and supervision exceeds the maximum possible term under the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act (FJDA), 18 U.S.C. 5031 et seq. The court agreed and held that the maximum term of supervision that a court may impose under section 5037(d)(6) is determined by the requirements in section 5037(d)(2), using the juvenile's age at the time of the revocation hearing. As a result, the maximum total period of detention and supervision that may be imposed upon revocation of a previously imposed term of supervision for a juvenile who is under age 21 at the time of revocation is (i) 3 years, (ii) the top of the Guidelines range that would have applied to a similarly situated adult defendant unless the court finds an aggravating factor to warrant an upward departure, or (iii) the maximum term of imprisonment that would be authorized if the juvenile had been tried and convicted as an adult, whichever is least, "less the term of official detention ordered." Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded with instructions. View "United States v. E.T.H." on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction for defrauding a health-care benefits program, and of making false statements about the delivery or payment for healthcare benefits. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting testimony under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) regarding a prior investigation about his physician assistant and a prior settlement agreement with his pharmacy. In this case, the district court did not clearly abuse its discretion in ruling that the investigation and settlement were relevant to defendant's intent and knowledge, and were not overly prejudicial. Furthermore, the district court gave a limiting instruction that the evidence could be considered only on the issue of whether defendant acted knowingly and willfully. Finally, the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the proposed testimony about other employees and defendant's patient care was irrelevant to the charged offenses. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Golding" on Justia Law

Movant pleaded guilty to, and was sentenced for, a crime that the stipulated facts in the plea agreement did not support. After the district court corrected the statute of conviction but left movant's sentence intact, he appealed. It is undisputed that movant was convicted and sentenced under the wrong statutory subsection. Therefore, the district court correctly held that movant's guilty plea was involuntary and unknowing. The court agreed with the district court that the government has carried its burden in showing that the error was harmless. Had movant gone to trial on the original indictment, he would have been exposed to a minimum of 15 years' imprisonment. Movant acknowledged that his decision to plead guilty was because the information presented a better deal than the original indictment. Although the district court correctly determined that movant's conviction for a more severe crime than the information supported was a prejudicial constitutional error, the district court incorrectly concluded that the harm did not entitle movant to resentencing. A resentencing hearing will enable the district court to fully and accurately address all relevant sentencing factors. Accordingly, movant is entitled to be resentenced under the correct statute. View "Gray v. United States" on Justia Law