Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute cocaine and to distribution of cocaine. Defendant moved to withdraw his guilty plea after a presentence report recommended an enhanced advisory guidelines sentence range based on a pending murder charge in state court. Under circuit precedent, misapprehension about the applicable guidelines calculation is not a fair and just reason to withdraw a plea, even if the confusion stemmed from erroneous legal advice. The court concluded that defendant is not entitled to withdraw his plea because the district court explained to him the statutory range of punishments for both counts of the indictment, and the district court further advised defendants that it would order preparation of a presentence report and advised him how the district court would calculate a sentencing range. Because no record was developed on a Sixth Amendment claim in the district court, any claim of ineffective assistance of counsel should be raised in a motion under 28 U.S.C. 2255. The court also concluded that defendant failed to identify a plain error warranting relief in regard to his claim that the district court, by applying the cross reference to USSG 2A1.1 and sentencing him based on the increased advisory guideline range, violated his Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury. Even if the premise of an unreasonable sentence were satisfied, defendant’s interpretation of the Sixth Amendment is not clearly correct under current law. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Briggs" on Justia Law

Defendant conditionally pled guilty to illegal reentry by a removed alien and then appealed the denial of his motion to suppress and motion to dismiss the indictment. The court concluded that law enforcement had reasonable suspicion to perform a traffic stop where immigration officers had information to believe defendant had illegally reentered the United States and was residing in Hampton, Iowa. Based on the totality of the circumstances, the agent had reasonable suspicion that defendant was committing a crime and therefore the traffic stop was lawful. The court rejected defendant's claim that his final order of removal in 2004 was not adequately explained to him and concluded that defendant's rights were adequately explained to him in Spanish and English, and that his decision to stipulate was voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently made. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Tamayo-Baez" on Justia Law

Petitioner, convicted of drug and firearms offenses, appealed the denial of his 28 U.S.C. 2255 petition for habeas relief. Petitioner claimed that his counsel had rendered ineffective assistance at sentencing by failing to object to the application of the career-offender enhancement. He argued that his prior conviction for domestic-abuse assault in Iowa did not qualify as a crime of violence under USSG 4B1.2(a). The court concluded that counsel's performance was objectively reasonable given the absence of a clearly controlling precedent requiring a different course of action, and in light of the substantial deference the court afforded trial counsel. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Kelly v. United States" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed the district court's denial of his motion to suppress evidence found in his camper pursuant to a search warrant and any statements following the search. The court concluded that the district court did not err in applying the protective sweep exception to the lieutenant's conduct and denying defendant's motion to suppress. In this case, the lieutenant did not violate defendant's Fourth Amendment rights when he opened the door to the camper, asked the individual inside to come out, and, in the process, observed contraband. The lieutenant had reasonable suspicion to conduct the sweep based upon defendant's declaration that his friend was inside the camper. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Pile" on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to conspiring to possess with intent to distribute cocaine base. Subsequently, the United States Sentencing Commission reduced the drug quantity base offense levels by two (Amendment 782). The district court denied defendant's motion to reduce the sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2). In Freeman v. United States, the Supreme Court addressed whether a sentence imposed under a Rule 11(c)(1)(C) plea agreement can be reduced under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2). In this case, Justice Sotomayor's concurring opinion in Freeman is controlling. Applying Freeman, the court concluded that defendant's plea agreement clearly fails to fit the first category of cases that Justice Sotomayor determined are "based on" the Guidelines - the plea agreement does not expressly use a particular Guidelines sentencing range. Therefore, defendant is not entitled to a sentence reduction under Amendment 782 and the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Bailey" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction and sentence for armed bank robbery and violating the terms of supervised release imposed following an earlier conviction. Defendant argued that the district court clearly erred when it found that his statement, “I don’t want to talk, man,” was not an unequivocal invocation of his right to remain silent. However, defendant thereafter continued to talk to law enforcement, never clarifying his earlier statement or otherwise unequivocally invoking his right to remain silent. The court concluded that the district court did not commit clear error in finding that defendant had not indicated a clear, consistent expression of a desire to remain silent; the district court did not err in concluding that defendant had waived his Miranda rights; and that, in light of the circumstances, defendant's waiver was voluntary. In any event, any error in denying the motion to suppress would have been harmless. The court also concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in placing more weight on some mitigating factors and less weight on others. Finally, the court found no merit in defendant's argument that his consecutive 18-month revocation sentence is substantively unreasonable because the district court did not identify which sentencing factors it considered in imposing the sentence and did not take into account those previously listed mitigating factors. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Neiman Adams" on Justia Law

In his second trial, petitioner was again convicted of first degree murder and attempted murder. On appeal, petitioner challenged the district court's denial of his petition for habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. 2254 based on claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. Petitioner alleged that trial counsel was ineffective because counsel failed to object to a jury instruction regarding his justification defense. The court concluded that counsel's failure to object to the jury instruction was not prejudicial under Strickland v. Washington in light of the overwhelming evidence against petitioner. Therefore, the state court’s determination under Strickland was not unreasonable regarding counsel’s failure to object to the jury instruction, and there is no structural error in this case. Petitioner also alleged that trial counsel was ineffective because he failed to object to a jury instruction that incorrectly stated that it was defendant who fired that shot that caused the victim's death. The court concluded that the error was not prejudicial; the state court's decision was not unreasonable; and that habeas relief will not be granted based on the cumulative effect of attorney errors. The court rejected defendant's additional arguments and affirmed the judgment. View "Shawn Shelton v. Terry Mapes" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his sentence after pleading guilty to receipt of child pornography. The district court applied an advisory guidelines cross reference under USSG 2G2.2(c)(1) and sentenced defendant to the statutory maximum of 240 months in prison. In this case, defendant does not deny that the facts on which the district court based its application of the cross reference - defendant secretly making pornographic videos of his sexual relations with a minor - were relevant conduct in determining his advisory guidelines sentencing range. He also concedes that the statutory maximum sentence was not increased by these findings, and that he was in fact sentenced within the authorized statutory range. Thus, the only effect of the findings was to influence the district court’s exercise of its discretion to impose a sentence within that statutory range. The court concluded that this is a constitutionally permissible effect under Apprendi v. New Jersey as applied in United States v. Booker. Even if the facts warranting the cross reference were elements of a separate crime, that simply means the district court determined defendant's advisory guidelines range based on uncharged relevant conduct. Finally, the Sixth Amendment did not require that the district court determine the additional offenses that could have been charged and then submit the factual elements of those offenses to a jury. Accordingly, the court affirmed the sentence. View "United States v. Steffen" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed her conviction of conspiracy to commit wire fraud and five counts of wire fraud. Defendant's conviction stemmed from her involvement in a conspiracy to solicit participation in fake credit-repair or grant programs. The court concluded that a reasonable jury could have found defendant guilty of the conspiracy and wire fraud counts beyond a reasonable doubt; the district court properly admitted voicemail messages where defendant is heard threatening a victim that she had her social security numbers, personal information, and knew where she lived, because the evidence was relevant to show intent and was not unfairly prejudicial; the district court court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for new trial based on a co-conspirator’s statement that defendant "killed a baby" where the statement was explained in context and was cured with further questioning; the district court's instruction sufficiently cured any potential prejudice caused by the prosecutor's comment in rebuttal closing; and the district court properly explained its reasons for defendant's sentence under the 18 U.S.C. 3353(a) factors and rejected defendant's claims that the district court should have varied downward. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Morris" on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to four counts of distributing child pornography over the internet and related charges. On appeal, defendant challenged his 262 months' imprisonment. The court concluded that defendant's sentence is substantively reasonable where the district court properly considered the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors: the nature and circumstances of the offense were extensive and devastating; defendant admitted to his sexual attraction to young boys living near him and his uncharged sexual contact with several other young boys; and a real and compelling need to protect the public. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Sigsbury" on Justia Law