Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Stevenson Charles engaged in a series of violent crimes against gay men in Miami, Florida, while on probation. Using the dating app Grindr, he lured victims to locations where he brandished a firearm, forced them into their cars, and directed them to banks or stores to withdraw money or purchase gift cards. Charles physically assaulted one victim and shot another multiple times. He expressed hatred towards gay people and indicated a desire to harm them. A federal grand jury indicted Charles on 17 counts, including carjacking, brandishing and discharging a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence, kidnapping, and bank robbery. Charles pleaded guilty to all counts without a plea agreement.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida sentenced Charles to 45 years of imprisonment and 15 years of supervised release, despite the statutory maximum for supervised release being five years. The district court justified the extended supervised release term by noting Charles's stipulation to it in exchange for a reduced prison sentence. The government objected to the supervised release term, arguing it exceeded the statutory maximum and could invalidate the entire sentence.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that a statutory maximum punishment is not waivable and that the district court lacked the authority to impose a supervised release term exceeding the statutory maximum of five years. Consequently, the court vacated Charles's sentence and remanded the case for resentencing, emphasizing that the district court must impose a new sentence considering the statutory sentencing factors without relying on an illegal term of supervised release. View "U.S. v. Charles" on Justia Law

Jeffrey Horn, a former registered stockbroker, was convicted by a jury in April 2022 of conspiracy to commit mail and wire fraud, conspiracy to commit securities fraud, and securities fraud. The district court sentenced him to 100 months in prison, followed by three years of supervised release, and ordered him to pay restitution of $1,469,702. Horn appealed his convictions, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence and alleging cumulative error. He also raised objections regarding the calculation of his loss, restitution, and offense level under the Sentencing Guidelines.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida initially reviewed the case. The jury found Horn guilty on all counts, and the district court sentenced him accordingly. Horn's co-defendant, Omar Leon Plummer, was also convicted and sentenced. Horn's appeal followed, raising several issues related to the trial and sentencing.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's judgment, finding that the evidence was sufficient to support Horn's convictions. The court held that Horn acted with the requisite intent to defraud, as evidenced by his distribution of materially false information to investors and his role in the fraudulent scheme. The court also rejected Horn's arguments regarding cumulative error, finding no merit in his claims.Regarding sentencing, the Eleventh Circuit upheld the district court's application of the Sentencing Guidelines. The court found no clear error in the district court's determination that Horn was an organizer or leader of the criminal activity, justifying a four-level enhancement. The court also affirmed the use of intended loss rather than actual loss for sentencing purposes, consistent with the Guidelines and relevant case law. The court concluded that the district court's loss calculation and restitution order were supported by reliable and specific evidence. View "USA v. Horn" on Justia Law

Two defendants, Antonio Lemus and Carlos Daniel Canario-Vilomar, were convicted of cocaine-related charges under the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act (MDLEA). Lemus was apprehended on December 30, 2021, when U.S. Coast Guard officers intercepted a vessel north of Panama, found cocaine, and determined the vessel was without nationality after Colombia could not confirm its registration. Canario-Vilomar was arrested on December 6, 2021, when a similar vessel was intercepted north of Colombia, and the Dominican Republic could not confirm its registration. Both defendants were charged with conspiracy to possess and distribute cocaine on a vessel subject to U.S. jurisdiction.In the Southern District of Florida, Lemus pled guilty to both counts and was sentenced to 87 months in prison. In the Middle District of Florida, Canario-Vilomar pled guilty to conspiracy, and his motion to dismiss the indictment was denied. He was sentenced to 120 months in prison. Both defendants appealed, arguing that the MDLEA exceeded Congress's authority under the Felonies Clause of the Constitution and that their vessels were not stateless under international law. Canario-Vilomar also argued that his offense occurred in an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), which he claimed was beyond Congress's regulatory authority.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Congress's authority under the Felonies Clause is not limited by international law, affirming that the MDLEA's definition of a "vessel without nationality" and the inclusion of the EEZ within the "high seas" were constitutional. The court also rejected Canario-Vilomar's due process argument, citing precedent that the MDLEA does not require a nexus to the United States for jurisdiction. Consequently, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the convictions of both defendants. View "USA v. Canario-Vilomar" on Justia Law

The case involves the appeals of Rolando Williamson, Hendarius Archie, Ishmywel Gregory, and Adrien Taylor, who were convicted of various drug distribution and conspiracy charges. Williamson argued that the district court erred in denying his motions to suppress evidence obtained from warrants to search his house and apartment, claiming the use of pole cameras violated the Fourth Amendment. Archie contended that the district court allowed improper opinion testimony from a case agent. Gregory challenged the district court’s findings on the type and amount of drugs attributable to him at sentencing. All defendants questioned the sufficiency of the evidence supporting their conspiracy convictions.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama convicted the defendants on multiple counts. Williamson was sentenced to life imprisonment for several counts, including engaging in a continuing criminal enterprise and conspiracy to distribute drugs. Taylor was convicted of distributing methamphetamine and using a communication facility to commit a drug trafficking crime. Gregory was convicted of distributing cocaine and conspiracy to distribute drugs. Archie was convicted of conspiracy to distribute marijuana and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the use of pole cameras did not violate Williamson’s Fourth Amendment rights as they surveilled areas exposed to the public. The court found that the case agent’s opinion testimony did not affect Archie’s substantial rights. The evidence was deemed sufficient to support each defendant’s conspiracy conviction. However, Williamson’s conspiracy conviction was vacated as it was a lesser-included offense of his continuing criminal enterprise conviction. Gregory’s sentence was vacated and remanded for resentencing as it exceeded the statutory maximum. The court affirmed the remaining convictions and sentences. View "United States v. Gregory" on Justia Law

Alexander Olson was involved in a conspiracy with seven others to set fires in four Walmart stores in Alabama and Mississippi during business hours. The fires caused chaos, fear, and significant property damage. Olson was indicted on two counts of maliciously setting fires and one count of conspiracy to do so. He pleaded guilty to the conspiracy charge in exchange for the dismissal of the other charges and a recommended sentence of 60 months imprisonment.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Alabama accepted Olson's guilty plea but did not follow the government's sentencing recommendation. Instead, the court sentenced Olson to 180 months imprisonment, three years of supervised release, and ordered him to pay over $7 million in restitution. The court justified the higher sentence by citing the extensive property damage, the risk to human life, and the political motivation behind the fires.Olson appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, arguing that the district court erred by not clearly specifying whether the sentence was a result of a departure or a variance and that the sentence was substantively unreasonable. The Eleventh Circuit found that the district court's statement that it would have imposed the same sentence "whether an upward departure or a variance" rendered the distinction irrelevant. The appellate court also held that the sentence was substantively reasonable given the severity of the offenses and the factors considered by the district court.The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision, concluding that there was no abuse of discretion in the sentencing. View "USA v. Alexander Olson" on Justia Law

Clevon Webster and his brother used stolen social security numbers to apply for government benefits from September 2014 until June 2015. The government had until June 3, 2020, to bring charges against Webster due to the five-year statute of limitations. However, the Southern District of Florida suspended grand jury sessions from March 2020 until November 2020 because of the coronavirus pandemic. Unable to obtain an indictment, the government filed an information against Webster on May 26, 2020, but did not obtain a waiver of indictment from him. After grand juries resumed, a grand jury indicted Webster on January 21, 2021, for the same offenses.Webster moved to dismiss the indictment as untimely, arguing that filing an information without a waiver of indictment did not toll the statute of limitations. The district court denied his motion, adopting the magistrate judge's report that concluded filing an information was sufficient to toll the statute of limitations and that the later indictment related back to the date of the timely filed information. Webster then pleaded guilty to one count of conspiring to commit access device fraud and one count of aggravated identity theft, preserving his right to appeal the denial of his motion to dismiss.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that filing an information without a waiver of indictment tolls the statute of limitations under 18 U.S.C. § 3282(a). The court reasoned that the statute's text, structure, and history support this interpretation and that the statute does not require a waiver of indictment to toll the limitations period. The court also held that the January 2021 indictment related back to the timely filed May 2020 information, making the indictment timely. View "USA v. Webster" on Justia Law

Petitioner filed an application under 28 U.S.C. 2255(h) and 2244(b)(3)(A) seeking an order authorizing the district court to consider a second or successive motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his federal sentence. The Eleventh Circuit denied the application, holding that petitioner raised the same arguments under Johnson v. United States in his application that the court previously denied on the merits. View "In Re: Orestes Hernandez" on Justia Law

When a defendant has attempted to persuade a minor to engage in sexual activity that could potentially violate multiple criminal statutes, the jury is not required to unanimously agree as to which statute the defendant's completed conduct would have violated so long as the jury unanimously agrees that the sexual activity being encouraged would violate one of these statutes. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction in this case, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion by rejecting defendant's proposed jury instruction that the jury must unanimously agree as to which sex acts defendant would have attempted to persuade the minor girl to perform, had he not been interrupted by arresting officers and had there been a real girl. In this case, the jurors were necessarily unanimous that defendant could have been charged with second-degree sexual abuse. View "United States v. Jockisch" on Justia Law

The low-end exception to a presumption of prejudice no longer applies in the post-Booker, advisory guidelines era where a sentence outside the guidelines range is not the extraordinary event that it once was. In this case, the district court's failure to address defendant personally about whether he wished to make a statement to the court was error; defendant was entitled to a presumption of prejudice; the district court could have varied downward from the sentence it imposed if convinced by defendant during allocation to do so; and thus the court vacated and remanded for resentencing so that defendant may have an opportunity to allocute. View "United States v. Doyle" on Justia Law

Georgia law by its terms does not provide for negligence actions directly against dogs. In this case, plaintiff filed suit against a police canine, Draco, and others after Draco inflicted serious damage to plaintiff when Draco refused to release his bite. The Eleventh Circuit held that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity because no binding precedent clearly established that their actions in allowing Draco to apprehend plaintiff violated defendant's Fourth Amendment rights; the County and Chief Ayers in his official capacity have sovereign immunity; and Defendants Fransen, Towler, Ross, and Ayers were entitled to official immunity for the claims against them in their individual capacities View "Jones v. Officer S. Fransen" on Justia Law