Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Petitioner, convicted of two counts of first degree murder and sentenced to death, appealed the denial of his petition for habeas relief. Petitioner argued that (1) the state violated petitioner’s due process rights by knowingly presenting false evidence at his sentencing proceeding; (2) the state violated the Due Process Clause and the Eighth Amendment by presenting differing theories about his culpability at his sentencing proceeding and at his co-defendant’s trial; (3) trial counsel provided unconstitutionally ineffective assistance by opening the door to the admission of the co-defendant’s tape-recorded confession; and (4) trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by inadequately preparing a mental health expert who testified in mitigation at petitioner's penalty phase trial. The court concluded that the Florida Supreme Court’s determination that petitioner had to show that the state knowingly presented false evidence was fully consonant with Supreme Court precedent; the Florida Supreme Court acted reasonably in rejecting petitioner's inconsistent-theories claim; and the court rejected the ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims. The court concluded that the Florida Supreme Court’s denials of petitioner's claims were neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, nor were they based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Raleigh v. Secretary, FL DOC" on Justia Law

Petitioner, convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm, seeks to invalidate his sentence on the ground that he no longer qualifies for a mandatory sentencing enhancement. Petitioner filed his petition under 28 U.S.C. 2241, seeking to obtain the benefit of revised New York sentencing laws, enacted in 2004 and 2009, which had the effect of retroactively lowering the penalties for certain drug offenders. See the Drug Law Reform Act of 2004, 2004 N.Y. Laws ch. 738, and the 2009 Drug Law Reform Act , N.Y. Crim. Proc. 440.46. The district court determined that petitioner lacked jurisdiction to hear the claim. The court affirmed the judgment of the district court because petitioner admits that he is not eligible for resentencing under the revised New York sentencing laws. View "Cortes-Morales v. Hastings" on Justia Law

Petitioner filed two applications seeking an order authorizing the district court to consider a second or successive motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his federal sentence under 28 U.S.C. 2255, citing Johnson v. United States and Welch v. United States. Petitioner argued that his conviction for aiding and abetting a Hobbs Act robbery no longer qualifies as a crime of violence because of Johnson, and thus, his 18 U.S.C. 924(c) sentence cannot stand. The court held that petitioner's companion conviction for aiding and abetting a Hobbs Act robbery, which was charged in the same indictment as, and makes up the basis for, petitioner's section 924(c) count, clearly qualifies as a crime of violence under the use-of-force clause in section 924(c)(3)(A). Therefore, petitioner's section 924(c) sentence would be valid even if Johnson makes the section 924(c)(3)(B) residual clause unconstitutional. Because petitioner has not made a prima facie showing that his proposed Johnson residual-clause claim meets the statutory criteria, the court denied this applications. View "In Re: Edgar Colon, Jr." on Justia Law

Petitioner filed an application seeking an order authorizing the district court to consider a second or successive motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his federal sentence, 28 U.S.C. 2255, citing Johnson v. United States and Welch v. United States. In this case, petitioner was convicted by a jury in 2008 of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute five or more kilograms of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A)(ii) (Count 1); possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug-trafficking crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 924(c) and 2 (Count 2); and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1) and 924(e)(1) (Count 3). Defendant was sentenced as a career offender based on a 1989 conviction on three counts of armed robbery with a deadly weapon and a 2004 Florida conviction for aggravated assault. The court concluded that, to the extent petitioner relies on Johnson to invalidate his mandatory life sentence for Count 1 under 18 U.S.C. 3559(c), his claim fails because the record shows he was not sentenced under section 3559(c); to the extent petitioner relies on Johnson to invalidate his sentence enhancement under the career-offender guidelines, his claim also fails; and, as for his claim that his enhanced sentence on his conviction for Count 3 is invalid in light of Johnson, petitioner has made a prima facie showing that he meets the statutory criteria, but the court nevertheless denied his application. Because petitioner has not demonstrated that he will benefit from Johnson, the court denied his applications for leave to file a second or successive section 2255 motion. View "In Re: Dennis Williams" on Justia Law

Petitioner filed a pro se application for permission to file a second or successive 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion based on Johnson v. United States. Because binding precedent does not dictate that petitioner has three Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. 924(e), predicates despite Johnson, the court concluded that petitioner has made a prima facie showing that his application contains a Johnson claim. The court also concluded that the fact that petitioner's motion will be filed after the one-year deadline does not require the court to deny him permission to file the motion. The court concluded that whether a section 2255 motion will be timely is not relevant to whether the applicant can obtain permission to bring a second or successive section 2255 motion, in cases where the parties have not had fair notice and an opportunity to present their positions on the limitations bar. Neither the government nor petitioner has presented a position about a limitations defense in this case. Accordingly, the court granted the application to file a new section 2255 motion and leave questions about the timeliness of that motion to the district court to decide in the first instance. View "In re: Steven Jackson" on Justia Law

Petitioner seeks authorization to file a second or successive 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion based on Johnson v. United States. The court held that Johnson does not apply to the Guidelines for the purpose of permission to file a second or successive 2255 petition. Therefore, the court concluded that petitioner failed to make a prima facie showing that his proposed petition will meet section 2255(h)’s requirements for second or successive petitions. The court denied the application. View "In re: Datrist McCall" on Justia Law

Petitioner seeks authorization to file a second or successive 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion, alleging that his sentence enhancement under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(1), is void in light of Johnson v. United States. The court concluded that, unless post-Descamps binding precedent clearly resolves the residual clause ambiguity the applicant has demonstrated, his application contains a Johnson claim such that his application is due to be granted. When, conversely, it is clear based on the sentencing court’s finding in sentencing the defendant that each predicate conviction qualified under the ACCA’s elements or enumerated crimes clause, or as a serious drug offense, or binding on-point precedent dictated that the predicate offenses categorically qualified under one of these other clauses, then his application does not “contain” a Johnson claim. In these limited circumstances, his application is due to be denied. The court concluded that petitioner failed to make out a prima facie case under Johnson where binding precedent clearly classifies as elements clause offenses the convictions petitioner’s sentencing court relied upon as ACCA predicates. Accordingly, the court denied the application. View "In re: Joseph Rogers, Jr." on Justia Law

Petitioner filed an application seeking an order authorizing the district court to consider a second or successive motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his federal sentence, 28 U.S.C. 2255. Petitioner asserts that his claim relies upon a new rule of law, citing Johnson v. United States, and argues that he was denied due process because the district court enhanced his sentence under the now-voided residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. 924(e), and subjected him to a mandatory minimum 15-year sentence. The court held that it is not enough for a federal prisoner to simply cite Johnson as the basis for the claim or claims he seeks to raise in a second or successive section 2255 motion, but he also must show that he was sentenced, at least in part, under the residual clause and thus that he falls within the new substantive constitutional rule announced in Johnson. In this case, because petitioner's three prior ACCA predicate convictions qualified under the elements clause without regard to the ACCA’s residual clause, petitioner's application does not contain a prima facie claim that his sentence was based on the residual clause, or that his sentence falls within the scope of the substantive ruling in Johnson or that he will benefit from Johnson. Accordingly, the court denied the application. View "In re. Morris Vernell Hires, Jr." on Justia Law

Petitioner, a lawful asylee from Cameroon, pled guilty to bank fraud and became removable as an aggravated felon. After petitioner completed his criminal sentence, ICE took custody of him and he has been in ICE detention since February 2, 2012. On appeal, the court addressed an issue of first impression: During their removal proceedings, are criminal aliens, like petitioner, detained under section 1226(c) entitled at any point to a bond hearing under the Due Process Clause? The court held that section 1226(c) contains an implicit temporal limitation against the unreasonably prolonged detention of criminal aliens without an individualized bond hearing. The court then established an approach for determining when the removal proceedings and the resulting section 1226(c) mandatory detention of a criminal alien become unreasonably protracted, triggering the need for a bond hearing. Joining the First, Third, and Sixth Circuits, the court adopted the case-by-case approach in determining whether a detention of a criminal alien has become unreasonable. Section 2241 courts must consult the record and balance the government’s interest in continued detention against the criminal alien’s liberty interest, always seeking to determine whether the alien’s liberty interest has begun to outweigh “any justification for using presumptions to detain him without bond.” If the balance tips in the alien’s favor, the district court must grant the section 2241 habeas petition and order the government to afford the criminal alien an individualized bond inquiry. When detained criminal aliens become entitled to a bond hearing, the agency shall conduct a bond inquiry under the procedures outlined in 8 C.F.R. 1236.1(c)(8) and (d). Finally, applying the court's holdings in petitioner's case, the court concluded that he must receive an immediate bond hearing as habeas relief. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded. View "Sopo v. U.S. Attorney General" on Justia Law

Petitioner, sentenced under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(1), seeks authorization to file a second or successive 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion. Petitioner argues that his ACCA-enhanced sentence is void in light of Johnson v. United States because his Florida burglary conviction cannot serve as a predicate offense for the ACCA enhancement in light of Johnson. The court concluded that petitioner has made the requisite prima facie showing because his prior Florida conviction for burglary of an unoccupied dwelling may not qualify as a valid predicate offense after Johnson. Accordingly, the court granted the application. View "In Re: Keith Devon Adams" on Justia Law