Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendants Frantz, Terry, and Chris appealed their convictions and sentences for charges related to their participation in a scheme in which they established a sham tax preparation business. The court concluded that the district court properly denied Frantz’s and Terry’s motions to suppress evidence seized during a traffic stop, and evidence seized from the Parkland residence; there was sufficient evidence to support Terry and Chris’s convictions for conspiracy to defraud the United States, conspiracy and use of unauthorized access devices to defraud, and aggravated identity theft; the district court did not plainly err in admitting testimony from a SWAT team officer executing a search warrant on the Parkland residence; the district court properly applied the two-level vulnerable victims enhancement pursuant to USSG 3A1.1(b)(1); the district court did not err in denying Terry a minor role sentencing reduction; the district court properly applied a two-level sentencing enhancement because defendants' offenses involved the production or trafficking of unauthorized access devices; and the evidence supports the district court’s loss amount calculation. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Pierre" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a citizen of Jamaica and a lawful permanent resident of the United States, petitioned for review of the BIA's ruling that she is deportable because she pleaded guilty to “theft by taking” in violation of Georgia Code 16-8-2. Petitioner argued that this crime is not “a theft offense” as that term is used in the Immigration and Nationality Act’s (INA), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(M)(i), list of grounds for deportation. The BIA initially held that Georgia “theft by taking” doesn’t require property to be taken “without consent,” as is required for generic theft, and ruled that petitioner's violation was not "a theft offense. After this initial ruling, a BIA official granted a motion to reconsider and then ruled the second time around that the crime is generic theft. The court granted the petition and concluded that the BIA determined years ago in a published opinion that theft based on taking property through fraudulently obtained consent is not “without consent.” View "Vassell v. U.S. Attorney General" on Justia Law

Petitioner seeks an order authorizing the district court to consider a second or successive motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his federal sentence. Petitioner wishes to raise a claim based on a new rule of constitutional law announced in Johnson v. United States in his 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion. The court concluded that petitioner's conviction under 18 U.S.C. 924(c) would be valid even if Johnson renders the "crime of violence" definition in section 924(c)(3)(B) unconstitutional. Therefore, the court denied the application for leave to file a second or successive motion because petitioner failed to make a prima facie showing that his proposed claim meets the statutory criteria. View "In Re: Charles Hines" on Justia Law

Petitioner, sentenced under 18 U.S.C. 924(c), seeks authorization to file a second or successive 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion. Petitioner claims that the statute is unconstitutional in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Johnson v. United States. Given the similarity between section 924(c) and section 924(e), other Courts of Appeals have authorized successive section 2255 petitions based on Johnson in section 924(c) cases. Although this court has not decided if Johnson applies to section 924(c)(3)(B), petitioner has made a prima facie showing that his motion contains a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court. Accordingly, the court granted the application. View "In Re: Ricardo Pinder, Jr." on Justia Law

Petitioner filed an application under 28 U.S.C. 2255(h) and 2244(b)(3)(A), seeking an order authorizing the district court to consider a second or successive motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his federal sentence. The court concluded that petitioner has not made a prima facie showing that he has satisfied the criteria of section 2255(h)(2) where his claim that Descamps v. United States is a new rule of constitutional law that the Supreme Court has made retroactive to cases on collateral review is unavailing. The court also concluded that petitioner's claim under Johnson v. United States fails to establish the required prima facie showing because, even though Johnson is a new rule of constitutional law that is retroactive, the applicability of petitioner's armed career criminal enhancement does not turn on the validity of the residual clause. Accordingly, the court denied the motion. View "In Re: Edward Thomas" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed the district court's denial of his motion to reduce his sentence under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2), based on Amendment 782 of the Sentencing Guidelines. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying defendant's section 3582(c)(2) motion because it complied with the two-part procedure for analyzing defendant's section 3582(c)(2) motion by determining that he was eligible for a sentence reduction, but the reduction was not warranted based on its analysis of the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors. The court declined to reassign defendant's case to a different district court judge because there is no need for a remand and reassignment is unnecessary to preserve the appearance of justice and would require undue duplication of effort. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Frazier" on Justia Law

Petitioner appealed the dismissal of his 28 U.S.C. 2254 federal habeas petition because it was time-barred. The district court concluded that the state habeas proceedings became complete once the Georgia Supreme Court denied petitioner's application for a certificate of probable cause and the period for seeking reconsideration of that denial lapsed under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), 28 U.S.C. 2244(d)(2). The court held that, for purposes of section 2244(d)(2), when the Georgia Supreme Court denies a state habeas petitioner’s application for a certificate of probable cause, the petitioner’s proceedings remain “pending” until the court issues the remittitur for the denial. Applying this holding to petitioner, his section 2254 petition was timely. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Dolphy v. Warden, Central State Prison" on Justia Law

After defendant admitted to violating his conditions of supervised release, the district court sentenced defendant to the statutory maximum sentence of 60 months in prison. The court held that 18 U.S.C. 3553(c)(2) applied to defendant's sentencing hearing and reviewed the claim de novo under the general United States v. Vandergrift rule. The court held that the district court failed to comply with section 3553(c)(2) because the district court failed to give sufficiently specific reasons for his non-guideline sentence. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded for resentencing. View "United States v. Parks" on Justia Law

Petitioner, an Alabama death row inmate, challenged the denial of his 28 U.S.C. 2254 petition for habeas relief. The district court granted petitioner a certificate of appealability (COA) on whether trial counsel was ineffective during petitioner's trial at both the penalty and guilt phase. The court concluded that petitioner's second amended Rule 32 petition pleaded more than sufficient specific facts about trial counsel’s acts and omissions to show their penalty phase investigation “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” Here, trial counsel’s failure to conduct any timely and meaningful mitigation interviews with petitioner and his family was objectively unreasonable under the circumstances of this case.The court vacated the district court's order denying petitioner's penalty phase ineffective assistance of counsel claim and its order denying discovery and an evidentiary hearing on this claim; the court affirmed the district court's denial of habeas relief on petitioner's guilt phase ineffective assistance of counsel claim; and remanded. View "Daniel v. Commissioner, AL DOC" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to one count of conspiring to distribute cocaine while on board a vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, in violation of the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act (MDLEA), 46 U.S.C. 70503(a)(1), 70506(b). The court rejected the government's contention that it should review only for plain error where the district court’s subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law that the court reviews de novo even when it is raised for the first time on appeal. In this case, the district court did not expressly make any factual findings with respect to its jurisdiction. In the plea agreement, defendant does not admit to facts that give rise to jurisdiction. The agreement does not state, for example, that defendant and his coconspirators failed to “make a claim of nationality” upon request when United States officials apprehended them. Instead, it asserts that defendant was on a vessel subject to the United States’ jurisdiction. The court concluded that a limited remand is the proper course of action in this case. Therefore, the court remanded the case to the district court for the limited purpose of determining whether subject matter jurisdiction exists. View "United States v. Gonzalez Iguaran" on Justia Law