Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
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Defendant was convicted of attempting to persuade, induce, entice, or coerce a minor into engaging in prostitution or unlawful sex, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 2422(b). Defendant's conviction stemmed from his response to a posting on an internet site frequented by prostitutes and their clients. Law enforcement, posing as a fifteen-year-old girl, offered to have sex with defendant for money and defendant accepted, arranged to meet, and was arrested after arriving at the meeting spot. The court concluded that there was sufficient evidence to convict defendant. The court held that, where an underage prostitute holds herself out as willing to engage in sex for money, the offer to pay that money qualifies as sufficient inducement under section 2422(b). The court also concluded that defendant is not entitled to relief based on the district court’s refusal to deliver a confusing and erroneous jury instruction requested by defendant or in its exclusion of particular evidence. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Rutgerson" on Justia Law

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Petitioner, a Florida prisoner serving a life sentence for second degree murder among other things, was granted federal habeas relief on the ground that appellate counsel had rendered ineffective assistance by failing to anticipate the Florida Supreme Court’s decision on a jury instruction issue and raise it before the Third District Court of Appeal. The court concluded, however, that the district court failed to apply the double deference standard mandated by 28 U.S.C. 2254 and Strickland v. Washington, and the district court should have evaluated the reasonableness of the state habeas court’s denial of petitioner's ineffective assistance claim. Instead, the district court bypassed that test and went straight to the reasonableness of appellate counsel’s actions. The district court’s error in disregarding the requirements of section 2254(d)(1) led it to skip the dispositive question of whether there was any “clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court,” holding that appellate counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to preserve an issue that was percolating in the courts at the time. The court found that no holding of the Supreme Court clearly establishes that in order to perform within the “wide range of reasonable professional assistance,” counsel must accurately predict how the law will turn out or hedge every bet in the hope of a favorable development. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's grant of habeas relief. View "Rambaran v. Secretary, Dep't of Corr." on Justia Law

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Petitioner, a state prisoner and a serial litigator in federal courts, appealed the denial of his petition to proceed in forma pauperis because it concluded that he had six strikes under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 28 U.S.C. 1915(g). Two of petitioner’s earlier filings were dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, and the other four were dismissed for want of prosecution. In three of the four dismissals for want of prosecution, a judge of this Court determined that petitioner could not proceed in forma pauperis because his filings were frivolous. But a single circuit judge cannot dismiss an action or appeal. Instead, panels of this Court dismissed petitioner’s filings because he failed to pay the filing fee. The court concluded that, although petitioner is a serial litigant who has clogged the federal courts with frivolous litigation, the court must follow the text of the Act, which does not classify his six prior dismissals for lack of jurisdiction and want of prosecution as strikes. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded for further proceedings. View "Daker v. Commissioner, GA Dep't of Corr." on Justia Law

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Garrity v. New Jersey held that a public employee may not be coerced into surrendering his Fifth Amendment privilege by threat of being fired or subjected to other sanctions. The principle issue on appeal is one of first impression: whether a state employee can, after he has been fired, waive his Garrity rights and allow his prior compelled and protected statements to be used by the federal government in a criminal investigation. The court concluded that Garrity rights may be waived in such circumstances, as long as the employee’s waiver is voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. Because defendant voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived his Garrity rights when he spoke to agents of the FBI following his termination by the Alabama Department of Corrections, the court held that the government did not violate the Fifth Amendment when it used his prior statements in a federal criminal investigation concerning the beating and death of an inmate. Accordingly, the court affirmed defendant's convictions for violating civil rights, making false statements, obstructing justice, and conspiring to obstruct justice. View "United States v. Smith" on Justia Law

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Petitioner Artez Hammonds was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death. Relevant to this appeal, petitioner invoked his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination during the guilt phase of his trial and elected not to testify. The court certified the following questions to the Alabama Supreme Court: 1) Whether corrected page 228 of the trial transcript in Artez Hammonds’s trial for the capital murder of Marilyn Mitchell, attached hereto as Appendix A, was part of “the record that was before the [Alabama Supreme Court]” when it “adjudicated [Artez Hammonds’s claim that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a mistrial following the prosecutor’s reference to his decision not to testify] on the merits.” 2) If so, whether page 228 of the original trial transcript or corrected page 228 constitutes the official transcript of Hammonds’s trial. View "Hammonds v. Commissioner, AL DOC" on Justia Law

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Petitioner, a state prisoner convicted of murder and sentenced to death, seeks a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2254 based on the ineffective assistance of counsel during the penalty phase of his trial, the sentencing court's failure to consider mitigating evidence, and the State's violation of his due process rights by suppressing material impeachment evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland. The district court denied relief and the court affirmed. The court concluded that, although petitioner's ineffective assistance of counsel claim is not procedurally barred, it fails on the merits because counsel's performance was not unreasonable where, among other things, counsel reasonably determined that the mitigating evidence could cut both ways and thus could have harmed his client as much as it could have helped him. Furthermore, petitioner is unable to establish prejudice. The court rejected petitioner's argument that the sentencing judge erred by failing to consider mitigating evidence because the sentencing document made no express reference to the reports counsel had submitted detailing petitioner's childhood and addiction issues. Addressing petitioner's Brady claim on the merits, the court found that, in the absence of evidence, the prosecution did not suppress any Brady material. Finally, petitioner is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his Brady claim. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Clark v. Attorney General, State of FL" on Justia Law

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Defendant was found guilty of three counts of producing child pornography and one count of committing those crimes while under obligation to register as a sex offender. On appeal, defendant challenged his conviction and his sentence on the three counts of producing child pornography. The court concluded that the district court did not err by refusing to give one of defendant's proposed jury instructions where the government was not required to prove that making explicit photographs was defendant’s sole or primary purpose for enticing the minor to engage in sexually explicit conduct because it was enough to show that it was “a purpose” for doing so; the 25-year statutory mandatory minimum in 18 U.S.C. 2251 applies to any defendant with a prior conviction relating to “abusive sexual contact involving a minor or ward,” as well as to any defendant with a prior conviction relating to “aggravated sexual abuse” or “sexual abuse,” whether or not that conviction involved a minor; and the district court did not err in enhancing defendant's sentence under section 2251(e) based on defendant's prior conviction for sexual battery because it clearly relates to "sexual abuse" as that term is generally understood. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Miller" on Justia Law

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Defendants Barron-Soto and Hernandez appealed convictions stemming from their involvement in a conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine. The court concluded that the evidence obtained from the execution of the search warrants was admissible under the independent source exception to the exclusionary rule. Therefore, notwithstanding the Supreme Court's decision in Riley v. California, the court affirmed the district court’s order denying Hernandez and Barron-Soto’s motions to suppress. The court also concluded that Hernandez has not shown that the district court abused its discretion admitting evidence of his prior charge or determining that the probative value of the evidence outweighed the risk of undue prejudice. Finally, the evidence was sufficient to convict Hernandez of knowingly joining a conspiracy to possess methamphetamine with the intent to distribute. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Barron-Soto" on Justia Law

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Petitioner was convicted of forcing women into prostitution and sentenced to life in prison. On remand, a different judge sentenced petitioner to 35 months of imprisonment. Three years after the trial, the United States disclosed that the judge who presided over petitioner's trial and sentenced him to life in prison, Jack Camp, had bipolar disorder and had suffered a brain injury. The investigation also disclosed allegations of racial bias. The court concluded that petitioner sufficiently alleged that Camp was actually biased against him where he proffered evidence that Camp had a difficult time adjudicating African-American men's cases and specifically disliked petitioner based on the fact that petitioner was a black man who pimped white women. Petitioner also alleged that Camp wanted to give all black offenders who pimped white women the maximum possible penalty, and Camp gave petitioner the maximum penalty. The government concedes that denial of an impartial judge is structural error that demands reversal. The court concluded that the district court must allow petitioner on remand an evidentiary hearing to prove that Camp was actually biased against him. The court concluded, however, that the district court correctly denied petitioner's claim that Camp was mentally incompetent without an evidentiary hearing. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. View "Norris v. United States" on Justia Law

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Defendant pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine and conspiracy to commit money laundering. At issue on appeal is a question of first impression: whether a criminal defendant must show good cause to dismiss retained counsel if the defendant intends to seek appointed counsel. The district court denied defendant's motion to withdraw counsel in this case based on the ground that defendant had been afforded effective assistance of counsel by his retained counsel. The court vacated, concluding that a criminal defendant need not show good cause to dismiss retained counsel. Therefore, the district court denied the motion by applying the wrong standard. The court remanded for further proceedings. View "United States v. Jiminez-Antunez" on Justia Law