Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant pleaded guilty to one count of illegally receiving a firearm while under indictment for robbery by intimidation, and then appealed the district court's application of a four-level enhancement under USSG 2K2.1(b)(4)(B) for his possession of a firearm that “had an altered or obliterated serial number.” When defendant was arrested, the serial number on the gun’s frame was intact, while the serial number on its slide had been altered or obliterated. The court held that the section 2K2.1(b)(4)(B) enhancement applies either when any serial number on a gun has been altered or obliterated or when just one serial number has been altered or obliterated. Because the text of section 2K2.1(b)(4)(B) is not ambiguous, the court need not resort to an in pari materia reading. Finally, the fact that the number was not required by federal regulations is irrelevant. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Warren" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction and sentence for ten counts of making false, fictitious, or fraudulent claims on his tax returns and one count of corruptly interfering with the administration of internal revenue laws. The court concluded that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's verdict. The court also concluded that the court lacked jurisdiction to review the district court's denial of defendant's downward departure request; defendant has not demonstrated that his sentence was procedurally or substantively unreasonable; the district court more than adequately explained its sentence and did not abuse its discretion in declining to grant a downward variance; and defendant's sentence was within the advisory guidelines range. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Croteau" on Justia Law

Defendants Jeffrey Green and Karen Hebble were each convicted of one count of conspiracy to distribute controlled substances, in violation of 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C), and 846; and one count of conspiracy to commit money laundering, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1956(h). As objects of the latter conspiracy, Green and Hebble together were convicted of two counts of money laundering and Green was separately convicted of four additional counts of money laundering, all in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1957 and 2. Defendants' convictions stemmed from their involvement in the illegal sale of oxycodone. The court concluded that the evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of the charges. The court also concluded that Hebble has failed to show that the district court abused its discretion in denying her severance motion. The court rejected Hebble's argument that had she and Green been tried separately, Green would have testified at her trial and would have exonerated her. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Green" on Justia Law

Defendant, convicted of knowingly accessing with intent to view child pornography, challenged the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence discovered on an HP desktop computer in his home. The court concluded that defendant's then-wife, Caroline Olausen, had authority to consent to the forensic search of the shared HP computer in her home, and thus there was no Fourth Amendment violation when the detective conducted the OS Triage forensic scan based on Olausen’s consent; even assuming arguendo that Georgia v. Randolph applied to the search, there was no Fourth Amendment violation because the officers stopped their search when defendant seemed to object; and the only information the detective relied on in obtaining the search warrant was data collected prior to defendant’s objection. Therefore, the court held that all of the fruits of the search following the issuance of the warrant were admissible. Furthermore, law enforcement would have sought the search warrant even without the fruits of the allegedly illegal forensic search, and the evidence ultimately obtained pursuant to the warrant was admissible under the independent source doctrine. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Thomas" on Justia Law

Petitioner, serving 3 concurrent 188-month sentences, appealed the district court's dismissal of his 28 U.S.C. 2241 petition brought pursuant to the 28 U.S.C. 2255(e) savings clause. At issue is the fourth prong of the jurisdictional test announced in Bryant v. Warden, FCC Coleman - Medium, which requires a petitioner to establish that his current detention exceeds the statutory maximum authorized by Congress. The court held that, in order to meet Bryant’s fourth prong, a section 2241 petitioner serving multiple concurrent sentences must demonstrate that his overall sentence exceeds the allowable statutory maximum for each of the counts of conviction. In other words, the petitioner must show that, as a result of sentencing error, he will be in prison-custody or detention for longer than any of his statutes of conviction authorize. In this case, petitioner cannot “open a portal” to the section 2255(e) savings clause because his 188-month sentence on his firearm offense, even if now illegal, is equivalent to and wholly concurrent with his 188-month drug sentences that are not illegal. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Brown v. Warden, FCC Coleman - Low" on Justia Law

Defendant's original 72-month sentence represented a downward departure from his advisory guidelines range of 87 to 108 months based on his substantial assistance to the government. The district court applied a 3-level reduction in defendant’s offense level in making this downward departure. On appeal, defendant challenged the district court's order ruling on his motion for a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2) and Amendment 782 to the Sentencing Guidelines. The court concluded that USSG 1B1.10(b)(2)(B) grants the sentencing court in a section 3582(c)(2) proceeding the discretion to comparably reduce a defendant’s sentence where that defendant previously received a USSG 5K1.1 departure at his original sentencing. If a sentencing court chooses to exercise its discretion and make a comparable reduction, it is not bound to use the percentage-based approach - or any one specific method - to calculate the comparable reduction. Rather, the court may use any of the reasonable methods that were available to calculate the original section 5K1.1 departure, so long as they result in a comparable reduction. In this case, the district court’s mistaken belief about the limitation of its discretion constitutes procedural error. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded. View "United States v. Marroquin-Medina" on Justia Law

Petitioner appealed the district court's dismissal of his pro se habeas petition as time-barred under 28 U.S.C. 2244(d)(1). The court granted a certificate of appealability (COA) on these issues: (1) Whether the proper filing of a Georgia extraordinary motion for new trial tolls the time period for filing a 28 U.S.C. 2254 petition; and if so, whether petitioner’s Georgia extraordinary motion for new trial was properly filed; and (2) If a Georgia extraordinary motion for new trial is a tolling motion under 28 U.S.C 2244(d)(2), and petitioner properly filed his extraordinary motion, whether the district court erred by dismissing his 28 U.S.C. 2254 petition as time-barred. After the court granted the COA, the state acknowledged that it had been wrong and now agrees that petitioner's petition is timely. The court agreed too and reversed and remanded. View "Westmoreland v. Warden" on Justia Law

Petitioner, convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm, appealed the district court's denial of his first and only 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion to vacate his sentence. Petitioner asserts that his sentence is illegal pursuant to Descamps v. United States and Johnson v. United States. The court held that Descamps and Johnson apply retroactively in the first post-conviction context. In this case, neither the enumerated clause nor the residual clause applies to petitioner’s prior burglary conviction, and it is therefore not a violent felony. Because petitioner only has two qualifying prior convictions under 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(1), his sentence is illegal. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for resentencing. View "Mays v. United States" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to charges related to his use of stolen identity information to add himself as an authorized user to other individuals’ pre-existing credit card accounts and open new accounts in the names of stolen identities, causing banks to create new credit cards that included him as an authorized user. The court concluded that USSG 2B1.6 does not prevent application of a section 2B1.1 production enhancement to a sentence imposed in conjunction with a 18 U.S.C. 1028A (aggravated identity theft) conviction when the underlying conduct at issue involves “production,” rather than conduct limited to “transfer, possession, or use.” The court also held that willfully causing an innocent third party to produce a fraudulent credit card qualifies as “production” under the Guidelines. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Taylor" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of charges related to his role as an international sex trafficker. The government argues that the district court erred when it refused to award restitution to a victim of defendant’s sex trafficking in Australia. The court concluded that Congress has the constitutional authority to punish sex trafficking by force, fraud, or coercion that occurs overseas. The court concluded that the William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008, 18 U.S.C.1596(a)(2), is a valid exercise of Congress’s authority under Article I of the Constitution. Furthermore, section 1596(a)(2) does not violate the due process clause. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion by issuing the supplemental jury instruction; the district court did not err when it denied defendant's motion for a judgment of acquittal; and the district court did not clearly err or abuse its discretion in calculating defendant's restitution obligations. Therefore, the court affirmed defendant's convictions and sentence, but the court vacated the order of restitution and remanded with an instruction for the district court to increase his restitution obligation. View "United States v. Baston" on Justia Law