Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Petitioner, a death-row inmate, filed a 28 U.S.C. 2254 petition, raising several challenges to his conviction and death sentence. The district court held an evidentiary hearing and found that petitioner was not intellectually disabled. The district court denied petitioner's multiple claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. However, the district court granted a certificate of appealability (COA) as to petitioner's claims of intellectual disability and ineffective trial counsel in the guilt and penalty phases. The court held that: (1) a district court is not required to apply a Flynn effect reduction to an individual’s IQ score in a death penalty case; (2) a district court should consider all of the expert medical testimony, including evidence about the Flynn effect, and make its own fact findings; and (3) a district court’s application or rejection of the Flynn effect constitutes a fact-finding subject to review only for clear error. In this case, the district court erred by not clearly discrediting petitioner's Flynn effect evidence or alternatively finding that, even applying the Flynn effect, petitioner is not intellectually disabled. The court also concluded that the district court committed no error in its consideration of the standard error of measurement. The district court also committed no clear error in finding that petitioner failed to prove that he suffered from significant deficits or impairments in adaptive functioning. Finally, the district court properly denied relief on petitioner's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, including petitioner's claim that trial counsel's primary defense - that petitioner was involuntarily intoxicated due to his early onset alcoholism - was foreclosed by Georgia law. The court affirmed the judgment. View "Ledford v. Warden, GDCP" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of charges stemming from his participation in a scheme to file fraudulent income tax returns with stolen identities. Defendant, an Arab Muslim, argues that he was denied a fair trial after Juror 9, at the start of deliberations, slipped a note to the clerk stating that she feared for her safety because “this reeks of al Qaeda.” The court concluded that the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions of aggravated identity theft; the jury instructions did not plainly amend the indictment by adding an additional means of identification to the means listed in the indictment; the district court did not abuse its discretion in responding to the note from Juror 9 where the district court did not clearly err in finding that Juror 9 could be fair and impartial; and the district court did not abuse its discretion in applying an enhancement under USSG 2B1.1(b)(2)(B) for an offense involving fifty or more victims; the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying a downward departure under USSG 3E1.1(a) for acceptance of responsibility where the district court found that defendant had not accepted responsibility; the district court did not abuse its discretion when it departed upward to a higher criminal history category; and the sentence is substantively reasonable. Accordingly, the court affirmed the convictions and sentence. View "United States v. Sammour" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to being a convicted felon in possession of a firearm that traveled interstate. The district court determined that defendant's three prior armed robbery convictions were committed on separate occasions and thus he could be sentenced under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(1). The court concluded that the charging documents, plea colloquy transcript, and paragraph 29 of the PSI do not provide “reliable and specific evidence” reflecting three violent felonies that defendant “committed on occasions different from one another.” Because the documents are vague as to which offense(s) they relate, even when taken collectively they do not satisfy the Government’s evidentiary obligations. Therefore, the burden of showing that defendant is an armed career criminal is not met and the district court erroneously applied the 15-year ACCA sentencing enhancement. The court vacated and remanded for resentencing. View "United States v. McCloud" on Justia Law

Petitioner, convicted of illegally possessing and making guns, appealed the district court's denial of his motion to vacate under 28 U.S.C. 2255. A pretrial intervention officer observed a bolt-action rifle in petitioner's bedroom. Based on that information, the police obtained a search warrant for the house where they found thirteen guns. The court concluded that the warrantless search of petitioner’s house was reasonable because the pretrial intervention officer had reasonable suspicion, because the supervision permitted by the pretrial intervention agreement gave petitioner a diminished expectation of privacy, and because the state has strong interests in the effectiveness of its pretrial intervention program. Accordingly, the court affirmed the denial of petitioner's motion without an evidentiary hearing. View "Castillo v. United States" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to illegal reentry after deportation and subseuqently appealed his sentence of 120 months in prison. The district court determined that a sentence within the guideline range would not adequately reflect defendant's criminal history and would not provide adequate deterrence or promote sufficient respect for the law. The court concluded that the district court's sentence is substantively reasonable where the district court considered the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors, including the fact that defendant engaged in a life of crime, with a staggering 20 convictions. The district court reasonably concluded that defendant's guideline range understated his criminal history, and defendant's repeated acts of violence against women and law-enforcement officers and his return trips to jail also support the conclusion that a lengthy sentence was necessary to promote deterrence and respect for the law. Accordingly, the court affirmed the sentence. View "United States v. Osorio-Moreno" on Justia Law

The court vacated its order on January 20, 2016, and replaced it with this order. Petitioner filed a pro se application for authorization to file a second or successive 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his federal sentence. Petitioner's application relies in part on the Supreme Court's decision in Johnson v. United States. The court recently granted certiorari in Welch v. United States. The court recognizes that it will likely take the Supreme Court longer than 30 days from now to decide Welch. The court joined its sister circuits and held that this 30-day timeframe is not mandatory in all circumstances. Therefore, the court held petitioner's application in abeyance, pending the Supreme Court's decision in Welch. View "In re: Anthony Johnson" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of videotaping his teenage stepdaughter performing her daily bathroom routine, without her knowing it, over a period of five months. On appeal, defendant challenged his convictions and sentences for one count of production or attempted production of child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. 2251(a) and one count of possession of child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. 2252(a)(4)(B). The court joined the Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits and held that a lascivious exhibition may be created by an individual who surreptitiously videos or photographs a minor and later captures or edits a depiction, even when the original depiction is one of an innocent child acting innocently. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, a reasonable jury could have found that defendant’s conduct - including placement of the cameras in the bathroom where his stepdaughter was most likely to be videoed while nude, his extensive focus on videoing and capturing images of her pubic area, the angle of the camera set up, and his editing of the videos at issue - was sufficient to create a lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area. Accordingly, the court affirmed the conviction. View "United States v. Holmes" on Justia Law

Petitioner pleaded guilty to the crime of lewd or lascivious molestation of a victim who was less than 12 years old. At issue is whether a petition for a belated direct appeal, under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.141(c), qualifies as an “application for State . . . collateral review,” 28 U.S.C. 2244(d)(2), that, while pending, tolls the period of limitation for a Florida prisoner’s federal petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The court answered the question in the negative, relying on its recent decision in Espinosa v. Secretary, Department of Corrections. In Espinosa, the court held that a petition for belated postconviction appeal under Rule 9.141(c) does not “involve ‘collateral review’ of [a] conviction” for the purpose of tolling the same statute of limitation. In this case, the petition does not qualify as an application for state collateral review. Accordingly, the court dismissed the petition as untimely. View "Danny v. Secretary, FL Dept. of Corr." on Justia Law

Petitioner, a Florida prisoner, appealed the district court's dismissal of his 28 U.S.C. 2254 habeas corpus petition as second or successive under 28 U.S.C. 2244(b). The court concluded that, under the court's prior decision in Insignares v. Secretary, petitioner's section 2254 petition is not second or successive within the meaning of section 2244(b). The court concluded that, as in Insignares, the state trial court’s grant of petitioner’s Rule 3.800 motion and its vacatur of the punishment of chemical castration from the original sentence constituted a resentencing that resulted in a new judgment, even though petitioner’s total custodial term (life in prison) remained the same, and even though the current habeas corpus petition challenges only the underlying convictions. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Patterson v. Secretary, FL Dept. of Corr." on Justia Law

Petitioner, convicted of murder and robbery, moved the court to recall its 2014 mandate denying his petition for habeas corpus relief and to reconsider his original habeas petition after the full Court issues an en banc decision in a different, although currently pending case, Wilson v. Warden, Georgia Diagnostic Prison. The court concluded that it was foreclosed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), 28 U.S.C. 2244(b), and Supreme Court precedent from recalling the mandate denying habeas relief; even if the court were not foreclosed and examined the merits of his motion, the court would still deny it because, regardless of how Wilson is decided, petitioner’s claim is without merit; and, even if the court could recall the mandate, the court's respect for the State of Georgia’s interest in the finality of its criminal judgments would strongly counsel against doing so. Further, the court denied petitioner's motion to stay his execution because, regardless of how Wilson is decided, petitioner has not shown a substantial likelihood that he will prevail on the merits of his underlying claim View "Jones v. GDCP Warden" on Justia Law