Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Petitioner filed two applications seeking an order authorizing the district court to consider a second or successive motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his federal sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2255(h) and 2244(b)(3)(A). Relying on Johnson v. United States, petitioner argued that his prior Florida convictions for burglary, robbery, and armed robbery no longer qualify as violent felonies. The court concluded that petitioner has made a prima facie case that he falls within the scope of the new substantive rule announced in Johnson. In this case, petitioner's two Florida robbery-with-a-firearm convictions (which count as one predicate conviction because they were not committed on occasions different from one another) and his separate armed robbery conviction qualify as violent felonies under the court's binding precedent. However, it is not clear which of petitioner's other felony convictions were used by the district court as the third Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. 924(e), predicate offense and why. It is also not clear whether the district court relied on the residual clause or the other ACCA clauses not implicated by Johnson. Accordingly, the court granted the application. View "In re: Jasper Moore" on Justia Law

Petitioner filed an application seeking an order authorizing the district court to consider a second or successive motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his federal sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2255(h) and 2244(b)(3)(A). The court concluded that it is not enough for a federal prisoner to simply identify Johnson v. United States as the basis for the claim or claims he seeks to raise in a second or successive section 2255 motion, as he also must show that he falls within the scope of the new substantive rule announced in Johnson. In this case, defendant has not made a prima facie showing for relief under Johnson as to his conviction under 18 U.S.C. 924(c) because his section 924(c) conviction was based on his companion conviction for bank robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 2113(a), which requires that the defendant take the property of a bank “by force and violence, or by intimidation.” The court agreed with the Fourth Circuit and held that a bank robbery conviction under section 2113(a) by force and violence or by intimidation qualifies as a crime of violence under the section 924(c)(3)(A) use-of-force clause. Similarly, defendant has not made a showing that he is entitled to relief on his career-offender enhancement following Johnson. The court rejected defendant's remaining claims and denied the application for leave to file a second or successive motion. View "In Re: James Howard Sams" on Justia Law

Defendant, the Chief Clerk of the Probate Court of Chatham County, plead guilty to one count of mail fraud and the district court sentenced her to 72 months in prison. Defendant had access to bank accounts controlled by the probate court and wrote herself $767,218.99 in checks drawn from conservatorship accounts belonging to 31 minors, 2 incapacitated adults, and 2 estates. As the chief clerk of a probate court, defendant knew or should have known that in Georgia, conservators are appointed to protect the assets of those who lack the capacity to do so themselves. Therefore, the court concluded that the district court did not err in applying the vulnerable victim enhancement pursuant to USSG 3A1.1(b)(1) because defendant knew or should have known that the victims of her scheme were vulnerable. Accordingly, the court affirmed the sentence. View "United States v. Birge" on Justia Law

Petitioner filed an application seeking an order authorizing the district court to consider a 28 U.S.C. 2255 second or successive motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his federal sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2255(h) and 2244(b)(3)(A). Petitioner claims that the district court improperly sentenced him, in 1995, as a career offender under the then-mandatory Sentencing Guidelines, using the residual clause of U.S.S.G. 4B1.2. He argues that because the residual clauses in section 4B1.2 and the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) are “identical,” Johnson v. United States also invalidated the Guidelines clause. The court concluded that petitioner's argument is foreclosed by the court's post-Johnson decisions in United States v. Matchett and In re Griffin. Because petitioner has failed to make a prima facie showing of the existence of either the grounds set forth in section 2255(h), the court denied the application. The court agreed that if the Supreme Court holds in Beckles v. United States that the section 4B1.2(a)(2) residual clause is unconstitutional, that decision will establish “a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable.” If that happens, petitioner will be able to file a new application seeking certification to file a second or successive section 2255 motion based not on Johnson but on Beckles. View "In Re: Wayne Anderson" on Justia Law

Petitioner filed an application seeking an order authorizing the district court to consider a second or successive motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his federal sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2255(h) and 2244(b)(3)(A). Petitioner argued that Johnson v. United States invalidates his conviction for knowingly using a firearm in furtherance of an assault with intent to rob a postal employee, 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A). The court concluded, however, that Johnson invalidated the residual clause of section 924(e), but the decision did not address the validity of the definition of a crime of violence found in section 924(c). Nor has the court held that Johnson affects section 924(c)(3)(B). Even if the court were to extrapolate from Johnson that section 924(c)(3)(B) is also unconstitutional, it would not help petitioner because his conviction would be valid even if Johnson renders the definition of “crime of violence” in section 924(c)(3)(B) unconstitutional. Accordingly, the court denied the application because petitioner has failed to make a prima facie showing that he is entitled to relief. View "In Re: Sheldon Dean Christopher Watt" on Justia Law

Petitioner filed an application seeking an order authorizing the district court to consider a second or successive motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his federal sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2255(h) and 2244(b)(3)(A). The court concluded that, to the extent petitioner relies on Johnson v. United States to invalidate his sentence under the Guidelines, his claim fails because the court has held that Johnson does not apply to the Guidelines for the purpose of obtaining permission to file a second or successive motion. Even if the court were to assume that the new substantive rule announced in Johnson also applies to the residual clause of section 4B1.2(a)(2) of the Guidelines, petitioner would not be entitled to relief because petitioner's sentencing enhancement would be valid regardless. Accordingly, the court denied the application because petitioner failed to make a prima facie showing that he is entitled to relief. View "In Re: Burgest" on Justia Law

Petitioner seeks to file a second or successive 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion based on Johnson v. United States. Petitioner claims his conviction for using a firearm during a crime of violence, 18 U.S.C. 924(c), is invalid because it arose under that section's residual clause, which is similar to the residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. 924(e). Petitioner also asserts that his advisory Guidelines sentence violates Johnson because it was enhanced pursuant to the residual clause of the career offender provision of the Guidelines. The court concluded that In re Hines forecloses petitioner's section 924(c) claim, and United States v. Matchett forecloses petitioner's Guidelines-based claim. The court noted that the Supreme Court recently granted certiorari in Beckles v. United States, which raises the question of whether Johnson applies to the Guidelines. The court denied the application. View "In Re: William Hunt" on Justia Law

Petitioner filed an application seeking an order authorizing the district court to consider a second or successive motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his federal sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2255(h) and 2244(b)(3)(A). Petitioner challenged his convictions under 18 U.S.C. 924(c) and 924(o) for using a firearm during a drug trafficking crime and conspiracy to possess a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime. Where the court has already denied an application for leave to file a second or successive motion under section 2255 on the merits, the court is required by statute and its caselaw to reject a subsequent application raising the same claim. In this case, petitioner's application does no more than restate his previous claim and argue that the court's order rejecting that claim was erroneous. Therefore, the court denied the application. View "In re: Gary Baptiste" on Justia Law

Petitioner appealed the denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus seeking to vacate, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2254, his Florida conviction and sentence for armed robbery with a firearm. The state court applied Strickland v. Washington and concluded that petitioner's attorney did not render ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to move the trial court to suppress an eye-witness identification on the ground that it was obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The court concluded that counsel's performance was not deficient and the state court's decision was not an unreasonable application of Supreme Court law. Accordingly, the court affirmed the denial of the petition. View "Marshall v. Secretary, FL DOC" on Justia Law

Defendants were convicted of several counts, including multiple counts of wire fraud and money laundering. At issue is whether the district court abused its discretion when it refused to give defendants' proposed jury instruction that the jurors could convict only if they found that defendants had schemed to lie about the quality or price of the goods sold to the victims. The court interpreted 18 U.S.C. 1343 de novo and concluded that it requires the jury to make just such a finding before convicting a defendant of wire fraud. Thus, the proposed instruction was a correct statement of the law, and the district court abused its discretion by refusing to give that instruction. The court reversed on all counts where the error was not harmless, except for Counts 21 and 38, and remanded for further proceedings. View "United States v. Takhalov" on Justia Law