Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Petitioner filed an application seeking an order authorizing the district court to consider a second or successive motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his federal sentence, 28 U.S.C. 2255. Petitioner argued that his claim is based on the rule announced in Johnson v. United States and made retroactive in Welch v. United States. Specifically, petitioner argued that his sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. 924(e), is invalid under Johnson because the sentence arose under the residual clause. The court's decision in In re Rogers held that when the record does not make clear that the sentencing court relied solely on the ACCA’s still-valid provisions to classify each predicate offense and binding precedent does not otherwise demonstrate that only valid ACCA clauses are implicated, the court applies Descamps v. United States. In this case, petitioner was sentenced under the ACCA based on two 1982 Florida convictions for aggravated assault and a 1983 Florida conviction for burglary of a dwelling. Under Rogers, petitioner has shown that his burglary conviction may be a residual-clause predicate. Because petitioner has made a prima facie showing that he has raised a claim that meets the statutory criteria set forth in section 2255, the court granted his application for leave to file a second or successive section 2255 motion. View "In re: Leslie A. Parker" on Justia Law

Petitioner filed an application seeking an order authorizing the district court to consider a second or successive motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his federal sentence, 28 U.S.C. 2255. Petitioner argues, pursuant to Johnson v. United States, that the mandatory career offender enhancement applied to his sentence, imposed in January 2003, is unconstitutional. In In re Griffin, the court held that its reasoning in United States v. Matchett applied with equal force to the residual clause of the career-offender guideline in the context of the mandatory Guidelines. While the court respectfully disagreed with the holding of Griffin, the court nonetheless was bound by that decision. Consequently, petitioner has not satisfied the statutory criteria for filing a successive section 2255 motion. First, even though the Supreme Court has held in Welch v. United States that Johnson applies retroactively to cases on collateral review, the court's binding precedent holds that Welch does not make Johnson retroactive for purposes of filing a successive section 2255 motion raising a Johnson-based challenge to the Sentencing Guidelines. Furthermore, petitioner cannot make a prima facie showing that Johnson applies to him in light of the court's holding in Griffin that the mandatory Sentencing Guidelines cannot be unconstitutionally vague. Because petitioner has failed to make a prima facie showing of the existence of either of the grounds set forth in section 2255(h), the court denied his application for leave to file a second or successive motion. View "In re: Leonard Sapp" on Justia Law

Petitioner filed two applications seeking an order authorizing the district court to consider a second or successive motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his federal sentence, 28 U.S.C. 2255. Specifically, petitioner asserts that his 60-month consecutive sentence for using and carrying a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 924(c), must be set aside in light of Johnson v. United States and Welch v. United States. The court concluded that petitioner's section 924(c) sentence would be valid even if Johnson makes the section 924(c)(3)(B) residual clause unconstitutional. The court held that a companion Hobbs Act robbery conviction, such as petitioner's, qualifies as a crime of violence under the use-of-force clause in section 924(c)(3)(A) without regard to the section 924(c)(3)(B) residual clause. Because petitioner failed to make a prima facie showing that his proposed claim meets the statutory criteria, the court denied his applications for leave to file a second or successive motion. View "In re: Darren Demeatrie Gordon" on Justia Law

Petitioner, convicted of first degree murder and other crimes, appealed the denial of his petition for habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. 2254. The district court found sua sponte that petitioner was procedurally barred from bringing this Sixth Amendment confrontation clause claim because he had not exhausted available state court remedies. The court concluded that the state expressly waived exhaustion where the state was aware of the exhaustion arguments and communicated to the court its intention not to pursue them. Further, in considering the exhaustion issue sua sponte, the district court did not point to any “important federal interest” or Thompson factors that required a rejection of the state’s waiver. Accordingly, the court concluded that the district court erred in rejecting the state's express waiver and dismissing the petition. The court vacated and remanded for further proceedings. View "Vazquez v. Secretary, FL DOC" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his 18-month sentence and life term of supervised release, imposed for violating the terms of supervised release that were part of his sentence for failing to register as a sex offender. In this case, defendant chose to violate the terms of supervised release in order to live with and take care of his wife's four minor children. The court concluded that, given the totality of the circumstances, considered in light of the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors, the life term of supervised release was not unreasonable. Because defendant has failed to demonstrate that the district court abused its discretion when it imposed a life term of supervised release, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Trailer" on Justia Law

Petitioner, convicted of two counts of first degree murder and sentenced to death, appealed the denial of his petition for habeas relief. Petitioner argued that (1) the state violated petitioner’s due process rights by knowingly presenting false evidence at his sentencing proceeding; (2) the state violated the Due Process Clause and the Eighth Amendment by presenting differing theories about his culpability at his sentencing proceeding and at his co-defendant’s trial; (3) trial counsel provided unconstitutionally ineffective assistance by opening the door to the admission of the co-defendant’s tape-recorded confession; and (4) trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by inadequately preparing a mental health expert who testified in mitigation at petitioner's penalty phase trial. The court concluded that the Florida Supreme Court’s determination that petitioner had to show that the state knowingly presented false evidence was fully consonant with Supreme Court precedent; the Florida Supreme Court acted reasonably in rejecting petitioner's inconsistent-theories claim; and the court rejected the ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims. The court concluded that the Florida Supreme Court’s denials of petitioner's claims were neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, nor were they based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Raleigh v. Secretary, FL DOC" on Justia Law

Petitioner, convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm, seeks to invalidate his sentence on the ground that he no longer qualifies for a mandatory sentencing enhancement. Petitioner filed his petition under 28 U.S.C. 2241, seeking to obtain the benefit of revised New York sentencing laws, enacted in 2004 and 2009, which had the effect of retroactively lowering the penalties for certain drug offenders. See the Drug Law Reform Act of 2004, 2004 N.Y. Laws ch. 738, and the 2009 Drug Law Reform Act , N.Y. Crim. Proc. 440.46. The district court determined that petitioner lacked jurisdiction to hear the claim. The court affirmed the judgment of the district court because petitioner admits that he is not eligible for resentencing under the revised New York sentencing laws. View "Cortes-Morales v. Hastings" on Justia Law

Petitioner filed two applications seeking an order authorizing the district court to consider a second or successive motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his federal sentence under 28 U.S.C. 2255, citing Johnson v. United States and Welch v. United States. Petitioner argued that his conviction for aiding and abetting a Hobbs Act robbery no longer qualifies as a crime of violence because of Johnson, and thus, his 18 U.S.C. 924(c) sentence cannot stand. The court held that petitioner's companion conviction for aiding and abetting a Hobbs Act robbery, which was charged in the same indictment as, and makes up the basis for, petitioner's section 924(c) count, clearly qualifies as a crime of violence under the use-of-force clause in section 924(c)(3)(A). Therefore, petitioner's section 924(c) sentence would be valid even if Johnson makes the section 924(c)(3)(B) residual clause unconstitutional. Because petitioner has not made a prima facie showing that his proposed Johnson residual-clause claim meets the statutory criteria, the court denied this applications. View "In Re: Edgar Colon, Jr." on Justia Law

Petitioner filed an application seeking an order authorizing the district court to consider a second or successive motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his federal sentence, 28 U.S.C. 2255, citing Johnson v. United States and Welch v. United States. In this case, petitioner was convicted by a jury in 2008 of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute five or more kilograms of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A)(ii) (Count 1); possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug-trafficking crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 924(c) and 2 (Count 2); and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1) and 924(e)(1) (Count 3). Defendant was sentenced as a career offender based on a 1989 conviction on three counts of armed robbery with a deadly weapon and a 2004 Florida conviction for aggravated assault. The court concluded that, to the extent petitioner relies on Johnson to invalidate his mandatory life sentence for Count 1 under 18 U.S.C. 3559(c), his claim fails because the record shows he was not sentenced under section 3559(c); to the extent petitioner relies on Johnson to invalidate his sentence enhancement under the career-offender guidelines, his claim also fails; and, as for his claim that his enhanced sentence on his conviction for Count 3 is invalid in light of Johnson, petitioner has made a prima facie showing that he meets the statutory criteria, but the court nevertheless denied his application. Because petitioner has not demonstrated that he will benefit from Johnson, the court denied his applications for leave to file a second or successive section 2255 motion. View "In Re: Dennis Williams" on Justia Law

Petitioner filed a pro se application for permission to file a second or successive 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion based on Johnson v. United States. Because binding precedent does not dictate that petitioner has three Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. 924(e), predicates despite Johnson, the court concluded that petitioner has made a prima facie showing that his application contains a Johnson claim. The court also concluded that the fact that petitioner's motion will be filed after the one-year deadline does not require the court to deny him permission to file the motion. The court concluded that whether a section 2255 motion will be timely is not relevant to whether the applicant can obtain permission to bring a second or successive section 2255 motion, in cases where the parties have not had fair notice and an opportunity to present their positions on the limitations bar. Neither the government nor petitioner has presented a position about a limitations defense in this case. Accordingly, the court granted the application to file a new section 2255 motion and leave questions about the timeliness of that motion to the district court to decide in the first instance. View "In re: Steven Jackson" on Justia Law