Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant appealed the district court's denial of his motion to reduce his sentence under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2), based on Amendment 782 of the Sentencing Guidelines. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying defendant's section 3582(c)(2) motion because it complied with the two-part procedure for analyzing defendant's section 3582(c)(2) motion by determining that he was eligible for a sentence reduction, but the reduction was not warranted based on its analysis of the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors. The court declined to reassign defendant's case to a different district court judge because there is no need for a remand and reassignment is unnecessary to preserve the appearance of justice and would require undue duplication of effort. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Frazier" on Justia Law

Petitioner appealed the dismissal of his 28 U.S.C. 2254 federal habeas petition because it was time-barred. The district court concluded that the state habeas proceedings became complete once the Georgia Supreme Court denied petitioner's application for a certificate of probable cause and the period for seeking reconsideration of that denial lapsed under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), 28 U.S.C. 2244(d)(2). The court held that, for purposes of section 2244(d)(2), when the Georgia Supreme Court denies a state habeas petitioner’s application for a certificate of probable cause, the petitioner’s proceedings remain “pending” until the court issues the remittitur for the denial. Applying this holding to petitioner, his section 2254 petition was timely. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Dolphy v. Warden, Central State Prison" on Justia Law

After defendant admitted to violating his conditions of supervised release, the district court sentenced defendant to the statutory maximum sentence of 60 months in prison. The court held that 18 U.S.C. 3553(c)(2) applied to defendant's sentencing hearing and reviewed the claim de novo under the general United States v. Vandergrift rule. The court held that the district court failed to comply with section 3553(c)(2) because the district court failed to give sufficiently specific reasons for his non-guideline sentence. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded for resentencing. View "United States v. Parks" on Justia Law

Petitioner, an Alabama death row inmate, challenged the denial of his 28 U.S.C. 2254 petition for habeas relief. The district court granted petitioner a certificate of appealability (COA) on whether trial counsel was ineffective during petitioner's trial at both the penalty and guilt phase. The court concluded that petitioner's second amended Rule 32 petition pleaded more than sufficient specific facts about trial counsel’s acts and omissions to show their penalty phase investigation “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” Here, trial counsel’s failure to conduct any timely and meaningful mitigation interviews with petitioner and his family was objectively unreasonable under the circumstances of this case.The court vacated the district court's order denying petitioner's penalty phase ineffective assistance of counsel claim and its order denying discovery and an evidentiary hearing on this claim; the court affirmed the district court's denial of habeas relief on petitioner's guilt phase ineffective assistance of counsel claim; and remanded. View "Daniel v. Commissioner, AL DOC" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to one count of conspiring to distribute cocaine while on board a vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, in violation of the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act (MDLEA), 46 U.S.C. 70503(a)(1), 70506(b). The court rejected the government's contention that it should review only for plain error where the district court’s subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law that the court reviews de novo even when it is raised for the first time on appeal. In this case, the district court did not expressly make any factual findings with respect to its jurisdiction. In the plea agreement, defendant does not admit to facts that give rise to jurisdiction. The agreement does not state, for example, that defendant and his coconspirators failed to “make a claim of nationality” upon request when United States officials apprehended them. Instead, it asserts that defendant was on a vessel subject to the United States’ jurisdiction. The court concluded that a limited remand is the proper course of action in this case. Therefore, the court remanded the case to the district court for the limited purpose of determining whether subject matter jurisdiction exists. View "United States v. Gonzalez Iguaran" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of attempting to persuade, induce, entice, or coerce a minor into engaging in prostitution or unlawful sex, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 2422(b). Defendant's conviction stemmed from his response to a posting on an internet site frequented by prostitutes and their clients. Law enforcement, posing as a fifteen-year-old girl, offered to have sex with defendant for money and defendant accepted, arranged to meet, and was arrested after arriving at the meeting spot. The court concluded that there was sufficient evidence to convict defendant. The court held that, where an underage prostitute holds herself out as willing to engage in sex for money, the offer to pay that money qualifies as sufficient inducement under section 2422(b). The court also concluded that defendant is not entitled to relief based on the district court’s refusal to deliver a confusing and erroneous jury instruction requested by defendant or in its exclusion of particular evidence. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Rutgerson" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a Florida prisoner serving a life sentence for second degree murder among other things, was granted federal habeas relief on the ground that appellate counsel had rendered ineffective assistance by failing to anticipate the Florida Supreme Court’s decision on a jury instruction issue and raise it before the Third District Court of Appeal. The court concluded, however, that the district court failed to apply the double deference standard mandated by 28 U.S.C. 2254 and Strickland v. Washington, and the district court should have evaluated the reasonableness of the state habeas court’s denial of petitioner's ineffective assistance claim. Instead, the district court bypassed that test and went straight to the reasonableness of appellate counsel’s actions. The district court’s error in disregarding the requirements of section 2254(d)(1) led it to skip the dispositive question of whether there was any “clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court,” holding that appellate counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to preserve an issue that was percolating in the courts at the time. The court found that no holding of the Supreme Court clearly establishes that in order to perform within the “wide range of reasonable professional assistance,” counsel must accurately predict how the law will turn out or hedge every bet in the hope of a favorable development. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's grant of habeas relief. View "Rambaran v. Secretary, Dep't of Corr." on Justia Law

Petitioner, a state prisoner and a serial litigator in federal courts, appealed the denial of his petition to proceed in forma pauperis because it concluded that he had six strikes under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 28 U.S.C. 1915(g). Two of petitioner’s earlier filings were dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, and the other four were dismissed for want of prosecution. In three of the four dismissals for want of prosecution, a judge of this Court determined that petitioner could not proceed in forma pauperis because his filings were frivolous. But a single circuit judge cannot dismiss an action or appeal. Instead, panels of this Court dismissed petitioner’s filings because he failed to pay the filing fee. The court concluded that, although petitioner is a serial litigant who has clogged the federal courts with frivolous litigation, the court must follow the text of the Act, which does not classify his six prior dismissals for lack of jurisdiction and want of prosecution as strikes. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded for further proceedings. View "Daker v. Commissioner, GA Dep't of Corr." on Justia Law

Garrity v. New Jersey held that a public employee may not be coerced into surrendering his Fifth Amendment privilege by threat of being fired or subjected to other sanctions. The principle issue on appeal is one of first impression: whether a state employee can, after he has been fired, waive his Garrity rights and allow his prior compelled and protected statements to be used by the federal government in a criminal investigation. The court concluded that Garrity rights may be waived in such circumstances, as long as the employee’s waiver is voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. Because defendant voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived his Garrity rights when he spoke to agents of the FBI following his termination by the Alabama Department of Corrections, the court held that the government did not violate the Fifth Amendment when it used his prior statements in a federal criminal investigation concerning the beating and death of an inmate. Accordingly, the court affirmed defendant's convictions for violating civil rights, making false statements, obstructing justice, and conspiring to obstruct justice. View "United States v. Smith" on Justia Law

Petitioner Artez Hammonds was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death. Relevant to this appeal, petitioner invoked his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination during the guilt phase of his trial and elected not to testify. The court certified the following questions to the Alabama Supreme Court: 1) Whether corrected page 228 of the trial transcript in Artez Hammonds’s trial for the capital murder of Marilyn Mitchell, attached hereto as Appendix A, was part of “the record that was before the [Alabama Supreme Court]” when it “adjudicated [Artez Hammonds’s claim that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a mistrial following the prosecutor’s reference to his decision not to testify] on the merits.” 2) If so, whether page 228 of the original trial transcript or corrected page 228 constitutes the official transcript of Hammonds’s trial. View "Hammonds v. Commissioner, AL DOC" on Justia Law