Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Petitioner, a state prisoner convicted of murder and sentenced to death, seeks a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2254 based on the ineffective assistance of counsel during the penalty phase of his trial, the sentencing court's failure to consider mitigating evidence, and the State's violation of his due process rights by suppressing material impeachment evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland. The district court denied relief and the court affirmed. The court concluded that, although petitioner's ineffective assistance of counsel claim is not procedurally barred, it fails on the merits because counsel's performance was not unreasonable where, among other things, counsel reasonably determined that the mitigating evidence could cut both ways and thus could have harmed his client as much as it could have helped him. Furthermore, petitioner is unable to establish prejudice. The court rejected petitioner's argument that the sentencing judge erred by failing to consider mitigating evidence because the sentencing document made no express reference to the reports counsel had submitted detailing petitioner's childhood and addiction issues. Addressing petitioner's Brady claim on the merits, the court found that, in the absence of evidence, the prosecution did not suppress any Brady material. Finally, petitioner is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his Brady claim. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Clark v. Attorney General, State of FL" on Justia Law

Defendant was found guilty of three counts of producing child pornography and one count of committing those crimes while under obligation to register as a sex offender. On appeal, defendant challenged his conviction and his sentence on the three counts of producing child pornography. The court concluded that the district court did not err by refusing to give one of defendant's proposed jury instructions where the government was not required to prove that making explicit photographs was defendant’s sole or primary purpose for enticing the minor to engage in sexually explicit conduct because it was enough to show that it was “a purpose” for doing so; the 25-year statutory mandatory minimum in 18 U.S.C. 2251 applies to any defendant with a prior conviction relating to “abusive sexual contact involving a minor or ward,” as well as to any defendant with a prior conviction relating to “aggravated sexual abuse” or “sexual abuse,” whether or not that conviction involved a minor; and the district court did not err in enhancing defendant's sentence under section 2251(e) based on defendant's prior conviction for sexual battery because it clearly relates to "sexual abuse" as that term is generally understood. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Miller" on Justia Law

Defendants Barron-Soto and Hernandez appealed convictions stemming from their involvement in a conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine. The court concluded that the evidence obtained from the execution of the search warrants was admissible under the independent source exception to the exclusionary rule. Therefore, notwithstanding the Supreme Court's decision in Riley v. California, the court affirmed the district court’s order denying Hernandez and Barron-Soto’s motions to suppress. The court also concluded that Hernandez has not shown that the district court abused its discretion admitting evidence of his prior charge or determining that the probative value of the evidence outweighed the risk of undue prejudice. Finally, the evidence was sufficient to convict Hernandez of knowingly joining a conspiracy to possess methamphetamine with the intent to distribute. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Barron-Soto" on Justia Law

Petitioner was convicted of forcing women into prostitution and sentenced to life in prison. On remand, a different judge sentenced petitioner to 35 months of imprisonment. Three years after the trial, the United States disclosed that the judge who presided over petitioner's trial and sentenced him to life in prison, Jack Camp, had bipolar disorder and had suffered a brain injury. The investigation also disclosed allegations of racial bias. The court concluded that petitioner sufficiently alleged that Camp was actually biased against him where he proffered evidence that Camp had a difficult time adjudicating African-American men's cases and specifically disliked petitioner based on the fact that petitioner was a black man who pimped white women. Petitioner also alleged that Camp wanted to give all black offenders who pimped white women the maximum possible penalty, and Camp gave petitioner the maximum penalty. The government concedes that denial of an impartial judge is structural error that demands reversal. The court concluded that the district court must allow petitioner on remand an evidentiary hearing to prove that Camp was actually biased against him. The court concluded, however, that the district court correctly denied petitioner's claim that Camp was mentally incompetent without an evidentiary hearing. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. View "Norris v. United States" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine and conspiracy to commit money laundering. At issue on appeal is a question of first impression: whether a criminal defendant must show good cause to dismiss retained counsel if the defendant intends to seek appointed counsel. The district court denied defendant's motion to withdraw counsel in this case based on the ground that defendant had been afforded effective assistance of counsel by his retained counsel. The court vacated, concluding that a criminal defendant need not show good cause to dismiss retained counsel. Therefore, the district court denied the motion by applying the wrong standard. The court remanded for further proceedings. View "United States v. Jiminez-Antunez" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to one count of illegally receiving a firearm while under indictment for robbery by intimidation, and then appealed the district court's application of a four-level enhancement under USSG 2K2.1(b)(4)(B) for his possession of a firearm that “had an altered or obliterated serial number.” When defendant was arrested, the serial number on the gun’s frame was intact, while the serial number on its slide had been altered or obliterated. The court held that the section 2K2.1(b)(4)(B) enhancement applies either when any serial number on a gun has been altered or obliterated or when just one serial number has been altered or obliterated. Because the text of section 2K2.1(b)(4)(B) is not ambiguous, the court need not resort to an in pari materia reading. Finally, the fact that the number was not required by federal regulations is irrelevant. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Warren" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction and sentence for ten counts of making false, fictitious, or fraudulent claims on his tax returns and one count of corruptly interfering with the administration of internal revenue laws. The court concluded that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's verdict. The court also concluded that the court lacked jurisdiction to review the district court's denial of defendant's downward departure request; defendant has not demonstrated that his sentence was procedurally or substantively unreasonable; the district court more than adequately explained its sentence and did not abuse its discretion in declining to grant a downward variance; and defendant's sentence was within the advisory guidelines range. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Croteau" on Justia Law

Defendants Jeffrey Green and Karen Hebble were each convicted of one count of conspiracy to distribute controlled substances, in violation of 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C), and 846; and one count of conspiracy to commit money laundering, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1956(h). As objects of the latter conspiracy, Green and Hebble together were convicted of two counts of money laundering and Green was separately convicted of four additional counts of money laundering, all in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1957 and 2. Defendants' convictions stemmed from their involvement in the illegal sale of oxycodone. The court concluded that the evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of the charges. The court also concluded that Hebble has failed to show that the district court abused its discretion in denying her severance motion. The court rejected Hebble's argument that had she and Green been tried separately, Green would have testified at her trial and would have exonerated her. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Green" on Justia Law

Defendant, convicted of knowingly accessing with intent to view child pornography, challenged the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence discovered on an HP desktop computer in his home. The court concluded that defendant's then-wife, Caroline Olausen, had authority to consent to the forensic search of the shared HP computer in her home, and thus there was no Fourth Amendment violation when the detective conducted the OS Triage forensic scan based on Olausen’s consent; even assuming arguendo that Georgia v. Randolph applied to the search, there was no Fourth Amendment violation because the officers stopped their search when defendant seemed to object; and the only information the detective relied on in obtaining the search warrant was data collected prior to defendant’s objection. Therefore, the court held that all of the fruits of the search following the issuance of the warrant were admissible. Furthermore, law enforcement would have sought the search warrant even without the fruits of the allegedly illegal forensic search, and the evidence ultimately obtained pursuant to the warrant was admissible under the independent source doctrine. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Thomas" on Justia Law

Petitioner, serving 3 concurrent 188-month sentences, appealed the district court's dismissal of his 28 U.S.C. 2241 petition brought pursuant to the 28 U.S.C. 2255(e) savings clause. At issue is the fourth prong of the jurisdictional test announced in Bryant v. Warden, FCC Coleman - Medium, which requires a petitioner to establish that his current detention exceeds the statutory maximum authorized by Congress. The court held that, in order to meet Bryant’s fourth prong, a section 2241 petitioner serving multiple concurrent sentences must demonstrate that his overall sentence exceeds the allowable statutory maximum for each of the counts of conviction. In other words, the petitioner must show that, as a result of sentencing error, he will be in prison-custody or detention for longer than any of his statutes of conviction authorize. In this case, petitioner cannot “open a portal” to the section 2255(e) savings clause because his 188-month sentence on his firearm offense, even if now illegal, is equivalent to and wholly concurrent with his 188-month drug sentences that are not illegal. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Brown v. Warden, FCC Coleman - Low" on Justia Law