Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

The Eleventh Circuit denied J.W. Ledford, Jr.'s motion for an emergency stay of execution, holding that Ledford's 42 U.S.C. 1983 complaint challenging Georgia's method of execution was time-barred. The court further held that, even if the claims were not time-barred, Ledford's allegations and supporting documents did not establish a substantial risk of serious harm, much less a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of his claims; Ledford has not alleged sufficient facts to render it plausible that a firing squad was a feasible and readily implemented method of execution in Georgia that would significantly reduce a substantial risk of severe pain; and, under all the particular facts and circumstances of this case, Ledford failed to show that he has met the equitable requirements for a stay of execution. View "Ledford, Jr. v. Commissioner, GA Department of Corrections" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's determination that granting Anthony Boyd leave to amend his complaint would be futile, and affirmed the dismissal of his suit alleging an Eighth Amendment violation regarding Alabama's new lethal injection protocol. Instead of identifying an alternative method of lethal injection that would be feasible, readily implemented, and substantially less risky than the midazolam protocol or opting for death by electrocution, Boyd alleged that Alabama should execute him by hanging or firing squad. The Eleventh Circuit held that Boyd has not come close to pleading sufficient facts to render it plausible that hanging and firing squad are feasible, readily implemented methods of execution for Alabama that would significantly reduce a substantial risk of severe pain. Alabama is under no constitutional obligation to experiment with execution by hanging or firing squad. Finally, Body's remaining claims were filed well beyond the two-year statute of limitations governing section 1983 claims in Alabama. View "Boyd v. Warden, Holman Correctional Facility" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the grant of summary judgment to defendants in a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging inadequate medical care while plaintiff was in jail. Plaintiff was diagnosed with meningitis while he was a pretrial detainee in the jail and subsequently suffered multiple strokes resulting in permanent injuries. In this case, all of the health care providers acted within the course and scope of their discretionary authority in providing care to plaintiff. Nurse Wilt, Nurse Preston-Mayle, Nurse Scott, Nurse Roberts, Nurse Densmore, and Doctor Ogunsanwo did not violate plaintiff's constitutional rights by being deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs and were entitled to qualified immunity. Because there was no constitutional deprivation, there was no basis for supervisor liability. View "Nam Dang v. Sheriff, Seminole County, Florida" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit reversed the dismissal of a federal habeas petition and remanded for further proceedings, holding that petitioner's motion under Rule 3.800(c), Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, tolled the limitations period for a federal habeas petition. The Eleventh Circuit explained that a Rule 3.800(c) motion is an application for collateral review that tolls the time a petitioner could petition for federal habeas relief because it is an application for judicial reexamination of a judgment or claim in a proceeding outside of the direct review process. View "Rogers v. Secretary, Department of Corrections" on Justia Law

The court affirmed the denial of a motion for special appearance of counsel to seek the dismissal of an indictment on the ground that defendant was a fugitive from justice, because the motion was not an immediately appealable collateral order. Defendant was indicted on one count of international parental kidnapping and subsequently moved to have his attorneys specially appear to seek dismissal of the indictment. The district court denied the motion based on the fugitive disentitlement doctrine. The court dismissed defendant's interlocutory appeal for lack of jurisdiction because denial of defendant's motion for counsel to appear specially implicates neither "a right not to be tried," nor a right like that against excessive bail. The court distinguished this case from that of the Seventh Circuit's in United States v. Bokhari. The court also denied defendant's petition for writ of mandamus because he had an adequate means to obtain relief -- appearance in the district court -- and could not establish that his right to mandamus was clear and indisputable. View "United States v. Shalhoub" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed her restitution order after pleading guilty to conspiracy to accept gratuities with the intent to be influenced or rewarded in connection with a bank transaction. The district court ordered her to pay $251,860.31 to her former employer, Wells Fargo, pursuant to the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act, 18 U.S.C. 3663A, finding that her conviction qualified as an "offense against property." The court affirmed the judgment, concluding that defendant facilitated bank transactions that proximately caused Wells Fargo's losses, and she intended to derive an unlawful benefit from the property that was the subject of these transactions. Therefore, the court concluded that defendant committed an "offense against property" as that phrase was understood in its ordinary and contemporary sense. View "United States v. Collins" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of five sex-related crimes involving minors. When defense counsel returned a few minutes late from a lunch break on the third day of defendant's six-day trial, he missed a small part of the testimony of the 12th of 13 government witnesses. Counsel had missed 7 minutes of a trial that lasted 31.4 hours. In this case, the parties agreed that it was Sixth Amendment error for inculpatory testimony to be taken in the absence of defense counsel. The court held that the harmless error rule was applicable to this brief absence of counsel from the courtroom. The court explained that the error that occurred when the trial resumed before counsel returned from lunch was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because overwhelming evidence offered while counsel was present went to and proved the charges in Counts 2–5, which were the only counts relevant to the testimony given during counsel's absence; the same questions were repeated and not objected-to after counsel returned to the courtroom; and there was no reasonable doubt that counsel's brief absence was harmless. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Roy" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted under 18 U.S.C. 666 of embezzlement from an organization receiving federal funds. In this case, defendant, a professor in the College of Business, was embezzling from Florida State University (FSU). Defendant was also a director and officer of the Student Investment Fund (SIF), a non-profit corporation established by FSU for charitable and educational purposes, and had signatory authority over the SIF's bank account. On appeal, defendant argued, among other things, that any embezzlement was not from FSU and that the Government did not prove that the victimized organization under the statute was a recipient of federal benefits. The court concluded that its decision in United States v. McLean was dispositive. The court reasoned that the SIF received no federal funding, directly or indirectly. Therefore, there were no federal funds owned by, or under the care, custody, or control of the SIF. The court explained that defendant was a director and officer and thus an agent of the SIF, and his employment as a professor at FSU was irrelevant inasmuch as he did not embezzle any FSU funds. Therefore, because the Government failed to prove that the relevant local organization, the SIF, received any federal benefits, the court reversed the judgment and directed the district court to enter a judgment of acquittal. View "United States v. Doran" on Justia Law

Defendant was found guilty of violating the Driver's Privacy Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. 2721(a), 2725(3), because she provided email addresses of residents in Mobile County from a License Commission database. Defendant, the former License Commissioner, provided the emails to a mayoral campaign. The court held that the term "personal information" in the Act, includes email addresses, and that the government presented sufficient evidence in this case for the jury to find that the License Commissioner was an "officer, employee, or contractor" of a "State department of motor vehicles." Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Hastie" on Justia Law

A jury found defendant guilty of being a felon in possession of a firearm; witness tampering; and obstruction of justice. On appeal, defendant challenged his convictions for witness tampering and obstruction of justice. Defendant raised numerous pretrial and trial challenges. The court rejected defendant's contention that the district court court erred when it concluded that the witness tampering and obstruction of justice charges were not multiplicitous and vindictive, and that the evidence at trial was insufficient to convict him under either charge. The court also rejected defendant's contention that the district court abused its discretion or otherwise erred when it denied his motion for a bill of particulars; denied him a continuance before trial; denied his motion to strike the venire panel; overruled his objection to Juror 14; and excluded the letter from his ex-girlfriend. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Davis" on Justia Law