Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant was convicted of five sex-related crimes involving minors. When defense counsel returned a few minutes late from a lunch break on the third day of defendant's six-day trial, he missed a small part of the testimony of the 12th of 13 government witnesses. Counsel had missed 7 minutes of a trial that lasted 31.4 hours. In this case, the parties agreed that it was Sixth Amendment error for inculpatory testimony to be taken in the absence of defense counsel. The court held that the harmless error rule was applicable to this brief absence of counsel from the courtroom. The court explained that the error that occurred when the trial resumed before counsel returned from lunch was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because overwhelming evidence offered while counsel was present went to and proved the charges in Counts 2–5, which were the only counts relevant to the testimony given during counsel's absence; the same questions were repeated and not objected-to after counsel returned to the courtroom; and there was no reasonable doubt that counsel's brief absence was harmless. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Roy" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted under 18 U.S.C. 666 of embezzlement from an organization receiving federal funds. In this case, defendant, a professor in the College of Business, was embezzling from Florida State University (FSU). Defendant was also a director and officer of the Student Investment Fund (SIF), a non-profit corporation established by FSU for charitable and educational purposes, and had signatory authority over the SIF's bank account. On appeal, defendant argued, among other things, that any embezzlement was not from FSU and that the Government did not prove that the victimized organization under the statute was a recipient of federal benefits. The court concluded that its decision in United States v. McLean was dispositive. The court reasoned that the SIF received no federal funding, directly or indirectly. Therefore, there were no federal funds owned by, or under the care, custody, or control of the SIF. The court explained that defendant was a director and officer and thus an agent of the SIF, and his employment as a professor at FSU was irrelevant inasmuch as he did not embezzle any FSU funds. Therefore, because the Government failed to prove that the relevant local organization, the SIF, received any federal benefits, the court reversed the judgment and directed the district court to enter a judgment of acquittal. View "United States v. Doran" on Justia Law

Defendant was found guilty of violating the Driver's Privacy Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. 2721(a), 2725(3), because she provided email addresses of residents in Mobile County from a License Commission database. Defendant, the former License Commissioner, provided the emails to a mayoral campaign. The court held that the term "personal information" in the Act, includes email addresses, and that the government presented sufficient evidence in this case for the jury to find that the License Commissioner was an "officer, employee, or contractor" of a "State department of motor vehicles." Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Hastie" on Justia Law

A jury found defendant guilty of being a felon in possession of a firearm; witness tampering; and obstruction of justice. On appeal, defendant challenged his convictions for witness tampering and obstruction of justice. Defendant raised numerous pretrial and trial challenges. The court rejected defendant's contention that the district court court erred when it concluded that the witness tampering and obstruction of justice charges were not multiplicitous and vindictive, and that the evidence at trial was insufficient to convict him under either charge. The court also rejected defendant's contention that the district court abused its discretion or otherwise erred when it denied his motion for a bill of particulars; denied him a continuance before trial; denied his motion to strike the venire panel; overruled his objection to Juror 14; and excluded the letter from his ex-girlfriend. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Davis" on Justia Law

Defendants Kenneth and Kimberly Horner, owners and operators of Topcat Towing, were convicted of assisting in the preparation of a fraudulent corporate tax return and filing a false individual income tax return. The court rejected defendants' claim of prosecutorial misconduct and concluded that no Giglio violation occurred in this case; the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendants' two requested jury instructions regarding good faith reliance and due diligence obligations of tax preparers; and the court rejected defendants' evidentiary challenges, concluding that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying defendants' motion in limine to exclude evidence of structuring cash deposits and false tax returns. Accordingly, the court affirmed the convictions. View "United States v. Horner" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to one count of production of child pornography, one count of distribution of child pornography, and one count of possession of child pornography. On appeal, defendant challenged the restitution order. The Mandatory Restitution for Sexual Exploitation of Children Act, 18 U.S.C. 2259, mandates that a district court order restitution for crimes involving the sexual exploitation of children. The court concluded that the district court did not err in concluding that the victim, defendant's one-year-old daughter, had suffered a loss or in awarding her restitution for future counseling expenses needed to address that loss. The court explained that, given the facts here, it seems that the need for future therapy was not just likely, but a virtual certainty. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Osman" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his 84 month sentence after being convicted of one count of possession with intent to distribute five grams or more of methamphetamine and one count of distribution of methamphetamine. Defendant argued that the district court erred in sentencing him as a career offender under USSG 4B1.1. The court concluded that defendant's convictions under section 893.13 of the Florida Statutes, for sale or delivery of a controlled substance and possession of a controlled substance with intent to sell, qualify as predicate "controlled substance offenses" for purposes of the career offender enhancement, and that the Commission did not exceed its statutory authority in defining "controlled substance offense" in a way that includes offenses lacking an element of mens rea regarding the illicit nature of the controlled substance. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's application of the career offender enhancement and defendant's sentence. View "United States v. Pridgeon" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his 120 month sentence after pleading guilty to one count of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of methamphetamine. The court rejected defendant's claim that he was entitled to a minor-role reduction because he merely acted as a low-level courier for methamphetamine, concluding that he had facilitated the flow of drugs in the country, he had control over which banks the proceeds from the sale went to, and he was held responsible only for his conduct in the conspiracy; the district court did not err by assessing three criminal history points for his 2001 Nevada felony drug-possession conviction; and, even if the district court erred in calculating defendant's concealing-identity conviction in the computation of his criminal history category, the error was harmless. View "United States v. Monzo" on Justia Law

USSG G1.3(b) requires the district court to "adjust" a defendant's sentence to credit him for time served in state custody on relevant conduct covered by his federal sentence—but only when the defendant has undischarged time remaining on his state sentence. Meanwhile, USSG 5K2.23 allows a district court to exercise discretion to "depart" from a guidelines sentence to reflect credit for time served in state custody on relevant conduct covered by his federal sentence when the related state sentence is completely discharged at the time of federal sentencing. In this case, the court found it unclear whether defendant's state sentence of imprisonment was entirely discharged or whether, instead, defendant had additional state time remaining to be completed. Accordingly, the court remanded for the district court to resolve that question and, if appropriate, to modify defendant's reduced sentence accordingly. View "United States v. Gonzalez-Murillo" on Justia Law

Defendant Bergman, a licensed physician's assistant employed by ATC, was convicted of conspiracy to commit health care and wire fraud and conspiracy to make false statements relating to health care matters. Defendant Santaya, also employed by ATC, was convicted of conspiracy to commit health care and wire fraud, conspiracy to pay and receive bribes and kickbacks in connection with a federal health care benefit program, and receipt of bribes and kickbacks in connection with a federal health care benefit program. The court concluded that the district court did not err by letting the jury decide whether Bergman withdrew from the conspiracy and in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal; the evidence was sufficient to convict Santaya of conspiracy to commit health care fraud and his motion for judgment of acquittal was properly denied; it was not an abuse of discretion for the district court or the magistrate judge to deny Santaya's request to strike the entire panel; the court rejected Bergman's evidentiary claims; the court rejected Santaya's claims of prosecutorial misconduct; Bergman's sentence of 180 months in prison and Santaya's sentence of 150 months in prison were reasonable; and the court rejected defendants' remaining claims. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Bergman" on Justia Law