Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant's original 72-month sentence represented a downward departure from his advisory guidelines range of 87 to 108 months based on his substantial assistance to the government. The district court applied a 3-level reduction in defendant’s offense level in making this downward departure. On appeal, defendant challenged the district court's order ruling on his motion for a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2) and Amendment 782 to the Sentencing Guidelines. The court concluded that USSG 1B1.10(b)(2)(B) grants the sentencing court in a section 3582(c)(2) proceeding the discretion to comparably reduce a defendant’s sentence where that defendant previously received a USSG 5K1.1 departure at his original sentencing. If a sentencing court chooses to exercise its discretion and make a comparable reduction, it is not bound to use the percentage-based approach - or any one specific method - to calculate the comparable reduction. Rather, the court may use any of the reasonable methods that were available to calculate the original section 5K1.1 departure, so long as they result in a comparable reduction. In this case, the district court’s mistaken belief about the limitation of its discretion constitutes procedural error. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded. View "United States v. Marroquin-Medina" on Justia Law

Petitioner appealed the district court's dismissal of his pro se habeas petition as time-barred under 28 U.S.C. 2244(d)(1). The court granted a certificate of appealability (COA) on these issues: (1) Whether the proper filing of a Georgia extraordinary motion for new trial tolls the time period for filing a 28 U.S.C. 2254 petition; and if so, whether petitioner’s Georgia extraordinary motion for new trial was properly filed; and (2) If a Georgia extraordinary motion for new trial is a tolling motion under 28 U.S.C 2244(d)(2), and petitioner properly filed his extraordinary motion, whether the district court erred by dismissing his 28 U.S.C. 2254 petition as time-barred. After the court granted the COA, the state acknowledged that it had been wrong and now agrees that petitioner's petition is timely. The court agreed too and reversed and remanded. View "Westmoreland v. Warden" on Justia Law

Petitioner, convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm, appealed the district court's denial of his first and only 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion to vacate his sentence. Petitioner asserts that his sentence is illegal pursuant to Descamps v. United States and Johnson v. United States. The court held that Descamps and Johnson apply retroactively in the first post-conviction context. In this case, neither the enumerated clause nor the residual clause applies to petitioner’s prior burglary conviction, and it is therefore not a violent felony. Because petitioner only has two qualifying prior convictions under 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(1), his sentence is illegal. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for resentencing. View "Mays v. United States" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to charges related to his use of stolen identity information to add himself as an authorized user to other individuals’ pre-existing credit card accounts and open new accounts in the names of stolen identities, causing banks to create new credit cards that included him as an authorized user. The court concluded that USSG 2B1.6 does not prevent application of a section 2B1.1 production enhancement to a sentence imposed in conjunction with a 18 U.S.C. 1028A (aggravated identity theft) conviction when the underlying conduct at issue involves “production,” rather than conduct limited to “transfer, possession, or use.” The court also held that willfully causing an innocent third party to produce a fraudulent credit card qualifies as “production” under the Guidelines. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Taylor" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of charges related to his role as an international sex trafficker. The government argues that the district court erred when it refused to award restitution to a victim of defendant’s sex trafficking in Australia. The court concluded that Congress has the constitutional authority to punish sex trafficking by force, fraud, or coercion that occurs overseas. The court concluded that the William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008, 18 U.S.C.1596(a)(2), is a valid exercise of Congress’s authority under Article I of the Constitution. Furthermore, section 1596(a)(2) does not violate the due process clause. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion by issuing the supplemental jury instruction; the district court did not err when it denied defendant's motion for a judgment of acquittal; and the district court did not clearly err or abuse its discretion in calculating defendant's restitution obligations. Therefore, the court affirmed defendant's convictions and sentence, but the court vacated the order of restitution and remanded with an instruction for the district court to increase his restitution obligation. View "United States v. Baston" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a death-row inmate, filed a 28 U.S.C. 2254 petition, raising several challenges to his conviction and death sentence. The district court held an evidentiary hearing and found that petitioner was not intellectually disabled. The district court denied petitioner's multiple claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. However, the district court granted a certificate of appealability (COA) as to petitioner's claims of intellectual disability and ineffective trial counsel in the guilt and penalty phases. The court held that: (1) a district court is not required to apply a Flynn effect reduction to an individual’s IQ score in a death penalty case; (2) a district court should consider all of the expert medical testimony, including evidence about the Flynn effect, and make its own fact findings; and (3) a district court’s application or rejection of the Flynn effect constitutes a fact-finding subject to review only for clear error. In this case, the district court erred by not clearly discrediting petitioner's Flynn effect evidence or alternatively finding that, even applying the Flynn effect, petitioner is not intellectually disabled. The court also concluded that the district court committed no error in its consideration of the standard error of measurement. The district court also committed no clear error in finding that petitioner failed to prove that he suffered from significant deficits or impairments in adaptive functioning. Finally, the district court properly denied relief on petitioner's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, including petitioner's claim that trial counsel's primary defense - that petitioner was involuntarily intoxicated due to his early onset alcoholism - was foreclosed by Georgia law. The court affirmed the judgment. View "Ledford v. Warden, GDCP" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of charges stemming from his participation in a scheme to file fraudulent income tax returns with stolen identities. Defendant, an Arab Muslim, argues that he was denied a fair trial after Juror 9, at the start of deliberations, slipped a note to the clerk stating that she feared for her safety because “this reeks of al Qaeda.” The court concluded that the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions of aggravated identity theft; the jury instructions did not plainly amend the indictment by adding an additional means of identification to the means listed in the indictment; the district court did not abuse its discretion in responding to the note from Juror 9 where the district court did not clearly err in finding that Juror 9 could be fair and impartial; and the district court did not abuse its discretion in applying an enhancement under USSG 2B1.1(b)(2)(B) for an offense involving fifty or more victims; the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying a downward departure under USSG 3E1.1(a) for acceptance of responsibility where the district court found that defendant had not accepted responsibility; the district court did not abuse its discretion when it departed upward to a higher criminal history category; and the sentence is substantively reasonable. Accordingly, the court affirmed the convictions and sentence. View "United States v. Sammour" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to being a convicted felon in possession of a firearm that traveled interstate. The district court determined that defendant's three prior armed robbery convictions were committed on separate occasions and thus he could be sentenced under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(1). The court concluded that the charging documents, plea colloquy transcript, and paragraph 29 of the PSI do not provide “reliable and specific evidence” reflecting three violent felonies that defendant “committed on occasions different from one another.” Because the documents are vague as to which offense(s) they relate, even when taken collectively they do not satisfy the Government’s evidentiary obligations. Therefore, the burden of showing that defendant is an armed career criminal is not met and the district court erroneously applied the 15-year ACCA sentencing enhancement. The court vacated and remanded for resentencing. View "United States v. McCloud" on Justia Law

Petitioner, convicted of illegally possessing and making guns, appealed the district court's denial of his motion to vacate under 28 U.S.C. 2255. A pretrial intervention officer observed a bolt-action rifle in petitioner's bedroom. Based on that information, the police obtained a search warrant for the house where they found thirteen guns. The court concluded that the warrantless search of petitioner’s house was reasonable because the pretrial intervention officer had reasonable suspicion, because the supervision permitted by the pretrial intervention agreement gave petitioner a diminished expectation of privacy, and because the state has strong interests in the effectiveness of its pretrial intervention program. Accordingly, the court affirmed the denial of petitioner's motion without an evidentiary hearing. View "Castillo v. United States" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to illegal reentry after deportation and subseuqently appealed his sentence of 120 months in prison. The district court determined that a sentence within the guideline range would not adequately reflect defendant's criminal history and would not provide adequate deterrence or promote sufficient respect for the law. The court concluded that the district court's sentence is substantively reasonable where the district court considered the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors, including the fact that defendant engaged in a life of crime, with a staggering 20 convictions. The district court reasonably concluded that defendant's guideline range understated his criminal history, and defendant's repeated acts of violence against women and law-enforcement officers and his return trips to jail also support the conclusion that a lengthy sentence was necessary to promote deterrence and respect for the law. Accordingly, the court affirmed the sentence. View "United States v. Osorio-Moreno" on Justia Law