Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant appealed the denial of his motion for a judgment of acquittal on his conviction for fraud and misuse of a visa, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1546(a). At issue is the meaning of the phrase “procured by means of,” as it is used in the first paragraph of section 1546(a). The court concluded that a common-sense, practical interpretation of the first paragraph of section 1546(a) criminalizes defendant’s conduct. In this case, a logical nexus is not only present between defendant’s false statement and the ensuing agency action taken on his visa application, but the making of that false statement materially altered the course of the adjudication process. Defendant’s statement was significant to his visa application process. Because defendant's conviction was supported by sufficient evidence, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Pirela Pirela" on Justia Law

Defendant, convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm, appealed his sentence after the district court applied certain enhancements under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. 924(e). The court concluded that the district court correctly determined that felony obstruction under Georgia law is categorically a violent felony for purposes of the ACCA’s elements clause; even counting defendant’s prior cocaine convictions as a single offense for purposes of the ACCA, his record still would have included three qualifying predicate offenses - two convictions for felony obstruction and a conviction for selling cocaine; because the district court’s treatment of defendant’s cocaine convictions did not affect his status as an armed career criminal, it did not affect his advisory guidelines range or sentence; and his sentence of 210 months in prison is substantively reasonable. Accordingly, the court affirmed the sentence. View "United States v. Brown" on Justia Law

Petitioner, an inmate on death row, petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. 2241. On appeal, petitioner challenged the district court's order dismissing his petition for lack of jurisdiction. The court rejected petitioner's claims under United States v. Davis and concluded that nothing in Davis undermines the court's precedent that section 2254 and in turn the requirements of section 2244(b) apply to petitioner's instant habeas petition filed in the district court. Alternatively, the court rejected petitioner's application for permission to file a successive section 2254 petition for numerous reasons. Finally, petitioner has not come close to showing that he is actually innocent and the court rejected his claims as to this issue. The court granted petitioner's request for expedited review, but denied petitioner relief as to his claims. View "Johnson v. Warden" on Justia Law

Petitioner appealed the district court's denial of habeas corpus, arguing that he is ineligible for the death penalty under the Eighth Amendment and Atkins v. Virginia because he is intellectually disabled. The court concluded that the Florida Supreme Court did not unreasonably apply Atkins’s ban on the execution of the intellectually disabled by setting a bright-line IQ cutoff at 70. The court also concluded that the Supreme Court's recent decision in Hall v. Florida cannot be applied retroactively. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Kilgore v. Secretary, FL Dept. of Corr." on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his convictions and sentence for one count of conspiracy to dispense controlled substances, 49 counts of unlawful dispensation of controlled substances, and one count of conspiracy to launder monetary instruments. The convictions stemmed from defendant and codefendants' participation in a pill-mill scheme in Garden City. The court rejected defendant's claim that even if he wrote prescriptions for illegal purposes, he did not “dispense” controlled substances or conspire to “dispense” controlled substances, as provided in 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1); the evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of the charges; the district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting an expert's testimony and, in the alternative, any allegedly objectionable portion of the expert's conclusions did not prejudice defendant and was harmless error; even if the prosecutor’s comments were improper, there was no prejudice in light of the entire record; and there is no cumulative error. Finally, in regard to defendant's sentence, the court rejected defendant's claim that the district court clearly erred in calculating the drug quantity attributable to him; his sentence was substantively unreasonable, and the district court erred in sentencing him more severely for exercising his Sixth Amendment right to trial. The court affirmed the convictions and sentence. View "United States v. Azmat" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a Florida death row inmate, appealed the denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. 2254. Petitioner broke into a home and killed four people. A friend of the victims witnessed the murders but did not report the identity of the assailant until three years later. The witness testified that he had lied about not knowing the identity of the assailant because petitioner threatened to torture and kill his family should he talk. At trial, the state called a professor of sociology who testified that the witness's behavior was consistent with the behavior of someone who had received credible death threats. At issue is the admissibility of the professor's testimony. The Florida Supreme Court denied relief because it determined that it was not reasonably probable that the result of the proceeding would have been different even if the professor's testimony had been excluded. The court affirmed the judgment, concluding that the Florida Supreme Court's decision was reasonable. View "Williamson v. Florida Department of Corrections" on Justia Law

Defendant, the CFO of Inno Vida, was convicted of two counts of conspiracy to commit wire fraud, one count of conspiracy to engage in financial transactions with criminally derived property, three counts of wire fraud, one count of major fraud against the United States, and three counts of making false statements to a federal agency. The government presented evidence that defendant maintained two sets of financial statements and used one set to mislead investors and the United States. The company's controller testified that, when the two sets of statements were prepared, he believed only the other set complied with Generally Accepted Accounting Principles. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the controller's testimony under Federal Rule of Evidence 701 because the testimony was rationally based on his own personal experiences. The court also concluded that the government presented sufficient evidence to convict defendant of each charge. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Toll" on Justia Law

Defendant, the Sheriff of Brooks County, appealed his convictions for federal-program embezzlement and for obstructing justice by hindering the communication of information about a potential federal offense to federal officials. The court concluded from the record that the government presented sufficient evidence to prove that Brooks County received more than $10,000 in federal funds during both 2007 and 2008 and therefore, the court affirmed defendant's conviction for federal-program embezzlement. However, the court vacated defendant's conviction for obstructing justice because the district court plainly erred in applying this circuit’s now-rejected possibility standard rather than the Supreme Court’s reasonable likelihood standard. Based on the trial evidence, the government did not meet its burden of proving that there was a reasonable likelihood that defendant’s misleading information about a potential federal offense would be communicated to federal authorities. The court remanded for further proceedings. View "United States v. Chafin" on Justia Law

Petitioner, convicted of two counts of sexual battery on a child, appealed the district court's dismissal of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus as untimely. The court affirmed the judgment, concluding that because petitioner's petition for belated appeal did not involve collateral review of his conviction, it did not toll the one-year limitation period of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, 28 U.S.C. 2244(d). View "Espinosa v. Secretary, Dep't of Corr." on Justia Law

The government moved the district court for entry of a forfeiture money judgment of $117,659 after defendant pled guilty to theft of government funds. The forfeiture money judgment was in the amount of loss sustained by the Social Security Administration as a result of defendant’s offense. The district court ordered defendant to pay restitution in the amount of $117,659, but denied the government's forfeiture motion. However, the court concluded that the district court erred in denying the motion where civil forfeiture was authorized against defendant for his offense under 18 U.S.C. 981 and the civil forfeiture statute is applicable in this case. Further, the district court could not offset the amount of restitution by the amount subject to forfeiture or consider defendant’s economic circumstances. The district court was required by law both to grant the forfeiture motion and order full restitution, and it erred when it denied the government’s forfeiture motion on the ground that it had also ordered defendant to pay restitution. The court rejected defendant's double jeopardy argument. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded. View "United States v. Hernandez" on Justia Law