Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant appealed his 180 month sentence after pleading guilty to three counts of being a felon in possession of a firearm. The district court sentenced defendant under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. 924(e), based on his prior convictions. The court concluded that defendant's prior convictions for Florida armed robbery categorically qualifies as a "violent felony" under the ACCA's elements clause. Accordingly, the court affirmed the sentence. View "United States v. Fritts" on Justia Law

After defendant was convicted of being a felon in possession, he filed a motion to dismiss his indictment under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. 3161 et seq. The district court reasoned that the nine-day period between April 21, 2014—when pretrial services and the government filed their petition seeking a warrant for defendant’s arrest—and April 29, 2014, was excludable as pretrial-motion delay and as advisement delay under 28 U.S.C. 3161(h)(1)(D), (H). The district court held that a six-day period from April 24 to 29 was automatically excludable as pretrial-motion delay. The court found that the nonexcludable event does not affect the timeout from the Speedy Trial Act clock required by the excludable event and denied defendant's challenge on this basis. The court likewise found no merit to defendant's other arguments on appeal. Accordingly, the court affirmed defendant's conviction. View "United States v. Hughes" on Justia Law

Petitioner was sentenced to death after being convicted of murdering his wife's daughters. At issue is whether, for purposes of federal habeas law, a Florida postconviction petition properly filed by a death-row prisoner claiming incompetency remains pending through the final resolution of the postconviction proceedings despite the state court’s having found the prisoner competent before the end of those proceedings. The court held that it does and concluded that the prisoner’s federal habeas petition was timely filed. In this case, petitioner's properly filed application was pending from March 13, 2006, through December 2, 2013, tolling the deadline during this period for petitioner to file his federal habeas petition. As a result, petitioner's federal petition, filed on January 21, 2014, was timely. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Hernandez-Alberto v. Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, convicted of murder and sentenced to death, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, challenging Alabama’s use of midazolam in its lethal injection protocol. The district court denied relief. The court concluded that substantial evidence supported the district court’s fact findings and, thus, plaintiff has shown no clear error in them. The court also concluded that plaintiff has shown no error in the district court’s conclusions of law, inter alia, that: (1) plaintiff failed to carry his burden to show compounded pentobarbital is a feasible, readily implemented, and available drug to the Alabama Department of Corrections for use in executions; (2) Alabama’s consciousness assessment protocol does not violate the Eighth Amendment or the Equal Protection Clause; and (3) plaintiff's belated firing-squad claim lacks merit. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Arthur v. Commissioner, AL DOC" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of four counts related to the murder of Erik Comesana, six counts related to a firearm trafficking scheme, and two counts related to possessing a firearm or ammunition while a fugitive from justice. The court concluded that the evidence was sufficient for the jury to find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that defendant conspired with at least one other person to kill Erik; that he killed Erik to prevent Erik from communicating with law enforcement officers regarding defendant's firearm trafficking scheme; and that defendant carried, used, and discharged a firearm, thereby causing Erik’s death. The court also concluded that there was sufficient evidence to convict defendant of the the firearm trafficking offenses. Furthermore, the court concluded that any error in permitting lay opinion evidence does not warrant a new trial where defendant cannot show that correcting the error would have affected the jury's verdict. Finally, the court concluded that the district court did not commit an error under the Double Jeopardy clause. The court declined to review defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claim on direct appeal. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Campo" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of one count of being a convicted felon in possession of firearms and ammunition, and one count of possessing a stolen firearm. The district court sentenced defendant under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. 924(e), based on his six prior Florida armed robbery convictions, each of which qualified as a predicate “violent felony” under the ACCA. The court concluded that the district court did not err in giving the aiding and abetting instruction; the evidence was more than sufficient to allow the jury to draw the reasonable inference that defendant intended to aid Nigel Butler in possessing stolen firearms; even assuming arguendo that Rosemond v. United States somehow applies to aiding and abetting a 18 U.S.C. 922(j) crime, this is enough evidence to warrant the aiding and abetting instruction in defendant's particular case; the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's verdict that defendant aided and abetted Butler in the section 922(g) crime and thus the district court's instruction was not reversible error; and the court rejected defendant's remaining claims of error regarding the aiding and abetting instruction. Therefore, the court affirmed defendant's convictions. Finally, the court concluded that court precedent applies to defendant's prior Florida convictions and the court affirmed his sentence. View "United States v. Seabrooks" on Justia Law

After defendant pled guilty to embezzlement by a bank officer or employee, she challenged her sentence, arguing that it violated her constitutional rights and that it was both procedurally and substantively unreasonable. The court concluded that the district judge abused his discretion by giving significant (indeed, dispositive) weight to defendant's inability to pay restitution. Because the district judge confirmed and reiterated his consideration of defendant's inability to pay restitution as a factor in his order on remand---coupled with his stated belief that defendant's arguments on appeal were “frivolous,” even after having the benefit of reviewing those arguments---it appears the district court may be unable to disregard its improper consideration of that factor or, at least, that it may appear so. Therefore, the court exercised its supervisory powers and remanded for resentencing before a different district judge. View "United States v. Plate" on Justia Law

Defendants Wilchcombe, Rolle, and Beauplaint appealed their convictions for conspiring to possess with intent to distribute and possessing with intent to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine and 100 kilograms or more of marijuana while on board a vessel subject to U.S. jurisdiction. Rolle also appeals his conviction for failing to obey a lawful order to heave to his vessel of which he was the master, operator, and person in charge. The court rejected Wilchcombe’s and Rolle’s arguments that the court's interpretation of the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act (MDLEA), 46 U.S.C. 70503(a) and (b), and 70506(a), violates due process; the statement of no objection (SNO) in this case was sufficient to inform the United States that the Bahamian Government consented to the United States’ exercise of jurisdiction over Rolle’s vessel; while the evidence presented at trial suggests that the Coast Guard may have incorrectly informed the Bahamian Government about the registration documents provided by Rolle to the Coast Guard, there are multiple reasons why this inconsistency does not lead the court to fault the district court’s decision to exercise jurisdiction over defendants; the evidence is sufficient to sustain Wilchcombe’s convictions for conspiring to possess with intent to distribute and possessing with intent to distribute under the MDLEA; the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to grant a mistrial as to Beauplant and Rolle; the district court properly denied Beauplant's motion to dismiss; and the district court did not abuse its discretion by permitting a DEA agent to testify regarding Beauplant's prior 2010 arrest. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Wilchcombe" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against defendants, including two deputies, after he was arrested for violating an injunction prohibiting his possession of firearms. The deputies were escorting plaintiff's former lover into plaintiff's residence in order to retrieve her personal belongings when they saw the firearms in plain view. The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment on plaintiff's claim of unlawful entry where the law was not sufficiently clearly established at the time of the alleged violation to give Deputies Harrison and Loucks fair warning that their entry into plaintiff's sunroom under the circumstances of this case would violate his Fourth Amendment rights; Harrison and Loucks are also entitled to qualified immunity on plaintiff's claim for unlawful entry into his home from the sunroom where plaintiff consented to the deputies' entry; the district court correctly found that Harrison and Loucks did not violate plaintiff's constitutional rights when they seized firearms within his home, because the firearms were in plain view; and the district court correctly found that defendants had at least arguable probable cause to arrest plaintiff. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Fish v. Brown" on Justia Law

After defendant pled guilty to illegal reentry after being deported, the district court applied a sixteen-level sentencing enhancement pursuant to USSG 2L1.2(b)(1)(A) based on defendant's prior Florida conviction for felony battery. The court held that felony battery under Fla. Stat. 784.041 does not qualify as a “crime of violence” under section 2L1.2 when it is committed by mere touching. Accordingly, the court vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing. View "United States v. Vail-Bailon" on Justia Law