Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant appealed his conviction of being a felon in possession of a firearm and an armed career criminal. Police had discovered firearms while arresting defendant on a writ of bodily attachment. At issue is a question of first impression: Can the police arrest someone based solely on a civil writ of bodily attachment for unpaid child support?The court concluded that writ of bodily attachment are “Warrants” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, U.S. Const. Amend. IV, so the officer found the firearm during a valid search incident to arrest. The court also concluded that defendant's argument that he does not qualify for the 15-year mandatory minimum under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. 924(e), are both waived and foreclosed by precedent. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Phillips" on Justia Law

Defendants Farha, Behrens, Kale, and Clay appeal their convictions for charges related to Medicaid fraud on multiple grounds. Defendants were all high-level executives of WellCare or one of its Florida subsidiaries, Staywell and HealthEase. At trial, the government proved that together defendants participated in a fraudulent scheme to file false Medicaid expense reports that misrepresented and overstated the amounts Staywell and HealthEase spent on medical services for Medicaid patients, specifically outpatient behavioral health care services. The court concluded that the evidence was sufficient to convict Farha, Behrens, and Kale for health care fraud; there was sufficient evidence to convict Behrens for making false representations to AHCA; and there was sufficient evidence to convict Clay for making false statements to federal agents. The court rejected Farha, Behrens, and Kale's challenge to the jury instructions with regard to their fraud convictions. Finally, the court rejected defendants' claims of evidentiary error. Accordingly, the court affirmed the convictions. View "United States v. Clay" on Justia Law

Petitioner seeks authorization to file a 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion based on Johnson v. United States. Petitioner was sentenced under 18 U.S.C. 924(c), which requires a longer prison sentence whenever a defendant uses a firearm during a crime of violence or drug trafficking crime. Petitioner contends that the residual clause of section 924(c) is unconstitutional in light of Johnson. The court recently ruled that Johnson's holding may invalidate the "very similar" section 924(c)(3)(B) residual clause. The court recognized, at the same time, that the law is unsettled on this question and left it to the district court to decide in the first instance what effect Johnson had on section 924(c)'s residual clause. The court concluded that when petitioner's section 2255 motion is filed in the district court, the district court should hear from the parties and apply the law to the facts as it thinks best. Accordingly, the court granted the petition. View "In Re: Devon Chance" on Justia Law

Petitioner filed an application seeking an order authorizing the district court to consider a second or successive motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his federal sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2255(h) and 2244(b)(3)(A). Petitioner asserts that his sentence, enhanced as a career offender under the residual clause of the Sentencing Guidelines, violates due process. Petitioner argued that his prior conviction for third-degree escape is no longer a predicate offense under the Guidelines because the residual clause is invalid in light of Johnson v. United States. The court held that section 2244(b)(1)'s mandate applies to applications for leave to file a second or successive section 2255 motion. The court also held that a prisoner may not file "what amounts to a motion for reconsideration under the guise of a separate and purportedly 'new' application" when the new application raises the same claim that was raised and rejected in the prior application. In this case, the court rejected petitioner's application because the claim in his instant application was raised and rejected on the merits in a prior application. Accordingly, the court denied the application. View "In re: Kiwanis Jones" on Justia Law

Petitioner filed an application seeking an order authorizing the district court to consider a second or successive motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his federal sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2255(h) and 2244(b)(3)(A). As an initial matter, the court denied In re Bradford's counseled motion to hold this counseled application in abeyance due to the grant of certiorari in Beckles v. United States. The court may also not consider petitioner's present Johnson v. United States claim for the simple reason that he raised that claim in his first application for certification, and section 2244 bars the court from considering claims that were raised on prior applications. Accordingly, the court dismissed the application for lack of jurisdiction and denied petitioner's motion to hold the application in abeyance. View "In Re: Brad Bradley Bradford" on Justia Law

Petitioner filed two applications seeking an order authorizing the district court to consider a second or successive motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his federal sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2255(h) and 2244(b)(3)(A). Relying on Johnson v. United States, petitioner argued that his prior Florida convictions for burglary, robbery, and armed robbery no longer qualify as violent felonies. The court concluded that petitioner has made a prima facie case that he falls within the scope of the new substantive rule announced in Johnson. In this case, petitioner's two Florida robbery-with-a-firearm convictions (which count as one predicate conviction because they were not committed on occasions different from one another) and his separate armed robbery conviction qualify as violent felonies under the court's binding precedent. However, it is not clear which of petitioner's other felony convictions were used by the district court as the third Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. 924(e), predicate offense and why. It is also not clear whether the district court relied on the residual clause or the other ACCA clauses not implicated by Johnson. Accordingly, the court granted the application. View "In re: Jasper Moore" on Justia Law

Petitioner filed an application seeking an order authorizing the district court to consider a second or successive motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his federal sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2255(h) and 2244(b)(3)(A). The court concluded that it is not enough for a federal prisoner to simply identify Johnson v. United States as the basis for the claim or claims he seeks to raise in a second or successive section 2255 motion, as he also must show that he falls within the scope of the new substantive rule announced in Johnson. In this case, defendant has not made a prima facie showing for relief under Johnson as to his conviction under 18 U.S.C. 924(c) because his section 924(c) conviction was based on his companion conviction for bank robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 2113(a), which requires that the defendant take the property of a bank “by force and violence, or by intimidation.” The court agreed with the Fourth Circuit and held that a bank robbery conviction under section 2113(a) by force and violence or by intimidation qualifies as a crime of violence under the section 924(c)(3)(A) use-of-force clause. Similarly, defendant has not made a showing that he is entitled to relief on his career-offender enhancement following Johnson. The court rejected defendant's remaining claims and denied the application for leave to file a second or successive motion. View "In Re: James Howard Sams" on Justia Law

Defendant, the Chief Clerk of the Probate Court of Chatham County, plead guilty to one count of mail fraud and the district court sentenced her to 72 months in prison. Defendant had access to bank accounts controlled by the probate court and wrote herself $767,218.99 in checks drawn from conservatorship accounts belonging to 31 minors, 2 incapacitated adults, and 2 estates. As the chief clerk of a probate court, defendant knew or should have known that in Georgia, conservators are appointed to protect the assets of those who lack the capacity to do so themselves. Therefore, the court concluded that the district court did not err in applying the vulnerable victim enhancement pursuant to USSG 3A1.1(b)(1) because defendant knew or should have known that the victims of her scheme were vulnerable. Accordingly, the court affirmed the sentence. View "United States v. Birge" on Justia Law

Petitioner filed an application seeking an order authorizing the district court to consider a 28 U.S.C. 2255 second or successive motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his federal sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2255(h) and 2244(b)(3)(A). Petitioner claims that the district court improperly sentenced him, in 1995, as a career offender under the then-mandatory Sentencing Guidelines, using the residual clause of U.S.S.G. 4B1.2. He argues that because the residual clauses in section 4B1.2 and the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) are “identical,” Johnson v. United States also invalidated the Guidelines clause. The court concluded that petitioner's argument is foreclosed by the court's post-Johnson decisions in United States v. Matchett and In re Griffin. Because petitioner has failed to make a prima facie showing of the existence of either the grounds set forth in section 2255(h), the court denied the application. The court agreed that if the Supreme Court holds in Beckles v. United States that the section 4B1.2(a)(2) residual clause is unconstitutional, that decision will establish “a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable.” If that happens, petitioner will be able to file a new application seeking certification to file a second or successive section 2255 motion based not on Johnson but on Beckles. View "In Re: Wayne Anderson" on Justia Law

Petitioner filed an application seeking an order authorizing the district court to consider a second or successive motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his federal sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2255(h) and 2244(b)(3)(A). Petitioner argued that Johnson v. United States invalidates his conviction for knowingly using a firearm in furtherance of an assault with intent to rob a postal employee, 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A). The court concluded, however, that Johnson invalidated the residual clause of section 924(e), but the decision did not address the validity of the definition of a crime of violence found in section 924(c). Nor has the court held that Johnson affects section 924(c)(3)(B). Even if the court were to extrapolate from Johnson that section 924(c)(3)(B) is also unconstitutional, it would not help petitioner because his conviction would be valid even if Johnson renders the definition of “crime of violence” in section 924(c)(3)(B) unconstitutional. Accordingly, the court denied the application because petitioner has failed to make a prima facie showing that he is entitled to relief. View "In Re: Sheldon Dean Christopher Watt" on Justia Law