Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
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Petitioner filed an application seeking an order authorizing the district court to consider a second or successive motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his federal sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2255(h) and 2244(b)(3)(A). The court concluded that, to the extent petitioner relies on Johnson v. United States to invalidate his sentence under the Guidelines, his claim fails because the court has held that Johnson does not apply to the Guidelines for the purpose of obtaining permission to file a second or successive motion. Even if the court were to assume that the new substantive rule announced in Johnson also applies to the residual clause of section 4B1.2(a)(2) of the Guidelines, petitioner would not be entitled to relief because petitioner's sentencing enhancement would be valid regardless. Accordingly, the court denied the application because petitioner failed to make a prima facie showing that he is entitled to relief. View "In Re: Burgest" on Justia Law

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Petitioner seeks to file a second or successive 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion based on Johnson v. United States. Petitioner claims his conviction for using a firearm during a crime of violence, 18 U.S.C. 924(c), is invalid because it arose under that section's residual clause, which is similar to the residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. 924(e). Petitioner also asserts that his advisory Guidelines sentence violates Johnson because it was enhanced pursuant to the residual clause of the career offender provision of the Guidelines. The court concluded that In re Hines forecloses petitioner's section 924(c) claim, and United States v. Matchett forecloses petitioner's Guidelines-based claim. The court noted that the Supreme Court recently granted certiorari in Beckles v. United States, which raises the question of whether Johnson applies to the Guidelines. The court denied the application. View "In Re: William Hunt" on Justia Law

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Petitioner filed an application seeking an order authorizing the district court to consider a second or successive motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his federal sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2255(h) and 2244(b)(3)(A). Petitioner challenged his convictions under 18 U.S.C. 924(c) and 924(o) for using a firearm during a drug trafficking crime and conspiracy to possess a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime. Where the court has already denied an application for leave to file a second or successive motion under section 2255 on the merits, the court is required by statute and its caselaw to reject a subsequent application raising the same claim. In this case, petitioner's application does no more than restate his previous claim and argue that the court's order rejecting that claim was erroneous. Therefore, the court denied the application. View "In re: Gary Baptiste" on Justia Law

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Petitioner appealed the denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus seeking to vacate, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2254, his Florida conviction and sentence for armed robbery with a firearm. The state court applied Strickland v. Washington and concluded that petitioner's attorney did not render ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to move the trial court to suppress an eye-witness identification on the ground that it was obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The court concluded that counsel's performance was not deficient and the state court's decision was not an unreasonable application of Supreme Court law. Accordingly, the court affirmed the denial of the petition. View "Marshall v. Secretary, FL DOC" on Justia Law

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Defendants were convicted of several counts, including multiple counts of wire fraud and money laundering. At issue is whether the district court abused its discretion when it refused to give defendants' proposed jury instruction that the jurors could convict only if they found that defendants had schemed to lie about the quality or price of the goods sold to the victims. The court interpreted 18 U.S.C. 1343 de novo and concluded that it requires the jury to make just such a finding before convicting a defendant of wire fraud. Thus, the proposed instruction was a correct statement of the law, and the district court abused its discretion by refusing to give that instruction. The court reversed on all counts where the error was not harmless, except for Counts 21 and 38, and remanded for further proceedings. View "United States v. Takhalov" on Justia Law

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Petitioner filed an application seeking an order authorizing the district court to consider a second or successive motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his federal sentence, 28 U.S.C. 2255. Petitioner argued that his claim is based on the rule announced in Johnson v. United States and made retroactive in Welch v. United States. Specifically, petitioner argued that his sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. 924(e), is invalid under Johnson because the sentence arose under the residual clause. The court's decision in In re Rogers held that when the record does not make clear that the sentencing court relied solely on the ACCA’s still-valid provisions to classify each predicate offense and binding precedent does not otherwise demonstrate that only valid ACCA clauses are implicated, the court applies Descamps v. United States. In this case, petitioner was sentenced under the ACCA based on two 1982 Florida convictions for aggravated assault and a 1983 Florida conviction for burglary of a dwelling. Under Rogers, petitioner has shown that his burglary conviction may be a residual-clause predicate. Because petitioner has made a prima facie showing that he has raised a claim that meets the statutory criteria set forth in section 2255, the court granted his application for leave to file a second or successive section 2255 motion. View "In re: Leslie A. Parker" on Justia Law

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Petitioner filed an application seeking an order authorizing the district court to consider a second or successive motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his federal sentence, 28 U.S.C. 2255. Petitioner argues, pursuant to Johnson v. United States, that the mandatory career offender enhancement applied to his sentence, imposed in January 2003, is unconstitutional. In In re Griffin, the court held that its reasoning in United States v. Matchett applied with equal force to the residual clause of the career-offender guideline in the context of the mandatory Guidelines. While the court respectfully disagreed with the holding of Griffin, the court nonetheless was bound by that decision. Consequently, petitioner has not satisfied the statutory criteria for filing a successive section 2255 motion. First, even though the Supreme Court has held in Welch v. United States that Johnson applies retroactively to cases on collateral review, the court's binding precedent holds that Welch does not make Johnson retroactive for purposes of filing a successive section 2255 motion raising a Johnson-based challenge to the Sentencing Guidelines. Furthermore, petitioner cannot make a prima facie showing that Johnson applies to him in light of the court's holding in Griffin that the mandatory Sentencing Guidelines cannot be unconstitutionally vague. Because petitioner has failed to make a prima facie showing of the existence of either of the grounds set forth in section 2255(h), the court denied his application for leave to file a second or successive motion. View "In re: Leonard Sapp" on Justia Law

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Petitioner filed two applications seeking an order authorizing the district court to consider a second or successive motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his federal sentence, 28 U.S.C. 2255. Specifically, petitioner asserts that his 60-month consecutive sentence for using and carrying a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 924(c), must be set aside in light of Johnson v. United States and Welch v. United States. The court concluded that petitioner's section 924(c) sentence would be valid even if Johnson makes the section 924(c)(3)(B) residual clause unconstitutional. The court held that a companion Hobbs Act robbery conviction, such as petitioner's, qualifies as a crime of violence under the use-of-force clause in section 924(c)(3)(A) without regard to the section 924(c)(3)(B) residual clause. Because petitioner failed to make a prima facie showing that his proposed claim meets the statutory criteria, the court denied his applications for leave to file a second or successive motion. View "In re: Darren Demeatrie Gordon" on Justia Law

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Petitioner, convicted of first degree murder and other crimes, appealed the denial of his petition for habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. 2254. The district court found sua sponte that petitioner was procedurally barred from bringing this Sixth Amendment confrontation clause claim because he had not exhausted available state court remedies. The court concluded that the state expressly waived exhaustion where the state was aware of the exhaustion arguments and communicated to the court its intention not to pursue them. Further, in considering the exhaustion issue sua sponte, the district court did not point to any “important federal interest” or Thompson factors that required a rejection of the state’s waiver. Accordingly, the court concluded that the district court erred in rejecting the state's express waiver and dismissing the petition. The court vacated and remanded for further proceedings. View "Vazquez v. Secretary, FL DOC" on Justia Law

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Defendant appealed his 18-month sentence and life term of supervised release, imposed for violating the terms of supervised release that were part of his sentence for failing to register as a sex offender. In this case, defendant chose to violate the terms of supervised release in order to live with and take care of his wife's four minor children. The court concluded that, given the totality of the circumstances, considered in light of the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors, the life term of supervised release was not unreasonable. Because defendant has failed to demonstrate that the district court abused its discretion when it imposed a life term of supervised release, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Trailer" on Justia Law