Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

In this case, the defendant was convicted of sex trafficking a minor after a jury trial. The evidence showed that in 2022, a 15-year-old girl ran away from home and met the defendant in Houston. The defendant, knowing her age, engaged in non-consensual sex with her, supplied her with drugs, and coerced her into sex work. He arranged for her to be photographed in lingerie for online advertisements and kept the money she earned from commercial sex acts, using it for personal expenses. The victim eventually escaped and was hospitalized, where she expressed severe emotional distress and suicidal thoughts. Her mother stayed with her during her hospital stay, incurring lost wages and later purchasing clothing to help her daughter feel safer in public.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas presided over the trial and sentencing. The jury found the defendant guilty, including findings that the victim was under eighteen and that force, threats, fraud, or coercion were involved. The presentence report calculated a Guidelines range of life imprisonment, but the district court imposed a sentence of 480 months’ imprisonment and ten years of supervised release, and later ordered restitution, including amounts for the mother’s lost wages and clothing purchases. The defendant objected to these restitution components and to the consideration of certain statements in the victim-impact statement, and also identified a clerical error in the written judgment.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. It held that the district court did not plainly err in considering the full victim-impact statement, did not exceed its statutory authority in awarding restitution for the mother’s lost wages and clothing purchases, and that the statutory scheme allowed such restitution as proximate results of the offense. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the sentence and restitution order, but remanded for correction of the clerical error in the amended judgment to match the court’s oral pronouncement. View "USA v. Limon" on Justia Law

The defendant pled guilty to possessing fentanyl with intent to distribute, after selling fentanyl-laced Percocet pills that resulted in the death of an Army soldier, L.G. The Presentence Investigation Report initially calculated a sentencing range of 210–240 months under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, based on the finding that death resulted from the drug offense. At sentencing, the government presented evidence linking the defendant’s sale to L.G.’s fatal overdose, including communications and undercover purchases. The district court overruled the defendant’s objection to the application of the enhanced guideline and imposed a 240-month sentence.On appeal, the government conceded that applying the enhanced guideline was plain error under United States v. Greenough, because the death was not part of the crime to which the defendant pled guilty. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit remanded for resentencing. At resentencing, the government acknowledged the lower guideline range of 10–16 months. The district court considered arguments for and against an upward variance, ultimately imposing the same 240-month sentence, citing the seriousness of the offense and other statutory factors, but did not inform the defendant of his right to allocute. The defendant’s counsel did not object after sentencing.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the procedural and substantive challenges to the sentence. The court found that the district court’s explanation for the upward variance was insufficient, constituting clear error, but held that this did not affect the defendant’s substantial rights. The court also held that considering L.G.’s death as a sentencing factor was permissible under precedent. Finally, the court found that the failure to allow allocution at resentencing did not warrant reversal. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the 240-month sentence. View "United States v. Horton" on Justia Law

A native and citizen of the Dominican Republic, the petitioner was admitted to the United States as a lawful permanent resident in 2007. In 2022, he pleaded guilty in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida to conspiracy to commit money laundering under 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h). The judgment included a forfeiture order stating that at least $3,934,518 was obtained and laundered by the petitioner as a result of his participation in the conspiracy. In 2023, the Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings, alleging that the petitioner was removable as an aggravated felon because his offense involved more than $10,000.An Immigration Judge found the petitioner removable as charged, relying on the conviction records, including the forfeiture order. The petitioner applied for cancellation of removal, but the Immigration Judge concluded he was ineligible due to the aggravated felony conviction. On appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals, the petitioner argued that the forfeiture order did not meet the evidentiary standard required to establish that his conviction was an aggravated felony, as it did not specify the amount directly attributable to his conduct. The Board, applying the circumstance-specific approach endorsed by the Supreme Court in Nijhawan v. Holder, found that the forfeiture order was sufficient to establish that the funds involved exceeded $10,000 and dismissed the appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the Board’s decision de novo. The court held that an unrebutted forfeiture order entered solely against an alien, finding a specific amount of laundered funds attributable to the alien’s conduct of conviction, can constitute clear and convincing evidence that the amount of funds required by 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(D) is met. The court denied the petition for review. View "Reyes v. Bondi" on Justia Law

Darell Montrell Trotter was charged with conspiracy to distribute fentanyl. Although the indictment alleged that his conduct caused the death of an individual, DS, the plea agreement did not include this allegation. The agreement stipulated that Trotter would be sentenced within the applicable range under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, but acknowledged that the court was not bound by these stipulations. The presentence investigation report calculated a Guidelines range of 135–168 months, and recommended a sentence at the bottom of the range. Trotter initially objected to the report but withdrew his objections and agreed with the recommended sentence. At sentencing, the Government presented testimony from DS’s father and argued that the Guidelines underrepresented the severity of Trotter’s conduct, urging the court to consider an upward variance.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas sentenced Trotter to 168 months’ imprisonment, the top of the Guidelines range, and five years of supervised release. The court did not reference the prosecutor’s remarks in its sentencing decision. Trotter appealed, arguing that the Government breached the plea agreement by undermining the agreed-upon Guidelines range and advocating for a sentence above it.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case under the plain error standard. The court found that the Government breached the plea agreement by advocating for a sentence above the Guidelines range, that this breach affected Trotter’s substantial rights, and that correcting the error was necessary to preserve the fairness and integrity of judicial proceedings. The Fifth Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded the case, allowing Trotter to either seek specific performance of the plea agreement before a new judge or withdraw from the plea agreement. View "United States v. Trotter" on Justia Law

George Jimenez was charged after sending sexually explicit messages and images to his girlfriend’s minor daughter, MV-1, and other minors, while pretending to be a thirteen-year-old boy. Over several weeks, Jimenez requested nude photographs from MV-1, specifically asking for images of her breasts and pubic area. The conduct was discovered when MV-1’s mother reported her suspicions to the FBI, who then obtained and searched both Jimenez’s and MV-1’s phones. A grand jury indicted Jimenez on multiple counts, but only the charge of coercing and enticing a minor to engage in sexual activity under 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b) proceeded to a stipulated bench trial.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas held a one-day bench trial on Count One. Jimenez moved for a judgment of acquittal, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to prove that his requests amounted to a “lascivious display” and that the statute only covered physical conduct. The district court denied the motion and found Jimenez guilty, sentencing him to 240 months in prison and 10 years of supervised release. Jimenez appealed, challenging the interpretation of “sexual activity” under § 2422(b) and the sufficiency of the evidence regarding lascivious exhibition.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court’s judgment. The court held that “sexual activity” under 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b) includes nonphysical conduct, such as the solicitation of sexually explicit images, and is not limited to interpersonal physical contact. The court also found that the evidence was sufficient to support that Jimenez attempted to coerce MV-1 to engage in the lascivious exhibition of her genitals or pubic area under 18 U.S.C. § 2256. Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment in full. View "USA v. Jimenez" on Justia Law

A Mexican citizen, whose legal permanent resident status in the United States had been revoked, was previously removed from the country multiple times following a criminal conviction. In August 2023, he entered the United States from Mexico by bus, intentionally seeking arrest in order to challenge his prior deportation and potentially regain legal status. Upon arrival at the port of entry in El Paso, he bypassed a pedestrian turnstile, was quickly apprehended by Customs and Border Protection officers, and admitted his intent to be arrested. He was indicted for illegal re-entry under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a).The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas conducted a jury trial. The defendant did not dispute the factual basis of his entry but argued that he was not “free from official restraint” and therefore had not “entered” the United States in the legal sense. He requested a jury instruction defining “official restraint,” which the district court denied, reasoning that the concept was not an additional element of the offense and that the pattern jury instructions sufficed. The jury found him guilty of illegal re-entry, and the court entered judgment for attempted illegal re-entry, sentencing him to 18 months’ imprisonment and supervised release.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed whether the district court erred in refusing the requested instruction. The Fifth Circuit held that while “freedom from official restraint” is part of the definition of entry for § 1326(a), the pattern jury instruction given was a correct statement of law and adequately covered the issues. The court found that the defendant was able to present his defense theory to the jury, and thus, the absence of the requested instruction did not constitute reversible error. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the conviction but remanded for correction of a clerical error in the judgment. View "United States v. Hernandez-Adame" on Justia Law

The defendant was charged with multiple counts of sex trafficking and coercion or enticement of prostitution, each count relating to one of four women he managed as a pimp over several years. The women testified that the defendant controlled their earnings, provided necessities, and used physical abuse, threats, and manipulation—including withholding drugs—to force or coerce them into commercial sex acts. Some victims also described having their identification taken and being compelled to travel interstate for sex work. The government’s case included testimony from the victims, law enforcement officers, and documentary evidence such as online advertisements and social media posts.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas presided over the trial. During the proceedings, the defense moved for a mistrial or to exclude certain witness testimony, arguing that the government failed to disclose text messages between an investigator and a victim, in violation of Brady v. Maryland and the Jencks Act. The district court denied these motions, allowed the contested testimony, and also denied the defendant’s motions for judgment of acquittal and a new trial. The jury convicted the defendant on all but one count, and the court sentenced him to 480 months’ imprisonment.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the sufficiency of the evidence de novo and found it sufficient to support the convictions. The court held that the missing text messages were not material under Brady or the Jencks Act, as their content was cumulative of other impeachment evidence. The court also found no reversible error in the admission of certain testimony and Instagram posts, concluding that any evidentiary errors were either harmless or not present. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment in all respects. View "United States v. Lewis" on Justia Law

The case concerns the former President and CEO of a New Orleans-based commercial bank, who was charged with conspiracy to commit bank fraud, bank fraud, and making false entries in bank records. The evidence at trial showed that he, along with other bank employees and borrowers, engaged in a scheme to misrepresent the creditworthiness of certain borrowers. This allowed the bank to issue loans to insolvent individuals, who then used the proceeds to pay off overdue and overdraft loans, thereby concealing the true financial state of the bank’s loan portfolio. The defendant did not dispute the existence of these loans but argued that he lacked the intent to defraud the bank.After the bank failed in 2017, resulting in significant losses to the FDIC, a federal grand jury indicted the defendant and several co-conspirators. Some co-defendants pleaded guilty, while the defendant proceeded to trial in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana. The jury found him guilty on all counts, and he was sentenced to 170 months in prison and ordered to pay substantial restitution. The district court denied his post-trial motions for acquittal, arrest of judgment, and a new trial.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the sufficiency of the evidence, the jury instructions, the admission of lay and summary testimony, and the denial of a motion to dismiss based on the government’s handling of privileged emails. The Fifth Circuit held that the evidence was sufficient to support all convictions, the jury instructions were proper and tracked the relevant law, the evidentiary rulings were not an abuse of discretion, and the government’s conduct regarding privileged material did not warrant dismissal. The court affirmed the jury’s verdict in full. View "USA v. Ryan" on Justia Law

In this case, the petitioner was arrested after an incident in which he was accused of firing a gun into a neighbor’s trailer. Law enforcement recovered evidence at the scene and, following his arrest, the petitioner gave a written statement after being advised of his rights. He was indicted on two counts: shooting into a dwelling and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. Due to a series of administrative errors, judicial conflicts, and continuances, the petitioner remained incarcerated for over three years before trial. During this period, a key defense witness died. The petitioner repeatedly asserted his right to a speedy trial through pro se motions.The Circuit Court of Tishomingo County, Mississippi, applied the four-factor test from Barker v. Wingo to the petitioner’s speedy trial claim. The court found a violation as to the first count (shooting into a dwelling) but not the second (firearm possession), and dismissed only the first count. The petitioner was tried and convicted on the remaining count and sentenced as a habitual offender. The Mississippi Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the speedy trial right could be analyzed and remedied on a count-by-count basis in a multi-count indictment. The Mississippi Supreme Court and the United States Supreme Court denied further review.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case on habeas corpus. The court held that, under clearly established federal law as determined by the Supreme Court, when a speedy trial violation is found, the only permissible remedy is dismissal of the entire indictment, not just the affected count. The Fifth Circuit concluded that the Mississippi appellate court’s approach was an unreasonable application of federal law. The judgment of the district court was reversed, and the case was remanded with instructions to grant the writ of habeas corpus. View "Berryman v. Huffman" on Justia Law

Juan Alaniz was convicted of possessing a firearm and ammunition as a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Alaniz had prior state felony convictions for illegally possessing a controlled substance and for burglary. He challenged his conviction on constitutional grounds, arguing that the statute exceeded Congress’s authority under the Commerce Clause, violated the Second Amendment on its face, and violated the Second Amendment as applied to him.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas reviewed the case and entered a conviction against Alaniz. On appeal, Alaniz raised the same constitutional arguments before the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. He specifically argued that only his controlled substance conviction should be considered as the predicate for his § 922(g)(1) conviction, and that his burglary conviction should not be relevant to the constitutional analysis.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit rejected Alaniz’s Commerce Clause and facial Second Amendment challenges, citing circuit precedent. The court reviewed his as-applied Second Amendment challenge de novo and held that the government may consider Alaniz’s entire criminal record, including his burglary conviction, when evaluating the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) as applied to him. The court found that founding-era laws support the constitutionality of disarming individuals convicted of burglary. Therefore, Alaniz’s as-applied challenge was foreclosed by circuit precedent, and the Fifth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "United States v. Alaniz" on Justia Law