Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Petitioner seeks a certificate of appealability (COA) to challenge the district court's dismissal, on the pleadings and without an evidentiary hearing, of his habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. 2254. Petitioner claimed that he was deprived of his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel when his trial counsel allegedly failed to adequately investigate and present mitigation evidence at the punishment phase of his capital murder trial. The court concluded that reasonable jurists could debate whether the district court correctly dismissed his habeas claim with respect to potential evidence of his fetal alcohol syndrome (FAS) or, more broadly, fetal alcohol spectrum disorder (FASD); reasonable jurists would agree that the district court erred in prematurely dismissing that claim; but no reasonable jurist could debate whether the district court erred in dismissing his habeas claim with respect to his additional character witness testimony that is not relevant to an FASD diagnosis or whether the district court erred by failing to hold an evidentiary hearing before its dismissal on the pleadings. Accordingly, the court granted in part and denied in part the COA. View "Trevino v. Davis" on Justia Law

Defendant plead guilty to being an alien who knowingly and unlawfully entered and was found in the United States following deportation. On appeal, defendant argued that the district court committed reversible error by applying a sixteen-level sentencing enhancement based on his prior conviction of child molestation. The court rejected defendant's contention that this appeal is not controlled by the court's precedent in United States v. Olalde-Hernandez. The court held that Clemens v. State does not prohibit conduct that is otherwise permitted under the court's interpretation of USSG 2L1.2, nor does it alter the court's reading of Ga. Code Ann. 16-6-4(a) or require the court to reconsider its holding in Olalde-Hernandez. Therefore, the court found that the district court’s application of section 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii) does not constitute error and the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Puga-Yanez" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty without a plea agreement to possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug-trafficking crime. Defendant argued that the district court plainly erred when it accepted his plea because there was an inadequate factual basis for the conviction. In this case, defendant possessed the firearms in his residence along with a substantial amount of drugs. Furthermore, defendant's possession of the firearms was illegal because he was a convicted felon at the time. In light of these facts, as well as the number and type of firearms seized from defendant’s residence combined with the fact that he was a methamphetamine supplier with a large amount of methamphetamine at his residence, the district court's acceptance of defendant's guilty plea was not clear error. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Walker" on Justia Law

The opinion issued June 29, 2016 is withdrawn by the panel, and the following is issued in its place. Defendant appealed his 34-month sentence after pleading guilty to harboring undocumented aliens for financial gain. The court concluded that it is unnecessary to resolve whether the plain error standard of review applies in the present circumstances because defendant fails to demonstrate error even under the less stringent clear error standard; it is unnecessary to resolve whether Amendment 794 was a substantive change or instead only clarifying because even if it were applied retroactively, it would not affect defendant's sentence; and, even assuming, without deciding that Amendment 794 is “clarifying” and should be considered on appeal, it does not affect the outcome in this case. Therefore, the court concluded that the district court did not err in concluding that defendant was neither a “minor” nor a “minimal” participant eligible for an USSG 3B1.2 reduction. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Gomez-Valle" on Justia Law

Defendant, a former detective in the Dallas Police Department, was convicted of four counts of obstruction of justice related to a grand jury investigation. The investigation focused on defendant, who was suspected of giving sensitive law enforcement information to a prostitute in exchange for sexual relations. The court affirmed the convictions on Counts One, Two, and Four. As to Count Three, attempting to obstruct an official proceeding, the court vacated the judgment of acquittal, concluding that a rational jury could infer beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant communicated his intent to the prostitute that she get rid of her cell phone. The evidence indicated that defendant had a motive for wanting to get rid of the phone, namely, to cover up his relationship with the prostitute. Further, he made other statements to her expressing his intent that she needed to cut all her connections and not just those relating to him. The court remanded for reinstatement of the jury verdict as to Count Three and for sentencing. View "United States v. Bedoy" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the district, alleging a claim of racial discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq. Plaintiff twice applied for employment as a master electrician with the district and was rejected both times. The district court granted summary judgment for the district. The court concluded that, even if plaintiff had adequately briefed the claim, he failed to establish a prima facie case for disparate impact where there is no evidence that the district maintained a policy of "excluding from consideration for employment all persons who have been convicted of a felony." In this case, plaintiff failed to demonstrate that the district hired someone outside of his protected class or otherwise treated him less favorably than others similarly situated outside of his protected class. Plaintiff argued that another district employee, Russell Leon Alvis, was similarly situated as plaintiff. The court concluded, however, that Alvis's criminal history was not comparable to that of plaintiff's where Alvis was convicted of delivery of marijuana and sentenced to 10 years probation, and plaintiff was convicted of at least three drug crimes for which he received a far more severe sentence than 10 years probation. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Rogers v. Pearland I.S.D." on Justia Law

Defendant appealed the dismissal of his 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion as time-barred under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), 28 U.S.C. 2255(f). The court concluded that defendant's filing of an untimely petition for writ of certiorari and the Supreme Court’s subsequent denial of that petition without comment did not reset or extend the date on which the judgment of his conviction became final. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's judgment. View "United States v. Wheaten" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his sentence of ten years of supervised release after being convicted for failure to register as a sex offender under 18 U.S.C. 2250(a). The government concedes that the district court erred in sentencing defendant to a ten-year term of supervised release and that the error was obvious. However, the court concluded that the term of supervised release is fair and does not call into question the integrity of judicial proceedings. In this case, the district court expressed its concern with defendant’s “temporary living arrangements” and that his life was not “squared away.” The district court also stated that, upon release, defendant had to find a “residence approved by your probation officer.” Moreover, defendant, after asking for a below-Guidelines term of imprisonment, requested that the judge impose “supervision for as much as you want.” Accordingly, the court declined to exercise its discretion to correct the error. View "United States v. Brown" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a death row inmate convicted of capital murder, was granted habeas relief based on the district court's finding that the jury instructions at the sentencing phase of petitioner's trial violated his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights under Penry v. Lynaugh, by not allowing the jury to give full effect to petitioner's mitigating evidence. The court concluded that the jury instructions at the sentencing phase of petitioner's trial did not adequately allow the jury to consider his mitigating evidence of good character and affirmed the district court's grant of habeas relief. In this case, petitioner proffered evidence of general good character at the sentencing phase that showed he was active at church, had been a good student, was a good father to his daughter, and had maintained regular employment. The court denied petitioner's application for a certificate of appealability (COA) to appeal the denial of his habeas claims that challenge his conviction. The court concluded that petitioner is not entitled to a COA on any of his ineffective-assistance claims because reasonable jurists would not debate the district court’s determinations that petitioner failed to established error under 28 U.S.C. 2254(d)’s standard for habeas relief and that, regardless, petitioner cannot show prejudice under Strickland v. Washington in light of the overwhelming evidence of his guilt. View "Norris v. Davis" on Justia Law

Movant seeks authorization to file a successive 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion pursuant to Johnson v. United States. Movant's sentence was based in part on USSG 2K2.1(a)(1), under which one of his prior convictions was deemed a “crime of violence” pursuant to the “residual clause” of USSG 4B1.2(a)(2), which defines a “crime of violence” for purposes of section 2K2.1(a)(1). The court concluded that, although Johnson announced a new rule of constitutional law that has been made retroactive by the Supreme Court to cases on collateral review, it did not address section 4B1.2(a)(2). Nor has the Supreme Court held that a Guidelines enhancement that increases the Guidelines range implicates the same due process concerns as a statute that increases a statutory penalty. The court noted that even in direct appeals, rather than collateral review as presented here, federal courts of appeals disagree on whether Johnson applies to the Guidelines, demonstrating that the Supreme Court has not decided the question. Even if Johnson does implicate section 4B1.2(a)(2), the Supreme Court has not addressed whether this arguably new rule of criminal procedure applies retroactively to cases on collateral review. Because movant failed to show that he is entitled to authorization to proceed based on Johnson, the court denied the motion for authorization. The court also denied the motion for appointment of a federal defender. View "In re: Dequintan Arnick" on Justia Law