Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant was indicted for sexual battery, domestic violence, and aggravated assault of his 16-year-old daughter, while he was on supervised release for failing to register as a sex offender. The district court revoked his supervised release, and imposed a two-year sentence and a life term of supervised release with several special conditions. The court found no procedural or substantive error with the district court’s imposition of a life term of supervised release. The court further found that the special conditions of his supervised release requiring that he: 1) participate in a sex offender treatment and monitoring program; 2) submit to polygraph tests; 3) refrain from living within 3,000 feet of places frequented by minors; and 4) submit to warrantless searches of his computer and other electronic devices, are substantively reasonable. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Winding" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to illegal reentry following deportation and the district court applied an eight-level enhancement based on his prior Arkansas conviction of aggravated assault on a household member. The court concluded that, assuming without deciding, the district court erred in classifying defendant's Arkansas conviction as an aggravated felony, that error was not “clear or obvious.” This court has never addressed the specific question at issue here - whether a suspended imposition of a sentence in Arkansas qualifies as a “term of imprisonment” for purposes of an aggravated felony sentencing enhancement. The confused history of suspended imposition and suspended execution of sentences in Arkansas and the judgment make classifying defendant's conviction under the court's case law anything but a clear or obvious task. Because the district court did not plainly err, the court affirmed the sentence. View "United States v. Narez-Garcia" on Justia Law

Defendants Bowen, Vega, and Salazar were convicted of conspiring to possess with intent to distribute methamphetamine. The court concluded that the evidence was sufficient to convict Vega and Bowen; in regard to Salazar and Bowen's multiple conspiracies argument, even assuming that the district court erred in failing to give a multiple conspiracies jury instruction, the error was harmless; Salazar is not entitled to a new trial based on the prosecutor's improper closing argument because it did not cast serious doubt on the correctness of the jury's verdict; and it was not error for the district court to enhance Bowen's offense level under USSG 3B1.1(b) for his role as a manager/supervisor. Because the court found no reversible error, the court affirmed defendants' convictions and Bowen's sentence. View "United States v. Bowen" on Justia Law

Petitioner, convicted of murder and sentenced to death, appealed the denial of relief under 28 U.S.C. 2254, and the denial of investigative assistance under 18 U.S.C. 3599(f) to develop evidence that might prove his previous attorneys were ineffective. Petitioner then moved to amend his section 2254 application to raise a new clam, but the district court denied the motion and denied a certificate of appealability (COA). The court concluded that the district court correctly rejected the assertion that petitioner’s trial and state habeas attorneys were ineffective. Consequently, because petitioner cannot show that his claim is viable and that assistance was reasonably necessary, the district court properly determined that petitioner was not entitled to a mitigation specialist. For the same reasons, the court denied a COA. Because petitioner did not exercise reasonable diligence in attempting to discover the memorandum order at issue, he is unable to prove that he would be entitled to a subsequent state habeas hearing to exhaust his new claims that are based on the newly discovered memorandum. Hence, petitioner has not exhausted, and will not be able to exhaust, these claims in state court. Because the court is unable to review unexhausted claims, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioner’s motion for a stay and abeyance. The court affirmed the judgment. View "Ayestas v. Stephens" on Justia Law

Defendant, convicted of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine and other controlled substances, as well as possession with intent to distribute cocaine, filed a 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion, raising numerous allegations of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. The district court denied the motion and denied a certificate of appealability (COA). This court, however, granted a COA on the issue of whether defendant’s trial counsel was ineffective for failing to move to dismiss the possession with intent to distribute cocaine charge in count three of the superseding indictment as barred by the five-year statute of limitations. The court held that counsel was deficient by not filing a motion to dismiss count three because counsel was required to perform research on whether the superseding indictment would relate back to the original indictment. Further, defendant suffered prejudice as a result of counsel's failure to move to dismiss the count because he had to pay a $100 special assessment on count three. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's judgment. View "United States v. Freeman, Jr." on Justia Law

Jason Dvorin appealed his conviction of conspiracy to commit bank fraud. Dvorin's appeal has been consolidated with the appeal of Mindy Sauter, the attorney who prosecuted defendant during his first trial. Dvorin asserted that the district court erred in: (1) denying his request for an apparent-authority jury instruction; (2) denying his request for a special unanimity jury instruction; (3) overruling his objections under Federal Rules of Evidence 701 and 704 to the government counsels’ and witnesses’ use of the terms “fraud,” “fraudulent check,” or “conspiracy”; (4) excluding extrinsic evidence of and cross-examination regarding the district court’s findings that Chris Derrington, Pavillion Bank's executive vice president, testified falsely in a prior proceeding; (5) declining to award sanctions for prosecutorial discovery misconduct; (6) admitting the testimony of Chase Bank representative Arthemis Lindsay despite the government’s failure to timely designate Lindsay as a possible witness on its witness list; and (7) permitting the government to add a forfeiture count to the second superseding indictment before the second trial and entering a forfeiture judgment at sentencing without having a jury find the facts essential to that judgment. Sauter contends that the district court erroneously found that she violated Brady, Giglio, and Napue and acted “recklessly” by failing to timely disclose Derrington’s plea agreement supplement. The court reversed the district court’s denial of Dvorin’s motion to dismiss the forfeiture account for prosecutorial vindictiveness because the presumption of vindictiveness applied in this case where the government added a forfeiture notice in the second superseding indictment, and the government failed to overcome this presumption. The court affirmed in all other respects. View "United States v. Dvorin" on Justia Law

Petitioner appealed the district court's denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus based on two claims of ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC). The court denied petitioner's application for a certificate of appealability and request for an evidentiary hearing. The court concluded that it need not decide whether it may grant an evidentiary hearing because petitioner cannot overcome the default of his underlying IAC claim. In this case, the district court may refuse an evidentiary hearing where there is not a factual dispute which, if resolved in the prisoner's favor, would entitle him to relief. Petitioner has been granted both time and funding to develop his IAC claim for failure to hire a neuropsychologist, but he still has been unable to adduce any favorable mitigating evidence. View "Norman v. Stephens" on Justia Law

Petitioner, convicted of malfeasance in office and felony theft, petitions this court for federal habeas relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2254, contending that he was denied meaningful appellate review because of an incomplete trial transcript and that he was denied his right to counsel at trial. In this case, petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas relief on his claims based on an incomplete trial transcript where he failed to show how the missing portions of the transcript prejudiced his appeal as to either of his claims. The state appellate court held that petitioner implicitly had waived his right to counsel through his dilatory tactics. The court concluded that the state appellate court's holding was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established law and petitioner failed to show that the state appellate court’s finding of dilatory tactics was unreasonable. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's denial of petitioner's section 2254 petition. View "Higginbotham v. State of Louisiana" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his sixteen-level sentencing enhancement under USSG 2LL1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii) based upon a prior conviction for assaulting a federal officer and inflicting bodily injury, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 111 (a)(1) and (b). As an issue of first impression, the court found that defendant's conviction under section 111(a)(1) and (b) necessarily required proof that he used, attempted to use, or threatened to use physical force against the person of another. Therefore, a conviction under section 111(a)(1) and (b) for assaulting a federal officer and inflicting bodily injury constitutes a crime of violence under section 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii). Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Hernandez-Hernandez" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction for failing to maintain an oil record book aboard a foreign-flagged merchant sea vessel, in violation of 33 U.S.C. 1908(a) and 33 C.F.R. 151.25. The district court denied defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal under Rule 29 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. The court reversed, concluding that the plain language of 33 C.F.R. 151.25 states that only the “master or other person having charge of the ship” has a duty to maintain the record book. The government concedes that defendant was not the “master or other person having charge” of the vessel at issue. The court vacated the conviction and remanded for entry of acquittal. View "United States v. Fafalios" on Justia Law