Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant plead guilty to theft of government property, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 641, for his unlawful receipt of social security benefits, and was sentenced to 18 months’ imprisonment. The court concluded that the district court did not err in applying a two-level enhancement under USSG 2B1.1(b)(11)(C)(i) for using an unauthorized means of identification to obtain another means of identification. The court concluded that defendant created fraudulent accounts in 2008 and 2011 without authorization; defendant's conduct fell within the ambit of USSG 2B1.1(b)(11)(C)(i) and 2B1.1 cmt. n.1; and the plain meaning of the phrase "actual" does not distinguish between living and deceased persons. As the Government demonstrated, the court has affirmed application of the Guideline outside the context of credit fraud, and applied the enhancement under circumstances factually analogous to those at hand. Finally, the court concluded that the rule of lenity does not preclude the application of the enhancement. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Suchowolski" on Justia Law

Movant was convicted of one count of conspiring to commit bank robbery, two counts of bank robbery and aiding and abetting, two counts of conspiring to obstruct interstate commerce by robbery and aiding and abetting, and four counts of using and carrying a firearm during a crime of violence and aiding and abetting. Movant seeks authorization to file a successive 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion challenging his convictions under 18 U.S.C. 924(c) for using and carrying a firearm during a crime of violence and aiding and abetting, as well as his convictions for bank robbery and conspiring to obstruct interstate commerce by robbery and aiding and abetting. The court concluded that movant has failed to make the requisite showing where Johnson v. United States does not provide a basis for authorizing a successive section 2255 motion challenging a conviction under section 924(c); the bank robbery and conspiracy to obstruct interstate commerce by robbery statutes that movant was convicted under do not contain language similar to the provision that the Supreme Court found unconstitutionally vague in Johnson; and movant failed to make a prima facie showing that Mathis v. United States and McDonnell v. United States set forth new rules of constitutional law that have been made retroactive to cases on collateral review. Accordingly, the court denied the motion for authorization and the motion to hold his case in abeyance. View "In Re: Andreco Lott" on Justia Law

The United States appealed the district court's order suppressing evidence seized in a traffic stop. The district court found exigent circumstances when the initial threat overheard on wiretap was first intercepted but none when the officers encountered defendant forty-five minutes later. Additionally, the district court found that the detective and his fellow officers’ response to the threat was unreasonable, criticizing their lack of urgency and questioning whether they actually believed defendant was in need of emergency help. The court concluded, however, that there was an objectively reasonable basis for believing that the emergency had not ended. Because the emergency had not dissolved after 45 minutes, the court concluded that the officers' actions, taken as a whole, were a reasonable response to the emergency. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "United States v. Toussaint" on Justia Law

Defendant plead guilty to possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. The district court concluded that defendant's prior conviction for assault under Texas Penal Code 22.01(a)(1), (b)(2)(B), constituted a "crime of violence" within the meaning of USSG 4B1.2(a). Thus, the district court enhanced defendant's base offense level under USSG 2K2.1(a)(3) and sentenced defendant to 100 months in prison. The court concluded that defendant's prior Texas assault offense “has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another,” within the meaning of section 4B1.2(a)(1) of the Guidelines. To obtain a conviction for the least culpable Texas offense for which defendant was convicted, a jury would be required to find the defendant recklessly caused bodily injury committed by recklessly impeding the normal breathing or circulation of the blood of the person by applying pressure to the person’s throat or neck or by blocking the person’s nose or mouth. It is difficult to conceive of how applying pressure to either a person’s throat or neck in a manner that resulted in “impeding the normal breathing or circulation” could not involve the use of physical force. The same is true of blocking a person’s nose or mouth resulting in “impeding the normal breathing or circulation of the blood of the person.” Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Howell" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to aiding and abetting two others in making false statements in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1001(a)(2) and (2), and was sentenced to ten months in prison and a three year term of supervised release. The court concluded that, because the facts alleged in the indictment do not support the application of USSG 2J1.2, the district court erred in applying the cross-reference provision under USSG 2.B1.1(c)(3). The court agreed with defendant that the Government did not specify and the district court did not find that the facts alleged in the indictment supported any offense other than a violation of 18 U.S.C. 1001(a)(2), and the indictment could not support any other offense. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded for resentencing. View "United States v. Griego" on Justia Law

Defendant, a licensed pharmacist and proceeding pro se, appealed his conviction and sentence based on healthcare fraud. The court rejected defendant's challenges to his conviction, sentence of incarceration, and order of restitution. The court concluded, however, that the district court erred to the extent that it held that forfeitable assets arising from commingled funds could be seized under the procedures of 18 U.S.C. 982(a)(7); but when a defendant’s assets cannot be traced to the crime of conviction under section 982(a)(7), due to the defendant’s commingling of legal and illegal assets, the Government may then invoke the provisions of 21 U.S.C. 853(p) to satisfy the money judgment. Therefore, the court vacated the Preliminary Order of Forfeiture listing defendant's forfeitable assets; vacated the Judgment in a Criminal Case, in part, with respect to forfeiture (pages 9 and 10, which refer to those same assets); remanded for further proceedings with respect thereto; and affirmed the Judgment in all other respects. View "United States v. Ayika" on Justia Law

Five men convicted of murder and sentenced to die by lethal injection (Appellants) filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging constitutional violations in connection to the state's use of pentobarbital to induce death. Three of the five received stays from the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals on state habeas petitions presenting claims not at issue here. The remaining two argue that Texas is obliged by the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment and the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of equal protection under the law to re-test the execution drug to assure it does not present a high risk of unnecessary pain. The court concluded that appellants' claims are meritless and that they have failed to make the showing required for a stay pending appeal. Accordingly, the court denied their motion for a stay of execution. View "Wood v. Collier" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his 41-month sentence for illegal reentry after deportation, arguing that the district court erred in imposing a 16-level sentencing enhancement. The enhancement was based on the district court's finding that a prior Ohio conviction for attempted unlawful sexual conduct with a minor constitutes a crime of violence. The court has previously held that Virginia and Louisiana statutes that lack any mens rea requirement nonetheless fall within the generic definition of “sexual abuse of a minor.” The court concluded that it necessarily follows that a statute like Ohio’s requiring at least a reckless state of mind concerning the age of the victim qualifies as “sexual abuse of a minor.” Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Rivas" on Justia Law

After defendant plead guilty to illegal reentry, he challenged the district court’s determination that his underlying Missouri conviction for sexual misconduct involving a child qualified as a crime of violence, specifically sexual abuse of a minor, under the Sentencing Guidelines. Defendant argued that the statute does not require proof that the victim was a child and, thus, does not fall within the generic definition of sexual abuse of a minor. Applying the modified categorical approach, the court concluded that defendant failed to show a realistic probability that Missouri would apply its statute to conduct that falls outside the generic definition of sexual abuse of a minor based on the peace officer provision. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Lara-Martinez" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his sentence after being convicted of illegal reentry under 8 U.S.C. 1326. The court held, in Nieto Hernandez v. Holder, that Texas Penal Code 46.04 prohibiting possession of a firearm by a felon qualifies as an aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43). Because the court is bound by the holding in Nieto Hernandez, and defendant's new arguments provide no basis to depart from precedent, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Castillo-Rivera" on Justia Law