Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

In 2024, the United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico revoked Kelvin García-Oquendo's terms of supervised release and imposed concurrent terms of 21 months and 18 months of imprisonment. This decision was based on findings that García had violated the conditions of his release by engaging in new criminal conduct, including identity theft and bank fraud.Previously, in 2013, García had pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit bank fraud and aggravated identity theft, and in 2015, he pleaded guilty to unauthorized use and transfer of access devices. He was sentenced to a total of 89 months' imprisonment and five years of supervised release. In 2023, the Probation Office alleged that García had committed new crimes, leading to his arrest and a preliminary revocation hearing where probable cause was found for some of the allegations.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. García argued that the District Court erred by admitting hearsay testimony without proper balancing under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.1(b) and the Due Process Clause. The First Circuit agreed that the District Court erred in admitting the testimony but concluded that the error was harmless due to the strong circumstantial evidence supporting the violation findings. The court held that Rule 32.1's limited confrontation right applies to the entirety of the revocation proceeding, including the determination of post-revocation sanctions. However, it found that any error in considering the hearsay testimony during sentencing was also harmless, as the other evidence strongly supported the District Court's findings.The First Circuit affirmed the District Court's revocation order and sentences. View "United States v. Garcia-Oquendo" on Justia Law

Jadnel Flores-Nater, a member of a gang, participated in the kidnapping and murder of a victim in Puerto Rico. On June 8, 2018, Flores-Nater and four other gang members kidnapped the victim from a public housing complex, each carrying an assault rifle. They drove the victim to a remote area, where Flores-Nater and other gang members shot and killed him. Flores-Nater was charged with kidnapping resulting in death, using a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence, and using a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence causing murder. He pleaded guilty to discharging a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence, and the government agreed to dismiss the other charges.The United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico initially sentenced Flores-Nater to 360 months in prison, which was above the 120-month guideline and the 300-month recommendation in the plea agreement. Flores-Nater appealed, and the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit vacated the sentence, finding it substantively unreasonable due to the district court's failure to articulate a plausible rationale for the upward variance. On remand, the district court again imposed a 360-month sentence, citing the high crime rate in Puerto Rico and the need for deterrence, but did not address Flores-Nater's argument regarding his age at the time of the offense.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case again. The court found that the district court committed procedural error by failing to explain whether and why it rejected Flores-Nater's argument that his youth at the time of the offense should be considered a mitigating factor. The appellate court vacated the sentence and remanded the case for resentencing, requiring the district court to provide a clear explanation of its reasoning, particularly regarding the defendant's age. The court did not find that the government breached the plea agreement by defending the higher sentence on appeal. View "United States v. Flores-Nater" on Justia Law

José Miguel Guzmán-Ceballos was sentenced to ninety months' imprisonment for his involvement in transporting 385 kilograms of cocaine from the Dominican Republic to Puerto Rico. He pleaded guilty to all counts without a plea agreement and sought a mitigating role adjustment under § 3B1.2 of the United States Sentencing Guidelines, which the district court denied. Guzmán-Ceballos argued that he was merely a fisherman recruited for the smuggling operation due to economic hardship and had no significant role in planning or organizing the venture.The District Court of Puerto Rico held a change-of-plea hearing where Guzmán-Ceballos pleaded guilty. At the sentencing hearing, he objected to the presentence report (PSR) for not applying the mitigating role adjustment. The district court denied his objection, adopted the PSR's recommendations, and sentenced him to ninety months' imprisonment, noting it considered the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors and his role in the offense. Guzmán-Ceballos timely appealed, arguing the district court failed to conduct the necessary legal analysis for the mitigating role adjustment.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case and agreed with Guzmán-Ceballos. The court found that the district court did not engage in the required four-part analysis to determine his role in the offense. Specifically, the district court failed to identify the universe of participants, order them along a continuum of culpability, and compare Guzmán-Ceballos's role to the average participant using the § 3B1.2 factors. The appellate court vacated the sentence and remanded the case for resentencing, instructing the district court to perform the correct mitigating role analysis. View "United States v. Ceballos" on Justia Law

In January 2018, Nycole Amaury Rosario Sánchez, then fifteen years old, and six accomplices committed a series of violent crimes in Puerto Rico, including three robberies, two carjackings, and four murders. Rosario brandished and discharged firearms during these crimes, resulting in multiple injuries and deaths. He was arrested on January 25, 2018, and agreed to be prosecuted as an adult. Rosario pleaded guilty to six counts, including interference with commerce by robbery, carjacking, and using a firearm during a crime of violence causing murder.The United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico sentenced Rosario to 480 months' imprisonment. Rosario appealed, arguing that the district court failed to consider mitigating factors such as his age, mental and emotional condition, and the sentencing disparity between him and his co-defendants. He also claimed that his sentence was both procedurally and substantively unreasonable.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the district court had considered Rosario's age, mental and emotional condition, and other mitigating factors, as evidenced by the sentencing transcript and the Presentence Investigation Report (PSR). The court also noted that Rosario's co-defendants were sentenced by a different judge and that Rosario had not provided sufficient information to establish an unwarranted sentencing disparity.The First Circuit held that the district court did not commit procedural error in its consideration of the section 3553(a) factors or in addressing the sentencing disparity. The court also found that Rosario's sentence was substantively reasonable, given the seriousness of his offenses and his behavior while incarcerated. Consequently, the First Circuit affirmed Rosario's 480-month sentence. View "United States v. Rosario Sanchez" on Justia Law

Thiago de Souza Prado was convicted by a jury of conspiracy to commit wire fraud, wire fraud, and aggravated identity theft. The scheme involved defrauding rideshare and food delivery companies by creating and using fraudulent accounts, and misappropriating the identities of third parties. Prado, who was ineligible to drive for these companies due to numerous driving infractions and his unauthorized status in the U.S., initially used fraudulent accounts created by others and later began creating and renting out his own fraudulent accounts. He obtained driver's license images and Social Security numbers from various sources, including associates and the dark web, and used software to spoof GPS information to inflate driver fees and generate fake referral rewards.The U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts sentenced Prado to seventy months in prison. Prado appealed, challenging his convictions and sentence. He argued that he was prejudiced by an amendment to the third superseding indictment during trial and by the district court's refusal to disqualify the prosecution team. He also contended that his sentence was procedurally and substantively unreasonable.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court found no error in the district court's decision to allow the amendment of the indictment, as it did not alter the substance of the charges. The court also upheld the district court's finding that the wall separating Levy, a former defense attorney who joined the U.S. Attorney's Office, from the prosecution team had not been breached. Additionally, the court determined that any potential errors in calculating loss and Prado's criminal history were harmless, as the district court indicated it would have imposed the same sentence regardless.The First Circuit affirmed Prado's convictions and sentence, concluding that the district court did not abuse its discretion and that Prado's sentence was reasonable. View "United States v. De Souza Prado" on Justia Law

Derek Capozzi was convicted in 1999 on three counts: possession of a firearm as a felon, attempted extortion, and use of a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence. The district court applied the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) enhancement, resulting in a 360-month sentence. Capozzi's direct appeal was unsuccessful, and the Supreme Court declined to review the case. In 2005, Capozzi filed his first motion to vacate his sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, arguing that his prior convictions should not count as ACCA predicates. The district court denied the motion, finding that the presentence report indicated his prior convictions involved buildings, qualifying them as ACCA predicates.In 2015, Capozzi sought permission to file a second § 2255 motion based on the Supreme Court's decision in Johnson v. United States, which invalidated the ACCA's residual clause. The district court granted the motion in part, vacating his firearm-in-furtherance conviction but denying his Johnson II claim, reasoning that the ACCA enhancement was not based solely on the residual clause. Capozzi appealed, arguing that the district court had jurisdiction to hear his Johnson II claim and that it erred in not conducting a resentencing hearing.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Capozzi could not establish a Johnson II claim because his sentence was not based solely on the residual clause. The court found that the district court had relied on the enumerated clause, which was not invalidated by Johnson II. Consequently, Capozzi's claim was time-barred under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA). The court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in opting to correct Capozzi's sentence without conducting a de novo resentencing. The First Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. View "United States v. Capozzi" on Justia Law

Carlos Reyes-Rosario was convicted of five federal offenses related to a drug trafficking conspiracy in the United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico. The indictment charged him with conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute controlled substances within 1,000 feet of a protected location, and possession with intent to distribute heroin, cocaine base, cocaine, and marijuana within 1,000 feet of a protected location. He was also charged with possession of firearms in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime but was acquitted of this charge. Reyes was sentenced to concurrent terms of 168 months for four counts and 120 months for one count.Reyes filed a motion for judgment of acquittal, arguing insufficient evidence for his convictions, particularly for Count Two, which involved aiding and abetting the possession with intent to distribute heroin. The District Court denied his motion, finding sufficient evidence for the jury to convict him based on his involvement in the conspiracy and the actions of his co-conspirators under the Pinkerton doctrine. Reyes appealed, challenging the denial of his motion for acquittal, the admission of certain evidence, and the reasonableness of his sentence.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court upheld the District Court's decision, finding that the evidence presented at trial, including testimony and video recordings, was sufficient to support Reyes's conviction under the Pinkerton doctrine. The court also found no abuse of discretion in the admission of the video and items seized during the search, as they were properly authenticated by a cooperating witness. Additionally, the court rejected Reyes's Confrontation Clause challenges, noting that he had ample opportunity to cross-examine the witness about relevant topics.The First Circuit affirmed the District Court's rulings, including the denial of Reyes's motion for acquittal and the admission of evidence. The court also found Reyes's sentence to be procedurally and substantively reasonable, as the District Court had adequately considered the relevant factors and provided a sufficient explanation for the sentence imposed. View "United States v. Reyes-Rosario" on Justia Law

Orlando Miguel Martínez-Ramos pleaded guilty to carjacking resulting in serious bodily injury and aiding and abetting the same, following a home invasion, robbery, and brutal physical attack on a 77-year-old woman who died nine days later. The advisory guideline sentencing range was up to fourteen years, but Martínez-Ramos acknowledged that an upward variance was warranted due to the victim's death. At sentencing, Martínez-Ramos argued for a fifteen-year sentence, while the government requested sixteen years.The United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico did not accept either recommendation. Instead, it considered a higher advisory guideline range based on the first-degree murder cross-reference, which would have recommended a life sentence, reduced to twenty-five years due to the statutory maximum. However, the court did not apply this cross-reference, citing insufficient causation evidence and the belief that a twenty-five-year sentence was too harsh given Martínez-Ramos's youth. The court imposed an eighteen-year sentence, a substantial upward variance from the guideline range, due to the physical attack contributing to the victim's death.Martínez-Ramos appealed, arguing that the upward variance was substantively unreasonable and that the court applied too lenient a standard of causation. The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that Martínez-Ramos had acknowledged the victim's death as a factor in his plea agreement and that the autopsy listed facial and bodily trauma as contributory factors to the death. The court concluded that the district court's finding was not clearly erroneous and affirmed the eighteen-year sentence. View "United States v. Martinez-Ramos" on Justia Law

Richard Evans, a former Captain in the Boston Police Department (BPD), was convicted of wire fraud, conspiracy to commit wire fraud, federal programs theft, and conspiracy to commit federal programs theft. These charges stemmed from his submission of false claims for overtime pay and his involvement in a scheme to submit such claims. Evans and his subordinates falsely reported working four-hour overtime shifts, even when they worked fewer hours or when the Evidence Control Unit (ECU) was closed.The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts found Evans guilty on all counts after a five-day jury trial. He was sentenced to one year and one day of incarceration for each count, to be served concurrently, fined $15,000, and ordered to pay $17,390.99 in restitution. Evans appealed, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, the willful blindness instruction, and other aspects of the trial.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed Evans' convictions for wire fraud and conspiracy to commit wire fraud, finding that the willful blindness instruction was appropriate given the numerous "flags of suspicion" that Evans ignored. However, the court vacated Evans' convictions for federal programs theft and conspiracy to commit federal programs theft, concluding that the government failed to present sufficient evidence to establish that the BPD received more than $10,000 in federal benefits during the relevant period, as required by 18 U.S.C. § 666(b). The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion. View "United States v. Evans" on Justia Law

Edison Burgos-Montes, serving a life sentence, sought compassionate release due to serious medical conditions, including severe hypertension and obstructive sleep apnea. He argued that the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) failed to provide adequate treatment for these conditions. Burgos filed a motion with the district court in late 2021, presenting evidence of his ongoing severe hypertension and lack of treatment for his sleep apnea. The district court found that Burgos was receiving adequate medical care and denied his motion without prejudice.Burgos appealed, contending that the district court's finding was clearly erroneous. He pointed to evidence that, nearly a year after his sleep apnea diagnosis, the BOP had not provided him with a CPAP machine, the standard treatment for sleep apnea. The district court had relied on a letter from Dr. Gary Venuto, Clinical Director at FCC Coleman, stating that Burgos was receiving adequate care. However, Burgos argued that this assessment overlooked significant evidence of inadequate treatment.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the district court clearly erred in concluding that Burgos was receiving adequate treatment for his sleep apnea. The appellate court noted that Burgos had not received a CPAP machine or any other treatment for his sleep apnea, despite a diagnosis and a recommendation from an outside cardiologist. The court vacated the district court's order and remanded the case for further proceedings to determine if Burgos had demonstrated an "extraordinary and compelling" reason for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). View "United States v. Burgos-Montes" on Justia Law