Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

After police executed a search warrant at an apartment in San Juan, Puerto Rico, where Heclouis Joel Nieves-Díaz was residing, they found drugs, ammunition, and a machine gun conversion device. Nieves, who was on supervised release for a previous federal drug conviction, pleaded guilty to federal charges including being a felon in possession of ammunition, illegal possession of a machine gun conversion device, and possession with intent to distribute cocaine.The United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico initially sentenced Nieves to eighty-four months' imprisonment, applying a four-level enhancement for using or possessing ammunition in connection with another felony. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit vacated that sentence, finding the enhancement inapplicable. On remand, the district court recalculated the guidelines range and resentenced Nieves to sixty-six months—twenty-five months above the top of the new Guidelines range—based on an upward variance. The court justified the variance by citing Nieves’s criminal history, the quantity of ammunition, and the prevalence of gun violence in Puerto Rico.Nieves appealed again, arguing that the district court failed to adequately explain the upward variance, particularly regarding the significance of the ammunition in the absence of a firearm. The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that the district court’s explanation for the variance was insufficient, especially in not addressing Nieves’s argument about the lack of a firearm. The court vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing, clarifying that while the district court could consider Nieves’s criminal history and community factors, it must provide a more specific explanation if it imposes an upward variance based on the quantity of ammunition. The appellate court declined to limit the sentence on remand or order reassignment to a different judge. View "US v. Nieves-Diaz" on Justia Law

A man sought to contest the forfeiture of a boat, claiming he was its rightful owner. The boat had been seized and made subject to forfeiture following his brother’s guilty plea to a federal drug conspiracy that began in May 2019. The man submitted a pro se petition in federal district court, asserting under penalty of perjury that he was the sole and rightful owner of the boat at the time it was seized. He attached several documents, all in Spanish, which he described as evidence of ownership and title. Later, with counsel, he provided additional documents purporting to show that he acquired the boat in 2017.The United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico had issued a preliminary order of forfeiture following the brother’s plea. After the man’s petition, the government moved to dismiss, arguing that the petition failed to allege when and how the man acquired his interest in the boat, as required by statute. The district court granted the government’s motion to dismiss without a hearing and entered a final order of forfeiture. The man appealed, arguing that his submissions sufficed or, alternatively, that he should have been allowed to amend his petition.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case de novo. It held that the man’s petition did not satisfy the statutory requirement to state the time and circumstances of his acquisition of the boat, and that untranslated documents could not be considered. However, the appellate court found that the district court did not address the alternative request for leave to amend, and the reasons for denial were not apparent from the record. The First Circuit vacated the denial of the petition and remanded for further proceedings, directing the district court to consider the request to amend in light of the liberal construction required by statute. View "US v. Calderin-Pascual" on Justia Law

The case concerns a defendant who, after previously being convicted of possessing child pornography and serving a prison sentence followed by supervised release, was found during his supervision with additional devices containing child sexual abuse material (CSAM). The defendant, Kevin Lee Ross, was subject to conditions including restrictions on his internet use, device monitoring, and random searches. During his term of supervised release, a tip from his brother led probation officers to search his residence and vehicle, where they discovered a cell phone, laptop, and external hard drive, all containing a large quantity of CSAM. Ross denied knowledge of the devices and their contents.A grand jury in the United States District Court for the District of Maine indicted Ross for possessing child pornography across three devices. At trial, Ross stipulated that certain exhibits contained child pornography as legally defined. Despite this, the government introduced and published nine representative exhibits to the jury and had a special agent describe their contents. Ross objected, arguing that, due to the stipulation, displaying the images and providing descriptions was unfairly prejudicial under Federal Rule of Evidence 403. The district court overruled his objections, relying on precedent that allows the government to present its evidence even where a defendant is willing to stipulate to certain elements. The jury convicted Ross.On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, Ross argued that the district court abused its discretion by allowing the publication and description of the CSAM exhibits in light of the stipulation. The First Circuit held that the district court did not abuse its discretion, finding that the evidence remained probative to issues of possession and knowledge, especially since Ross denied knowing the contents of the devices. The court affirmed Ross’s conviction. View "US v. Ross" on Justia Law

Two brothers operated an energy-conservation contracting business and, beginning in 2013, engaged in a bribery scheme involving the Mass Save program, a state-mandated initiative to promote energy efficiency. One brother owned CAP Electric, Inc., and recruited the other to establish Air Tight Solutions, LLC as a Mass Save contractor with the assistance of a CLEAResult employee, who was responsible for selecting and overseeing contractors. The brothers paid this employee, and later another, regular bribes in cash and gifts to secure contracts, favorable treatment, and advance warning of audits. Air Tight performed little or no work directly, subcontracted projects, and disguised employees and payments to conceal the scheme. Over several years, their companies received multi-million dollar payments from the program.The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts accepted their guilty pleas to conspiracy, honest-services wire fraud, making false statements, and (for one brother) aiding and assisting false tax returns. The district judge sentenced both to 27 months in prison (above-guidelines for one), and ordered forfeiture of $13.2 million and $3.6 million respectively. The brothers challenged the sentences and forfeitures on several grounds, including alleged errors in calculating tax loss, application of sentencing enhancements, and the process and proportionality of the forfeiture orders.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. It held that the district court did not err in calculating tax loss or applying sentencing enhancements for sophisticated means, obstruction of justice, and aggravating role. The appellate court also held that the district court correctly found a sufficient connection between the criminal conduct and the forfeited proceeds, and that any procedural errors in the forfeiture process were harmless. Finally, the court determined that the forfeiture orders were not unconstitutionally excessive. The First Circuit affirmed the sentences and forfeiture orders. View "United States v. Ponzo" on Justia Law

Federal agents began investigating after tracing firearms used in crimes in Massachusetts to purchases made by a South Carolina resident, Brunson. During interviews in 2021, Brunson told agents he had purchased twenty-four firearms for someone known as “Boston,” later identifying Roache as that individual. Brunson described a process in which Roache would select, pay for, and then receive firearms from him. Additional investigation revealed more firearms linked to Brunson’s purchases had been recovered in Massachusetts, and records showed similar transactions between Brunson and Roache continued into early 2023. In total, agents traced at least forty-six firearms purchased by Brunson, with evidence directly connecting Roache to six purchases in 2023.Roache and Brunson were indicted and pled guilty in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts to conspiring to traffic firearms. The Presentence Investigation Report (PSR) recommended a six-level sentencing enhancement based on the number of firearms Brunson stated he had purchased for Roache, as well as those confirmed in 2023. Roache objected, arguing that Brunson’s statements about the earlier purchases were uncorroborated and unreliable. The district court overruled Roache’s objection, finding that Brunson’s statements were sufficiently reliable, given corroborative evidence and the consistency of the described transactions with later confirmed acts. Roache was sentenced to fifty-seven months’ imprisonment, with three years of supervised release.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the district court’s application of the six-level enhancement for procedural error. The appellate court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in crediting Brunson’s statements about the number of firearms trafficked, as those statements were supported by adequate indicia of reliability, and affirmed the sentence. View "United States v. Roache" on Justia Law

Three defendants were charged following a federal investigation into La Asociación Ñeta, an organization originally founded to advocate for prisoners’ rights in Puerto Rico, but later alleged to have evolved into a criminal enterprise engaged in drug trafficking and violence. The defendants were accused of conspiring to violate the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act, and of conspiring to possess with intent to distribute heroin, cocaine, and marijuana. The indictment described La Ñeta as an enterprise whose members facilitated drug transactions and other criminal conduct. The defendants were tried jointly before a jury and convicted on both counts.After conviction in the United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico, the defendants appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. Their appeals were consolidated with those of several codefendants. In an earlier opinion, the First Circuit rejected most challenges but found that it could not resolve whether certain hearsay statements used at trial were admissible under United States v. Petrozziello because the District Court had not made the required findings. The First Circuit remanded for the District Court to make explicit findings about whether the statements were made by coconspirators during and in furtherance of the conspiracy, and retained jurisdiction over the appeals.After the District Court made its findings, the First Circuit reviewed the record and supplemental briefs. The court held that the challenged statements were properly admitted under Petrozziello or, where any error occurred, it was harmless given the overwhelming evidence of guilt. The court also rejected a cumulative error argument, finding no basis to overturn the convictions. The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the convictions of all three defendants. View "United States v. Rosario-Orangel" on Justia Law

In 1974, a fatal shooting occurred in a Boston park, resulting in the death of a fourteen-year-old victim. The suspect, who was twenty years old at the time, was identified by witnesses and a murder complaint was issued against him. Shortly after the incident, the suspect was arrested in Indiana under an alias for an unrelated crime. After being acquitted of that charge, he was mistakenly released, and his whereabouts were unknown to Massachusetts authorities for nearly two decades. During this period, he lived under his own name in Indiana, worked, attended university, and occasionally used aliases when interacting with law enforcement.Following a renewed discovery of his location in 1994, Massachusetts authorities interviewed and indicted him for murder in 1997. He was tried and convicted in 2004. Prior to trial, the defendant filed multiple motions to dismiss the indictment on speedy-trial grounds, all unsuccessful. The Massachusetts Superior Court and then the Supreme Judicial Court (SJC) rejected his arguments, finding that the delay was largely attributable to his own conduct, including the use of aliases. The SJC also denied his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims on direct appeal.The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts denied his habeas petition, which alleged violations of his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial and ineffective assistance by counsel. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that, under binding federal precedent, the speedy-trial right only attached upon indictment, not at the issuance of the complaint, and since the relevant delay was seven years, not thirty, his federal speedy-trial claim failed. The court also found his ineffective-assistance claims unavailing, as the record showed no deficient performance or prejudice. Therefore, the First Circuit affirmed the denial of habeas relief. View "Carr v. Lizotte" on Justia Law

Jacob Parlin was arrested after law enforcement, investigating a narcotics operation, intercepted communications implicating him in drug transactions. The Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) began wiretapping a suspected dealer’s phone, capturing conversations among Parlin, the dealer, and a third party, which discussed drug sales and pricing strategies. Following these intercepts, officers stopped Parlin's vehicle and discovered nearly two pounds of pure methamphetamine, along with drug paraphernalia and a small quantity of drugs indicative of personal use.A federal grand jury indicted Parlin on conspiracy to distribute and possession with intent to distribute fifty grams or more of methamphetamine, as well as substantive distribution and possession charges. At trial in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts, Parlin objected to a police officer's testimony about the typical amount of methamphetamine held by users versus distributors, arguing the officer was giving undisclosed expert testimony. The court allowed the testimony, finding it was based on the officer’s personal observations. Parlin was convicted by a jury on both counts. He then moved for acquittal or a mistrial, asserting the testimony was improper; the district court denied these motions, determining the testimony was appropriately limited and other evidence supported the verdict.Parlin appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, contending the district court erred by admitting the officer’s opinion testimony and that, without it, the evidence was insufficient to prove intent to distribute. The First Circuit held that, even if admitting the testimony was error, it was harmless given the overwhelming evidence of Parlin's intent to distribute, including recorded phone calls and the large quantity of drugs. The court affirmed Parlin’s conviction on both counts. View "United States v. Parlin" on Justia Law

The case involves a defendant who was recruited in Puerto Rico to act as a courier, transporting two suitcases containing approximately eleven kilograms of cocaine on a flight to Newark, New Jersey. Airport authorities in San Juan discovered the drugs before the defendant boarded the flight. After her arrest, she admitted to knowingly transporting the suitcases for a promised payment of $1,500, a sum far less than the drugs’ street value.Following her guilty plea to conspiracy and possession with intent to distribute cocaine, the United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico sentenced her to forty-eight months in prison and forty-eight months of supervised release. The Probation Office recommended a three-level reduction in her Sentencing Guidelines offense level based on her minor or minimal role, highlighting other individuals who recruited her, organized the transport, and prepared the luggage. The government objected, arguing she was indispensable to the offense. The district court agreed with the government and denied the mitigating-role reduction, focusing primarily on her own conduct and the fact she was the one transporting the drugs.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed whether the district court properly conducted the required comparative culpability analysis under the Sentencing Guidelines. The appellate court held that the district court erred by failing to consider the roles of all participants in the criminal activity and by not applying the multi-step analysis clarified in United States v. Guía-Sendeme. The First Circuit vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing so the district court could properly assess the defendant’s eligibility for a mitigating-role reduction, consistent with current precedent and the proper legal framework. View "United States v. Robles-Lopez" on Justia Law

In the 1990s, Anthony M. Shea was involved in a series of bank and armored-car robberies in New Hampshire. In 1997, following a federal jury trial in the United States District Court for the District of New Hampshire, Shea was convicted on fourteen counts, including two counts of using or carrying a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), and was sentenced to life imprisonment. The § 924(c) convictions were based on underlying predicate offenses, including substantive Hobbs Act robbery, conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery, and bank robbery with a dangerous weapon. The jury returned a general verdict, finding Shea guilty of all counts.After his convictions were affirmed on direct appeal by the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, Shea filed a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 seeking to vacate his § 924(c) convictions and to be resentenced, arguing that subsequent Supreme Court decisions, particularly United States v. Davis and Johnson v. United States, rendered his predicate conspiracy offenses invalid for purposes of § 924(c). The District Court denied relief as to the § 924(c) convictions, finding any error in the jury instructions harmless, but granted resentencing because Shea’s "career offender" designation was no longer applicable.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed both the partial denial of Shea’s § 2255 motion and the amended judgment after resentencing. The First Circuit held that the District Court did not err in its harmless error analysis, finding that even though the jury was instructed on both valid and invalid predicate offenses, the valid predicates were so interrelated and coextensive with the invalid ones that the instructional error did not have a substantial and injurious effect on the verdict. The First Circuit affirmed both the denial of relief as to the § 924(c) convictions and the amended judgment. View "Shea v. United States" on Justia Law