Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant pleaded guilty in federal court to a single count of wire fraud. A judge sentenced Defendant to a term of imprisonment, thirty-six months of supervised release, and restitution. After Defendant was released from custody, probation asked the court to revoke his supervised release for violating the conditions of his probation. After a hearing, the judge found that Defendant had violated the conditions of his probation by committing two new crimes and tampering with electronic-monitoring equipment probation installed in his house. The judge then revoked Defendant’s supervised release and sentenced him to twelve months in prison followed by two years of supervised release. The First Circuit affirmed the judgment in all respects, holding that the district court did not err in its judgment. View "United States v. Marino" on Justia Law

Pursuant to a plea agreement, Defendant pled guilty to carjacking and possessing a firearm. After a sentencing hearing, the judge imposed a within-guidelines prison sentence of seventy months for the carjacking crime and a consecutive prison sentence of eighty-four months for the firearm crime. Defendant appealed, challenging his sentence. The First Circuit affirmed Defendant sentence on the carjacking count, vacated his sentence on the firearm count, and remanded for resentencing, holding (1) there was no procedural error in Defendant’s carjacking sentence; and (2) because Defendant pled guilty to possessing a firearm rather than brandishing a firearm, the judge plainly erred in sentencing Defendant for brandishing a firearm. View "United States v. Garay-Sierra" on Justia Law

Petitioner pleaded guilty to two counts of carjacking resulting in death. The jury sentenced Petitioner to death under the Federal Death Penalty Act (FDPA). Due to jury taint, Petitioner’s sentence was vacated and his case remanded for further proceedings. The government subsequently filed an amended notice of intent to seek the death penalty, as required by the FDPA. The amended notice listed the factors that the government believed justified the death penalty, largely tracking the original notice. Petitioner filed a motion in limine to dismiss or strike two non-statutory aggravating factors the prosecutor intended to present in a second penalty-phase proceeding under the FDPA. The district court denied the motion. Petitioner appealed, arguing that because the jury in his first penalty-phase proceeding did not find unanimously that the government proved these two aggravating factors beyond a reasonable doubt, their introduction at the new penalty-phase proceeding was barred by double jeopardy principles. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the Double Jeopardy Clause did not bar the government from alleging those non-statutory aggravating factors again at Petitioner’s new penalty-phase proceeding. View "Sampson v. United States" on Justia Law

Pursuant to a non-binding plea agreement, Appellant pled guilty to knowingly possessing a firearm and ammunition after having been convicted of a felony. The presentence investigation report resulted in a guidelines sentencing range of thirty to thirty-seven months. Despite the parties’ joint recommendation for a mid-range guideline sentence, the court varied upward and imposed a term of sixty months of incarceration, to be followed by a three-year term of supervised release. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) Appellant’s sentence was not substantively unreasonable; and (2) the district court did not plainly err err in attaching a financial disclosure condition to Appellant’s supervised release term. View "United States v. Colon-de Jesus" on Justia Law

Defendant, a tile salesman, received material, nonpublic information from a corporate inside and then passed that information along to friends, who used it to obtain substantial trading gains. After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of committing securities fraud and conspiring to commit securities fraud. Defendant appealed, arguing that there was insufficient evidence in the record to support his conviction, where he was neither a corporate insider nor a trader of securities. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) the evidence was sufficient to show that Defendant knowingly breached a duty of confidence; (2) the district court’s instructions did not improperly shift the burden of proof or misstate the state of mind element of the securities fraud offense; and (3) the evidence was sufficient to show that Defendant anticipated receiving a benefit as a result of his disclosure. View "United States v. McPhail" on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to one count each of robbery, brandishing of a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence, and possession of a firearm by a felon subject to the Armed Career Criminal Act’s (ACCA) mandatory minimum sentence. The district court imposed a downwardly variant sentence of 192 months’ imprisonment. Defendant appealed his sentence. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err in concluding that Defendant’s prior convictions subjected him to a fifteen-year mandatory minimum sentence under the ACCA; and (2) the district court properly applied a career offender sentencing enhancement under the United States Sentencing Guidelines. View "United States v. Reed" on Justia Law

Patricia Cornwell, a well-known crime novelist, and her spouse filed suit against their former business managers Anchin Block & Anchin and the company’s principal, Evan Snapper, alleging New York state law claims of negligent performance of professional services, breach of contract, and breach of fiduciary duty. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Plaintiffs on all three claims and awarded Plaintiffs $51 million in damages. Thereafter, the district court vacated the jury’s decision, ruling that it had incorrectly instructed the jury and that Defendants’ statements to the Department of Justice (DOJ) were protected by a qualified privilege and therefore should not have been considered by the jury. The First Circuit reversed in part, holding (1) the district court correctly found that it incorrectly instructed the jury on New York’s statute of limitations for a breach of fiduciary duty claim; and (2) the district court erred in entering judgment as a matter of law for Defendants on the DOJ issue. Remanded for a new trial. View "Cornwell Ent., Inc. v. Anchin, Block & Anchin, LLP" on Justia Law

When the decedent in this case died he owed over $340,000 in unpaid federal income tax liabilities. The decedent was survived by his wife, Appellant, and four minor children. Appellant, the decedent’s wife, was appointed executrix of the decedent’s estate. When Appellant told the IRS she was not cooperate with the IRS’s attempt to collect on the estate’s federal tax debts, the IRS served Appellant with a formal notice of potential liability under the federal priority statute, 31 U.S.C. 3713. The government then sued the decedent’s estate and Appellant, both individually and in her capacity as executrix. The district court concluded that Appellant was personally liable for the value of the estate’s assets Appellant transferred to herself without first paying the estate’s federal tax debts. The district court then entered judgment holding that estate and Appellant as executrix liable for $351,218 and holding Appellant, individually, liable for $125,938. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in entering summary judgment against Appellant personally, as the government showed that Appellant’s conduct satisfied the requirements of section 3713(b) to be held personally liable for amounts not paid to the United States. View "United States v. McNicol" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of making a false declaration before a federal grand jury investigating a money laundering scheme. Appellant filed a motion for a new trial, claiming that newly discovered evidence revealed that the government had improperly withheld impeachment evidence and failed to disclose other information that Appellant claimed tainted his indictment and prosecution. The district court concluded that certain evidence should have been disclosed but that Appellant had not shown a reasonable probability that disclosure of the withheld evidence would have produced a different outcome at trial. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court (1) did not abuse its discretion in finding that it was not reasonably probable that timely disclosure of the withheld evidence would have produced a different result at trial; (2) did not abuse its discretion in rejecting Appellant’s Brady/Giglio claim connected to the other challenged information; and (3) did not err in refusing to order release of a grand jury transcript. View "United States v. Calderon" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to possessing child pornography. The district court sentenced Defendant to 135 months in prison. At a second change-of-plea hearing, Defendant acknowledged that the indictment charged “pornography involving prepubescent minors.” Defendants was sentenced to fifteen years of supervised release. Defendant appealed, arguing, inter alia, that the district court violated the Double Jeopardy Clause by permitting the prosecution to continue via a second change-of-plea hearing because his “first plea was to possession of child pornography and not to possession of prepubescent child pornography.” The First Circuit affirmed Defendant’s conviction and prison sentence but vacated one of the conditions of Defendant’s supervised release, holding (1) the Double Jeopardy Clause did not bar the government from “continuing its prosecution” of Defendant on the greater offense, even assuming that Defendant’s initial plea was to a lesser-included offense; (2) the district court did not commit clear or obvious error in “vacat[ing]” Defendant’s first plea and accepting the second after the presentence report had issued; (3) Defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim is not reviewable on direct appeal; (4) the prosecutor did not breach the plea agreement at the sentencing hearing; and (5) the district court did not err in sentencing Defendant. View "United States v. Gall" on Justia Law