Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

It is a violation of Massachusetts state law for a handgun-purveyor to transfer to customers any handgun “which does not contain a load indicator or magazine safety disconnect.” When the Attorney General (AG) informed firearms dealers and consumers that Glock, Inc.’s third and fourth generations pistols lacked an adequate load indicator, some dealers and consumers, joined by two advocacy groups, challenged the constitutionality of the load indicator requirement of the Massachusetts regulation. The district court granted the AG’s motion to dismiss, concluding that the dealers and consumers failed to state a claim for relief and that the two advocacy groups lacked standing. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) the load indicator requirement was not unconstitutionally vague, and dismissal of the due process claim required dismissal of the consumers’ Second Amendment claim; and (2) the advocacy groups lacked standing to sue. View "Draper v. Healey" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to four felony counts related to a conspiracy to import more than 13,000 kilograms of cocaine. The sentencing court ultimately sentenced Defendant to concurrent prison terms of 151 months for each of the four counts. The sentence was at the low end of the guidelines sentencing range given a Total Offense Level (TOL) of 34 and Criminal History Category I. Defendant appealed, asserting that the district court should have given an additional one-level reduction in his offense level pursuant to U.S.S.G. 3E1.1(b). The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) the sentencing court did not err in its determining that the proper TOL was 34; and (2) Defendant’s substantial rights were not affected by the sentencing court’s alleged failure to satisfy Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(i)(1)(A). View "United States v. Acevedo-Sueros" on Justia Law

Defendant entered into a conditional guilty plea to being a felon in possession of a firearm. Defendant appealed the denial of his motion to suppress evidence seized from his home, arguing that the affidavit a law enforcement officer submitted in support of the application failed to establish probable cause because it did not provide an adequate nexus between Defendant’s drug dealing and his house. Defendant also sought a Franks hearing. The judge concluded that even if the affidavit failed to establish probable cause, the agent obtained the warrant in good faith. The judge also concluded that a Franks hearing was unnecessary. The First Circuit affirmed on different grounds, holding (1) law enforcement had probable cause for the search; and (2) Defendant failed to make the requisite showing to get a Franks hearing. View "United States v. Rivera" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of twenty-two counts of theft of government property and one count of aggravated identity theft. Defendant appealed, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support her convictions and that the district court abused its discretion in denying her request to continue her trial to a later date due to the issuance of a superseding indictment only ten days before trial. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) there was sufficient evidence to support Defendant’s convictions; and (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendant’s request to continue her trial to a later date because Defendant failed to identify any concrete respect in which she was harmed by the denial of her request for a continuance. View "United States v. Gonzalez-Martinez" on Justia Law

Officers sought to execute a warrant for Bey's arrest, stemming from a domestic violence dispute involving a firearm. They determined that Bey was likely at the Summons home. Bey was barred from that residence by an abuse prevention order. Five officers arrived at Summons's apartment, Summons answered her door, repeated aloud, "Is Paul Bey here?" and stated that she was not sure. Summons then put her finger to her lips in a hushing gesture and backed into the apartment while opening the door. The officers entered and found Bey in a bedroom. Concerned for his own safety, Officer Stallbaum moved a backpack away from Bey's reach and noticed its weight. Bey stated the bag belonged to Summons. After Bey's removal, Officer McCabe asked Summons about her four-year-old son and mentioned contacting the Massachusetts Department of Children and Families. McCabe did not mention removing the child. Stallbaum returned to the apartment and asked Summons to sign a consent-to-search form, stating that she was free to withhold consent. Summons signed. She stated that the backpack was hers, but that she was lending it to Bey. A search of the backpack yielded a loaded semi-automatic pistol and ammunition, 15.31 grams of marijuana, 22.5 15-milligram oxycodone pills, and an electronic scale with cocaine and marijuana residue. Bey was charged with drug and firearm offenses. Bey pleaded guilty and was sentenced to 60 months’ imprisonment. The First Circuit affirmed denial of a motion to suppress and rejected a challenge to the sentence as waived. Summons's decisions to admit the officers and to allow a search of the backpack were knowing and intelligent. View "United States v. Bey" on Justia Law

An armed assailant entered Banco Popular, covered his face with a mask, and told a teller to fill a bag with money. The teller complied, but added red security dye packs. The robbery was captured by video surveillance equipment. After the assailant left, off-duty Puerto Rico Police Officer Guzman, present during the robbery, tried unsuccessfully attempted to catch the assailant, but saw him remove his mask and get into a dark brown Nissan Pathfinder. Days later, the PRPD Bank Robbery Division received an anonymous tip concerning a different bank robbery involving "Bartolo" and a "brown colored" Nissan Pathfinder. After confirming that Santiago was called Bartolo, officers went to Santiago's address. After being read his Miranda warnings, Santiago stated that he had disposed of the gun, but had money that was damaged by the red stain. After signing consent forms. Santiago led officers to his bedroom and revealed the money. His mother, who owned the Nissan, authorized its search; the seat was stained red. As they were driving to the police station, Santiago, without prompting, stated that he was repentant. He later stated that he wanted to apologize. Officers provided additional Miranda warnings, plus writing tools. Santiago wrote a note asking forgiveness. Guzmán identified Santiago during an in-person lineup. Santiago was convicted of robbery, 18 U.S.C. 2113 (a)(d), and use of a firearm in relation to a crime of violence, 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A)(ii), and was sentenced to 204 months in prison. The First Circuit rejected challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence and to the reasonableness of the sentence and affirmed without prejudice to Santiago’s right to raise a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in a post-conviction proceeding. View "United States v. Santiago-Gonzalez" on Justia Law

In 2005, Puerto Rico Police Agent Lizardi was undercover, investigating Casey. Lizardi went missing on the day of a scheduled drug buy. Casey was arrested, signed a Miranda waiver, and at some point, told officers he was no longer interested in talking. While Casey was in custody, Casey's grandparents, with whom he lived, permitted officers to search his bedroom without a warrant. The FBI discovered a loaded firearm, Lizardi's cell phone, and a pair of blood-stained flip flops. Confronted with this evidence, Casey requested an attorney. His common-law wife visited him in custody. Casey's statements to her during their exchange were overheard by officers. Lizardi's body was found. Casey was charged with carjacking with the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury (18 U.S.C. 2119(3)); possession, use, discharge, carrying of firearms during a crime of violence resulting in another's death (18 U.S.C. 924(j)); and being a felon in possession of a firearm (21 U.S.C. 922(g)(1)). Pretrial proceedings took six years and included unsuccessful motions to suppress evidence from the bedroom search, a photo array identification that connected him to the crime, statements elicited from him allegedly in violation of his Miranda rights, words exchanged with his wife while in custody, and photos of Lizardi's decomposing body. The FIrst Circuit affirmed Casey’s convictions and the sentence of life in prison, rejecting challenges concerning voir dire, the motions to suppress, and the judge’s refusal to recuse himself. View "United States v. Casey" on Justia Law

In 1997, Jaynes befriended 10-year-old Jeffrey in his Massachusetts neighborhood. Jaynes took Jeffrey for rides in Jaynes's Cadillac without his parents' knowledge. On October 1, Jaynes and Sicari picked Jeffrey up in the Cadillac, bought gasoline, duct tape, a large plastic container, lime, and concrete, and traveled to a New Hampshire apartment that Jaynes rented. The next morning, the Cadillac was seen parked at the Great Works River Bridge in Maine. Jaynes was arrested; an inventory search of the Cadillac yielded a driver's license with a picture of Jaynes under a different name and a Manchester address; duct tape; and receipts for a plastic container, lime, and concrete. Following Sicari’s confession, implicating Jaynes, police conducted a warranted search of Jaynes's New Hampshire apartment and found lime, the plastic container's label, and Jeffrey's jersey smelling of gasoline. Jeffrey's body was discovered in the Great Works River, inside a plastic container sealed with duct tape. An autopsy revealed that a gasoline-soaked rag had been held over his nose and mouth. Jaynes was convicted of kidnapping and second-degree murder. State appeals courts rejected his claims that the Commonwealth was required to prove that harm preceding death (not the separately charged abduction) occurred in Massachusetts, and concerning brief closing of the courtroom to the public, although not to Jaynes or his counsel. On unsuccessful appeal from denial of a second motion for a new trial, Jaynes argued that inflammatory evidence of his sexual preferences was improperly admitted, evidence from the searches should have been excluded, and ineffective assistance. The First Circuit affirmed denial of his federal habeas petition, holding that no state court determination was either contrary to nor an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. View "Jaynes v. Mitchell" on Justia Law

Acevedo and Vazques seized Doe at gunpoint, pulling him out of a car in Boston. Doe’s family paid the ransom with money marked by the FBI. Agents watched the ransom drop. Vazquez, Moreno, and Acevedo later met to hide the ransom money. They held Doe for several days before he was rescued by the FBI. When Acevedo pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit kidnapping, 18 U.S.C. 1201(c), he acknowledged that he had read the indictment and did not object to its description of the offense. The PSR added that Vazquez, a drug dealer who ran an auto shop, was hired by another drug dealer to kidnap Doe to collect a drug debt, and recruited the others. Cellphone analysis revealed that, for three weeks before the kidnapping and one day after Doe's recovery, Vazquez's and Acevedo's phones made contact 114 times; Moreno's and Acevedo's phones made contact 89 times. The PSR calculated an offense level of 37, including an enhancement for making a ransom demand and another for using a firearm, with a reduction for acceptance of responsibility, yielding a Guidelines imprisonment range of 210-262 months. Acevedo challenged factual details, claimed a "minor role" in the conspiracy, argued the ransom-demand enhancement was "double counting," and challenged the firearm enhancement, arguing that he could not reasonably have foreseen that any co-conspirator would possess a gun. The First Circuit affirmed Acevedo’s 192-month sentence, noting that Acevedo, unlike his co-conspirators, did not cooperate. View "United States v. Acevedo" on Justia Law

Guzman, a supervisor at Kmart, provided his co-conspirators with information about a Kmart store, including the store's layout and the identity of the security guard. Guzman's co-conspirators robbed the store, using a firearm and physically restraining and injuring the security guard. Guzman subsequently provided details about another Kmart store and prepared a hiding spot for his co-defendant, who hid in that spot until the store closed. When Guzman and other employees encountered the robber the next morning, Guzman pretended to be a victim. The second robbery involved a firearm, restraint of employees, and injury to the security guard. The value of the property taken during the two robberies exceeded $50,000. Guzman pled guilty to conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robberies, 18 U.S.C. 1951(a). His plea agreement and PSR recommended a range of 97 to 121 months, based on a total offense level of 30 and a criminal history category of I. The offense level included enhancements because a firearm was brandished, victims sustained bodily injury, victims were physically restrained, the loss exceeded $50,000, and Guzman abused a position of trust. The court imposed a 135-month term, explaining its consideration of the sentencing factors in 18 U.S.C. 3553(a). The First Circuit affirmed; the factors relied on by the court established a plausible rationale for the modest variance. View "United States v. Guzman-Fernandez" on Justia Law