Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant pled guilty to possession of child pornography and was sentenced to seventy-eight months’ imprisonment and ten years of supervised release. Defendant appealed, arguing that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress because the search and seizure of computers and other items from his apartment violated the Fourth Amendment. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in finding (1) FBI agents did not violate the curtilage of Defendant’s home; (2) Defendant consented to the search, and the FBI agents did not exceed the scope of that consent; and (3) the temporary seizure of Defendant’s apartment did not violate the Fourth Amendment. View "United States v. Perez-Diaz" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of conspiring to possess cocaine with the intent to distribute and aiding and abetting others to posses cocaine with the intent to distribute. Defendant appealed, arguing that he was entitled to a new trial of the prosecutor’s improper questioning that compelled him to comment on the veracity of two cooperating government witnesses, a problem that was compounded by improper judicial intervention in support of the prosecutor’s questions. The First Circuit vacated Defendant’s conviction and remanded for a new trial, holding that the government’s questions were extensive and improper, and the preserved errors were not harmless. View "United States v. Pereira" on Justia Law

Defendant, a police officer acting under color of state law, took Plaintiff into protective custody, handcuffed him, transported him to a police station, and jailed him after attempting to evaluate whether Defendant was incapacitated by his consumption of alcohol. Plaintiff sued in federal district court, arguing that Defendant lacked probable cause to take him into protective custody. The district court granted Defendant’s motion for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds, concluding that the law was not clearly established as to the need for probable cause. The First Circuit vacated the entry of summary judgment and remanded for further proceedings, holding (1) the state of preexisting law established that a reasonable officer must have probable cause to take an individual into protective custody, handcuff him, transport him to a police station, and confine him in a jail cell; (2) an objectively reasonable officer in this case would not have had adequate reason to believe that Plaintiff, though intoxicated, was incapacitated; and (3) therefore, the qualified immunity defense was not available to Plaintiff. View "Alfano v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Swaby, a citizen of Jamaica, entered the U.S. on a tourist visa in 1996 and adjusted to lawful permanent resident status in 2010. In 2013, Swaby pled nolo contendere in Rhode Island to three counts of manufacturing, delivering, or possessing with intent to distribute marijuana. Swaby was charged with removability under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(B)(i), which authorizes removal of an alien convicted of a violation of any federal or state law "relating to a controlled substance,” defined as a "drug or other substance" included in one of the five federal drug schedules, 21 U.S.C 802(6). Swaby initially appeared pro se and accepted an order of removal, waiving his right to appeal. In 2015, represented by counsel, Swaby moved to reopen and terminate removal proceedings, arguing that under the Supreme Court’s 2015 holding, Mellouli v. Lynch, his convictions did not qualify as removable offenses. The IJ reopened, but denied Swaby's request for cancellation of removal. The BIA affirmed. The First Circuit dismissed in part and denied relief in part. Under the modified categorical approach, the plea documents make clear that Swaby's convictions were for the manufacturing, delivering, or possessing with intent to distribute marijuana and "relat[e] to a controlled substance (as defined in [the federal drug schedules])," as section 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) requires. View "Swaby v. Yates" on Justia Law

In 1991, six men were shot, execution-style, in an illegal gambling club in Boston's Chinatown district; one (Lee) survived. Lee testified that Tran arrived at the club with one of the victims after they had been drinking. Tran left, then returned with Tham and Pham. All three had guns. Lee felt a gun at the back of his head, heard a bang, and lost consciousness. Two hours later, Lee regained consciousness. Arrest warrants issued, but the three had left the country. Authorities in China arrested Tran in 1999, and Tham in 2000. They were extradited. At trial, the Commonwealth was allowed to introduce, as evidence of consciousness of guilt, a passenger manifest and ticket inquiry showing that three weeks after the shooting, passengers named Tran, Tham, and Pham flew on United Airlines from New York to Hong Kong, having purchased their tickets together. Both were convicted and sentenced to five consecutive terms of life in prison, plus 24 to 25 years. State courts affirmed. They filed federal habeas petitions. The First Circuit affirmed denial of relief, rejecting arguments that the prosecution’s use of photocopies of the flight records violated the Sixth Amendment either because defendants had a right to confront someone who knew the airline's procedures for verifying passenger identities at the time of the flight or had a right to confront the person who created the records. View "Van Tran v. Roden" on Justia Law

Nieves and two other men traveling on a Puerto Rico highway pulled alongside a car stopped at a traffic light. Nieves exited the vehicle, carrying "a long pointed tip object" to the driver's side of the car. He ordered the driver to get out. When she did not immediately comply, he opened the driver's side door, yanked the driver from her seat, and pushed her toward the highway lane divider. Nieves drove away in her car. The vehicle in which he arrived fled. Hours later, reports surfaced of three armed individuals disassembling a matching vehicle in Canóvanas. Police responded and took both men into custody. Their investigation confirmed that the car was the vehicle carjacked hours earlier. Nieves, arrested the following day, waived his constitutional rights, admitted to participating in the carjacking, and was charged under 18 U.S.C. 2119(1). Nieves pled guilty; the government agreed to recommend a sentence in "the middle range of the applicable guideline," with no stipulation as to criminal history category. His 60-month sentence exceeded by nine months the top of the guidelines range and by 14 months the government's recommendation. The First Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the court abused its discretion by considering unreliable evidence (statement by a codefendant concerning the reasons for disassembling the stolen car), by varying upward based on information already factored into the guidelines range, and by ignoring "the significant mitigating factor" of his youth. View "United States v. Nieves-Mercado" on Justia Law

In 2011, while serving a four-year probation sentence for a robbery, Llanos-Falero conspired to rob Banco Santander de Puerto Rico. His associate drew police away with a bogus 911 call while Llanos-Falero drove two others to the bank. They entered with a loaded 12-gauge shotgun, and stole approximately $38,813 of FDIC-insured deposits. A bank employee activated the bank's silent alarm; the two associates were arrested about 10 minutes after the start of the robbery. Before being charged, Llanos-Falero committed other offenses and was sentenced by a Puerto Rico court to one year and nine months of imprisonment for two counts of domestic violence, and, for illegal possession of a submachine gun, to seven addition years. Llanos-Falero was indicted for the federal crimes in 2014, while serving his Puerto Rico sentences. He entered a plea and was sentenced to 137 months of imprisonment for bank robbery, 18 U.S.C. 2113(a), 2113(d), and brandishing a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence, 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A)(ii), to run consecutively to the Puerto Rico sentences. The First Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the sentencing judge failed to make the proper inquiry into the effects of Llanos-Falero's medication on his competence to enter a plea and failed to warn Llanos-Falero that his federal sentence might be imposed consecutively with his Puerto Rico sentences, and that the consecutively imposed federal sentence was unreasonable. View "United States v. Llanos-Falero" on Justia Law

Appellant pleaded guilty to being a prohibited person in possession of a firearm. The district court sentenced Appellant to thirty-six months’ imprisonment to be followed by a three-year term of supervised release. The applicable sentencing guidelines range recommended a term of imprisonment of twelve to eighteen months. The First Circuit affirmed Appellant’s sentence, holding (1) the district court did not obviously violate Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(h) when it decided to impose a sentence above the guidelines sentencing range, nor did the manner in which it proceeded affect Appellant’s substantial rights; (2) the district court’s decision to impose a sentence of thirty-six months’ imprisonment followed by a three-year term of supervised release was not unreasonable; and (3) Appellant waived his argument that judicial bias warranted recusal. View "United States v. Santini-Santiago" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of five counts of drug trafficking and one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition. Appellant was sentenced to a term of sixty-three to seventy-eight months. The First Circuit affirmed Appellant’s conviction and sentence, holding (1) the totality of the circumstances here did not present the rare case where any government misconduct was sufficiently blatant, outrageous, or egregious to warrant the dismissal of Appellant’s indictment; (2) the trial court adequately inquired into the existence and extent of any prejudice Appellant suffered after at least two jurors viewed a text message on his phone and effectively mitigated any prejudice suffered by Appellant; and (3) the district court did not err when it refused to decrease Appellant’s offense level during sentencing. View "United States v. Therrien" on Justia Law

Appellant entered a guilty plea to conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute marijuana. After a disposition hearing, the district court sentenced Appellant to a fifty-month term of immurement. Appellant appealed, arguing that the district court plainly erred in conversing off the record with the probation officer during sentencing without apprising Appellant of the substance of these conversations. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that Appellant failed to show a reasonable probability that the outcome of his sentencing proceeding would have been different but for the two off-the-record conversations between the sentencing judge and the probation officer. View "United States v. Bramley" on Justia Law