Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Augustine Perez was on federal supervised release in North Carolina, subject to conditions that allowed warrantless searches of his “person and property” by probation officers. Perez moved from a residence at Teal Drive to Lawndale Drive, reporting the change as required, but retained ownership of Teal Drive and leased it to Deanna Coleman, who moved in with her daughter. About a year later, probation officers received a tip from a confidential informant that Perez was living at Teal Drive and involved in drug trafficking. Without a warrant, officers searched both Lawndale Drive and Teal Drive on the same day. At Teal Drive, Coleman objected to the search, but officers proceeded, finding cash and items they alleged were connected to drug trafficking.In the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, Perez and Coleman moved to suppress the evidence from the Teal Drive search, claiming it was unconstitutional. The district court denied the motion to suppress and granted summary judgment to the government, ruling that the currency found was subject to forfeiture as drug proceeds, largely relying on the evidence seized during the search.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed, vacated, and remanded. The court held that a supervised release condition permitting warrantless searches of a supervisee’s “property” does not authorize the search of real property owned by the supervisee but leased and occupied by a third party. The court further held that, to lawfully search Coleman’s residence under Perez’s supervision conditions, officers needed probable cause to believe Perez resided there. The government failed to meet this standard, rendering the search of Teal Drive unconstitutional. The Fourth Circuit ordered suppression of the evidence and dismissal of the forfeiture complaint. View "US v. Perez" on Justia Law

Three men—Clifton Mosley, Davon Carter, and Matthew Hightower—were involved in marijuana trafficking together. Hightower, who worked at a medical supply company, was indicted for healthcare fraud based on information provided by his coworker, Lisa Edmonds. After Hightower’s indictment, he, Carter, and Mosley allegedly conspired to retaliate against Edmonds, who was expected to testify against Hightower. On the morning Edmonds was scheduled for a court appearance, Carter fatally shot Edmonds’ neighbor, Latrina Ashburne, having apparently mistaken her for Edmonds. Surveillance footage, phone records, and witness testimony connected Mosley and Carter to the murder and to each other in the hours before the shooting.The United States District Court for the District of Maryland presided over the criminal proceedings. Carter and Mosley were jointly tried and convicted by a jury of witness-murder and marijuana trafficking. Mosley had moved to sever the murder and marijuana charges and to suppress evidence found on Carter, but the district court denied these motions, finding the offenses were properly joined under the Federal Rules, and that Mosley lacked standing to challenge the search of Carter’s property. A jury returned guilty verdicts on all counts, and Mosley received life imprisonment for the witness-murder counts and a concurrent sentence for marijuana distribution.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed Mosley’s appeal. The court held that joinder of the charges was proper, and the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying severance. The appellate court also held that Mosley lacked standing to challenge the suppression of evidence from Carter’s property. Finally, the Fourth Circuit concluded that substantial evidence supported the jury’s verdict. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court’s judgment and upheld Mosley’s convictions. View "US v. Mosley" on Justia Law

The defendant was charged with several offenses arising from a scheme in which he and others conspired to commit wire fraud by deceiving businesses into transferring funds to accounts they controlled. The conspirators, operating from Nigeria and Saudi Arabia, used phishing emails containing malware to access business computers and steal money. The government linked the defendant to the conspiracy using evidence including overlapping social media handles, email accounts, IP addresses, and testimony connecting his online activity to fraud-related accounts. The government also introduced evidence that one company suffered financial losses and response costs due to the crimes.A grand jury indicted the defendant and his co-conspirators, but only the defendant proceeded to trial in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. During jury selection, a prospective juror mentioned familiarity with the defendant and the case due to his work in cybersecurity. The court struck this juror for cause and repeatedly instructed the panel on impartiality. The jury convicted the defendant on all counts, including sentencing enhancements. The defendant moved for acquittal and a new trial, arguing that the prospective juror’s comments affected jury impartiality and that the evidence was insufficient to connect him to the scheme or to establish the necessary $5,000 loss for an enhanced sentence. The district court denied these motions and sentenced the defendant to 120 months’ imprisonment.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of a new trial, finding no prejudicial error in the jury selection process and holding that there was sufficient evidence linking the defendant to the fraud. However, the appellate court reversed the sentencing enhancement for intentional damage to a protected computer, concluding that the government failed to prove $5,000 in qualifying losses as required by statute. The case was remanded for resentencing consistent with this opinion. View "United States v. Umeti" on Justia Law

Daqua Ritter was indicted for three federal crimes connected to the murder of Ernest “Dime” Doe, a transgender woman in rural South Carolina. Ritter and Doe had a secretive sexual relationship, and Ritter was sensitive about public knowledge of this relationship, especially since Doe openly referred to Ritter as her boyfriend. Evidence at trial showed Ritter pressured Doe to keep their relationship hidden and reacted angrily when others mentioned it. Doe was found shot dead in a car, and Ritter was last seen with her hours before her death. After the murder, Ritter disposed of his gun and burned his clothes. A federal grand jury indicted Ritter for willfully causing bodily injury based on Doe's gender identity resulting in death, using a gun during a crime of violence, and making false statements to investigators.The United States District Court for the District of South Carolina presided over Ritter’s trial. A jury convicted Ritter on all charges, and the district court sentenced him to life in prison. Ritter moved for a new trial, claiming juror bias and prejudicial hearsay testimony, and challenged the sufficiency of evidence for two counts. The district court held an evidentiary hearing regarding juror bias and denied the motion for a new trial, finding the juror credible and impartial. It also denied the motion for a mistrial based on hearsay, issuing a curative instruction to disregard the testimony.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding no juror bias or in denying a mistrial based on hearsay, as the curative instruction was sufficient. The court also found that, viewed in the light most favorable to the government, there was sufficient evidence for the jury to convict Ritter on all counts, including motive based on gender identity and the likelihood that false statements would be communicated to federal law enforcement. The judgment was affirmed. View "United States v. Ritter" on Justia Law

An individual who served as Executive Director of a local economic development authority in Virginia was indicted on thirty-four counts stemming from multiple fraudulent schemes. These included wire fraud, bank fraud, money laundering, and aggravated identity theft. The prosecution presented evidence that the defendant used forged documents and misrepresentations to divert public funds for personal gain. One scheme involved a $2 million wire transfer, where the defendant lied to both her employer and others, using another person’s identity to facilitate the movement of funds. The trial was repeatedly delayed due to health issues experienced by the defendant and her counsel, resulting in significant breaks and several motions for mistrial by the defense.The United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia presided over the trial, ultimately entering judgments of acquittal on four counts of bank fraud but allowing the remaining convictions to stand. The court denied the defendant’s motions for mistrial, a new trial, and to introduce certain grand jury testimony. After the jury returned guilty verdicts on the remaining counts, the defendant was sentenced accordingly. The defendant appealed, challenging the aggravated identity theft conviction, the handling of trial delays, evidentiary rulings, and a supplemental jury instruction given after closing arguments.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that, under Dubin v. United States, the aggravated identity theft conviction could not stand because the use of another’s identity was not at the “crux” of the predicate wire fraud offense. The court vacated the conviction and sentence on that count and remanded for resentencing. However, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s rulings on all other issues, including denial of a mistrial, exclusion of grand jury testimony, and the propriety of the additional jury instruction. View "United States v. McDonald" on Justia Law

Lawrence Levon Jones was investigated by Raleigh police as a suspected drug supplier during a larger drug-trafficking operation in 2020. Officers monitored a suspected stash house and wiretapped Jones’s phone, observing frequent visits by Jones and connections with other individuals involved in drug distribution. Jones financed marijuana purchases via Wesley Kelly, who transported drugs between California and North Carolina. Coordinated arrests and searches in July 2020 resulted in the seizure of large quantities of drugs, cash, and firearms from the stash house and related locations. Jones was arrested at the stash house and later made jail calls directing associates to move large sums of money.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina charged Jones and others with several drug and firearms offenses. Jones was specifically indicted on four counts, including drug conspiracy and firearms possession. At trial, the government presented testimony from investigators and Kelly, a cooperating witness. The district court excluded evidence of Kelly’s decades-old federal drug convictions under Federal Rule of Evidence 609(b). After the government’s case, Jones moved for acquittal on the firearms charges, arguing lack of evidence of possession; the court denied the motion. The jury found Jones guilty on all counts. During sentencing, Jones objected to enhancements for obstruction and leadership, but the district court overruled these objections and imposed a sentence of 480 months.On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, Jones challenged the exclusion of Kelly’s convictions, the denial of his motion for acquittal, and the sentencing enhancements. The Fourth Circuit held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding impeachment evidence, that sufficient evidence supported the firearms convictions under constructive possession principles, and that the sentencing enhancements were not clearly erroneous. The Court also found that any error would have been harmless given Jones’s guidelines range. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "United States v. Jones" on Justia Law

The defendant was originally convicted of possession with intent to distribute cocaine and illegal reentry after deportation. He was sentenced to concurrent prison terms and supervised release. After serving his sentence, he was released and removed from the United States. Several years later, he was found in Virginia in possession of over six kilograms of cocaine and charged with a new federal drug offense, to which he pled guilty. The United States Probation Office filed a petition alleging violations of his supervised release: committing a new crime and reentering the country. At his sentencing and revocation hearing, the defendant admitted to both violations and argued that his actions had been influenced by fear of cartel reprisals, seeking a sentence within the advisory guideline range and concurrent with his new sentence.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia imposed a 36-month sentence for the supervised release violation, the statutory maximum, to run consecutively to the new sentence. The district court cited the defendant’s prior similar conviction and the large quantity of drugs but did not address the defendant’s arguments regarding coercion or mitigating circumstances.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. It held that the district court’s revocation sentence was procedurally unreasonable because the court failed to sufficiently explain its reasons for imposing the statutory maximum, particularly by not engaging with the defendant’s nonfrivolous argument that his conduct was influenced by coercion. The Fourth Circuit concluded that this error was not harmless and that the sentence was plainly unreasonable under clearly established law. Accordingly, the appellate court vacated the revocation sentence and remanded the case for resentencing. View "US v. Celedon" on Justia Law

In July 2023, law enforcement responded to an incident in which James Jacobs allegedly discharged a firearm during a dispute with his girlfriend at his home. During a subsequent search, officers discovered two firearms. Jacobs, who has a prior felony conviction and a previous misdemeanor conviction for domestic battery in West Virginia, admitted to knowing he was prohibited from possessing firearms. As a result, a grand jury in the Northern District of West Virginia indicted him for possessing firearms after a felony conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) and after a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence under § 922(g)(9).The United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia granted Jacobs’ motion to dismiss both counts of the indictment. The district court, employing the framework from New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen, found that the government failed to demonstrate a historical tradition of disarming individuals like Jacobs—nonviolent felons and domestic violence offenders. The court concluded that both statutes were unconstitutional as applied to Jacobs and dismissed the charges without reaching the facial challenges.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the district court’s rulings de novo. The Fourth Circuit held that recent decisions—including United States v. Rahimi, United States v. Canada, United States v. Hunt, and United States v. Nutter—foreclose Jacobs’ facial and as-applied challenges to § 922(g)(1) and his facial challenge to § 922(g)(9). Accordingly, the court reversed the district court’s dismissal of the § 922(g)(1) charge and barred Jacobs from reviving those challenges. However, the Fourth Circuit determined that further proceedings were necessary regarding Jacobs’ as-applied challenge to § 922(g)(9), vacated the district court’s ruling on that count, and remanded for additional factfinding and analysis. View "United States v. Jacobs" on Justia Law

The case concerns a defendant who, in May 2023, sold crack cocaine to a confidential informant on three occasions, totaling nearly 66 grams. When law enforcement later executed an arrest warrant for his failure to register as a sex offender, they discovered additional quantities of cocaine, marijuana, and crack cocaine in his possession. The defendant was indicted on three counts of distributing cocaine base and one count of possessing cocaine with intent to distribute. He pled guilty to all four counts without a plea agreement.A probation officer preparing a Presentence Investigation Report determined that the defendant should be classified as a career offender under the Sentencing Guidelines, based on two prior state convictions for drug offenses. This classification significantly increased his sentencing range. The defendant objected, arguing that one of the predicate offenses—under Florida law—criminalized conduct not covered by the federal definition of a “controlled substance offense,” such as simple possession and purchase. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina accepted the career-offender enhancement but, anticipating a possible error, stated it would impose the same 120-month sentence regardless, based on the defendant’s criminal history and other factors.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that the district court erred in applying the career-offender enhancement, because the underlying Florida statute was not a categorical match to the federal definition. However, the Fourth Circuit found this error harmless. The district court made clear it would have imposed the same sentence even without the enhancement, and the sentence was substantively reasonable in light of the court’s thorough consideration of statutory sentencing factors. The Fourth Circuit therefore affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Cox" on Justia Law

A group of defendants operated a drug trafficking ring in Virginia. When a customer failed to pay for drugs, two leaders of the organization sought retribution and offered one defendant $10,000 to murder someone close to the delinquent customer. That defendant recruited his cousin, and together they traveled from North Carolina to Virginia and murdered the customer’s aunt. All four defendants were charged with numerous offenses related to drug distribution, murder, and murder-for-hire. After a jury trial, each defendant was convicted on all counts and sentenced to life imprisonment.Prior to this appeal, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia reviewed and denied several pretrial motions to suppress evidence, including challenges to GPS tracker warrants, pen register orders, cell-site location data, and wiretap authorizations. The district court also rejected arguments related to double jeopardy, jury instructions, evidentiary rulings, and severance of trials. The defendants raised sufficiency of the evidence challenges and various constitutional and statutory claims in the district court, many of which were preserved for appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the convictions and sentences. Applying the relevant legal standards, the Fourth Circuit found that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s verdicts on all counts for each defendant. The court held that convictions and sentences for both murder-for-hire and conspiracy to commit murder-for-hire do not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause because each offense requires proof of a fact the other does not. The court affirmed the denial of motions to suppress, finding no reversible error. It also rejected additional challenges related to jury instructions, evidentiary matters, severance, and duplicity. The judgments of the district court were affirmed. View "United States v. Evans" on Justia Law