Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

After pleading guilty to two felony charges, an individual was sentenced to prison and a term of supervised release. Upon his release, he violated several conditions of his supervision almost immediately. As a result, the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina revoked his supervised release, sentencing him to 41 months in prison followed by a lifetime of supervised release, with a specific condition of nearly 21 months (629 days) of home detention.Following the revocation hearing, the defendant filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing that the home detention term exceeded what the law allows when combined with his prison sentence. He pointed to 18 U.S.C. § 3563(b)(19), which states that home detention “may be imposed only as an alternative to incarceration,” and argued that since the statutory maximum for incarceration under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3) is 48 months, only 7 additional months of home detention could be imposed. The district court denied this motion, reasoning that home detention is distinct from incarceration and thus did not need to be included in the statutory calculation.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the district court’s ruling. The Fourth Circuit held that under § 3563(b)(19), home detention may only be imposed as a direct substitute for incarceration, on a one-for-one basis, and that the combined total of incarceration and home detention cannot exceed the statutory maximum term of incarceration (48 months in this case). Because the district court imposed a total combined sentence of approximately 62 months (41 months imprisonment plus nearly 21 months home detention), the sentence exceeded statutory limits. The Fourth Circuit vacated the sentence and remanded the case for resentencing in accordance with this interpretation. View "US v. Watson" on Justia Law

The defendant pleaded guilty in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina to charges including conspiracy to distribute controlled substances and unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon. As part of his plea agreement, he waived his right to appeal his conviction or sentence except for claims of ineffective assistance of counsel or prosecutorial misconduct. At sentencing, the district court found that three prior North Carolina convictions—including second-degree murder—qualified as violent felonies under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), resulting in an enhanced sentence of 360 months’ imprisonment. The defendant withdrew all objections to the presentence report at sentencing and was sentenced accordingly.On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, the defendant argued that his North Carolina second-degree murder conviction did not qualify as a violent felony under the ACCA, and also that his firearm conviction was unconstitutional under the Second Amendment. The government moved to dismiss only the Second Amendment challenge based on the appeal waiver, and argued the merits regarding the ACCA issue. The court dismissed the Second Amendment challenge, but deferred ruling on the ACCA claim. The government later attempted to invoke the appeal waiver against the ACCA challenge, but the court found this argument forfeited as the government had already argued the merits without raising the waiver.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that the government forfeited its right to enforce the appeal waiver by failing to timely assert it. On the merits, the court held that North Carolina’s second-degree murder statute categorically qualifies as a violent felony under the ACCA, as it requires malice amounting to extreme recklessness akin to knowledge and always involves the use of physical force. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "US v. Goode" on Justia Law

Two executives of a Charlotte-based software company, serving as Chief Executive Officer and Chief Operating Officer, were responsible for the company’s financial affairs, including filing required IRS forms and paying over trust-fund taxes withheld from employees’ wages. Over multiple years, the company failed to pay over these taxes, despite repeated IRS interventions, warnings from advisors, and assurances from the executives that steps were being taken to resolve their liabilities. Despite participation in an IRS Voluntary Disclosure Program and substantial company revenues, the executives continued to pay themselves significant salaries while the unpaid trust-fund tax debt accumulated, ultimately exceeding $500,000. After the company ceased operations, the IRS imposed personal liability and penalties on both executives, who also failed to use available funds to pay overdue taxes.A federal grand jury in the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina indicted both executives in January 2023 for five counts of willful failure to pay over trust-fund taxes, in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7202. After a joint jury trial in March 2024, both were convicted on these counts, though acquitted of filing false tax returns and tax evasion. Their post-trial motions for acquittal and a new trial—based on insufficiency of the evidence and the alleged weight of evidence favoring their cooperation with the IRS—were denied by the district court.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the convictions and denial of the new trial motion. The court applied an abuse of discretion standard to the jury instruction and Rule 33 new trial issues, and reviewed legal questions de novo. The Fourth Circuit held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the jury to review the indictment, providing instructions regarding willfulness and the good faith defense, or denying a new trial, finding that the evidence of willful failure to pay over taxes was overwhelming. The criminal judgments were affirmed. View "US v. Gentner" on Justia Law

Jonathan Revels was involved in a fatal altercation during which he shot and killed Jason Hunt with a revolver. Evidence showed Revels possessed three firearms at various times during the incident: two shotguns and the revolver used in the shooting. He was charged in federal court with a single count of possessing a firearm after a felony conviction, specifically referencing the two shotguns in the indictment, but not the revolver. A jury convicted Revels of this charge, and he was sentenced to 120 months in prison. While an earlier appeal affirmed the conviction, it remanded for resentencing due to a material fact misrepresented by the government at the original sentencing.After the remand from the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, but before resentencing, Revels was convicted in state court of voluntary manslaughter for the killing of Hunt. At resentencing, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina applied a cross-reference in the Federal Sentencing Guidelines that enhances sentences if a firearm cited in the offense of conviction was used in connection with another offense, here applying the voluntary manslaughter guideline. The district court imposed a sentence of 84 months. Revels appealed, arguing that the government had not proved the statutory requirements for the enhancement, and that his sentence was both procedurally and substantively unreasonable.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit vacated Revels’ sentence and remanded for resentencing. The court held that the district court did not make sufficient factual findings to support the application of the cross-reference provision in the Sentencing Guidelines, specifically failing to identify which firearm formed the basis for the enhancement or to explain how it was used in connection with the homicide. The court did not decide whether the enhancement could apply, leaving that for the district court on remand. View "US v. Revels" on Justia Law

The defendant pleaded guilty to a federal offense that prohibits possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. During sentencing, his presentence report recommended an enhanced base offense level because of a prior 2008 conviction under Virginia Code § 18.2-53.1 for using a firearm in the commission of a felony, specifically robbery. This enhancement was based on the conclusion that the prior conviction constituted a “crime of violence” as defined by the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. The defendant, through counsel, objected, arguing that his prior conviction did not meet the Guidelines’ definition of a crime of violence, and the parties’ written and oral arguments focused primarily on whether the elements clause or the enumerated offense clause of the Guidelines applied.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia overruled the defendant’s objection and applied the enhancement, basing its conclusion on the elements clause. The court’s reasoning mirrored the elements clause language, and its supporting citations were to cases addressing that clause or similar provisions. The resulting advisory Guidelines range was higher, and the defendant received a 33-month sentence. On appeal, he argued that the court erred in finding his prior conviction qualified as a crime of violence. The government defended the application of the elements clause and also raised arguments under the enumerated offense clause and harmless error doctrine.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that the district court erred in concluding the prior Virginia conviction satisfied the elements clause, adopting circuit precedent holding that Virginia robbery does not categorically require the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against another. The Fourth Circuit found the government had not demonstrated harmless error and declined to affirm based on the enumerated offense clause. The court vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing. View "US v. Scott" on Justia Law

Jaron Starkey pleaded guilty to a federal drug-trafficking offense and was sentenced to 300 months in prison. His sentence was enhanced under the career-offender provision of the United States Sentencing Guidelines, based on two prior felony drug-distribution convictions in Delaware from 2012 and 2019. Starkey challenged the use of these convictions as predicates for the enhancement, contending that the Delaware statutes under which he was convicted criminalized attempted drug distribution, which, according to Fourth Circuit precedent prior to a 2023 Guidelines amendment, would not qualify as “controlled substance offenses” under the Sentencing Guidelines.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia rejected Starkey’s argument and applied the career-offender enhancement, concluding that his prior Delaware convictions qualified as predicate offenses under the Guidelines. Starkey appealed this determination.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s judgment. The Fourth Circuit held that the Delaware statutes under which Starkey was convicted define “delivery” to include “attempted transfers,” but this does not mean they criminalize attempted delivery as an inchoate offense. Instead, the offense of delivery encompasses completed acts that may include attempted transfers, which are distinct from mere attempts prosecuted under separate attempt statutes. The court found that Delaware law does not prosecute inchoate attempted deliveries under its drug-distribution statutes. Therefore, Starkey’s prior convictions properly qualified as controlled substance offenses for the career-offender enhancement. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "US v. Starkey" on Justia Law

In this case, the defendant participated in two incidents at a North Carolina bank: an armed robbery in which employees were assaulted with firearms, and a subsequent attempted armed robbery where the group was foiled when the bank manager recognized them and secured the building. The defendant was convicted by a jury of both armed bank robbery and attempted armed bank robbery under 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) and (d), as well as for brandishing firearms during these crimes in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii).Following his conviction and sentence, which were affirmed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in 2014, the defendant filed several postconviction motions in the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina. These were denied. On appeal, the Fourth Circuit granted a certificate of appealability limited to the question of whether the defendant’s conviction for attempted armed bank robbery qualified as a “crime of violence” for purposes of supporting his related conviction under Section 924(c).The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed de novo whether attempted armed bank robbery under 18 U.S.C. § 2113(d) categorically constitutes a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3). The court held that because Section 2113(d) requires either assaulting another person or putting another’s life in jeopardy by use of a dangerous weapon or device during the course of an attempted bank robbery, the offense necessarily entails the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force. The court also found that the statute requires intentional, rather than merely reckless, conduct. Therefore, the court affirmed that attempted armed bank robbery under Section 2113(d) is categorically a crime of violence and affirmed the district court’s decision. View "US v. Straite" on Justia Law

The defendant was arrested in March 2021 for unlawfully possessing a firearm as a convicted felon after a police encounter outside a convenience store. During the arrest, he resisted and threatened officers, and was found in possession of a loaded ghost gun and distributable amounts of fentanyl. He was charged with possession of ammunition as a convicted felon and possession with intent to distribute fentanyl, ultimately pleading guilty to the ammunition charge. At sentencing, the court weighed the seriousness of his offense and history, including his mental health issues and young age, and imposed a within-Guidelines sentence of 70 months' imprisonment.After sentencing, a retroactive amendment to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines (Amendment 821) reduced the impact of "status points," lowering the defendant's criminal history category and decreasing his advisory Guidelines range from 57-71 months to 51-63 months. In March 2024, he moved for a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2), citing rehabilitation efforts while incarcerated. The government opposed, documenting three disciplinary violations by the defendant in prison, including threatening prison staff.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia found the defendant eligible for a reduction but denied the motion, concluding that the relevant § 3553(a) factors and his disciplinary record weighed against a reduction. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the denial for abuse of discretion. The court held that a sentence reduction motion does not trigger a plenary resentencing or require a detailed explanation for retaining a sentence above the amended Guidelines range. The district court’s acknowledgment and consideration of relevant factors sufficed. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision, finding no abuse of discretion and that the presumption of judicial consideration was not rebutted. View "US v. Davis" on Justia Law

Rami Mhana operated businesses that purchased fraudulently obtained Apple iPhones and other electronics at below-market prices, paying in cash and often shipping these goods overseas in bulk. His suppliers included individuals who acquired electronics using stolen personal information to make purchases from major retailers and wireless carriers. Mhana did not verify his suppliers’ identities or the legitimacy of the goods, nor did he provide receipts. He also paid third-party services to unlock phones, enabling their use on any network. The government’s investigation began after a ruptured overseas shipment revealed the scheme, ultimately leading to the discovery of thousands of fraudulent transactions.A federal grand jury in the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina indicted Mhana on multiple counts, including transportation of stolen goods, conspiracy, and money laundering. Following a six-day trial, the jury convicted him on all charges. The indictment included a forfeiture notice, and the jury found a nexus between certain property and Mhana’s crimes. The district court initially granted a preliminary order of forfeiture but, at sentencing, declined to enter a final forfeiture judgment, citing concerns about double payment with restitution. The district court entered final judgment, prompting Mhana to appeal his convictions and the government to cross-appeal the forfeiture ruling.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. It affirmed Mhana’s convictions, finding no reversible error in the district court’s evidentiary rulings, and determined that any assumed errors were harmless given the overwhelming evidence of guilt. However, the appellate court reversed the district court’s denial of forfeiture, holding that forfeiture is mandatory under federal law when the statutory prerequisites are satisfied, even if restitution is also imposed, and remanded the case for entry of a forfeiture judgment. View "US v. Mhana" on Justia Law

A former software developer and naval reservist from Virginia, the defendant became the subject of a federal investigation after participating in the events of January 6, 2021, for which he was later pardoned. In the following months, he purchased several firearms and accessories, including devices labeled as “solvent traps” from an online retailer. These devices, although purportedly for cleaning firearms, were constructed in a manner similar to silencers, with features such as threaded ends and internal baffles. The defendant discussed with an undercover FBI employee how these devices could be converted into silencers, despite not possessing the necessary tools for such modification.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia heard the case after a federal grand jury indicted the defendant for possessing unregistered silencers in violation of the National Firearms Act (NFA). The defendant moved to dismiss the indictment, contending that the statutory definition of a silencer was unconstitutionally vague and that his conviction would violate the Second Amendment. The district court denied these motions and, after a mistrial, the second jury found the defendant guilty on all counts. He was sentenced to 36 months in prison.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the district court’s jury instructions accurately reflected the statutory definition of a silencer, which does not require operability or exclude dual-use devices. The court found sufficient evidence for the conviction, as the devices’ design and the defendant’s statements supported their classification as silencers. The court also determined the NFA was not unconstitutionally vague as applied. Finally, the court concluded that, even if silencers are protected by the Second Amendment, the NFA’s shall-issue registration regime is presumptively constitutional and the defendant had not shown otherwise. The conviction was affirmed. View "US v. Hatchet Speed" on Justia Law