Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

The Government filed a motion to transfer defendant, under 18 U.S.C. 5032, for prosecution as an adult for murder in aid of racketeering. Defendant was a juvenile at the time of the alleged offense. The district court denied the Government’s motion after concluding that the prosecution would be unconstitutional given that recent Supreme Court decisions have held that the United States Constitution prohibits sentencing juvenile offenders to either death or life imprisonment. The court agreed with the district court that defendant cannot be prosecuted for murder in aid of racketeering because his conviction would require the district court to impose an unconstitutional sentence. Because the district court did not err in denying the Government’s motion to transfer defendant for prosecution as an adult, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Under Seal" on Justia Law

Defendants McNeal and Stoddard were convicted of conspiracy, armed bank robberies, and brandishing firearms during crimes of violence. The court concluded that the evidence was sufficient to convict defendants of the brandishing offenses; the evidence was sufficient to convict McNeal of conspiracy to commit armed bank robbery; the district court properly denied McNeal's motions to suppress evidence where the warrant was supported by probable cause; and the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence seized from McNeal's residence. The court also concluded that bank robbery under 18 U.S.C. 2113(a) is a crime of violence within the meaning of the force clause of 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(3), because it has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force. Because bank robbery is a lesser-included offense of section 2113(d) armed bank robbery, armed bank robbery is also a crime of violence under the force clause. McNeal and Stoddard’s challenge to their brandishing convictions therefore fails at the first step of plain error review, in that the trial court did not err in concluding that armed bank robbery qualifies as a crime of violence. The court rejected each of defendants' contentions and affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. McNeal" on Justia Law

Petitioner appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the government on his petition for habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. 2241. Petitioner challenges his prior civil commitment as a “sexually dangerous person” under the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, 18 U.S.C. 4248. The court concluded that Congress sufficiently expressed its intent that the Adam Walsh Act apply to all persons in the BOP’s custody who would pose a current threat to the public if released. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the government on petitioner’s retroactivity claim. The court concluded that, although the BOP records submitted by petitioner, even if they had been authenticated, are insufficient to demonstrate that the BOP relinquished its legal authority over him prior to the government’s filing of the section 4248 certificate, they are also largely unexplained. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment on petitioner's claim that he was not “in the custody” of the BOP when the section 4248 proceedings were initiated, and remanded for further proceedings on this issue. View "Matherly v. Andrews" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of charges related to his involvement in prostitution and drug rings. This appeal presents an issue of first impression in this Circuit: whether a defendant’s right to effective assistance of counsel is violated when his counsel sleeps during trial. The court held that a defendant is deprived of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel when counsel sleeps during a substantial portion of the defendant’s trial. In this case, multiple witnesses testified that counsel was asleep during multiple occasions. The court concluded that the fact that counsel was sleeping during defendant's trial amounted to constructive denial of counsel for substantial periods of that trial. Furthermore, the facts of this case are equally -if not more - egregious than the facts presented in cases where other circuits have presumed prejudice. Accordingly, the court vacated the conviction and sentence, directed entry of judgment in favor of defendant on his 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion, and remanded for further proceedings. View "United States v. Ragin" on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to possession of a firearm by a convicted felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. 922(g) and the district court sentenced him to a fifteen-year mandatory minimum term of imprisonment under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. 924(e). Defendant then filed a motion under 28 U.S.C. 2255 asserting actual innocent of the section 922(g) offense. The court agreed with defendant that because his civil rights had been restored by North Carolina following his discharge from parole and long before his 2012 arrest, none of his prior state convictions was a predicate felony conviction for purposes of sections 922(g) or 924(e). The court vacated the conviction and sentence because defendant pled guilty to a crime he could not commit. The court remanded with instructions to grant the section 2255 motion. View "United States v. Burleson" on Justia Law

Petitioner challenged the denial of his motion for relief from judgment under FRCP 60(b)(6). The district court held that petitioner's motion was not only untimely under Rule 60(c), but that a change in habeas decisional law, without more, is an insufficient basis for Rule 60(b)(6) relief. The court affirmed the district court's conclusion that the change in post-conviction procedural default rules fashioned by Martinez v. Ryan and Trevino v. Thaler did not constitute the kind of “extraordinary circumstance” needed to reopen petitioner's case. View "Moses v. Joyner" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction for knowingly and intentionally distributing heroin to Eric Thomas, causing Thomas' death from the use of the heroin distributed. The court concluded that, because there was no evidence in the record that Thomas could have died without the heroin, the jury’s verdict was necessarily consistent with the Supreme Court’s requirement of but-for causation; the district court’s decision not to elaborate on the meaning of the statutory results-in-death language did not amount to an abuse of discretion, let alone plain error, in light of that court’s legitimate concerns about confusing the jury; the court's decision in United States v. Patterson forecloses defendant's argument that the district court should have instructed the jury on the foreseeability of death; and the district court did not commit reversible error in admitting hearsay testimony that Thomas said he purchased heroin from “Fat Boy” because (1) even if the hearsay did not fall under a hearsay exception, its admission was harmless; and (2) the hearsay was not “testimonial” and therefore did not implicate defendant’s Sixth Amendment right of confrontation. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Alvarado" on Justia Law

Almost five years outside the window to file a timely motion, defendant filed a motion seeking post-conviction DNA testing pursuant to the Innocence Protection Act (IPA), 18 U.S.C. 3600–3600A. Defendant was convicted of various crimes related to an attempted robbery and murder. The district court concluded that the motion was untimely and refused to grant a certificate of appealability (COA). The court concluded that a COA is not required to appeal the denial of an IPA motion and therefore defendant's appeal is properly before this court. Applying a deferential standard, the court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that neither of the exceptions to untimeliness are applicable in this case. Therefore, the court concluded that the motion was untimely and affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Cowley" on Justia Law

Defendant conditionally pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm, preserving his right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress. Because the carrying of a concealed firearm is not itself illegal in West Virginia, and because the circumstances did not otherwise provide an objective basis for inferring danger, the court concluded that the officer who frisked defendant lacked reasonable suspicion that defendant was not only armed but also dangerous. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress the evidence uncovered by the unlawful search. View "United States v. Robinson" on Justia Law

After defendant pled guilty to failing to register as a sex offender under the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act, 42 U.S.C. 16911(4)(A), the district court calculated defendant's Guidelines range as if he were a tier III sex offender. The court held that the categorical approach was applicable in this instance and, after comparing defendant's state court conviction for endangering the welfare of a child to the generic offenses enumerated in section 16911(4)(A), the court agreed with defendant that the district court erred in deeming defendant a tier III offender. Accordingly, the court vacated defendant’s sentence and remanded for resentencing. View "United States v. Berry" on Justia Law