Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed suit alleging claims for violation of his Fourth Amendment rights under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and for malicious prosecution under state law. The district court granted summary judgment for defendants, who are probation officers; denied supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff's malicious prosecution claim; and dismissed the malicious prosecution claim with prejudice. The court concluded that defendants violated plaintiff's Fourth Amendment rights by seeking his arrest for alleged probation violations without reasonable suspicion. However, the court concluded that the standard required by the Fourth Amendment to arrest a probationer was not clearly established at the time defendants sought plaintiff’s arrest for allegedly violating the terms of his probation. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court’s conclusion that defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. View "Jones v. Chandrasuwan" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty pursuant to a plea agreement to one count of aiding and abetting the theft of a firearm. On appeal, defendant contends that the government breached the plea agreement. In the plea agreement, the government agreed to advise the district court at sentencing that the parties had agreed that the 4-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. 2K2.1(b) (increasing a defendant’s offense level for use or possession of a firearm in connection with another felony offense)(6)(B) did not apply. At sentencing, however, the government advised the district court that it had changed its position on whether a North Carolina breaking and entering offense constituted a felony, concluding that it did, regardless of a defendant’s criminal history. Nonetheless, the government asked the district court to honor the plea agreement and not apply the enhancement to defendant. The district court concluded that the government, although acting in good faith, breached its undertaking in the plea agreement by stating that the enhancement did apply. Accordingly, the court vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing before a different district judge pursuant to Santobello v. New York. View "United States v. Warner" on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to firearm and drug charges after the district court assured him that he was not waiving his right to appeal the court’s earlier denial of a suppression motion. At issue is whether defendant entered a valid conditional guilty plea. The court concluded that no valid conditional guilty plea was entered because the government-consent requirement was not satisfied. Insofar as defendant did not enter a valid conditional guilty plea, the question of whether the district court erred in denying his suppression motion is not properly before the court. Because the court has neither a valid conditional plea nor a valid unconditional plea, the court vacated the judgment. On remand, defendant can decide whether to plead guilty again or whether to proceed to trial. View "United States v. Fitzgerald" on Justia Law

Defendant and two companions participated in a crime spree that started with a pair of burglaries and ended with a high-speed police chase. At issue is whether the two burglaries served as part of the predicate for defendant’s Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(1), sentencing enhancement occurred on different occasions. The court affirmed the district court's ruling that the burglaries did in fact occur on different occasions. In this case, it was proper for the district court to note that defendant harmed 31 different victims during his many offenses; that defendant’s most recent pair of burglaries ended with a dangerous police chase; and that defendant appeared to be the leader in at least this latest chapter of his long history of criminal activity. View "United States v. Linney" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to possession with intent to distribute crack cocaine and being a felon in possession of a firearm. On appeal, defendant challenged the district court's denial of his motion to suppress drug and firearm evidence seized by police officers during a traffic stop. The court concluded that no constitutional violation occurred in this case. The officer did not unreasonably expand the scope of the stop by beginning an unjustified drug investigation. Furthermore, the officer did not conduct a warrantless search of the vehicle without probable cause when he stuck his head inside the car to examine its fraudulent inspection sticker where the officer's means of investigating the inspection sticker were appropriate and not unreasonably intrusive. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Palmer" on Justia Law

Defendants Hare, Williams, and Edwards appealed their convictions stemming from their participation in a plan to rob a cocaine "stash house," which was actually fabricated by undercover federal agents as part of a sting operation. The court concluded that defendants have received all the discovery to which they are entitled, and affirmed the district court’s denial of their motion for discovery. In this case, even assuming that defendants' evidentiary showing is sufficient to warrant discovery into selective enforcement, defendants have not shown that they are entitled to discovery beyond what the government has already produced. The court also affirmed the district court's denial of defendants' motion to dismiss the indictment because defendants' arguments, whether considered alone or collectively, do not establish outrageous government conduct. The court rejected defendants' challenge to their convictions for possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime or a crime of violence; found defendant's remaining challenges to be without merit; and affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Hare" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction for carjacking in violation of 18 U.S.C. 2119. The court held that, in light of Holloway v. United States, the evidence was insufficient to support a rational finding beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant possessed the specific intent, conditional or otherwise, to kill or seriously harm his victim when he took control of the vehicle. Applying Holloway, the court concluded that evidence of generalized recklessness and desperation, coupled with an unconsummated implied threat or “bluff” provided insufficient evidentiary support from which a jury could reasonably find beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant possessed the specific intent. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded with instructions that a judgment of acquittal be entered. View "United States v. Bailey" on Justia Law

The Government filed a motion to transfer defendant, under 18 U.S.C. 5032, for prosecution as an adult for murder in aid of racketeering. Defendant was a juvenile at the time of the alleged offense. The district court denied the Government’s motion after concluding that the prosecution would be unconstitutional given that recent Supreme Court decisions have held that the United States Constitution prohibits sentencing juvenile offenders to either death or life imprisonment. The court agreed with the district court that defendant cannot be prosecuted for murder in aid of racketeering because his conviction would require the district court to impose an unconstitutional sentence. Because the district court did not err in denying the Government’s motion to transfer defendant for prosecution as an adult, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Under Seal" on Justia Law

Defendants McNeal and Stoddard were convicted of conspiracy, armed bank robberies, and brandishing firearms during crimes of violence. The court concluded that the evidence was sufficient to convict defendants of the brandishing offenses; the evidence was sufficient to convict McNeal of conspiracy to commit armed bank robbery; the district court properly denied McNeal's motions to suppress evidence where the warrant was supported by probable cause; and the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence seized from McNeal's residence. The court also concluded that bank robbery under 18 U.S.C. 2113(a) is a crime of violence within the meaning of the force clause of 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(3), because it has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force. Because bank robbery is a lesser-included offense of section 2113(d) armed bank robbery, armed bank robbery is also a crime of violence under the force clause. McNeal and Stoddard’s challenge to their brandishing convictions therefore fails at the first step of plain error review, in that the trial court did not err in concluding that armed bank robbery qualifies as a crime of violence. The court rejected each of defendants' contentions and affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. McNeal" on Justia Law

Petitioner appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the government on his petition for habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. 2241. Petitioner challenges his prior civil commitment as a “sexually dangerous person” under the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, 18 U.S.C. 4248. The court concluded that Congress sufficiently expressed its intent that the Adam Walsh Act apply to all persons in the BOP’s custody who would pose a current threat to the public if released. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the government on petitioner’s retroactivity claim. The court concluded that, although the BOP records submitted by petitioner, even if they had been authenticated, are insufficient to demonstrate that the BOP relinquished its legal authority over him prior to the government’s filing of the section 4248 certificate, they are also largely unexplained. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment on petitioner's claim that he was not “in the custody” of the BOP when the section 4248 proceedings were initiated, and remanded for further proceedings on this issue. View "Matherly v. Andrews" on Justia Law