Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant was convicted of charges related to his involvement in prostitution and drug rings. This appeal presents an issue of first impression in this Circuit: whether a defendant’s right to effective assistance of counsel is violated when his counsel sleeps during trial. The court held that a defendant is deprived of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel when counsel sleeps during a substantial portion of the defendant’s trial. In this case, multiple witnesses testified that counsel was asleep during multiple occasions. The court concluded that the fact that counsel was sleeping during defendant's trial amounted to constructive denial of counsel for substantial periods of that trial. Furthermore, the facts of this case are equally -if not more - egregious than the facts presented in cases where other circuits have presumed prejudice. Accordingly, the court vacated the conviction and sentence, directed entry of judgment in favor of defendant on his 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion, and remanded for further proceedings. View "United States v. Ragin" on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to possession of a firearm by a convicted felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. 922(g) and the district court sentenced him to a fifteen-year mandatory minimum term of imprisonment under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. 924(e). Defendant then filed a motion under 28 U.S.C. 2255 asserting actual innocent of the section 922(g) offense. The court agreed with defendant that because his civil rights had been restored by North Carolina following his discharge from parole and long before his 2012 arrest, none of his prior state convictions was a predicate felony conviction for purposes of sections 922(g) or 924(e). The court vacated the conviction and sentence because defendant pled guilty to a crime he could not commit. The court remanded with instructions to grant the section 2255 motion. View "United States v. Burleson" on Justia Law

Petitioner challenged the denial of his motion for relief from judgment under FRCP 60(b)(6). The district court held that petitioner's motion was not only untimely under Rule 60(c), but that a change in habeas decisional law, without more, is an insufficient basis for Rule 60(b)(6) relief. The court affirmed the district court's conclusion that the change in post-conviction procedural default rules fashioned by Martinez v. Ryan and Trevino v. Thaler did not constitute the kind of “extraordinary circumstance” needed to reopen petitioner's case. View "Moses v. Joyner" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction for knowingly and intentionally distributing heroin to Eric Thomas, causing Thomas' death from the use of the heroin distributed. The court concluded that, because there was no evidence in the record that Thomas could have died without the heroin, the jury’s verdict was necessarily consistent with the Supreme Court’s requirement of but-for causation; the district court’s decision not to elaborate on the meaning of the statutory results-in-death language did not amount to an abuse of discretion, let alone plain error, in light of that court’s legitimate concerns about confusing the jury; the court's decision in United States v. Patterson forecloses defendant's argument that the district court should have instructed the jury on the foreseeability of death; and the district court did not commit reversible error in admitting hearsay testimony that Thomas said he purchased heroin from “Fat Boy” because (1) even if the hearsay did not fall under a hearsay exception, its admission was harmless; and (2) the hearsay was not “testimonial” and therefore did not implicate defendant’s Sixth Amendment right of confrontation. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Alvarado" on Justia Law

Almost five years outside the window to file a timely motion, defendant filed a motion seeking post-conviction DNA testing pursuant to the Innocence Protection Act (IPA), 18 U.S.C. 3600–3600A. Defendant was convicted of various crimes related to an attempted robbery and murder. The district court concluded that the motion was untimely and refused to grant a certificate of appealability (COA). The court concluded that a COA is not required to appeal the denial of an IPA motion and therefore defendant's appeal is properly before this court. Applying a deferential standard, the court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that neither of the exceptions to untimeliness are applicable in this case. Therefore, the court concluded that the motion was untimely and affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Cowley" on Justia Law

Defendant conditionally pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm, preserving his right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress. Because the carrying of a concealed firearm is not itself illegal in West Virginia, and because the circumstances did not otherwise provide an objective basis for inferring danger, the court concluded that the officer who frisked defendant lacked reasonable suspicion that defendant was not only armed but also dangerous. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress the evidence uncovered by the unlawful search. View "United States v. Robinson" on Justia Law

After defendant pled guilty to failing to register as a sex offender under the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act, 42 U.S.C. 16911(4)(A), the district court calculated defendant's Guidelines range as if he were a tier III sex offender. The court held that the categorical approach was applicable in this instance and, after comparing defendant's state court conviction for endangering the welfare of a child to the generic offenses enumerated in section 16911(4)(A), the court agreed with defendant that the district court erred in deeming defendant a tier III offender. Accordingly, the court vacated defendant’s sentence and remanded for resentencing. View "United States v. Berry" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. 922(g). The court concluded that the district court erred in dismissing defendant’s claim as barred by the waiver provision in the plea agreement. Furthermore, under the court's holding in United States v. Simmons, defendant was not a convicted felon at the time of the offense, and it was therefore not a violation of section 922(g)(1) for defendant to be in possession of a firearm. Therefore, the court concluded that defendant has shown factual innocence as contemplated by Bousley v. United States because he has shown that it is impossible for the government to prove one of the required elements of a section 922(g)(1) charge - that the defendant was a convicted felon at the time of the offense. The court also concluded that defendant has made the requisite showing of actual innocence. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "United States v. Adams" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to bank fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1344. Defendant signed a waiver of appellate rights as part of her plea agreement. Nonetheless, defendant challenged the establishment of her Sentencing Guidelines range on appeal. The court concluded that her waiver provision quite specifically waives the right to appeal the sentence “on any ground, including any issues that relate to the establishment of the advisory Guideline range.” Accordingly, the court dismissed the appeal. View "United States v. McLaughlin" on Justia Law

Petitioner was arrested for sexually abusing his fourteen-year-old daughter and, during his first interview, he said he needed an attorney. Petitioner was reinterviewed three days later without an attorney present and confessed. With respect to petitioner's sexual abuse charges, the court found that petitioner has demonstrated ineffective assistance of counsel under both the deficient performance and prejudice prongs of Strickland v. Washington, and reversed the district court’s dismissal of his habeas petition as to those convictions. The court remanded with instructions that the district court issue petitioner a writ of habeas corpus as to the sexual abuse charges unless the Commonwealth endeavors, within a reasonable period of time, to prosecute him in a new trial on those counts without utilizing the confession. With respect to petitioner's convictions on the child pornography charges, the court found that petitioner has not shown a reasonable probability that his confession altered the outcome of his trial, as required to demonstrate prejudice under Strickland, and therefore the court affirmed the district court order in that respect. View "Grueninger v. Director, VDOC" on Justia Law