Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Steven Fulton was convicted by a jury of knowingly making a false statement in connection with the attempted acquisition of a firearm. The evidence showed that Fulton denied having any felony convictions on a background check form at a gun shop in North Carolina, despite having a prior felony conviction in New Jersey. The district court overturned the jury’s verdict and entered a judgment of acquittal, reasoning that the Government did not present evidence to the jury demonstrating that Fulton’s New Jersey offense was punishable by more than a year in prison. The district court also conditionally granted Fulton a new trial in case the acquittal was reversed.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina initially reviewed the case. The district court granted Fulton’s motion for acquittal, holding that the Government failed to prove that Fulton’s New Jersey conviction was a felony. The court reasoned that the criminal judgment did not define a third-degree offense, did not include the word “felony,” and did not identify the maximum punishment for the offense. The district court also conditionally granted a new trial, citing insufficient evidence of Fulton’s knowledge that he was a felon.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The appellate court reversed the district court’s judgment of acquittal, holding that the Government had introduced sufficient evidence to prove that Fulton’s New Jersey conviction was a felony punishable by more than one year in prison. The court determined that whether a crime is punishable by more than one year in prison is a legal question for the judge to determine, not a factual question for the jury. The appellate court also reversed the district court’s conditional grant of a new trial, finding that the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support the jury’s verdict. The case was remanded with instructions to reinstate the jury’s verdict. View "US v. Fulton" on Justia Law

Samir Fernandes Baptista, a lawful permanent resident, was convicted in Massachusetts of unarmed assault with intent to rob or steal. During his removal proceedings, the immigration judge and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) determined that this state crime is categorically an aggravated felony attempted theft offense under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). Consequently, the immigration judge ordered Baptista removed for committing an aggravated felony after admission, and the BIA upheld this order.Baptista appealed the BIA's decision, arguing that his conviction does not qualify as an attempted theft offense under the INA. He contended that under Massachusetts law, a defendant could be convicted of unarmed assault by stealing property with the victim’s fraudulently obtained consent, which would make the state offense broader than the generic federal theft offense that requires the taking to be against the victim’s will. Baptista also argued that his conviction cannot qualify as an attempt because it does not require a defendant to commit an overt act toward a taking.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the BIA's legal conclusion de novo. The court concluded that the Massachusetts unarmed assault statute requires the taking to be against the victim’s will and involves force and violence, making it a categorical match to a generic federal theft offense. Additionally, the court found that the statute requires an overt act constituting a substantial step towards the commission of the theft, thus qualifying as an attempted theft offense under the INA. Therefore, the Fourth Circuit denied Baptista’s petition for review. View "Baptista v. Bondi" on Justia Law

The case involves Raymond Dugan, who was convicted and sentenced in the Southern District of West Virginia for accessing child pornography. Dugan raised three main issues on appeal: the denial of his motion to compel discovery related to a foreign law enforcement agency's investigation, the denial of his motion to suppress evidence obtained from a search warrant, and the restitution order requiring him to pay $22,000 to five child victims.In the lower court, Dugan was convicted by a jury of accessing child pornography. He was sentenced to 54 months in prison, followed by five years of supervised release, and ordered to pay $22,000 in restitution. Dugan filed pretrial motions to compel discovery and suppress evidence, both of which were denied by the district court. The court found that the foreign agency's tip was reliable and that the search warrant was supported by probable cause. The court also ruled that the officers acted in good faith when executing the warrant.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's decisions, holding that the denial of the motion to compel discovery was appropriate because Dugan's request was speculative and unsupported by evidence. The court also upheld the denial of the motion to suppress, finding that the search warrant was based on probable cause, given the deliberate steps required to access the child pornography website. Finally, the court found no abuse of discretion in the restitution order, as the district court had carefully considered the relevant factors and evidence in determining the amounts.The Fourth Circuit affirmed Dugan's conviction and sentence, including the restitution order. View "US v. Dugan" on Justia Law

Julio Alvarado Dubon moved to suppress firearms and ammunition discovered during a warrantless search of his home. The district court denied the motion, concluding that Alvarado Dubon voluntarily consented to the search and, even if he had not, the items were found during a valid protective sweep. The case involves officers searching for a man named Rolman Balcarcel, who was reported to have weapons and potentially planning violent acts. Alvarado Dubon allowed officers into his home, where they saw a handgun magazine. After a brief interaction, Alvarado Dubon gestured and verbally indicated consent for the officers to check the rest of the house, where they found firearms.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia denied Alvarado Dubon's motion to suppress the evidence obtained from the search. The court found that Alvarado Dubon had voluntarily consented to the search and that the search was justified as a protective sweep. Alvarado Dubon entered a conditional guilty plea, preserving his right to appeal the denial of his suppression motion. He was sentenced to 16 months of imprisonment.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that the district court's finding of voluntary consent was not clearly erroneous. The court noted that Alvarado Dubon's actions and body language indicated consent and that the conditions under which he consented did not suggest coercion or duress. The court also concluded that Alvarado Dubon did not effectively revoke his consent before the rifle was found. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "US v. Dubon" on Justia Law

Dr. Timothy Baxter, while working for Indivior, a pharmaceutical company, distributed misleading information to Massachusetts’s Medicaid program about the safety of new opioid drugs. This led to his conviction for misdemeanor drug misbranding. Following his conviction, the Secretary of Health and Human Services banned him from participating in federal healthcare programs for five years. Baxter challenged this exclusion, arguing that his crime did not categorically relate to the delivery of an item or service under a state healthcare program.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia granted summary judgment in favor of the Secretary, rejecting Baxter’s claims. Baxter then appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.The Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and held that the exclusion statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7(a), does not require a categorical approach. Instead, it employs a circumstance-specific approach, meaning it looks at the actual conduct of the individual rather than the elements of the statute of conviction. The court found that Baxter’s conduct—misbranding drugs to influence MassHealth’s coverage decisions—was related to the delivery of an item under a state healthcare program. Therefore, his exclusion was mandatory under the statute.The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision, upholding Baxter’s exclusion from federal healthcare programs. View "Baxter v. Kennedy" on Justia Law

Adolfo Acevedo Ibarra, a Mexican citizen, entered the United States illegally and used the identity of a U.S. citizen, Raul Cabrera, to obtain various documents and benefits fraudulently. He was detained in 2014 for using a fraudulent Social Security number and later pleaded guilty to illegal entry. The Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings against him, and Ibarra admitted to the allegations and agreed he was removable. He sought cancellation of removal, arguing that his removal would cause hardship to his four U.S.-citizen children. However, the immigration judge denied his application, citing his lack of good moral character due to his fraudulent activities.The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the immigration judge's decision, agreeing that Ibarra's significant negative criminal history, including fraud, outweighed any evidence of good character. Ibarra then petitioned for review, claiming that his Fifth Amendment rights were violated during the removal hearing when his attorney's attempts to assert the privilege against self-incrimination were overruled.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and found that substantial evidence supported the immigration judge's finding that Ibarra lacked good moral character. The court noted that Ibarra's fraudulent activities, even without a conviction, justified the finding under the catchall provision of 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f). The court also rejected Ibarra's Fifth Amendment claim, stating that the privilege against self-incrimination must be asserted by the individual, not their attorney, and that Ibarra continued to testify without asserting the privilege himself.The Fourth Circuit denied Ibarra's petition for review, upholding the BIA's decision to deny cancellation of removal based on the substantial evidence of his lack of good moral character and rejecting his Fifth Amendment claims. View "Ibarra v. Bondi" on Justia Law

In 2019, Irene Pressley, a rural mail carrier, was found dead in her car in Andrews, South Carolina, having been shot multiple times. An assault rifle and 21 bullet casings were found near the scene. A package containing marijuana addressed to Trevor Seward's residence, with Pressley's blood on it, was discovered nearby. Surveillance footage showed Seward leaving his house after Pressley did not deliver the package and later returning with an assault rifle. Seward's fingerprints and palm prints were found on Pressley's car and packages inside it, including a palm print in her blood.The United States District Court for the District of South Carolina convicted Seward of murdering a federal employee, using a firearm during a crime of violence, Hobbs Act robbery, possessing a firearm after a felony conviction, and conspiring to possess marijuana with intent to distribute. Seward appealed, challenging the qualifications of the government's firearms toolmark examiner and the exclusion of evidence that another witness failed a polygraph test. He also argued that the admission of testimony from the government's DNA expert violated the Confrontation Clause.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the firearms toolmark examiner's testimony or in excluding the polygraph evidence. Regarding the Confrontation Clause, the court acknowledged that the DNA expert's testimony may have violated the clause but concluded that any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt due to the overwhelming evidence of Seward's guilt. Consequently, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment. View "United States v. Seward" on Justia Law

Brock Beeman was convicted by a federal jury of mailing three threatening letters to a prosecutor and an investigator involved in a previous criminal case against him, violating 18 U.S.C. § 876(c). Beeman appealed his conviction, challenging the district court's decisions on three grounds: the admission of an uncharged threatening letter, the empaneling of an anonymous jury, and the denial of his motion for a mistrial due to the prosecutor's improper statement during closing arguments.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia admitted the uncharged letter as res gestae evidence and under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b), finding it provided necessary context for Beeman's animus and intent. The court also empaneled an anonymous jury due to Beeman's history of threatening behavior and potential for lengthy incarceration, while ensuring Beeman's rights were protected by providing his counsel with an unredacted juror list. During closing arguments, the prosecutor improperly suggested jurors consider their personal feelings about the threats, but the court immediately corrected this with a curative instruction.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed Beeman's challenges for abuse of discretion. The court found no abuse of discretion in admitting the uncharged letter, as it was relevant to proving elements of the crime and not unfairly prejudicial. The court also upheld the empaneling of an anonymous jury, noting the district court's careful consideration of the factors and safeguards to protect Beeman's rights. Finally, the court determined that the prosecutor's improper statement during closing arguments did not prejudice Beeman, given the immediate correction and overwhelming evidence of his guilt.The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment, upholding Beeman's conviction. View "US v. Beeman" on Justia Law

Luis Avila pleaded guilty to three counts of violating 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(2) and (b)(1) for possessing material involving the sexual exploitation of a minor. The probation officer calculated Avila’s advisory guideline range using Section 2G2.2 of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, which starts with a base offense level of 22 and includes several enhancements that increased Avila’s offense level to 35. The probation officer then applied a cross-reference under Section 2G2.2(c)(1), which increased the offense level to 38, resulting in a guidelines range of 168 to 210 months after a three-level decrease for acceptance of responsibility.Avila challenged the application of the cross-reference, arguing that his actions did not cause the creation of the sexually explicit material because the victims were already sending the same videos to other people. The government argued that Avila’s actions, including offering and paying money for specific videos, caused the victims to create and send the videos. The United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina overruled Avila’s objection and applied the cross-reference, sentencing him to 132 months of imprisonment followed by 30 years of supervised release.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and found that the district court committed procedural error in sentencing Avila. The appellate court held that the district court’s factual findings were legally insufficient to support the application of the cross-reference under Section 2G2.2(c)(1). The court concluded that offering money for specific conduct and causing that conduct to happen are different, and proving the former does not prove the latter. Therefore, the Fourth Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded the case for resentencing. View "US v. Avila" on Justia Law

In May 2021, the appellant, along with a co-defendant, robbed a gas station in New Bern, North Carolina. The appellant entered the store armed with a revolver, pointed it at the cashier, struck the cashier on the head, and took money and cartons of cigarettes. The robbery was captured on surveillance video, and a witness provided a photo of the getaway vehicle. The next day, law enforcement located the vehicle and arrested the appellant and his co-defendant, recovering stolen items and the revolver used in the robbery.The appellant was indicted for robbery, using/brandishing a firearm during a crime of violence, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. He agreed to plead guilty to the first two counts and waived his right to appeal his conviction and sentence, except on grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel or prosecutorial misconduct. The district court conducted a brief plea hearing and sentenced the appellant to 144 months of imprisonment. The appellant argued that his appeal waiver was invalid because the district court failed to properly conduct the plea hearing and did not acknowledge his mitigation arguments or provide an explanation for the sentence.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and held that the appellant’s appeal waiver was not knowingly and intelligently made. The court found that the district court failed to properly inform the appellant of the terms of the appeal waiver and did not ensure that he understood it. The court also noted that enforcing the appeal waiver would result in a miscarriage of justice due to the district court’s repeated disregard for proper procedure. Consequently, the Fourth Circuit vacated the sentence as procedurally unreasonable and remanded the case for reassignment to a different district court judge for further proceedings. View "US v. Smith" on Justia Law