Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Amir Golestan, founder and CEO of Micfo, LLC, orchestrated a scheme to fraudulently obtain approximately 1.3 million valuable IPv4 Internet Protocol addresses from the American Registry for Internet Numbers (ARIN) by creating fictitious companies and individuals. He then resold some of these addresses for profit. The scheme was uncovered when ARIN blocked a large attempted sale. Golestan and Micfo were indicted by a federal grand jury on 20 counts of wire fraud.The United States District Court for the District of South Carolina denied Golestan and Micfo’s motion to dismiss the indictment, finding that IP addresses constituted “property” under the wire fraud statute. During a bench trial, after the government presented substantial evidence, Golestan and Micfo changed their pleas to guilty. The district court accepted the pleas without advising Golestan of possible immigration consequences. Sentencing was delayed for 17 months, during which Golestan moved to continue sentencing pending the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Ciminelli, and later sought to withdraw the guilty pleas, arguing that Ciminelli invalidated the prosecution’s theory and that he was not properly advised of immigration consequences. Micfo also argued Golestan lacked authority to plead on its behalf. The district court denied these motions and sentenced Golestan to 60 months’ incarceration and Micfo to probation.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgments. The court held that the government’s theory of wire fraud did not rely on the “right-to-control” doctrine rejected in Ciminelli, but rather on deprivation of traditional property interests. The court found the district court’s failure to advise Golestan of immigration consequences was harmless error, as he was a naturalized citizen. The court also held that the record supported Golestan’s authority to plead for Micfo and declined to address ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal. View "US v. Golestan" on Justia Law

A woman was convicted of first-degree murder in Maryland state court after being tried jointly with her husband. The prosecution’s case was largely circumstantial, focusing on motive and opportunity, and initially argued that she was the shooter. After her conviction, she moved for a new trial, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. In support of her motion, she disclosed attorney-client privileged materials and testified about her defense strategy and communications with counsel. The trial court granted her a new trial but ordered her to turn over privileged materials to the State and allowed the same prosecution team, now privy to her defense strategy, to retry her case. The court also left open the possibility that her prior testimony could be used to impeach her if she testified at the new trial.On appeal, the Maryland Court of Special Appeals assumed, without deciding, that the trial court erred by allowing the same prosecution team to retry the case and by permitting the State to use information obtained from privileged materials. However, the appellate court found no prejudice, reasoning that the new evidence (including the existence of a second wig) did not harm her defense and that her decision not to testify was not prejudicial absent a proffer of her intended testimony. The Maryland Court of Appeals denied certiorari, and the United States Supreme Court also declined review.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case on habeas corpus. The Fourth Circuit held that the Maryland Court of Special Appeals’ finding of no prejudice was based on an objectively unreasonable determination of the facts, given the record showing the State’s use of privileged evidence and the impact on the defendant’s ability to testify. However, because the state appellate court had not actually decided whether a constitutional violation occurred, the Fourth Circuit vacated the district court’s denial of habeas relief and remanded for the district court to determine that question de novo. View "Kaur v. Warden" on Justia Law

In August 2022, law enforcement officers in Sterling, Virginia, stopped a Ford Explorer as part of an operation to execute an arrest warrant for a suspected armed robber. Herbert Murillo-Lopez was driving the vehicle. During the stop, officers recovered a firearm from a satchel worn by Murillo-Lopez. He admitted to being an undocumented non-citizen. Subsequent investigation confirmed he was born in El Salvador, had no lawful status in the United States, and had no record of legal entry.A grand jury indicted Murillo-Lopez for violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5)(A), which prohibits possession of a firearm by an undocumented non-citizen. He moved to suppress the evidence from the stop, arguing the stop and search were unconstitutional, but the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia denied the motion. Shortly before trial, he moved to dismiss the indictment on Second Amendment grounds, but the district court found the motion untimely and unpersuasive. After a jury found him guilty, the district court denied his motion for judgment of acquittal and sentenced him to eight months in prison and three years of supervised release.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s finding that Murillo-Lopez knew he was unlawfully present in the United States. The court also found the stop was supported by reasonable suspicion that Murillo-Lopez might be the subject of the arrest warrant, and that the search of his satchel was consensual. Finally, the court rejected his Second Amendment challenge to § 922(g)(5)(A), holding that existing circuit precedent remains valid after recent Supreme Court decisions. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "United States v. Murillo-Lopez" on Justia Law

The defendant pleaded guilty in the United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia to two charges: possession with intent to distribute heroin and unlawful possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. During sentencing, a significant dispute arose over whether the defendant should be classified as a career offender under the Sentencing Guidelines, which would substantially increase his advisory sentencing range. The career offender designation was based on the defendant’s current conviction and two prior felony convictions, both deemed “controlled substance offenses” under the Guidelines.The district court, after extensive briefing and a continued hearing, determined that both the defendant’s prior Virginia state conviction for drug distribution and a prior federal conviction for distribution of crack cocaine qualified as predicate offenses for the career offender enhancement. The court sentenced the defendant as a career offender to 151 months in prison, at the low end of the applicable Guidelines range. The defendant appealed, arguing that neither prior conviction should count as a “controlled substance offense” under the Guidelines.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court held that the Virginia statute at issue did not criminalize attempt offenses as part of completed distribution offenses, distinguishing it from a West Virginia statute previously found overbroad in United States v. Campbell. The court also held that, under its precedent and in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Brown v. United States, the proper approach for determining whether a prior conviction qualifies as a predicate offense is to look at the law in effect at the time of the prior conviction, not at the time of federal sentencing. Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment and upheld the career offender enhancement. View "United States v. Nelson" on Justia Law

A lawful permanent resident of the United States, originally from Mexico, was convicted for purchasing firearms in the United States and reselling them in Mexico without a license, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(1)(A). As a result of these unlicensed sales, he was sentenced to 78 months in prison. Following his conviction, the Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings, alleging that his conviction constituted an “aggravated felony” under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), specifically as “illicit trafficking in firearms.”An immigration judge determined that the conviction qualified as an aggravated felony and ordered his removal. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed this decision, agreeing that the conviction under § 922(a)(1)(A) matched the generic definition of “illicit trafficking in firearms” as used in the INA. The petitioner then sought review of the BIA’s order, arguing that the statute of conviction criminalized a broader range of conduct than the generic aggravated felony and thus was not a categorical match.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case de novo, focusing on whether a conviction under § 922(a)(1)(A) categorically constitutes “illicit trafficking in firearms.” The court held that the plain meaning of “illicit trafficking in firearms” is “unlawful trading or dealing in firearms,” and that the statute of conviction fits within this definition. The court rejected the petitioner’s arguments regarding overbreadth and found no ambiguity in the statutory language. Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit denied the petition for review, holding that a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(1)(A) qualifies as an aggravated felony for “illicit trafficking in firearms” under the INA. View "Alvarez Ronquillo v. Bondi" on Justia Law

Several individuals affiliated with the MS-13 gang were charged in connection with the kidnapping and murder of two teenage boys in Northern Virginia in 2016. Both victims, aged fourteen and seventeen, were low-ranking affiliates of the gang’s Park View Locos Salvatrucha (PVLS) clique. The first victim was killed after gang leaders mistakenly believed he was associated with a rival gang, while the second was murdered after rumors spread that he was cooperating with law enforcement. Both murders were carried out in a remote park, involved multiple assailants, and were documented with graphic videos and photographs. The perpetrators received promotions within the gang for their participation.A federal grand jury in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia indicted the defendants on eight counts, including conspiracy to commit kidnapping and murder in aid of racketeering, murder in aid of racketeering, and kidnapping resulting in death. After an eight-week jury trial, all defendants were convicted on all counts and sentenced to life imprisonment on the most serious charges. The district court denied various defense motions, including those for acquittal, suppression of evidence, and requests for certain jury instructions.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed numerous challenges, including evidentiary rulings, the denial of a duress defense, sufficiency of the evidence, joinder of defendants and counts, and sentencing issues. The court affirmed the convictions and sentences for four defendants. For one defendant, Henry Zelaya Martinez, the court affirmed his conviction but vacated his sentence due to inconsistencies between the oral and written pronouncements at sentencing, remanding for resentencing. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in its evidentiary and procedural rulings, and that the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions. View "United States v. Contreras" on Justia Law

After a high-speed police chase in Colonial Heights, Virginia, Melvin Myrick abandoned a crashed vehicle and fled on foot. Law enforcement officers recovered significant quantities of methamphetamine and cocaine, drug paraphernalia, and three loaded firearms from the car. Documents in the vehicle linked Myrick to the scene, and he was later identified and arrested. A federal grand jury initially indicted him for possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine, and a superseding indictment later added two firearms charges and expanded the drug charge to include cocaine.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia managed the pretrial proceedings, during which Myrick changed counsel, filed motions to suppress evidence, and requested continuances, resulting in various delays. On the day his trial began, Myrick moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the government violated the Speedy Trial Act by not commencing trial within the required 70 days. The district court denied the motion, finding that excludable periods of delay brought the trial within the statutory timeframe. The jury convicted Myrick on all counts, and the court sentenced him to 270 months’ imprisonment, at the bottom of the applicable Sentencing Guidelines range.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed Myrick’s challenges to the denial of his Speedy Trial Act motion, aspects of his sentencing, and the sufficiency of the evidence for one firearms charge. The Fourth Circuit held that the district court correctly excluded certain periods of delay under the Speedy Trial Act, making the trial timely. The court also found no error in the application of sentencing enhancements, the calculation of criminal history points, or the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the firearms conviction. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "United States v. Myrick" on Justia Law

Law enforcement in Onslow County, North Carolina, identified an individual as the leader of a White supremacist gang and conducted surveillance on his residence. After stopping vehicles leaving the residence and finding drugs, cash, and paraphernalia, officers obtained and executed a search warrant, recovering firearms, drugs, and related items. The individual was indicted for possession of a firearm by a felon and later for conspiracy and possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine and heroin. He pleaded guilty to these charges, first without a plea agreement and then with one. While detained awaiting sentencing, he was involved in smuggling drugs into jail and assaulted sheriff’s deputies, leading to an additional federal indictment for assaulting persons assisting federal officers.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina accepted his guilty pleas after thorough Rule 11 colloquies. After discovery revealed that the government had initially provided an incomplete copy of the search warrant affidavit, the defendant moved to withdraw his first two guilty pleas, arguing the omission rendered his pleas unknowing and involuntary and that he lacked competent counsel. The district court held an evidentiary hearing, found the missing pages immaterial, and denied the motion. At sentencing, the court also denied a reduction for acceptance of responsibility due to the defendant’s post-plea conduct and imposed a downward variant sentence of 300 months’ imprisonment, below the advisory Guidelines range.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s rulings. The court held that the incomplete search warrant affidavit was not material to the defendant’s decision to plead guilty, that he had the close assistance of competent counsel, and that the district court did not err in denying credit for acceptance of responsibility or in imposing the sentence. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "United States v. Milam" on Justia Law

The defendant, while incarcerated at a federal correctional institution in Petersburg, Virginia, created and possessed obscene visual depictions of the sexual abuse of children. Correctional officers discovered these materials during a routine search of his cell, and the defendant admitted to making and possessing them. He was charged under 18 U.S.C. § 1466A(a)(1) and (b)(1), which criminalize such conduct when committed within the special territorial jurisdiction of the United States.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia conducted a bench trial after the defendant waived his right to a jury. At trial, the government presented evidence that the defendant’s conduct occurred at FCI Petersburg and argued that the prison’s status as federal territory was a legal question for the court. The district court found the government had not established an interstate commerce basis for jurisdiction but concluded that FCI Petersburg was within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States, relying on the federal government’s practical usage and dominion over the facility. The court took judicial notice of this status and convicted the defendant. The defendant moved for a judgment of acquittal, arguing insufficient proof of federal jurisdiction, but the court denied the motion and imposed a 180-month sentence.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that, while the government must prove to the factfinder where the offense occurred, the legal status of that location as within federal jurisdiction is a question for the court, based on legislative facts that may be judicially noticed. However, the Fourth Circuit found that the district court applied the wrong legal standard by not fully analyzing the statutory requirements for federal territorial jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 7(3). The appellate court vacated the conviction and remanded for the district court to properly determine FCI Petersburg’s jurisdictional status. View "United States v. Perez" on Justia Law

Lawrence Florentine killed his wife, Nicole, during an interstate trip that began in North Carolina. After her death, he attempted to conceal the crime by burning her body and burying the remains in a Kentucky cemetery. Surveillance and forensic evidence established that Nicole was already dead when Florentine set her body on fire. The government charged Florentine with several felonies, including interstate domestic violence resulting in death and use of fire to commit a felony, with the latter charge based on his burning of Nicole’s corpse after her death.The United States District Court for the District of South Carolina denied Florentine’s motion to dismiss the use-of-fire charge, holding that interstate domestic violence is a continuing offense that had not ended at the time Florentine used fire. Florentine entered a conditional guilty plea, preserving his right to appeal the denial of his motion to dismiss Count 4. The district court sentenced him to 360 months’ imprisonment, including a mandatory consecutive sentence for the use-of-fire count, and stated it would have imposed the same sentence even if the use-of-fire charge had been dismissed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the statutory interpretation de novo. The court held that the crime of interstate domestic violence, as defined by 18 U.S.C. § 2261(a)(2), ends when the victim dies. Acts undertaken to conceal the crime after the victim’s death, such as burning the body, are not part of the offense. Therefore, the district court erred in denying Florentine’s motion to dismiss the use-of-fire charge. However, because the district court made clear it would have imposed the same sentence regardless, the Fourth Circuit reversed and remanded solely for entry of an amended judgment, finding resentencing unnecessary. View "United States v. Florentine" on Justia Law