Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

A nurse at a medical clinic where Dr. George P. Naum, III worked prescribed controlled substances without a doctor's supervision. The government prosecuted Naum for conspiracy and aiding and abetting the distribution of controlled substances outside the usual course of his professional practice, alleging he knew about the nurse’s conduct but did not stop it. A federal jury convicted Naum on these counts.The United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia handled the initial trial. Naum was found guilty of one count of conspiracy to distribute controlled substances outside the bounds of professional medical practice and four counts of aiding and abetting in the distribution of controlled substances outside the bounds of professional medical practice. Naum's motion for a new trial was denied, and he appealed. The Fourth Circuit initially affirmed the district court's decision.The United States Supreme Court later clarified in Ruan v. United States that to convict a defendant under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a), the government must prove the defendant knew or intended that their conduct was unauthorized. Naum argued that the district court failed to instruct the jury on this requirement. The Fourth Circuit agreed that the jury instructions misstated the law post-Ruan but applied plain error review. The court concluded that Naum did not meet his burden of showing that the outcome of his trial would have been different with proper instructions. Therefore, the Fourth Circuit affirmed Naum's conviction. View "United States v. Naum" on Justia Law

Nathaniel Powell pled guilty in 2016 to conspiracy to manufacture, distribute, and possess with intent to distribute more than 100 grams of heroin. The United States Probation Office recommended a two-level sentence enhancement under the United States Sentencing Guidelines for maintaining a premises for drug distribution, based on information from Powell’s co-defendant, Valerie Wilson. Wilson claimed she bought drugs from Powell at his residence and witnessed heroin processing there. Powell’s attorney, Lawrence Woodward, objected to the enhancement, questioning Wilson’s credibility and the sufficiency of the evidence.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia overruled the objection and adopted the presentence report, sentencing Powell to 300 months in prison. Powell later filed a pro se motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to vacate his sentence, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to investigate potentially exculpatory evidence, including a lease agreement showing someone else leased the premises during part of the relevant time. The district court dismissed most claims but held a hearing on this issue. Woodward testified he did not receive the lease and believed attacking Wilson’s credibility was the best strategy. The district court dismissed Powell’s claim, finding Woodward’s performance was not deficient and the lease would not have changed the outcome.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Woodward’s performance was not constitutionally deficient, as his strategy to attack Wilson’s credibility was reasonable. The court also found no prejudice, as the district court indicated it would have applied the same sentence even without the enhancement. Thus, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of Powell’s § 2255 motion. View "United States v. Powell" on Justia Law

Eugenia Bautista Chavez, a native and citizen of Mexico, challenged the Board of Immigration Appeals’ order of removal based on her 2011 conviction for petit larceny under section 18.2-96 of the Virginia Code. The Board held that petit larceny categorically qualified as a crime involving moral turpitude, rendering Chavez ineligible for cancellation of removal. Chavez argued that a defendant in Virginia could be convicted of larceny for taking property that he or she sincerely but unreasonably believed was abandoned, which falls short of the requisite mental state for a crime involving moral turpitude. She also contended that petit larceny for taking property of de minimis value does not constitute sufficiently reprehensible conduct to make out a crime involving moral turpitude.The Immigration Judge ruled for the government, reasoning that he was required to find that petit larceny was a crime involving moral turpitude under the Fourth Circuit’s decision in Hernandez v. Holder. Chavez appealed to the Board, arguing that Virginia petit larceny did not require a culpable mental state and did not involve reprehensible conduct. The Board dismissed Chavez’s appeal, concluding that the offense required a culpable mental state and involved reprehensible conduct. Chavez then moved the Board to reconsider its decision, but a temporary Board member denied her motion.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and denied Chavez’s petition. The court held that Virginia petit larceny is a crime involving moral turpitude because it requires an intent to permanently deprive the owner of property, which satisfies the culpable mental state requirement. The court also found that the offense involves reprehensible conduct, regardless of the value of the property taken. Additionally, the court rejected Chavez’s challenge to the authority of the temporary Board member who decided her reconsideration motion, citing its previous decision in Salomon-Guillen v. Garland. View "Chavez v. Bondi" on Justia Law

The appellants, Jose Joya Parada, Oscar Armando Sorto Romero, Milton Portillo Rodriguez, and Juan Carlos Sandoval Rodriguez, were charged in 2018 with various racketeering offenses related to their involvement with the MS-13 gang. During jury selection, the government used peremptory strikes on several Black venirepersons, including Jurors 217 and 138. The appellants raised Batson challenges to these strikes, which the district court rejected. The trial proceeded, and during jury deliberations, Juror 9 tested positive for COVID-19. Over the appellants' objections, the district court decided to proceed with an eleven-member jury. The jury found some appellants guilty on all charges and others guilty on some charges.The United States District Court for the District of Maryland denied the appellants' Batson challenges and decided to proceed with an eleven-member jury after Juror 9 tested positive for COVID-19. The appellants were subsequently found guilty of various charges. The appellants appealed, arguing that the district court erred in rejecting their Batson challenges and in proceeding with an eleven-member jury.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the district court did not clearly err in rejecting the Batson challenges, as the government provided race-neutral reasons for the peremptory strikes, and the district court found these reasons credible. The court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in proceeding with an eleven-member jury, as it thoroughly considered all alternatives and found good cause to excuse Juror 9. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment. View "US v. Parada" on Justia Law

M.B., a Pakistani woman, was forced into labor by her in-laws, Zahida Aman and her sons, Nauman and Rehan Chaudhri, after marrying another son, Salman. Upon arriving in Virginia, M.B. was isolated, had her documents confiscated, and was coerced into performing extensive household chores under threats of deportation and physical abuse. The abuse escalated over the years, including physical violence and psychological manipulation, until M.B. was eventually confined to a laundry room and later a garage annex. M.B. managed to escape in 2016 with the help of her brother and law enforcement.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia convicted the defendants of conspiracy to commit forced labor, forced labor, and document servitude. The defendants appealed, arguing that the forced labor statute did not apply to familial relationships, that the government improperly struck jurors based on race, that prejudicial evidence was admitted, and that the jury was improperly instructed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the forced labor statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1589, applies broadly and includes familial relationships. The court found no Batson violation in the jury selection process, since the government's peremptory strikes were based on age, marital status, and childlessness, not race. The court also ruled that the evidence of abuse after the forced labor ended was intrinsic to the crime and necessary to complete the story. Finally, the court determined that the jury instructions were adequate, despite the defendants' objections.The Fourth Circuit affirmed the convictions, concluding that the statute applied to the defendants' conduct and that the district court did not err in its rulings during the trial. View "U.S. v. Chaudhri" on Justia Law

In 2011, Winston Sylvester Oliver II and his co-defendant, Warren Brown, were convicted of conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery, attempted Hobbs Act robbery, and use of a firearm during these crimes. Oliver's firearm convictions were later vacated, necessitating resentencing for the remaining convictions. At his resentencing, Oliver argued that his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights were violated when the court allowed Brown to invoke his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination due to his pending appeal. Oliver also contended that his sentence was procedurally and substantively unreasonable.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia initially sentenced Oliver to 630 months in prison. After his firearm convictions were vacated, the court resentenced him to 610 months. On appeal, the Fourth Circuit vacated his remaining firearm conviction and remanded for resentencing. At the second resentencing, Oliver's motion to recuse the entire bench of the Eastern District of Virginia was denied. The district court allowed Brown to invoke his Fifth Amendment right, excluded unauthenticated letters allegedly written by Brown, and calculated Oliver's Guidelines range, ultimately sentencing him to 480 months in prison.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing Brown to invoke his Fifth Amendment right, as his testimony could have had adverse consequences due to his pending appeal. The court also found that the district court did not err in applying sentencing enhancements for Oliver's leadership role, obstruction of justice, and firearm discharge. The court concluded that the 480-month sentence was substantively reasonable, considering Oliver's extensive criminal history and the impact on the victims. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment. View "United States v. Oliver" on Justia Law

Anthony Williams was convicted of two drug offenses in 1999 and has been on supervised release since 2020. In March 2023, a woman Williams had been living with contacted the police, alleging that Williams had assaulted her by strangling and slapping her. The complainant provided photos of her injuries and reported symptoms consistent with strangulation. A police officer and a probation officer corroborated her account through interviews and evidence collection. The district court held a revocation hearing more than eight months later, during which the complainant was not present. The government introduced her out-of-court statements and other evidence, which Williams objected to as hearsay.The United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina admitted the statements, finding that the government showed good cause for the complainant's absence and that the statements were reliable. The court found Williams had committed the violations and sentenced him to 24 months of imprisonment followed by 12 months of supervised release. Williams appealed, arguing that the district court erred in admitting the hearsay evidence.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the complainant's statements. The court found that the government made sufficient efforts to contact the complainant, establishing good cause for her absence. Additionally, the court determined that the complainant's statements were reliable, supported by corroborating evidence and consistent recounting. The balancing test weighed in favor of admissibility, and the district court's judgment was affirmed. View "United States v. Williams" on Justia Law

Telly Armstrong pled guilty in March 2005 to two counts of brandishing a firearm during a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) and was sentenced to 384 months in prison. Armstrong later filed a motion for compassionate release, arguing that the disparity between his original sentence and the sentence he would receive under current law constituted an extraordinary and compelling reason for relief. The district court acknowledged the disparity but denied the motion, citing Armstrong's extensive criminal history and the violent nature of his offenses.Armstrong appealed the denial of his compassionate release motion and subsequently filed a pro se motion for reconsideration in the district court. The district court denied the motion for reconsideration, stating that Armstrong's arguments were without merit. Armstrong then appealed the denial of his motion for reconsideration.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The principal question was whether Fed. R. Crim. P. 37 allows district courts to deny motions for reconsideration while an appeal of the underlying order is pending. The Fourth Circuit held that Rule 37 does grant such authority, allowing district courts to deny, defer, or provide an indicative ruling on motions for reconsideration during a pending appeal. The court affirmed the district court's denial of Armstrong's motion for reconsideration, clarifying that the district court acted within its discretion under Rule 37. The court also noted that arguments raised by the government regarding the timeliness and propriety of Armstrong's motion for reconsideration were waived as they were not raised in the lower court. View "US v. Armstrong" on Justia Law

Melissa Barrett was serving a 168-month sentence for federal drug offenses when Amendment 821 to the Sentencing Guidelines took effect. This amendment, made retroactive by the Sentencing Commission, limited the impact of "status points" used in calculating Barrett's original Guideline range. Barrett moved to reduce her sentence to 120 months based on this amendment. The government agreed she was eligible for a reduction but disagreed on the scope of the amendment's retroactive effect. Barrett argued that the amendment affected both her criminal history category and her offense level, while the government contended it only applied to her criminal history category. The district court sided with the government and reduced Barrett's sentence to 150 months.The United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia initially reviewed the case. The court recognized Barrett's eligibility for a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) due to Amendment 821 but concluded that the amendment only applied to her criminal history category, not her offense level. Consequently, the court reduced her sentence to 150 months, reflecting a revised Guideline range of 135 to 168 months.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the district court erred by not giving full retroactive effect to Amendment 821. The Fourth Circuit determined that the amendment should apply to both Barrett's criminal history category and her offense level. The court explained that the policy statement at § 1B1.10(b)(1) requires determining the amended guideline range, which includes both the criminal history category and the offense level. The Fourth Circuit vacated the district court's judgment and remanded the case for further consideration of Barrett's motion, instructing the lower court to determine if Barrett qualifies for the offense-level reduction under § 2D1.1(b)(17). View "US v. Barrett" on Justia Law

James Ervin pleaded guilty to possessing a semi-automatic rifle as a convicted felon, violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). He later sought to withdraw his guilty plea through a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel and that the government provided false inculpatory information about the rifle. Ervin's arguments centered on the interpretation of the phrase “in or affecting commerce” in § 922(g).The United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina denied Ervin's motion to vacate his plea. The court found that the rifle had traveled in interstate commerce, thus meeting the statutory requirement. Ervin's ineffective assistance claim failed because he could not establish prejudice, as the firearm's interstate travel was sufficient to satisfy the commerce element of § 922(g). The court also denied his motion for reconsideration and his request for a certificate of appealability.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the phrase “in or affecting commerce” in § 922(g) should be interpreted broadly, consistent with the Supreme Court's decision in Scarborough v. United States. The court found that the rifle, which traveled from North Carolina to Louisiana, Georgia, and back to North Carolina, met the interstate commerce requirement. Consequently, Ervin's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and due process violations were rejected. The court affirmed the district court's denial of Ervin's motion to withdraw his guilty plea, concluding that his interpretation of the statute was incorrect and that his defense would have been meritless. View "United States v. Ervin" on Justia Law