Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

The defendant, while incarcerated at a federal correctional institution in Petersburg, Virginia, created and possessed obscene visual depictions of the sexual abuse of children. Correctional officers discovered these materials during a routine search of his cell, and the defendant admitted to making and possessing them. He was charged under 18 U.S.C. § 1466A(a)(1) and (b)(1), which criminalize such conduct when committed within the special territorial jurisdiction of the United States.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia conducted a bench trial after the defendant waived his right to a jury. At trial, the government presented evidence that the defendant’s conduct occurred at FCI Petersburg and argued that the prison’s status as federal territory was a legal question for the court. The district court found the government had not established an interstate commerce basis for jurisdiction but concluded that FCI Petersburg was within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States, relying on the federal government’s practical usage and dominion over the facility. The court took judicial notice of this status and convicted the defendant. The defendant moved for a judgment of acquittal, arguing insufficient proof of federal jurisdiction, but the court denied the motion and imposed a 180-month sentence.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that, while the government must prove to the factfinder where the offense occurred, the legal status of that location as within federal jurisdiction is a question for the court, based on legislative facts that may be judicially noticed. However, the Fourth Circuit found that the district court applied the wrong legal standard by not fully analyzing the statutory requirements for federal territorial jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 7(3). The appellate court vacated the conviction and remanded for the district court to properly determine FCI Petersburg’s jurisdictional status. View "United States v. Perez" on Justia Law

Lawrence Florentine killed his wife, Nicole, during an interstate trip that began in North Carolina. After her death, he attempted to conceal the crime by burning her body and burying the remains in a Kentucky cemetery. Surveillance and forensic evidence established that Nicole was already dead when Florentine set her body on fire. The government charged Florentine with several felonies, including interstate domestic violence resulting in death and use of fire to commit a felony, with the latter charge based on his burning of Nicole’s corpse after her death.The United States District Court for the District of South Carolina denied Florentine’s motion to dismiss the use-of-fire charge, holding that interstate domestic violence is a continuing offense that had not ended at the time Florentine used fire. Florentine entered a conditional guilty plea, preserving his right to appeal the denial of his motion to dismiss Count 4. The district court sentenced him to 360 months’ imprisonment, including a mandatory consecutive sentence for the use-of-fire count, and stated it would have imposed the same sentence even if the use-of-fire charge had been dismissed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the statutory interpretation de novo. The court held that the crime of interstate domestic violence, as defined by 18 U.S.C. § 2261(a)(2), ends when the victim dies. Acts undertaken to conceal the crime after the victim’s death, such as burning the body, are not part of the offense. Therefore, the district court erred in denying Florentine’s motion to dismiss the use-of-fire charge. However, because the district court made clear it would have imposed the same sentence regardless, the Fourth Circuit reversed and remanded solely for entry of an amended judgment, finding resentencing unnecessary. View "United States v. Florentine" on Justia Law

The petitioner pleaded guilty in 2003 to attempted bank robbery and to carrying and using a firearm during a crime of violence. At sentencing, he was classified as a career offender under the then-mandatory Sentencing Guidelines, resulting in a sentence of 274 months’ imprisonment. Over the years, he filed several postconviction motions, including a first motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, which was denied. After subsequent changes in Supreme Court precedent regarding the constitutionality of certain sentencing provisions, the petitioner argued that the mandatory Guidelines’ career-offender provision was unconstitutionally vague and sought habeas relief.The United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia dismissed his habeas petition brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, finding that he could not proceed under § 2241 because he did not satisfy the requirements of the “saving clause” in § 2255(e). The district court determined that the petitioner was procedurally barred from bringing a second or successive § 2255 motion and that this procedural bar did not render § 2255 “inadequate or ineffective” to test the legality of his detention.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The Fourth Circuit held that, under the Supreme Court’s decision in Jones v. Hendrix, the inability to satisfy the procedural requirements for a second or successive § 2255 motion does not make § 2255 inadequate or ineffective, and thus does not permit recourse to § 2241 via the saving clause. The court also held that this result does not violate the Suspension Clause of the Constitution, relying on its en banc precedent in In re Vial. Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the dismissal for lack of jurisdiction. View "Bell v. Streeval" on Justia Law

The case concerns a man who kidnapped his estranged wife by luring her to his home, forcibly taking her keys and phone, and compelling her into his truck, where she saw a gun in the back seat. Throughout the ordeal, the victim was aware of the gun’s presence and testified that it deterred her from attempting escape, as she feared for her safety and the safety of others. The kidnapping followed two prior incidents of violence by the defendant against the victim, one of which also involved a gun. During the kidnapping, the defendant made explicit and implicit threats, including referencing the gun and threatening to drive off a cliff. The victim ultimately escaped and reported the crime to law enforcement, who arrested the defendant and recovered the firearm.The United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia initially convicted the defendant on three counts: kidnapping, interstate domestic violence, and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence. The court imposed a sentence that included a mandatory enhancement for the firearm offense. After subsequent Supreme Court and Fourth Circuit decisions clarified the definition of a “crime of violence,” the district court vacated the convictions for interstate domestic violence and the firearm offense, leaving only the kidnapping conviction. At resentencing, the government sought a sentencing enhancement for “use” of a dangerous weapon during the kidnapping, which the district court applied over the defendant’s objection.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed whether the district court properly applied the sentencing enhancement for “use” of a dangerous weapon. The Fourth Circuit held that the defendant’s conduct—employing the gun to convey an imminent threat, rather than merely intimidating the victim with the possibility of future harm—constituted “use” under the relevant Sentencing Guideline. The court affirmed the district court’s application of the enhancement and the resulting sentence. View "US v. Faulls" on Justia Law

Law enforcement officers suspected that the defendant was involved in a drug trafficking operation based out of his apartment in a large, multi-unit building. To investigate further, officers, with the building management’s permission, conducted a warrantless dog sniff in the common hallway immediately outside the defendant’s apartment door. The trained dog alerted to the presence of drugs, and this information was used to obtain a search warrant. The subsequent search uncovered drugs, firearms, and other evidence. The defendant was indicted on drug and firearm charges.The United States District Court for the District of Maryland denied the defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence, rejecting his arguments that the dog sniff constituted an unlawful search under the Fourth Amendment. The court found that the dog sniff did not violate a reasonable expectation of privacy because it only revealed the presence of contraband, and that the area outside the apartment door was not protected “curtilage” since it was a common hallway accessible to other residents and building staff. The defendant was convicted by a jury on all counts and sentenced to 150 months in prison.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the district court’s legal conclusions de novo and factual findings for clear error. The Fourth Circuit held that a dog sniff at an apartment door in a common hallway does not violate a reasonable expectation of privacy, as established by United States v. Place and Illinois v. Caballes, because it only reveals the presence of contraband. The court also held that the common hallway outside the apartment door is not curtilage protected by the Fourth Amendment, as the defendant had no right to exclude others from that area. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "US v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Keith Moore was stopped by Richmond, Virginia police officers after they observed his vehicle displaying a temporary license tag number that matched two other vehicles they had stopped earlier that day. Moore fled from the police, leading to a chase that ended with him crashing his car. Upon his arrest, officers found a gun in his vehicle and discovered that Moore had a prior felony conviction. He was subsequently indicted for illegal possession of a firearm.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia dismissed Moore’s indictment, finding that the traffic stop was racially motivated and thus violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The court based its decision on statistical evidence showing that Black drivers were disproportionately stopped by Richmond police and historical evidence of racial discrimination in Richmond. The court concluded that Moore’s stop was part of a pattern of selective enforcement against Black drivers.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court’s decision. The appellate court found that the evidence was insufficient to prove that Moore’s stop and arrest were motivated by racial discrimination. The court noted that the officers had probable cause to stop Moore due to the fake license tag and his subsequent flight. The statistical evidence presented did not adequately demonstrate a discriminatory purpose, and the historical evidence was not contemporaneous with the events in question. The Fourth Circuit remanded the case with instructions to reinstate the indictment against Moore. View "US v. Moore" on Justia Law

Larry Antonio Burleigh, along with two accomplices, committed a violent carjacking and robbery in Richmond, Virginia. They forced the victim, D.O., to withdraw money from multiple ATMs at gunpoint, physically assaulted him, and threatened his life. Burleigh was arrested shortly after the incident. He pled guilty to carjacking and two counts of possessing a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia sentenced Burleigh to a total of 545 months in prison, including mandatory consecutive terms for the firearm charges. Burleigh later filed a motion for compassionate release, arguing that his rehabilitation, young age at the time of the offense, and the lengthy stacked sentences under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) constituted extraordinary and compelling reasons for a sentence reduction. The district court denied the motion, finding that Burleigh's arguments did not meet the threshold for extraordinary and compelling reasons and that the § 3553(a) factors did not support a sentence reduction.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Burleigh's motion for compassionate release. The district court had adequately considered Burleigh's arguments, including the changes to § 924(c) under the First Step Act, his rehabilitation, and his age. The court found that the seriousness of Burleigh's crime, its impact on the victim, and his criminal history outweighed the factors in favor of release. The Fourth Circuit concluded that the district court's explanation was sufficient to allow for meaningful appellate review and that it had not acted arbitrarily or irrationally. View "United States v. Burleigh" on Justia Law

James Gould was involuntarily committed to mental health facilities four times between May 2016 and July 2019. In February 2022, police found him in his West Virginia home with a twelve-gauge shotgun. A grand jury indicted him for violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4), which makes it unlawful for anyone who has been committed to a mental institution to possess a firearm. Gould pleaded guilty but appealed, arguing that the Second Amendment renders the statute facially unconstitutional.The United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia rejected Gould’s challenge, concluding that there is a historical basis for disarming individuals determined to be dangerous to themselves or the public. The court found that § 922(g)(4) is constitutional on its face. Gould then changed his plea to guilty and was sentenced to time served and three years of supervised release.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that § 922(g)(4) is consistent with the nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation. The court noted that historically, legislatures incapacitated those suffering from mental illness when they posed a danger to themselves or others. Additionally, the court found that legislatures had the authority to disarm groups of people considered dangerous. The court emphasized that disarmament under § 922(g)(4) is not categorically permanent, as individuals can petition for relief to restore their firearm rights. The court concluded that § 922(g)(4) is facially constitutional because it can be applied in situations consistent with the Second Amendment. The Fourth Circuit affirmed Gould’s conviction. View "United States v. Gould" on Justia Law

In 2023, Tovis Ation Richardson pled guilty to conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute methamphetamine, and possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine, under a written plea agreement. He was sentenced to 240 months in prison. Richardson appealed, raising two issues: whether the district court erred in applying a sentencing enhancement for firearm possession, and whether his counsel was ineffective for not objecting to this enhancement.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina adopted the presentence report (PSR) which included a base offense level of 36, with two enhancements: one for firearm possession and another for maintaining a premises for drug distribution. The PSR also included reductions for acceptance of responsibility, resulting in a total offense level of 37 and a sentencing range of 210 to 262 months. Both parties recommended a 240-month sentence, which the district court imposed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that Richardson had waived his right to appeal the firearm enhancement in his plea agreement, which was valid and enforceable. The court also determined that Richardson’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel did not conclusively appear in the record, as required for direct appeal. The court noted that the firearm enhancement was properly applied based on the discovery of a shotgun in Richardson’s car, which was used in the drug conspiracy. The court concluded that counsel’s failure to object to the enhancement did not constitute deficient performance under the Strickland standard.The Fourth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court, upholding Richardson’s 240-month sentence. View "United States v. Richardson" on Justia Law

Eric Walton, whose life sentence was commuted by the President, was found in possession of drugs and drug proceeds within a year of his release, violating the terms of his supervised release. Walton represented himself in the revocation proceedings, and the district court sentenced him to 60 months' imprisonment. Walton appealed, arguing that the court erred in allowing him to represent himself, lacked jurisdiction over his commuted sentence, and imposed an unreasonable sentence.The United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia revoked Walton's supervised release based on multiple violations, including committing new offenses and possessing controlled substances. Walton admitted to these violations during the revocation hearing. The court appointed counsel for Walton, but he chose to proceed pro se, with stand-by counsel available.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the district court retained jurisdiction over Walton's supervised release, as the commutation order explicitly left the supervised release term intact. The court also found that Walton knowingly and voluntarily chose to represent himself, given his extensive experience with the legal system and his clear and repeated requests to proceed pro se.Regarding the sentence, the Fourth Circuit determined that the district court did not err in its calculation of the Guidelines range or in its explanation of the sentence. The court noted that Walton's violations included a Grade A violation, justifying the 60-month sentence. The court also found that the district court adequately considered the relevant statutory factors and provided a sufficient explanation for the sentence imposed.The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment, upholding Walton's 60-month imprisonment sentence for violating the terms of his supervised release. View "United States v. Walton" on Justia Law