Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Social security survivors' benefits are a thing of value of the United States that can support a conviction under 18 U.S.C. 641. Viewed in the light most favorable to the government, the Fourth Circuit concluded that substantial evidence supported defendant's conviction for theft of government property beyond a reasonable doubt. In this case, the jury could reasonably infer from two denied benefits applications that defendant had a motive to file under a different benefits program to again attempt to obtain benefits to which he was not entitled. Finally, the district court's trial management was reasonable and far from an abuse of discretion. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Kiza" on Justia Law

The Fourth Circuit affirmed the denial of defendant's motion to dismiss a charge under the murder-for-hire statute, 18 U.S.C. 1958, holding that the manufactured jurisdiction doctrine had no bearing in this case. The Fourth Circuit explained that each of defendant's voluntary acts was sufficient to support her criminal culpability under section 1958, and they were not somehow tainted or discounted by a government informer's initial text. Furthermore, the district court did not err in establishing and considering 120 months as the guidelines range. The district court considered the parties' sentencing arguments and provided a reasoned explanation for the sentence, with specific consideration of the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors and defendant's downward variance request. View "United States v. Davis" on Justia Law

Beckles v. United States held that the Sentencing Guidelines are not subject to vagueness challenges under the Due Process Clause and therefore that USSG 4B1.2(a)(2)'s residual clause is not void for vagueness. Based on Beckles, the Fourth Circuit affirmed defendant's sentence, rejecting his vagueness challenge to USSG 4B1.2(a), and concluding that defendant's North Carolina conviction for attempting and conspiring to commit first-degree burglary qualifies as a crime of violence under USSG 4B1.2(a)(2). View "United States v. Mack" on Justia Law

The court vacated the grant of qualified immunity to prison officials and summary judgment, concluding that a reasonable prison official had fair warning that retaliating against an inmate who filed a prison grievance was unlawful and an inmate's First Amendment right to be free from retaliation for filing a grievance was clearly established at the time. Plaintiff, an inmate at SCDC, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that he received a disciplinary charge in retaliation for filing a prison grievance. Although the court agreed with the district court's conclusion that no published decision squarely addressed whether filing a grievance was protected First Amendment conduct, the court concluded that the district court failed to consider whether the right was clearly established based on general constitutional principles or a consensus of persuasive authority. In this case, the inmate's right was clearly established based on a robust consensus of persuasive authority where the Second, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits have all recognized in published decisions that inmates possess a right, grounded in the First Amendment's Petition Clause, to be free from retaliation in response to filing a prison grievance. View "Booker v. South Carolina Department of Corrections" on Justia Law

Petitioners, convicted of murder and sentenced to death, sought post-conviction relief in state court under North Carolina's Racial Justice Act (RJA), N.C. Gen. Stat. 15A-2010 to 2012. The state trial court awarded relief under the RJA and reduced petitioners' sentences to life imprisonment. The State appealed and the North Carolina Supreme Court vacated, remanding for additional RJA proceedings. Petitioners filed suit under 28 U.S.C. 2241 in federal court, arguing that a second RJA proceeding would violate their rights under the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The district court abstained from exercising federal jurisdiction pursuant to Younger v. Harris, and alternatively held that petitioners failed to exhaust their state remedies. The court affirmed, concluding that the district court did not abuse its discretion by deciding to abstain because the basic requirements for Younger abstention were present in this case and petitioners failed to make a showing of extraordinary circumstances. The court rejected petitioners' claims to the contrary and affirmed the judgment. View "Robinson v. Thomas" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native of Panama and admitted to the United States on a B-2 visitor visa, was subjected to expedited removal proceedings because he was not lawfully admitted for permanent residence and his burglary offense was an aggravated felony for purposes of immigration law. Petitioner unsuccessfully sought review in the immigration court, petitioned for review, and was then removed. Following the DHS's subsequent cancellation of petitioner's removal order, the Attorney General moved in this Court to dismiss petitioner's petition for review. The court denied the Attorney General's renewed motion to dismiss, concluding that the court was not stripped of jurisdiction in a pending case simply by writing "cancelled" on a removal order the DHS has sued to remove an alien, and the court declined to dismiss the petition on mootness grounds. The court found that the Attorney General waived his remaining arguments. On the merits, the court concluded that the offense of statutory burglary in Virginia does not constitute an aggravated felony for purposes of immigration law. The court concluded that the Virginia burglary statute is indivisible, and application of the modified categorical approach is inappropriate. Using the categorical approach, the court concluded that the Virginia offense of statutory burglary criminalizes more conduct than the generic federal offense of burglary. Therefore, the DHS erred in classifying petitioner's conviction as an aggravated felony. The court granted the petition for review, vacated, and remanded. View "Castendet-Lewis v. Sessions III" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction for various offenses related to the crime of carjacking. The court concluded that there was sufficient evidence to convict defendant of carjacking where he grabbed the victim's car keys while holding a loaded gun and after threatening her life. Therefore, there was plenty of evidence of intent to cause serious harm when he took control of the car. The court also concluded that the indictment was not duplicitous because it charged defendant with one count for violating 18 U.S.C. 922(g) both with the actual possession of the handgun he was carrying and with the constructive possession of the shotgun that a codefendant was carrying. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Robinson" on Justia Law

The court issued a certificate of appealability (COA) to allow federal prisoner, Lamar Richard Lee, to challenge the denial of his motion under 28 U.S.C. 2255. The court held this case in abeyance pending the Supreme Court's decision in Beckles v. United States. In Beckles, the Supreme Court concluded that the Guidelines are not subject to a vagueness challenge under the Due Process Clause. The court explained that, in short, Johnson v. United States' vagueness holding does not apply to the residual clause in USSG 4B1.2(a)(2). In this case, the court concluded that the district court did not err by determining that Lee's unlawful wounding conviction qualified as a crime of violence under the residual clause. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Lee" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty in 2009 to various drug and firearm offenses and was sentenced to a stipulated plea agreement. In 2014, the Sentencing Guidelines were amended, retroactively lowering the offense levels associated with two of the offenses to which defendant pleaded guilty. In 2015, the district court sua sponte denied defendant a sentence reduction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2), on the grounds that defendant's sentence was not based on the Guidelines. Defendant then filed a motion for reconsideration, but the district court denied the motion. The court concluded that the implied prohibition on 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2)-based motions for reconsideration, as recognized in United States v. Goodwyn, is non-jurisdictional. In this case, the government waived its right to object to the district court's failure to deny defendant relief on the grounds that he brought an unauthorized motion for reconsideration. Because the government failed to raise this non-jurisdictional limitation, it was waived on appeal. Applying de novo review, the court agreed with the district court that defendant was ineligible for relief under section 3582(c)(2) because he was sentenced pursuant to a Rule 11(c)(1)(C) plea agreement that did not use a Guidelines sentencing range. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. May" on Justia Law

Defendant, a citizen of Jamaica, asserted a Sixth Amendment ineffective assistance of counsel challenge to his conviction under the criminal counterfeiting statute. The district court determined that, although counsel provided deficient performance, defendant was not prejudice because the district court corrected counsel's deficiencies. In this case, defendant unknowingly pleaded to an aggravated felony that rendered him automatically deportable. Counsel had consulted with an immigration attorney regarding repercussions of defendant's plea to his immigration status, but the immigration attorney gave advice based upon an amended version of the statute that did not apply to defendant's case. Therefore, neither counsel nor the district court informed defendant that he was pleading to a crime that rendered him automatically deportable. The court issued a certificate of appealability and addressed defendant's claim on the merits. The court concluded that defendant received deficient performance under the Sixth Amendment, and that it prejudiced defendant because the district court's warnings, which were general and referenced only a vague "risk" or possibility of deportation, did not cure counsel's deficient performance. The court explained that defendant could demonstrate prejudice by showing a reasonable likelihood that, absent his counsel's error, he could have negotiated a different plea agreement or would have gone to trial instead. Accordingly, the court reversed, vacated, and remanded for further proceedings. View "United States v. Swaby" on Justia Law