Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant appealed his 45-month sentence after pleading guilty to mailing a threatening letter in violation of 18 U.S.C. 876(c). Defendant's conviction stemmed from him sending a threatening letter to a federal courthouse that was covered with white powder. The court concluded that defendant failed to establish that any lack of notice of the district court's intention to depart from the advisory Guidelines range affected his substantial rights. The court rejected defendant's claim that the severity of the sentence rested on improper sentencing factors and unfounded factual findings. In this case, the inferences drawn by the district court were within the bounds of its discretion. Because defendant's sentence was procedurally and substantively reasonable, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Spencer" on Justia Law

Petitioner seeks review of the district court's denial of his 28 U.S.C. 2254 petition for habeas relief. Defendant argued that his petition was not time-barred because it was filed within one year of his discovery of his petitions' factual predicates -- his incorrect blood type and factual findings in the Zain III report -- which he argues could not have been discovered sooner. The court found, however, that had petitioner exercised due diligence, he would have discovered the factual predicates far earlier. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's denial of the petition. View "Gray v. Ballard" on Justia Law

Defendant plead guilty to one count of Hobbs Act robbery, one count under the carjacking statute, 18 U.S.C. 2119, and one count of discharging a firearm during a carjacking. On appeal, defendant challenges the district court's ruling that the federal offense of carjacking qualified as a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. 924(c). The court affirmed the judgment, agreeing with the district court that the carjacking statute qualifies as a crime of violence under Section 924(c), because the carjacking statute "has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another." View "United States v. Evans" on Justia Law

Defendant appeals her conviction for one count of conspiracy to commit bank fraud and mail fraud and ten counts of bank fraud for her role in originating and submitting fraudulent mortgage loan applications. Defendant raised several issues on appeal. The court concluded that defendant failed to establish any Sixth Amendment error where the district court allowed the government's pretrial seizure of defendant's assets where the seizure did not prevent defendant from being represented by her counsel of choice; the evidence was sufficient to support the conspiracy conviction; the court rejected defendant's evidentiary challenges; the evidence was sufficient to support the bank fraud convictions; the court rejected defendant's argument that the government constructively amended the indictment; the district court had jurisdiction to enter the preliminary and final forfeiture orders after the October 3 hearing; and the court rejected defendant's challenge to the district court’s substitute property order. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Chittenden" on Justia Law

After defendant pled guilty to distribution of a quantity of cocaine base, he appealed the district court's application of the modified categorical approach when it determined that his prior state court attempt conviction qualified as a controlled substance offense under USSG 4B1.2. Defendant also argued that West Virginia’s general attempt statute criminalized more conduct than a generic controlled substance offense. The court concluded that the district court erred in applying the modified categorical approach to the West Virginia general attempt statute; held that sentencing courts must compare the state and generic elements of such statutes as well as the elements of the underlying substantive statutory offense when determining whether a prior attempt conviction qualifies as a controlled substance offense; and concluded that the district court failed to make these required comparisons. The court explained, however, that under the correct approach, defendant's attempt conviction properly constitutes a controlled substance offense under USSG 4B1.2. Therefore, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Dozier" on Justia Law

After defendant was charged with illegal reentry and failure to register as a sex offender, he argued that his underlying convictions for three counts of indecent liberties with a child under North Carolina law were unconstitutional in light of Padilla v. Kentucky. Padilla held that the Sixth Amendment requires a defense attorney to advise a non-citizen client of the immigration risks of a guilty plea. A North Carolina court, relying on Padilla, did vacate defendant's convictions in 2015. The court concluded that the alleged constitutional deficiency in defendant's state convictions had no effect on his subsequent prosecution for illegal reentry. The court explained that because Padilla does not apply retroactively to defendants like defendant, convicted before the case was decided, defendant's convictions remain valid today as a matter of federal law, and his attempt to collaterally attack his 2009 removal is unavailing on that ground alone. Because the district court properly denied defendant's motion to vacate the 2009 removal order and to withdraw his guilty plea to the charge of illegal reentry, and because there is no error in the district court’s reliance on the vacated state convictions in determining defendant's sentencing range under the Sentencing Guidelines, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Moreno-Tapia" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to two counts of structuring cash transactions to evade reporting requirements and agreed to forfeit significant assets. The court concluded that the district court did not err in calculating defendant's sentencing range by applying a two level enhancement for his leadership role under USSG 3B1.1(c), and a two-level enhancement for his abuse of a position of trust under USSG 3B1.3. The court also concluded that the district court fully informed defendant of the terms of the plea agreement and its provision for waiver of any challenge to his agreement to forfeit assets. In any event, defendant failed to establish that his substantial rights were affected. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Agyekum" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native of Belarus, seeks review of the BIA's final order of removal based on petitioner's Virginia involuntary manslaughter offense, which the agency deemed a categorical crime involving moral turpitude. The court explained that an involuntary manslaughter conviction can be secured in Virginia without proving a conscious disregard of risks attendant to the offender’s conduct; such a conviction can be predicated on proof that the offender failed to appreciate or be aware of the risks emanating from his conduct. Therefore, the court concluded that Virginia’s involuntary manslaughter offense is not categorically a crime involving moral turpitude. Accordingly, the court granted the petition for review and vacated, remanding for further proceedings. View "Sotnikau v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Defendant, the former chairman and CEO of Massey, appealed his conviction for violating federal mine safety laws and regulations. Defendant's conviction stemmed from his involvement in a tragic mine accident that caused the death of 29 miners. The court concluded that the district court did not err in refusing to dismiss the superseding indictment; the district court did not reversibly err in denying defendant an opportunity to engage in recross-examination of a Massey employee; the district court properly instructed the jury that it could conclude that defendant “willfully” violated federal mine safety laws if it found that defendant acted or failed to act with reckless disregard as to whether the action or omission would lead to a violation of mine safety laws; the first, second, and third jury instructions reflect the “bad purpose” mens rea discussed in Bryan v. United States because they required that the jury conclude that defendant took actions that he knew would lead to violations of safety laws or failed to take actions that he knew were necessary to comply with federal mine safety laws; and the district court did not reversibly err in providing the two-inference instruction. The court noted that, although it disapproved of the two-inference instruction, the district court's use of that instruction in this case does not amount to reversible error. The court directed the district courts not to use the two-inference instruction going forward. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Blankenship" on Justia Law

Defendant signed a plea agreement in which the government agreed to seek a sentence at the lowest end of the “applicable guideline range.” After the government recommended a sentence at the lowest end of the guideline range found by the district court, defendant appealed. The court held that, in this case, the phrase “applicable guideline range” only obligated the government to recommend a sentence at the lowest end of the guideline range found by the district court. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Tate" on Justia Law