Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Movant seeks authorization to file a second or successive application for habeas relief. The court held that a convicted state prisoner, such as movant in this case, challenging the execution of his sentence is required to apply for authorization to file a second or successive habeas application. According to the plain language of the statutes at issue and the purpose and context of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), movant's petition, although styled as a 28 U.S.C. 2241 petition, is governed by 28 U.S.C. 2254, and as such, should be treated as an “application under section 2254.” Therefore, when a prisoner being held “pursuant to the judgment of a State court” files a habeas petition claiming the execution of his sentence is in violation of the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States, the more specific section 2254 “and all associated statutory requirements” shall apply, regardless of the statutory label the prisoner chooses to give his petition. In this case, movant must move in the appropriate court of appeals for an order authorizing the district court to consider the second or successive application. Movant's petition is second or successive, and he does not meet the criteria for authorization. Accordingly, the court denied the motion. View "In Re: Terrence Wright" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his 60-month sentence after pleading guilty to illegal reentry into the United States. The district court concluded that defendant's 1997 aggravated assault conviction under Texas Penal Code 22.02(a) constituted a predicate “crime of violence” under the reentry sentencing guideline, USSG 2L1.2(b)(1)(A). The court concluded that the Texas legislature, in setting out alternative means of satisfying the mens rea element of the Texas statute, did not render the statute divisible such that the state law can be said to have created two offenses, one involving a reckless mens rea, the other involving a knowing or intentional mens rea. The court concluded that the Texas aggravated assault offense created in section 22.02(a) is broader than the federal generic “aggravated assault” offense qualifying under the reentry guideline as supporting an enhanced sentencing range, is not divisible, and therefore cannot support the application of a 16-level enhancement under the reentry guideline. Accordingly, the court vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing. View "United States v. Barcenas-Yanez" on Justia Law

Movant seeks authorization to file a successive habeas corpus application under 28 U.S.C. 2254. Movant alleged that despite multiple attempts over the years to obtain his entire case file from his trial and appellate counsel, it was not until May 2014 that he was provided with a particular document suggesting that his counsel provided constitutionally ineffective assistance. The document is a proposed plea agreement. Movant claims that his counsel was ineffective for failing to communicate this offer and that movant was prejudiced as a result. The court concluded that the plea offer would have no bearing on the deliberations of a reasonable factfinder regarding movant's innocence or guilt. Newly discovered evidence that a defendant may have lost out on a favorable plea offer fits neither of section 2244(b)’s exceptions to the bar on successive habeas applications. Accordingly, the court denied the motion. View "In re: John McFadden" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction for the murder of Special Agent James Terry Watson. Agent Watson - as an Assistant Attaché for the United States Mission in Colombia - was an internationally protected person (an IPP). Defendant, a citizen of Colombia, pleaded guilty to offenses of kidnapping conspiracy and murder of an IPP. Defendant argued that his prosecution in this country for offenses committed in Colombia contravened the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. Applying the arbitrary-or-unfair framework, the court concluded that defendant's prosecution in this country was not fundamentally unfair where kidnapping and murder are "self-evidently criminal." Furthermore, the IPP convention alone gave defendant notice sufficient to satisfy due process. The court rejected defendant's contention that because the United States Code provisions implementing the IPP Convention require knowledge of the victim’s IPP status that Bello did not possess, those provisions cannot have put him on notice that he was subject to prosecution in this country. Accordingly, there is no merit to defendant’s mens rea contention - nor his broader claim that the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause precluded his prosecution in this country - and the court must uphold his kidnapping conspiracy and murder convictions. View "United States v. Bello Murillo" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to one count of communicating a false distress message to the United States Coast Guard and was sentenced to 14 months in prison, as well as ordered to pay restitution for the costs incurred by the Coast Guard in responding to the specious communication. Defendant was drunk on a boat when the Coast Guard found him in a restricted marine area. Defendant told the Coast Guard that he had a fight with another man and threw him overboard. After the Coast Guard's rescue efforts could not find the man, defendant admitted that he had taken some medication that may have caused him to imagine that another man was on the boat. The rescue efforts cost the Coast Guard $117,913. The court rejected defendant's argument that the district court lacked the statutory authority to issue a restitution order. The court concluded that the text and all reasonable inferences from it provide a clear rebuttal to defendant's proposed construction of 14 U.S.C. 88(c)(3). The court held that an order of restitution may issue under section 88(c)(3) as part of a criminal sentence. The primary purpose of the statute was to preserve for legitimate purposes the Coast Guard’s finite budget. It would defeat that purpose to mandate that the Coast Guard expend even more resources in separate civil actions to recoup false distress call costs. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Serafini" on Justia Law

Movant seeks pre-filing authorization to pursue a successive 28 U.S.C. 2255 petition for habeas relief. Movant argued that the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Johnson produced a new rule of constitutional law made retroactive by that Court, and that he is entitled to seek relief under the new rule. The court granted the request for authorization to file a successive section 2255 motion because application of Johnson to 18 U.S.C. 16(b) as incorporated into the Sentencing Guidelines might render the career-offender residual clause that was applicable at the time movant was sentenced unconstitutional, and because the rule in Johnson is substantive with respect to its application to the Sentencing Guidelines and therefore applies retroactively. View "In Re: Creadell Hubbard" on Justia Law

The district court granted defendant's motion to dismiss an indictment charging him with illegal reentry by a deported alien in violation of 8 U.S.C. 1326(a), (b)(2), concluding that the underlying removal order was invalid because DHS failed to explain to defendant in his native language either the removal charges against him or his right to contest the charges or obtain legal representation. The court agreed with the government that, even assuming the administrative removal proceedings were procedurally defective, defendant failed to establish prejudice. In this case, the government contends that even if DHS had provided defendant a Spanish language translation of the removal charges and his right to contest them, it would not have made a difference - he still would have been removed to Mexico. The court concluded that defendant failed to establish that his order of removal was “fundamentally unfair” under section 1326(d). Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "United States v. Lopez-Collazo" on Justia Law

Petitioner challenged the district court's denial of his 28 U.S.C. 2241 habeas petition. Petitioner appealed the computation of his federal sentence, and, more specifically, the refusal of the federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) to designate nunc pro tunc a state facility for service of his federal sentence. Although the court found no error in the district court’s analysis of the BOP’s sentencing calculation, the court concluded that the district court overlooked a two-pronged flaw in the BOP’s exercise of its broad discretion in denying petitioner’s requested nunc pro tunc designation. The court held that, in its consideration of the fourth statutory factor under 18 U.S.C. 3621(b), the BOP misapplied 18 U.S.C. 3584(a). That is, in the face of the federal sentencing judge’s silence as to the court’s intention, the BOP invoked a presumption that the unelaborated federal sentence should be deemed to run consecutively to the later imposed state sentence. The court concluded that the presumption relied on was inapplicable in this case. Because the court concluded that the BOP abused its discretion, the court affirmed the judgment in part, vacated in part, and remanded with instructions that the district court remand petitioner's request for a nunc pro tunc designation to the BOP for further consideration. View "Mangum v. Hallembaek" on Justia Law

Defendant conditionally plead guilty to one count of possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug crime, and then appealed the denial of his motion to suppress evidence obtained from a search of his residence. The court concluded that defendant has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the investigator omitted information from the search warrant affidavit - material information about the reliability of the confidential informant who was the primary source of the information used to establish probable cause - with at least a reckless disregard for whether these omissions made the application misleading. Because these omissions were material to a finding of probable cause, defendant has established a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights under Franks v. Delaware. Therefore, the district court erred in denying defendant’s suppression motion. The court reversed the district court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress, vacated defendant's conviction and sentence, and remanded for further proceedings. View "United States v. Lull" on Justia Law

Defendant conditionally plead guilty to being a prohibited person in possession of a firearm, and then challenged the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence recovered after a stop-and-frisk. The court rejected defendant's version of the facts as well as his accompanying legal argument that he was seized before he reached for his pocket. The court also concluded that the police had reasonable suspicion based on a tip from a 911 call, defendant was found in the area in which the gunshot was reported in a high-crime area, defendant failed to respond or make eye contact with the officers, and defendant's performance of a security check gave credence to the anonymous tip and gave the officers reason to suspect that defendant was the man of whom they had been warned. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Foster" on Justia Law