Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant was convicted of conspiracy, making a false statement, theft, and embezzlement, all in connection with her unlawful receipt of government benefits. Defendant argues that, in the affidavit supporting the search warrant for the house, the affiant recklessly omitted material, exculpatory facts. The critical information that defendant maintains the special agent recklessly omitted from his affidavit were facts demonstrating that she and her husband “occupied different parts of the house.” The court affirmed the district court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress, concluding that the inclusion of the omitted information would not have defeated probable cause for the search and thus that information was not material. View "United States v. Wharton" on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to possession of a firearm by a felon and was sentenced under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. 924(e), to a mandatory minimum sentence of 180 months in prison. The court affirmed the district court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress but found that, because of an intervening change in law following sentencing, the district court erroneously sentenced defendant under the ACCA. In this case, Johnson v. United States was decided during the pendency of the appeal and the Supreme Court held in that case that the residual clause is unconstitutionally vague and therefore violates due process. Therefore, defendant's prior burglary convictions do not qualify as the ACCA enumerated offense of "burglary" under the categorical approach. Accordingly, the court affirmed defendant's conviction, vacated the sentence, and remanded for resentencing. View "United States v. White" on Justia Law

Defendant plead guilty to one count of failing to register as a sex offender and one count of illegal reentry. The district court concluded that defendant's prior felony conviction qualified as a crime of violence and applied a 16-level enhancement, sentencing defendant to 46 months in prison. The court applied the plain and ordinary meaning of the Sentencing Guidelines' language and determined that defendant's prior conviction under Md. Code Ann., Crim. Law 3-307(a)(1) qualifies as a "forcible sex offense" for purposes of USSG 2L1.2. The court joined the other circuits addressing the issue and held that, for purposes of the re-entry Guideline, a “sex offense” is an offense involving sexual conduct with another person. And as the Guidelines commentary itself makes clear, a sex offense is “forcible” if it is not consensual. Therefore, the lease culpable version of the crime defined by section 3-307(a)(1) - sexual contact while aided or abetted by another - categorically qualifies as a “forcible sex offense” and thus a “crime of violence” under USSG 2L1.2. Accordingly, the court affirmed the sentence. View "United States v. Alfaro" on Justia Law

Defendant, a CPA, appealed his sentence and conviction for conspiracy and obstruction of justice following his involvement in earnings mismanagement and improper accounting transactions while acting as chief accounting officer of Beazer Homes. The court concluded that the district court did not err in excluding evidence surrounding the false email accusations. In any event, any error was harmless where defendant was not ultimately prejudiced. The court also concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in quashing defendant's Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 17(c) subpoena to Beazer; in prohibiting defendant's accounting expert from testifying about work papers prepared by Beazer's independent auditors; and in allowing the government to have Beazer employees testify as lay witnesses about the propriety of complex accounting transactions without calling an accounting expert to testify. Finally, the court rejected all three of defendant's potential misconduct claims and concluded that any error was harmless. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Rand" on Justia Law

Claimants appeal the district court's entry of default judgment for the government in a civil forfeiture action against funds deposited in claimants’ names in banks in New Zealand and Hong Kong. Default judgment was entered after the government successfully moved to disentitle claimants from defending their claims to the defendant property under the federal fugitive disentitlement statute, 28 U.S.C. 2466. Claimants’ alleged copyright infringement scheme, dubbed the “Mega Conspiracy,” used public websites to facilitate the illegal reproduction and distribution of copyrighted movies, software, television programs, and music. The court rejected claimants' challenge to the district court's in rem jurisdiction over assets in foreign countries; the court affirmed the district court's adoption of the reasoning in Collazos v. United States, a Second Circuit case, holding that claimants had waived the due process rights they claim were violated by operation of section 2466; as section 2466 predicates disentitlement on an allowable presumption that a criminal fugitive lacks a meritorious defense to a related civil forfeiture, the court concluded that it does not violate the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and affirmed the district court’s decision; and the court adopted a specific intent standard for section 2466 and affirmed the district court's finding of intent with respect to each defendant. The court rejected claimants' remaining arguments and affirmed the judgment in its entirety. View "United States v. Batato" on Justia Law

In 2006, Keith Alan Clark was found guilty of kidnapping and assault with intent to commit criminal sexual conduct. In 2014, Clark, pro se, filed a motion for extension of time to request a certificate of appealability. At issue is whether this motion, filed within the thirty day requirement of Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4, is the functional equivalent of a formal notice of appeal demanded by Rule 3. The court held that a document filed by a pro se litigant as an extension of time to request a certificate of appealability qualifies as the notice of appeal required by Rule 3. Because Clark's motion was timely under Rule 4 and satisfied the notice requirements of Rule 3, the court concluded that it has jurisdiction to consider Clark's application for a certificate of appealability. View "Clark v. Cartledge" on Justia Law

Defendants, four commercial boat captains, were charged with violating the Lacey Act, 16 U.S.C. 3372(a)(1), after they caught Atlantic striped bass in federal waters and later sold them. The district court granted defendants' motions to dismiss the indictment. The court concluded that the text of the fishery management plan created by the Commission and referenced by the Atlantic Striped Bass Conservation Act, 16 U.S.C. 5151, in fact regulates only state coastal waters, and accordingly does not regulate fishing in federal waters. Therefore, the court concluded that the Lacey Act does not except from prosecution defendants' conduct alleged in the indictments. The court also rejected the contention that the regulatory regime governing defendants' actions is unconstitutionally vague. Accordingly, the court reversed the orders of the district court dismissing the indictments and remanded the cases with instructions that the indictments be reinstated. View "United States v. Saunders" on Justia Law

Movant seeks authorization to file a second or successive application for habeas relief. The court held that a convicted state prisoner, such as movant in this case, challenging the execution of his sentence is required to apply for authorization to file a second or successive habeas application. According to the plain language of the statutes at issue and the purpose and context of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), movant's petition, although styled as a 28 U.S.C. 2241 petition, is governed by 28 U.S.C. 2254, and as such, should be treated as an “application under section 2254.” Therefore, when a prisoner being held “pursuant to the judgment of a State court” files a habeas petition claiming the execution of his sentence is in violation of the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States, the more specific section 2254 “and all associated statutory requirements” shall apply, regardless of the statutory label the prisoner chooses to give his petition. In this case, movant must move in the appropriate court of appeals for an order authorizing the district court to consider the second or successive application. Movant's petition is second or successive, and he does not meet the criteria for authorization. Accordingly, the court denied the motion. View "In Re: Terrence Wright" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his 60-month sentence after pleading guilty to illegal reentry into the United States. The district court concluded that defendant's 1997 aggravated assault conviction under Texas Penal Code 22.02(a) constituted a predicate “crime of violence” under the reentry sentencing guideline, USSG 2L1.2(b)(1)(A). The court concluded that the Texas legislature, in setting out alternative means of satisfying the mens rea element of the Texas statute, did not render the statute divisible such that the state law can be said to have created two offenses, one involving a reckless mens rea, the other involving a knowing or intentional mens rea. The court concluded that the Texas aggravated assault offense created in section 22.02(a) is broader than the federal generic “aggravated assault” offense qualifying under the reentry guideline as supporting an enhanced sentencing range, is not divisible, and therefore cannot support the application of a 16-level enhancement under the reentry guideline. Accordingly, the court vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing. View "United States v. Barcenas-Yanez" on Justia Law

Movant seeks authorization to file a successive habeas corpus application under 28 U.S.C. 2254. Movant alleged that despite multiple attempts over the years to obtain his entire case file from his trial and appellate counsel, it was not until May 2014 that he was provided with a particular document suggesting that his counsel provided constitutionally ineffective assistance. The document is a proposed plea agreement. Movant claims that his counsel was ineffective for failing to communicate this offer and that movant was prejudiced as a result. The court concluded that the plea offer would have no bearing on the deliberations of a reasonable factfinder regarding movant's innocence or guilt. Newly discovered evidence that a defendant may have lost out on a favorable plea offer fits neither of section 2244(b)’s exceptions to the bar on successive habeas applications. Accordingly, the court denied the motion. View "In re: John McFadden" on Justia Law