Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Tracey Brown was convicted by a Nevada jury of multiple offenses related to a series of convenience store robberies. During the trial, an incident of juror misconduct occurred when several jurors shared an elevator with a prosecution witness, Teshae Gallon, and her friend. The friend made comments about the case, including references to surveillance videos and Gallon’s truthfulness. Brown moved for a mistrial based on this misconduct, but the trial court denied the motion, finding that the misconduct did not prejudice Brown. The court offered to replace two jurors who recalled the incident with alternates, but Brown chose to keep the original jurors.The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed Brown’s convictions on direct appeal, concluding that although juror misconduct had occurred, Brown failed to show it was prejudicial. The court relied on Meyer v. State, which requires the defendant to demonstrate that juror misconduct probably affected the verdict.Brown then filed a habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in federal court, which was denied. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s denial of the habeas petition. The Ninth Circuit held that the juror misconduct constituted trial error, not egregious misconduct, and thus required Brown to show actual prejudice under Brecht v. Abrahamson. The court found that the Nevada Supreme Court’s application of Meyer did not violate clearly established Supreme Court precedent and that the state court’s factual determinations were reasonable based on the record. Consequently, the Ninth Circuit concluded that habeas relief was not warranted and affirmed the denial of Brown’s petition. View "BROWN V. ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR THE STATE OF NEVADA" on Justia Law

Steven Zinnel was convicted of bankruptcy fraud, money laundering, and other financial crimes. He was sentenced to 152 months in prison and ordered to pay over $2.5 million in restitution and fines. The government sought to garnish funds from Zinnel's TD Ameritrade Individual Retirement Account to satisfy the unpaid restitution and fines. Zinnel objected to the garnishment and requested that the proceedings be transferred to the District of Oregon, where he claimed to reside.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of California denied Zinnel's motion to transfer the proceedings, ruling that venue was proper in the Eastern District of California. The court overruled Zinnel's objections to the writ of garnishment and ordered TD Ameritrade to disburse funds to cover the unpaid restitution, fines, and a litigation surcharge. Zinnel appealed the final garnishment order.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and held that the district court erred in denying Zinnel's motion to transfer the garnishment proceedings. The Ninth Circuit agreed with the Sixth and Eleventh Circuits that the plain language of the Federal Debt Collection Procedures Act (FDCPA) imposes a mandatory obligation on the district court to transfer the proceedings upon the debtor's timely request. The court also held that the district court's failure to transfer the proceedings was not subject to harmless error analysis, as it necessarily affected the debtor's substantial rights.The Ninth Circuit vacated the district court's final order of garnishment and remanded the case, allowing Zinnel to litigate the proceedings in the district where he now resides. The court concluded that the appeal was not moot, as a partial remedy could still be fashioned by directing the United States to return the funds to TD Ameritrade. View "United States v. Zinnel" on Justia Law

Michael Hogan, a death row inmate in Nevada, appealed the denial of his habeas corpus petition. Hogan challenged the district court's denial of relief on two certified issues and sought to expand the certificate of appealability (COA) on five additional issues. The case predates the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996.Hogan's first certified claim alleged ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC) for failing to investigate his 1971 Iowa manslaughter conviction, which was used as an aggravating factor in his Nevada penalty proceeding. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision, finding that Hogan's trial counsel made a reasonable strategic decision to challenge the Iowa conviction in Nevada rather than in Iowa. The court also found that Hogan could not demonstrate prejudice from his counsel's failure to challenge the Iowa conviction as a crime of violence under Nevada law.Hogan's second certified claim argued that the procedural default of his trial-court IAC claims should be excused under Martinez v. Ryan. The Ninth Circuit disagreed with the district court's reasons for concluding that Hogan failed to establish "cause" under Martinez. The court held that Martinez applies to procedural defaults based on state timeliness rules and that Hogan's failure to raise the trial IAC claims in his second petition did not preclude Martinez relief. The court remanded Claims 2(A)-(G) and (I)-(O) to the district court for further proceedings.The Ninth Circuit granted Hogan's motion to expand the COA to include whether the district court erred in dismissing his challenges to the aggravating circumstances (Claims 5(A) and (B)) as procedurally defaulted. The court held that these claims were properly exhausted and that Nevada's procedural rules were not consistently applied as of 1990, allowing federal review of the merits. The court affirmed the district court's judgment on the merits of these claims.The Ninth Circuit declined to expand the COA to cover four other issues, including Hogan's Confrontation Clause claim, jury instructional errors, lethal injection claim, and cumulative errors claim. The court affirmed the district court's judgment on these issues. View "Hogan v. Bean" on Justia Law

Antoine Johnson was convicted of conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery, Hobbs Act robbery, and the use and discharge of a firearm causing death during a crime of violence. The charges stemmed from the robbery of an armored truck in which a guard was fatally shot. Johnson argued that his conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) was unlawful because intervening Supreme Court case law invalidated § 924(c)’s residual clause, and thus, the jury must have based his conviction on invalid crime-of-violence predicates.The United States District Court for the Central District of California denied Johnson’s motion to vacate his sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. The district court held that Johnson’s § 924(c) conviction was based on at least one valid predicate pursuant to the elements clause: Hobbs Act robbery. The court also ruled that any error in the jury instructions was harmless because no reasonable juror could have found Johnson guilty of § 924(c) based solely on his participation in the conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery and not the commission of the robbery itself.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling on two alternative grounds. First, the Ninth Circuit held that there was no error in the jury instructions because the district court correctly instructed the jury that it could rely on either of two valid predicate crimes of violence: the direct commission of Hobbs Act robbery or Hobbs Act robbery under a Pinkerton theory of liability. Second, the Ninth Circuit concluded that even if the trial court had instructed the jury that it could rely on one invalid predicate in addition to the valid theories of Hobbs Act robbery, the error would have been harmless on the facts of this case. View "JOHNSON V. USA" on Justia Law

Petitioners Joshua Davis and N.A. were victims of a cryptocurrency theft and extortion scheme. The defendants impersonated Davis to gain control of his cellphone number, hacked his email accounts, and stole both Davis's and N.A.'s Ether. Davis reported the crime to the FBI and filed a petition for remission, while N.A. also reported the theft and filed similar petitions. The government, however, failed to properly calculate the restitution amounts, leading to the district court ordering restitution that significantly understated the value of the stolen Ether.The United States District Court for the Northern District of California sentenced the defendants and ordered restitution of $43,000 to Davis and $40,000 to N.A., based on the government's incorrect calculations. Petitioners later discovered the errors and filed motions to reopen the restitution orders, arguing that the correct value of their stolen Ether was much higher. The district court acknowledged the government's mistakes but denied the motions, concluding that Petitioners did not "discover further losses subsequent to sentencing" under 18 U.S.C. § 3664(d)(5).The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and granted the petitions for writs of mandamus. The court held that Petitioners were entitled to seek mandamus relief under the Crime Victims' Rights Act (CVRA), 18 U.S.C. § 3771(d)(3), and that the limitations on motions to reopen a sentence set forth in § 3771(d)(5) do not apply to petitions to reopen restitution brought under § 3664(d)(5). The court concluded that the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act (MVRA), 18 U.S.C. § 3664(d)(5), allows crime victims to petition to reopen restitution when they "subsequently discover" that a district court's restitution order failed to include recoverable losses. The case was remanded to the district court to consider whether Petitioners met the additional good cause and timing requirements set forth in the MVRA. View "A. V. UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA" on Justia Law

Yasiel Puig Valdes signed a pre-indictment plea agreement with the Government, agreeing to plead guilty to making false statements to federal officers in exchange for a reduced sentence and the Government's promise not to bring an additional charge of obstruction of justice. Puig later decided not to plead guilty, leading the Government to declare him in breach of the plea agreement and seek to enforce a provision waiving all evidentiary objections to the admission of the plea agreement’s factual basis at trial, including objections based on Rule 410 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.The United States District Court for the Central District of California ruled that Rule 410 remained applicable and excluded the factual basis of Puig’s plea agreement from being admitted at trial. The court held that the plea agreement was unenforceable because it had not been approved by the court, as required for agreements under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1)(A). The Government appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling. The Ninth Circuit held that Puig’s waiver of the protections of Rule 410 was contingent on a court finding that there was a breach of an enforceable agreement. Since the plea agreement required court approval and such approval had not occurred, the agreement was not enforceable. Consequently, the waiver did not apply, and Rule 410 barred the admission of the factual basis of Puig’s plea agreement at trial. The Ninth Circuit concluded that the district court correctly excluded the factual basis under Rule 410. View "United States v. Puig Valdes" on Justia Law

Namir Malik Ali Greene committed a series of convenience store and gas station robberies during a three-week period in March and April 2023. He used a BB gun to intimidate store clerks and stole between $100 and $2,000 from each location. Greene also stole three cars, two by using the BB gun to intimidate the owners and one by stealing the keys. He was eventually arrested after a high-speed pursuit. Greene was charged with nine counts of interference with commerce by robbery and one count of carjacking.Greene pleaded guilty to one count of Hobbs Act robbery and stipulated to facts establishing seven additional Hobbs Act robberies and one car theft. The presentence report treated the car theft as a carjacking pseudo-count and calculated an adjusted offense level of 26 for that offense. The district court adopted the presentence report’s calculation, including the use of carjacking as the greater of the adjusted offense levels, and sentenced Greene to 120 months in prison.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case for plain error because Greene did not object to the district court’s reliance on carjacking to calculate his offense level. The Ninth Circuit agreed with Greene that the district court erred by using the carjacking pseudo-count because the elements of federal carjacking were not specifically established by his plea agreement. The stipulated facts did not establish that Greene acted with the intent to cause death or serious bodily harm, which is required for federal carjacking. The Ninth Circuit held that this error was plain and affected Greene’s substantial rights. The court exercised its discretion to correct the error and remanded the case for resentencing on an open record. View "USA V. GREENE" on Justia Law

Tyler Jay Watson was investigated by a police task force in Nampa, Idaho, for drug distribution based on information from a confidential informant. Watson, who was on parole, had his vehicle and residence searched by law enforcement and probation officers. Methamphetamine was found in his vehicle, and during a subsequent search of his residence, Watson was detained in a patrol car. After being read his Miranda rights, Watson admitted to having more drugs at his grandmother's home. Officers obtained consent to search the grandmother's garage, where they found fentanyl, methamphetamine, and cash.Watson was charged with possession with intent to distribute fentanyl. He filed a motion to suppress his incriminating statements and the evidence found, arguing that his parole conditions compelled him to cooperate with law enforcement under threat of parole revocation, violating his Fifth Amendment rights. The United States District Court for the District of Idaho denied the motion, finding the searches constitutional and Watson's statements not involuntarily compelled. Watson conditionally pled guilty and was sentenced to 188 months in prison.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that Watson's statements were not involuntarily compelled because his parole conditions required cooperation only with his parole officer, not all law enforcement officers. Additionally, Watson was properly Mirandized before making the incriminating statements, and there was no indication that he was told refusal to cooperate would result in parole revocation. Thus, the court concluded that Watson was not subject to a penalty situation under these circumstances. View "USA V. WATSON" on Justia Law

The case involves codefendant brothers Joshua and Jamie Yafa, who were convicted of securities fraud and conspiracy to commit securities fraud for their involvement in a "pump-and-dump" stock manipulation scheme. They promoted the stock of Global Wholehealth Products Corporation (GWHP) through various means, including a "phone room" and social media, to inflate its price. Once the stock price rose significantly, they sold their shares, earning over $1 million. Following the sale, the stock price plummeted, causing significant losses to individual investors. A grand jury indicted the Yafas, along with their associates Charles Strongo and Brian Volmer, who pled guilty and testified against the Yafas at trial.The United States District Court for the Southern District of California sentenced the Yafas, applying the United States Sentencing Guidelines (U.S.S.G.) § 2B1.1. The court used Application Note 3(B) from the commentary to § 2B1.1, which allows courts to use the gain from the offense as an alternative measure for calculating loss when the actual loss cannot be reasonably determined. The district court found it difficult to calculate the full amount of investor losses and thus relied on the gain as a proxy. This resulted in a fourteen-level increase in the offense level for both brothers, leading to sentences of thirty-two months for Joshua and seventeen months for Jamie.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the term "loss" in § 2B1.1 is genuinely ambiguous and that Application Note 3(B)'s instruction to use gain as an alternative measure is a reasonable interpretation. The court concluded that the district court did not err in using the gain from the Yafas's offenses to calculate the loss and affirmed the district court's decision. View "USA V. YAFA" on Justia Law

Erika Marie Plancarte pleaded guilty to conspiracy to transport an alien into the United States. The plea agreement required the government to recommend a 90-day imprisonment sentence. At the San Ysidro Port of Entry, Plancarte illegally transported a woman and her three children into the U.S., using false documents. She was arrested after admitting to the smuggling.The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California received a presentence report (PSR) that contained ambiguities about the relationship between the woman and the children. Plancarte requested a non-custodial sentence, while the government adhered to the plea agreement, recommending 90 days of custody. The government also clarified the PSR's ambiguities and highlighted Plancarte's criminal history and recidivism, arguing that previous sentences had not deterred her behavior. Plancarte argued that the government breached the plea agreement by including additional commentary and referencing her criminal history.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the government did not implicitly breach the plea agreement. The government’s references to Plancarte’s criminal history and its clarification of the PSR were permissible and did not undermine the plea agreement. The court found that the government’s comments were made in good faith and were consistent with advocating for the agreed-upon sentence. The court also noted that the government was not required to present mitigating evidence. Consequently, the appellate waiver in the plea agreement was enforced, and the appeal was dismissed. View "USA V. PLANCARTE" on Justia Law