Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Robert Louis Carver pleaded guilty to charges related to two separate criminal schemes: a biotechnology investment fraud from 2004 to 2008 and a lighting company stock fraud from 2017 to 2018. The government filed indictments in 2011 and 2023, respectively. Carver's plea agreement acknowledged a total offense level of 20 under the Sentencing Guidelines but did not agree on his criminal history category.The United States Probation Office calculated Carver's criminal history score, including two points each for two 1994 California convictions, resulting in a total score of four and a criminal history category of III. Carver objected, arguing that these convictions were expunged under California Penal Code section 1203.4, which should exclude them from his criminal history under U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(j). The district court disagreed, ruling that the relief provided by section 1203.4 did not amount to expungement under the Guidelines.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that under United States v. Hayden, convictions set aside under California Penal Code section 1203.4 are not considered expunged for the purposes of U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(j). The court rejected Carver's argument that Hayden was overruled by Kisor v. Wilkie, which modified the standard for deferring to agency interpretations of their regulations. The court found that Hayden's interpretation used traditional tools of construction and did not rely on the Guidelines' commentary, making it consistent with Kisor. The court also found that United States v. Castillo did not apply, as Hayden did not rely on commentary deference. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision to include Carver's prior convictions in his criminal history score. View "USA V. CARVER" on Justia Law

John Holcomb was arrested after his ex-girlfriend, J.J., accused him of sexual assault. During the investigation, officers obtained a search warrant for Holcomb's computer, which led to the discovery of videos depicting child sexual abuse. Holcomb initially consented to the search but later withdrew his consent. A second warrant was issued, allowing a broader search of his computer, which included a provision to search for evidence of "dominion and control" without any temporal limitation. This search uncovered the incriminating videos.The United States District Court for the Western District of Washington initially granted Holcomb's motion to suppress the videos, finding the "dominion and control" provision overbroad and insufficiently particular. However, upon reconsideration, the court applied the good-faith exception, citing the lack of clear precedent requiring temporal limitations for such provisions, and denied the motion to suppress. Holcomb then pleaded guilty but reserved the right to appeal the suppression ruling.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that the "dominion and control" provision was invalid due to its overbreadth and lack of particularity. The court also determined that the good-faith exception did not apply because the warrant was facially deficient, and the plain view doctrine did not justify the seizure of the videos. Consequently, the Ninth Circuit vacated Holcomb's conviction and sentence and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "USA V. HOLCOMB" on Justia Law

Juan Carlos Enriquez, a pharmacy technician, was involved in a scheme to refer Medicare and Medi-Cal beneficiaries to pharmacies owned by his alleged co-conspirator, Irina Sadovsky, in exchange for kickbacks. Enriquez was indicted for conspiracy to receive healthcare kickbacks in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 and for receiving prohibited payments in violation of the Anti-Kickback Statute (AKS). He moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing it failed to state an offense and lacked specificity because it did not negate the statutory safe harbor for a bona fide employment relationship under 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b)(3)(B).The United States District Court for the Central District of California denied Enriquez’s motion to dismiss. Enriquez then entered a conditional guilty plea, reserving the right to appeal the denial of his pretrial motion. The district court sentenced him to one day of imprisonment, followed by two years of supervised release, and ordered him to pay $121,115 in restitution.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. Enriquez argued that the principles from Ruan v. United States, which required the government to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant knew they were acting in an unauthorized manner under the Controlled Substances Act, should apply to the AKS. He contended that the AKS bona fide employment safe harbor should be treated as a "quasi-element" for pleading purposes. The Ninth Circuit declined to extend Ruan’s reasoning to the AKS or to pleading requirements, affirming that indictments need not allege affirmative defenses. The court held that the indictment provided sufficient detail to inform Enriquez of the charges and enable him to prepare his defense. The district court’s denial of Enriquez’s motion to dismiss was affirmed. View "USA V. ENRIQUEZ" on Justia Law

Abelardo Rodriguez-Arvizu was arrested by U.S. Border Patrol agents on November 18, 2019, for a suspected immigration violation. During processing, an outstanding arrest warrant related to his involvement in a marijuana "rip crew" was discovered. He was subsequently arrested by FBI agents, who did not inform him of the specific charges. During the ride to the FBI office, Rodriguez-Arvizu made incriminating statements. At the FBI office, he was read his Miranda rights, and he made further statements after waiving his rights.The United States District Court for the District of Arizona denied Rodriguez-Arvizu's motion to suppress his statements. The court found that although the FBI agents violated Fed. R. Crim. P. 4(c)(3)(A) by not informing him of the charges, suppression was not warranted. The court also found no violation of his Fifth Amendment right to counsel, as he did not unambiguously invoke this right. Additionally, the court determined that he validly waived his Sixth Amendment right to counsel despite not knowing the specific charges. Finally, the court ruled that his confession was within the safe harbor period of 18 U.S.C. § 3501(c) and did not violate the McNabb-Mallory rule.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The Ninth Circuit held that suppression was not warranted for the Rule 4(c)(3)(A) violation, as the agents' conduct was not sufficiently deliberate or culpable. The court also agreed that Rodriguez-Arvizu did not unambiguously invoke his Fifth Amendment right to counsel and that he validly waived his Sixth Amendment right. The court further held that the safe harbor period began with his FBI arrest, making his confession admissible. View "USA V. RODRIGUEZ-ARVIZU" on Justia Law

Paige Thompson committed a significant data breach, hacking into Amazon Web Services (AWS) customers' accounts, stealing data from at least 30 entities, and causing tens of millions of dollars in damage. She also used the stolen credentials to mine cryptocurrency, further increasing the financial impact on the victims. Thompson was arrested after she revealed her activities to a cybersecurity professional, leading to an FBI investigation.The United States District Court for the Western District of Washington calculated Thompson's sentencing range under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines to be 168 to 210 months of imprisonment. However, the court granted a substantial downward variance, sentencing her to time served (approximately 100 days) and five years of probation. The court emphasized Thompson's personal history, including her transgender identity, autism, and past trauma, as significant factors in its decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and found that the district court overemphasized Thompson's personal story and failed to properly weigh several of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors. The appellate court held that the district court's findings regarding Thompson's lack of malicious intent, her remorse, and the seriousness of her actions were clearly erroneous and not supported by the record. The Ninth Circuit also noted that the district court did not adequately consider the need for general and specific deterrence or the risk of unwarranted sentencing disparities.The Ninth Circuit vacated Thompson's sentence and remanded the case for resentencing, instructing the district court to properly weigh all relevant factors and provide a more substantial justification for any variance from the Guidelines. View "USA V. THOMPSON" on Justia Law

Carl Race, a prisoner in Montana, filed a pro se habeas corpus petition in 2023 seeking to set aside his 1996 conviction for deliberate homicide and attempted deliberate homicide. Race argued that his petition should be considered despite being filed over twenty years late due to ineffective assistance of counsel and his own mental and physical impairments. He claimed these impairments constituted extraordinary circumstances that should toll the statute of limitations under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA).The United States District Court for the District of Montana dismissed Race's petition sua sponte as time-barred without providing him prior notice or an opportunity to respond. The court concluded that Race had not demonstrated the necessary extraordinary circumstances to warrant equitable tolling of the AEDPA's one-year statute of limitations. The court also denied Race a certificate of appealability.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and held that the district court erred in dismissing the petition without providing Race notice and an opportunity to respond. The Ninth Circuit emphasized that due process requires that a petitioner be given notice and an opportunity to present their case before a habeas petition is dismissed on timeliness grounds. The court vacated the district court's order of dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with this holding. The dissenting judge would have affirmed the dismissal, arguing that due process did not require giving Race another chance to repeat his arguments. View "RACE V. SALMONSEN" on Justia Law

Joseph Sullivan, the former Chief Security Officer for Uber Technologies, was convicted of obstruction of justice and misprision of a felony. The case arose from Sullivan's efforts to cover up a significant data breach at Uber while the company was under investigation by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) for its data security practices. The breach involved hackers accessing and downloading sensitive information from Uber's servers. Sullivan and his team tracked down the hackers and had them sign a non-disclosure agreement (NDA) in exchange for a payment, recharacterizing the hack as part of Uber's Bug Bounty Program.The United States District Court for the Northern District of California presided over the trial, where a jury found Sullivan guilty. Sullivan appealed, challenging the jury instructions, the sufficiency of the evidence, and an evidentiary ruling. He argued that the district court erred in rejecting his proposed jury instructions regarding the "nexus" requirement for the obstruction charge and the "duty to disclose" instruction. He also contended that the evidence was insufficient to support his misprision conviction and that the court improperly admitted a guilty plea agreement signed by one of the hackers.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decisions. The court held that Ninth Circuit precedent foreclosed Sullivan's argument regarding the "nexus" instruction and that the district court did not err in rejecting it. The court also found that the omission of the "duty to disclose" instruction was proper, as the theories of liability under Section 1505 and Section 2(b) were conjunctive. The court concluded that the evidence was sufficient to support Sullivan's misprision conviction and that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the hacker's guilty plea agreement. The Ninth Circuit affirmed Sullivan's conviction. View "USA V. SULLIVAN" on Justia Law

Jose Trinidad Martinez Santoyo was sought for extradition to Mexico to face charges of intentional aggravated homicide. In January 2014, a Mexican judge issued an arrest warrant for Santoyo, alleging he shot a man twice in the head after an argument. Mexico requested his provisional arrest in November 2018, and the United States filed a complaint in August 2021. Santoyo was arrested in May 2022 and released on bail in November 2022. Mexico formally requested his extradition in July 2022, providing various supporting documents. A magistrate judge certified the extradition in February 2023, and Santoyo challenged this certification via a habeas corpus petition.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of California denied Santoyo's habeas corpus petition. Santoyo argued that the extradition treaty between the United States and Mexico incorporated the Sixth Amendment's Speedy Trial Clause, contending that the delay between the 2014 arrest warrant and the 2022 extradition request violated his speedy trial rights. The district court rejected this argument, holding that the treaty's "lapse of time" provision referred only to statutes of limitations, not to the Sixth Amendment's speedy trial protections.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The Ninth Circuit held that the "lapse of time" language in the extradition treaty does not incorporate the Sixth Amendment Speedy Trial Clause. The court emphasized that extradition proceedings are not criminal prosecutions and that the treaty's language refers to statutes of limitations rather than the constitutional right to a speedy trial. The court also noted that the judiciary's role in extradition is limited and that issues of delay are more appropriately addressed by the Secretary of State. View "SANTOYO V. BOYDEN" on Justia Law

John Walthall, while awaiting sentencing for a fraud conviction, solicited a fellow inmate to arrange for hit men to murder the judge, investigators, and attorneys involved in his case. The inmate reported Walthall's request to authorities, leading to Walthall's conviction for solicitation to commit a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 373(a). Walthall argued that the evidence was insufficient because he had no direct contact with the hit men, who did not exist.The United States District Court for the Central District of California found Walthall guilty, but the jury was initially unable to reach a verdict. After a retrial, Walthall was convicted, but the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and remanded for a new trial, citing errors in denying Walthall the right to represent himself. On remand, the district court evaluated Walthall's competency to stand trial and represent himself, ultimately concluding that he was competent to stand trial but not to represent himself due to severe mental illness.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed Walthall's conviction. The court held that 18 U.S.C. § 373(a) does not require direct communication with the person solicited or that the person solicited actually exists. The evidence was sufficient to support the conviction, as Walthall's intent and actions strongly corroborated his intent for someone to commit violence. The court also rejected Walthall's challenges to the jury instructions and the district court's finding that he was incapable of representing himself. The court found no error in the district court's sentencing calculation based on the maximum sentence for soliciting murder. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment. View "USA V. WALTHALL" on Justia Law

During a traffic stop in Nevada, Oak Porcelli was found with over a million dollars in cash, which he claimed was "petty cash" for a non-existent movie production company. The Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) seized the money, suspecting it was linked to drug trafficking, and the government filed a civil forfeiture complaint.Porcelli filed a claim asserting ownership of the money and moved to suppress evidence from the traffic stop, arguing lack of probable cause. The government served interrogatories under Supplemental Rule G(6) to determine Porcelli's relationship to the money. Porcelli's responses were vague, and despite multiple court orders, he refused to provide more detailed answers. The district court struck his claim and granted the government default judgment of forfeiture.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Rule G(6) allows the government to seek discovery about a claimant's standing at any time during the litigation, not just at the pleading stage. The court found that Porcelli's standing was reasonably in dispute and that his vague responses to the interrogatories were insufficient. The court ruled that the district court did not abuse its discretion in striking Porcelli's claim for failing to comply with discovery orders. The court emphasized that while the government has the burden to prove the money is subject to forfeiture, claimants must still provide some evidence of their standing.The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's orders, upholding the default judgment of forfeiture against the currency. View "USA V. $1,106,775 IN US CURRENCY" on Justia Law