Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Brandon Wade Kurns, a convicted felon, began working at Modern Pawn & Consignment in Helena, Montana, in June 2021, where he sold firearms and ammunition. In July 2021, after an investigation linked stolen gunpowder to the shop, ATF agents searched Modern Pawn and found evidence that Kurns had possessed several firearms. Kurns was indicted and pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm.The United States District Court for the District of Montana sentenced Kurns to 36 months in prison, applying a base offense level of 20 under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(4)(B)(i)(I) for possessing a semiautomatic firearm capable of accepting a large capacity magazine, and a four-level enhancement under § 2K2.1(b)(1)(B) for possessing eight or more firearms. Kurns objected, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support these enhancements and that the court violated his Fifth Amendment rights by drawing an adverse inference from his silence during sentencing.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court held that the evidence, including surveillance footage and ATF transfer forms, supported the finding by a preponderance of the evidence that Kurns possessed a semiautomatic firearm with a large capacity magazine and at least eight firearms. The court also found no Fifth Amendment violation, as there was no indication that the district court drew an adverse inference from Kurns' silence. Additionally, the court declined to consider Kurns' Second Amendment challenge based on New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen, as it was raised for the first time after the completion of appellate briefing. View "USA V. KURNS" on Justia Law

Edgar Murillo-Chavez, a lawful permanent resident (LPR) from Mexico, entered the United States as a child without being admitted or paroled. He was granted special immigrant juvenile (SIJ) status in 2010 and became an LPR in 2011. In 2016, he pleaded no contest to unlawful possession of a firearm in Oregon. In 2018, he was convicted of unlawful use of a weapon and first-degree criminal mistreatment, both in Oregon.An Immigration Judge (IJ) found Murillo removable for a firearms offense and for committing two crimes involving moral turpitude (CIMTs). The IJ also determined that Murillo was ineligible for cancellation of removal because he committed a CIMT within seven years of being admitted. Murillo appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), which dismissed his appeal, agreeing with the IJ that his 2018 convictions were CIMTs and that he was admitted when he became an LPR in 2011. Murillo then filed a motion to reopen, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel, which the BIA denied.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Murillo's 2016 conviction for unlawful possession of a firearm was a removable offense under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(C). The court also agreed with the BIA that Murillo was not "admitted" when he obtained SIJ status but when he became an LPR in 2011. Consequently, his 2018 conviction for first-degree criminal mistreatment, which occurred within seven years of his LPR admission, was a CIMT, making him ineligible for cancellation of removal. The court denied Murillo's petitions for review. View "MURILLO-CHAVEZ V. BONDI" on Justia Law

Lamar Allen Thompson was convicted of production and possession of child pornography. He had a prior 2016 Washington state conviction for first-degree child molestation. Thompson argued that this prior conviction should not have triggered a 10-year increase to his mandatory minimum sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 2251(e), which increases the mandatory term for production of child pornography if the individual has a prior conviction for certain sexual offenses involving minors.The United States District Court for the Western District of Washington held that Thompson's 2016 conviction did trigger the 10-year increase, concluding that the Washington statute under which Thompson was convicted relates to sexual abuse of a minor. Additionally, Thompson requested the district court to recommend that his federal sentence run concurrently with anticipated state sentences. The district court declined to make any recommendation, noting that the decision would ultimately be up to the state courts. Thompson did not object to this decision at the time.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Washington Revised Code § 9A.44.083, under which Thompson was convicted, either categorically matches or relates to the predicate generic offenses in 18 U.S.C. § 2251(e), thus triggering the mandatory minimum sentence increase. The court also found that the district court did not plainly err in declining to recommend whether Thompson's federal sentence should run concurrently with anticipated state sentences, as there was no controlling authority requiring the district court to make such a recommendation.The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment, upholding Thompson's 28-year term of imprisonment. View "USA v. THOMPSON" on Justia Law

Eugene Allen Doerr was convicted in 1996 by a jury for the kidnapping, sexual assault, and murder of Karen Bohl, and was sentenced to death by an Arizona state court judge. After his conviction and sentence were affirmed by the Arizona Supreme Court, Doerr filed a federal habeas petition, which was partially denied by the district court. Doerr then moved for a stay and abeyance to present new claims in state court, including ineffective assistance of counsel at sentencing and intellectual disability under Atkins v. Virginia.The district court initially denied Doerr’s federal habeas petition, finding his claim of ineffective assistance at sentencing procedurally defaulted. The court held that ineffective assistance of state postconviction counsel did not constitute cause to excuse the procedural default. Doerr appealed, and while his appeal was pending, the Supreme Court decided Martinez v. Ryan, which held that ineffective assistance of state postconviction counsel could excuse procedural default. The Ninth Circuit remanded the case to the district court to reconsider Doerr’s ineffective assistance claim in light of Martinez. On remand, the district court again denied relief on the ineffective assistance claim but granted relief on another claim. Doerr appealed the partial denial.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and granted Doerr’s motion to remand to the district court with instructions to stay and abey the federal habeas petition. The court held that the criteria for a stay and abeyance under Rhines v. Weber were met, allowing Doerr to present his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel at sentencing and intellectual disability under Atkins to the state court. The court found that Doerr had good cause for not previously bringing these claims, that the claims were potentially meritorious, and that there was no indication of intentionally dilatory litigation tactics. The case was remanded to the district court for further proceedings. View "DOERR V. SHINN" on Justia Law

An individual, referred to as "Client," became the target of a criminal investigation into alleged tax evasion. The grand jury issued a subpoena to Client, who invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and refused to produce documents. Subsequently, the grand jury subpoenaed the law firm that had represented Client in tax matters, requesting documents related to that representation and instructing the firm to provide a privilege log if any documents were withheld. The law firm declined to produce certain documents or provide a privilege log, citing attorney-client privilege, the work-product doctrine, and Client’s Fifth Amendment rights.The United States District Court for the Central District of California ordered the law firm to provide the Government with a privilege log, rejecting the firm's assertion of Client’s Fifth Amendment rights. The district court temporarily stayed enforcement of its order, and Client filed an interlocutory appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that an attorney cannot be compelled to provide the Government with a privilege log of documents protected under Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976). The court explained that providing a privilege log would reveal the existence, authenticity, and Client’s custody of the documents, thus undermining Client’s Fifth Amendment act-of-production privilege. The court determined that to assess whether the documents are indeed protected under Fisher, the district court should conduct an in camera review.The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s order and remanded the case for further proceedings, instructing the district court to conduct an in camera review to determine the applicability of the Fisher privilege. View "In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Dated July 21, 2023" on Justia Law

Romio Villagomez, a native and citizen of the Federated States of Micronesia, was convicted of felony battery resulting in substantial bodily harm under Nevada Revised Statutes § 200.481(2)(b). Following his conviction, the Department of Homeland Security sought to remove him, arguing that his conviction qualified as a crime of violence under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F).An Immigration Judge determined that Villagomez’s conviction was indeed a crime of violence and ordered his removal. Villagomez appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals, which dismissed his appeal. He then petitioned for review by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.The Ninth Circuit reviewed whether Villagomez’s conviction under Nevada law qualified as a crime of violence. The court noted that a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 16(a) requires the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force capable of causing physical pain or injury. The court referenced its previous decision in United States v. Fitzgerald, which held that the attempt version of the same Nevada statute is categorically a crime of violence.Villagomez argued that the Nevada statute criminalizes mere unwanted touching and allows for conviction where substantial bodily harm occurs recklessly. The court rejected these arguments, holding that causing substantial bodily harm in Nevada necessarily requires Johnson-level force, which is force capable of causing physical pain or injury. The court also held that Nevada law requires intentional conduct for battery resulting in substantial bodily harm, and thus, the statute does not encompass injuries caused by reckless deployments of force.The Ninth Circuit concluded that Nevada felony battery resulting in substantial bodily harm is categorically a crime of violence and affirmed the Board’s removability determination. The petition for review was denied. View "VILLAGOMEZ V. MCHENRY" on Justia Law

The case involves a challenge to an Arizona law that requires criminal defense attorneys and their agents to initiate any contact with crime victims through the prosecutor’s office. The plaintiffs, a group of criminal defense attorneys and their association, argue that this law violates the First Amendment's Speech Clause by restricting their ability to communicate directly with victims.The United States District Court for the District of Arizona initially dismissed the case for lack of standing, but the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed that decision, allowing the case to proceed. On remand, the district court held a bench trial and concluded that the law was unconstitutional on its face, issuing a permanent injunction against its enforcement. The district court found that the law's requirement for defense attorneys to communicate through the prosecutor's office was a content- and viewpoint-based regulation of speech.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court’s judgment. The Ninth Circuit held that the plaintiffs' facial challenge failed because they did not challenge the law's primary application to victim-interview requests, which remain regulated under a similar Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure. The court noted that the unchallenged applications of the law, which include requests for victim interviews, are substantial and legitimate. Therefore, the challenged applications related to non-interview contacts are not substantial enough to render the entire statute unconstitutional.The Ninth Circuit vacated the permanent injunction and remanded the case for entry of judgment in favor of the defendants, concluding that the facial challenge to the Victim Contact Limit, as framed by the plaintiffs, must fail. View "ARIZONA ATTORNEYS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE V. MAYES" on Justia Law

Alfred Velazquez, a U.S. citizen residing in Tijuana, was stopped by U.S. Customs and Border Protection Officer Sean Hanlon while entering the United States from Mexico. Hanlon noticed Velazquez's nervous behavior and inconsistencies in his story about his destination. A cursory search of Velazquez's vehicle, a red Pontiac Firebird, revealed signs of tampering around the engine. A canine inspection led to the discovery of 4.53 pounds of fentanyl and heroin hidden in the vehicle. Velazquez was arrested, and the drugs were seized.The Government charged Velazquez with importing a mixture containing fentanyl under 21 U.S.C. §§ 952 and 960. At his first trial, Velazquez was convicted, but the conviction was reversed due to a prosecutorial error. A second trial ended in a mistrial with a hung jury. In the third trial, the district court admitted testimony from a Homeland Security Investigations Special Agent about the retail value of the seized fentanyl, which ranged from $405,888 to $608,832. Velazquez was found guilty, and the court sentenced him to 139 months in custody and 5 years of supervised release. Velazquez appealed the admission of the retail value testimony.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that district courts do not abuse their discretion when admitting evidence of the retail value of narcotics in importation cases if the evidence is relevant, probative, and not unfairly prejudicial under the Federal Rules of Evidence. The court found that the retail value of the fentanyl was relevant to Velazquez's knowledge of the drugs and that its probative value was not substantially outweighed by any prejudicial effect. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision to admit the testimony and upheld Velazquez's conviction. View "USA V. VELAZQUEZ" on Justia Law

Julian Omidi and his business, Surgery Center Management, LLC (SCM), were involved in a fraudulent scheme called "Get Thin," which promised weight loss through Lap-Band surgery and other medical procedures. Omidi and SCM defrauded insurance companies by submitting false claims for reimbursement, including fabricated patient data and misrepresented physician involvement. The scheme recruited patients through a call center, pushing them towards expensive medical tests and procedures regardless of medical necessity.A grand jury indicted Omidi and SCM for mail fraud, wire fraud, money laundering, and related charges. After extensive pretrial litigation and a lengthy jury trial, both were convicted on all charges. The district court sentenced Omidi to 84 months in prison and fined SCM over $22 million. The government sought forfeiture of nearly $100 million, arguing that all proceeds from the Get Thin scheme were derived from fraud. The district court agreed, finding that even proceeds from legitimate procedures were indirectly the result of the fraudulent scheme.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's forfeiture judgment, holding that under 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(C), all proceeds directly or indirectly derived from a health care fraud scheme must be forfeited. The court rejected the argument that only proceeds from fraudulent transactions should be forfeited, noting that the entire business was permeated with fraud. The court concluded that there is no "100% Fraud Rule" in forfeiture cases seeking proceeds of a fraud scheme, and all proceeds from the Get Thin scheme were subject to forfeiture. View "United States V. Surgery Center Management, LLC" on Justia Law

The defendants, Namrata Patnaik and Kartiki Parekh, served as the chief executive officer and human resources manager of a semiconductor chip design consulting and staffing company, respectively. They were charged with submitting fraudulent H-1B visa applications by falsely stating that the visa applicants would be working on internal projects on-site, while in reality, they were contracted out to other companies. The government alleged that these false statements were material misrepresentations that could influence the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) in granting the visas.The United States District Court for the Northern District of California dismissed the indictment, accepting the defendants' argument that the false statements could not be materially false because it was unlawful for the government to ask for such information. The district court relied on the ITServe All., Inc. v. Cissna decision and a USCIS memorandum that suggested USCIS could not require details about specific projects or work assignments.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's judgment. The appellate court held that lying on H-1B visa applications constitutes visa fraud even if the government asked questions it was not legally entitled to ask, as long as the misrepresentations could have influenced USCIS at the time they were made. The court emphasized that the government may protect itself against fraud regardless of whether it had the right to ask the questions. The case was remanded for reinstatement of the criminal charges against the defendants. View "USA V. PATNAIK" on Justia Law