Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Robert Hutton secretly installed a hidden camera in the bathroom of his home and, over the course of about a year, recorded several nude videos and images of his 14-year-old stepdaughter without her knowledge. He edited some of the footage to focus on moments when the victim was visibly nude. The victim discovered the existence of these files after seeing a suspicious file name on Hutton’s phone and subsequently reported the matter to the police. A search of Hutton’s residence uncovered additional child pornography, including images of other minors.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Washington presided over a bench trial based on stipulated facts. Hutton was charged with sexually exploiting a minor under 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a). He moved for a judgment of acquittal, arguing that the images were not “lascivious,” that the statute was unconstitutionally vague as applied, and that he did not “use” the victim within the meaning of the statute. The district court denied these motions, found Hutton guilty, and sentenced him to 20 years’ imprisonment.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed Hutton’s arguments de novo where appropriate and for clear error regarding factual findings. The court held that existing Ninth Circuit precedent foreclosed Hutton’s arguments on all grounds. Specifically, the court found that the district court did not clearly err in determining the images were “lascivious” under the Dost factors, that § 2251(a) is not unconstitutionally vague as applied, and that Hutton’s conduct constituted “use” of a minor under the statute. The court also held that the Supreme Court’s decision in Dubin v. United States, which interpreted the term “use” in a different statutory context, did not undermine the Ninth Circuit’s precedent regarding § 2251(a). The Ninth Circuit affirmed the conviction. View "USA V. HUTTON" on Justia Law

Federal law enforcement agents began investigating drug and firearm distribution activities in Spokane, Washington, in 2022. Their investigation led to Johnathan Allen, who had a significant criminal history and was known to distribute methamphetamine and possess firearms. Allen and three codefendants were indicted by a federal grand jury in January 2023 for distribution of methamphetamine and being a felon in possession of a firearm. After his arrest, several pretrial motions and continuances delayed the trial. A superseding indictment was returned in May 2023, and Allen continued to file additional pretrial motions. Although Allen initially insisted on a speedy trial, the court, with agreement from the parties, set a new trial date for October 2023.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Washington later determined that a violation of the Speedy Trial Act (STA) had occurred because it had not sufficiently documented the reasons for the trial continuance as required by statute, nor had it obtained a waiver from Allen. The court dismissed both the original and superseding indictments without prejudice, after weighing the seriousness of the offense, the technical nature of the violation, and the lack of prejudice to Allen. The government promptly re-indicted Allen on the same charges, and the case proceeded to trial. During trial, the court admitted Facebook records linking Allen to the crimes, over his objection that they were not properly authenticated.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed Allen’s convictions. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the indictments without prejudice, as it properly considered the statutory factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(2). The appellate court also found no error in the admission of the Facebook records, concluding they were self-authenticating business records under Federal Rules of Evidence 902(11) and 803(6), and that their substantive content was properly authenticated under Rule 901(a). The court further held that the records were admissible under Rules 404(b) and 403. View "USA V. ALLEN" on Justia Law

Ryan VanDyke was subject to a civil protection order and a no-contact order in Idaho after persistently harassing a woman, violating both probation conditions for a prior telephone-harassment conviction and earlier court-ordered protections. In October 2022, after being charged with felony stalking for continued unwanted contact and harassment, a state court issued a no-contact order that explicitly prohibited VanDyke from using, attempting to use, or threatening physical force against the victim. In May 2023, while still under these orders, VanDyke entered a courthouse carrying a loaded revolver.The United States District Court for the District of Idaho dismissed the federal indictment against VanDyke, which charged him with illegal firearm possession under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8)(C)(ii). The district court found that, as applied to VanDyke, this statute did not fit within the historical tradition of firearm regulation required by the Second Amendment, and therefore held the statute unconstitutional in this context.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case following the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680 (2024). The Ninth Circuit held that § 922(g)(8)(C)(ii) is constitutional as applied to VanDyke. The court reasoned that there is a historical tradition of both individualized and categorical disarmament of persons deemed dangerous, including those subject to judicial findings of threat or facing serious criminal charges. The court found that the procedures and justifications for VanDyke’s disarmament were analogous to those recognized in Rahimi and related precedent. Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal of the indictment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "USA V. VANDYKE" on Justia Law

A lawful permanent resident of the United States, who is a Canadian citizen, pleaded guilty in 2003 to one count of health care fraud after participating in a scheme involving fraudulent prescriptions and false Medicaid/Medi-Cal billing. The conviction, which involved a loss exceeding $10,000, rendered him removable from the United States. He claimed that his attorneys gave him incorrect or incomplete advice regarding the immigration consequences of his plea. Despite being informed by both the sentencing judge in 2003 and a U.S. immigration official in 2007 that his conviction could lead to removal, he did not seek to vacate his conviction until many years later.After removal proceedings began in 2008, the defendant waited until 2016 to file his first petition for a writ of coram nobis in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel. The district court denied the petition due to unreasonable delay, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed that denial in 2020, finding the delay between 2014 and 2016 unjustified. The first petition focused on the conduct of the attorney who represented him at sentencing.In 2021, the defendant filed a second coram nobis petition in the same district court, this time alleging ineffective assistance by three different attorneys, including the one who handled his first petition. The district court denied the second petition, finding it barred by laches due to prejudicial delay, as key witnesses had died and evidence had been lost. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that the government was prejudiced by the delay and that the defendant failed to show reasonable diligence in seeking relief, given that he was on notice of the immigration consequences years earlier. View "USA V. KROYTOR" on Justia Law

A man with a prior felony conviction used another person’s identity to purchase a firearm and later used fraudulent identification to obtain a U.S. passport, which he used for international travel. He was indicted and ultimately pleaded guilty to making a false statement during a firearms transaction, making a false statement in a passport application, and aggravated identity theft. As part of his plea agreement, he waived his right to appeal his sentence if it was within or below the guideline range calculated by the court.After entering his plea but before sentencing, the defendant requested a psychological evaluation under 18 U.S.C. § 4241 to determine his mental competency, specifically asking that the examiner’s report be filed with the court. The evaluation was conducted by a Bureau of Prisons examiner, who informed the defendant that the results would be shared with the court. The report was included in the presentence report. At sentencing in the United States District Court for the District of Montana, the defendant objected to the use of the evaluation, arguing it violated his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. The district court overruled his objections, including those to a sentencing enhancement for obstruction of justice and to certain supervised release conditions, and imposed a sentence within the guideline range.On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, the defendant argued that the district court’s consideration of his psychological evaluation at sentencing violated his Fifth Amendment rights. The Ninth Circuit held that the Supreme Court’s decision in Estelle v. Smith does not extend to voluntary psychological evaluations requested by the defendant and that the district court did not violate his right against self-incrimination. The court also held that the defendant’s waiver of appeal barred his remaining challenges to the sentence. The sentence was affirmed. View "USA V. DAVIS" on Justia Law

The defendant, a former U.S. Coast Guard employee, was convicted by a jury of murdering two co-workers in Alaska. At the time of the government’s collection action, he held approximately $450,000 in a Thrift Savings Plan (TSP) account, a federal retirement savings plan. His wife had a statutory right to a joint and survivor annuity from the account, and federal law generally requires spousal consent for lump-sum withdrawals. Following his conviction, the government sought to collect the entire balance of his TSP account as restitution for the victims’ families.The United States District Court for the District of Alaska initially ordered restitution from the defendant’s retirement and disability income, including his TSP funds, but limited lump-sum withdrawals from the TSP without spousal consent, instead permitting monthly payments. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit vacated the restitution order, holding that the district court could not use the All Writs Act to bypass statutory garnishment limits and remanded for a determination of whether the defendant’s benefit streams constituted “earnings” subject to a 25% garnishment cap under the Consumer Credit Protection Act.On remand, the district court issued amended restitution orders authorizing the government to collect the entire TSP account balance as a lump sum. The defendant appealed, arguing that statutory spousal protections limited the government to periodic garnishments. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the government may only cash out a defendant’s TSP account to satisfy a restitution order under the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act if the plan’s terms would allow the defendant to do so at the time of the order. Because spousal consent was required and not obtained, the court vacated the restitution orders and remanded for further proceedings. View "United States v. Wells" on Justia Law

A resident of Billings, Montana, who lived across the street from a public elementary school, began carrying a shotgun outside his home, including on the sidewalk, during the summer of 2023. He did so to protect himself and his mother from a former neighbor who had repeatedly violated a protection order. Local police received several complaints about his conduct but did not charge him with any crime and told him he was complying with state law. After the resident contacted the FBI to complain about police harassment, federal authorities indicted him for possessing a firearm within 1,000 feet of a school, in violation of the Gun-Free School Zones Act, 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(2)(A).The United States District Court for the District of Montana denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss the indictment. The defendant argued that he was exempt from the federal prohibition because, under Montana law, he was considered licensed to possess a firearm in a school zone. The district court found that Montana’s licensing scheme did not meet the federal requirements for the statutory exception, and also rejected the defendant’s Second Amendment challenge. The defendant then pleaded guilty, reserving his right to appeal the denial of his motion to dismiss.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court’s order, directing that the indictment be dismissed. The Ninth Circuit held that the statutory exception for state-licensed individuals in the Gun-Free School Zones Act was ambiguous as applied to Montana’s licensing scheme. Given this ambiguity, and considering the rule of lenity, constitutional avoidance, and the presumption in favor of scienter as articulated in Rehaif v. United States, the court concluded that the defendant lacked fair notice that his conduct was criminal. The court did not address the Second Amendment argument. View "USA V. METCALF" on Justia Law

A man was arrested after he attempted to meet someone he believed to be a 12-year-old girl for sex, following extensive online and text communications. The “girl” was actually a fictional persona created by law enforcement as part of an undercover operation. After his arrest, officers obtained a warrant to search his residence, where they discovered a large quantity of child pornography on a hard drive. The defendant was charged with attempted coercion and enticement of a minor to engage in illegal sexual activity, as well as possession of child pornography.The United States District Court for the District of Montana denied the defendant’s pretrial motions to suppress the evidence seized from his residence, to sever the two charges in the indictment, and to exclude evidence of his uncharged interactions with a 17-year-old girl. The court found that the search warrant was supported by probable cause, that the charges were properly joined as offenses of similar character, and that the evidence regarding the 17-year-old was admissible to show intent. After a jury convicted the defendant on both counts, the district court sentenced him to 154 months’ imprisonment on each count, to run concurrently.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the conviction and sentence. The court held that the search warrant was supported by probable cause to search for both enticement and child pornography, and that any omission in the warrant affidavit was immaterial. The court also held that the charges were properly joined under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 8(a), and that the evidence of the defendant’s relationship with the 17-year-old was properly admitted under Federal Rules of Evidence 404(b) and 403. Finally, the court found that the sentence was substantively reasonable and did not result in unwarranted sentencing disparity. View "USA V. BOUDREAU" on Justia Law

The defendant was indicted for possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine and pled guilty to the charge. At sentencing, he received a prison term of 151 months, three years of supervised release, and was ordered to pay a $1,000 fine and a $100 special assessment. The district court specified that these monetary penalties were “due immediately,” but, recognizing the defendant’s indigency, also established a payment schedule: while incarcerated, he was to make nominal payments through the Bureau of Prisons’ Inmate Financial Responsibility Program, and during supervised release, he was to pay a percentage of his income, subject to a minimum monthly amount.After sentencing, the United States District Court for the District of Idaho entered judgment reflecting both the immediate due date and the payment schedule. The government sent a letter demanding immediate payment of the full amount and warning of a possible judgment lien. The defendant appealed, arguing that 18 U.S.C. § 3572(d)(1) does not permit a court to make monetary penalties due immediately while also setting a payment schedule, contending that the statute requires the court to choose only one of these options.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the statutory interpretation issue de novo. The court held that the district court did not violate 18 U.S.C. § 3572(d)(1) by making the fine and special assessment due immediately while also providing a payment schedule. The Ninth Circuit reasoned that the statute allows for the total amount to be due immediately, with a payment schedule reflecting the defendant’s ability to pay, and that this approach is consistent with its own precedent and that of other circuits. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "USA V. PATRICK" on Justia Law

The defendant pled guilty in federal court to being a felon in possession of a firearm. At the time of sentencing, he had a prior Oregon felony conviction for aggravated unlawful use of a weapon, specifically under the “possession” subsection of the Oregon statute, with an added firearm enhancement. The key issue at sentencing was whether this prior conviction qualified as a “crime of violence” under the federal Sentencing Guidelines, which would increase the recommended sentence.The United States District Court for the District of Oregon determined that the prior Oregon conviction did qualify as a crime of violence under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(1). This finding increased the defendant’s base offense level and resulted in a higher recommended sentencing range. The district court ultimately imposed a sentence of 46 months, which was below the enhanced guideline range but above what it would have been without the crime-of-violence enhancement. The defendant appealed, arguing that the district court’s analysis was incorrect.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court held that the Oregon statutes at issue do not require, as an element, the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another. The court found that neither the underlying offense nor the firearm enhancement statute required such an element, and that the government’s arguments to the contrary were not supported by the statutory text or Oregon case law. As a result, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the prior conviction was not a crime of violence under the Sentencing Guidelines. The court vacated the sentence and remanded the case for resentencing without the crime-of-violence enhancement. View "USA V. KEAST" on Justia Law