Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Petitioner pleaded guilty to second-degree murder and was sentenced to 15 years to life. Petitioner successfully petitioned to withdraw her guilty plea about five years later when she established that the sentencing court failed to inform her that she would receive a mandatory term of lifetime parole as a direct consequence of her plea. At her subsequent trial, petitioner was convicted of first-degree murder, first-degree burglary, and the special circumstance that the murder was committed in the course of a burglary. She was sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. The district court then denied petitioner's 28 U.S.C. 2254 habeas petition and issued a certificate of appealability (COA) on the question of specific performance of her plea agreement. The court assumed without deciding that the State promised petitioner release after seven and a half years and that the State breached that promise. Nevertheless, the court concluded that petitioner is not entitled to specific performance of her plea agreement because she voluntarily chose to withdraw her guilty plea, thereby voiding her plea agreement. There is thus no plea agreement to enforce. Under these circumstances, there is no precedent suggesting that petitioner was denied due process by denying her specific performance. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Fox v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of transporting a stolen vehicle, being a felon in possession of a firearm, possessing counterfeit credit cards and possessing counterfeiting devices. Defendant was sentenced to 137 months in prison and ordered to pay restitution. The government subsequently conceded that certain detention facility documents were not in the record. Given the government's concession, the court allowed the Assistant U.S. Attorney 48 hours to consider whether to confess error. The government responded by requesting a remand to allow the district court to consider a more fully developed record. At issue on appeal is whether a remand for resentencing should be on an open or closed record. The court concluded that when the government does not have occasion to tender a fully developed argument, the court remands for resentencing on an open record. In this case, defendant specifically objected to the proposed sentence on three separate occasions, the government was on notice of the factual deficiencies in its papers and had opportunities to supplement the record, and the government chose not to do so, preferring to rest on evidence that it later conceded was insufficient to support its position. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded. View "United States v. Pridgette" on Justia Law

Defendants Smith, Long, Thompson, Manzo, Craig, Leavins (collectly, the "Joint Appellants"), and Sexton each appealed their convictions for obstruction of justice and conspiracy to obstruct justice. Long and Craig also appealed their convictions for making false statements, and Craig and Leavins appealed their sentences. Furthermore, the Joint Appellants and Sexton raise numerous challenges to the jury instructions. The Joint Appellants and Sexton were all members of the LASD, and were convicted for their roles in interfering with a federal investigation into civil rights abuses at Los Angeles County jails. The court concluded that the district court’s use of the phrase “grand jury investigation,” rather than “grand jury proceeding,” was neither misleading nor an abuse of discretion in these circumstances; the court rejected the claim that a defendant’s unlawful purpose to obstruct justice must be sole or primary; the evidence was sufficient to suggest various motives for the Joint Appellants’ and Sexton’s conduct, so it was appropriate for the court to give an instruction regarding dual purposes; the court rejected the Joint Appellants' challenge to the adequacy of the good faith instruction; the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing an additional innocent intent instruction; in light of the clear instruction regarding the Joint Appellants’ authority to investigate, any error in the instruction regarding whether or not federal agents actually violated California law was undoubtedly harmless; and the court rejected Craig and Long's challenge to the instructions for the false statement counts. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Smith" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of assault by strangulation in violation of 18 U.S.C. 113. At issue is whether the jury was properly instructed to disregard defendant’s voluntary intoxication, which requires the court to determine whether section 113(a)(8) is a general or specific intent crime. Also at issue is whether the district court’s instruction to the jury on assault by strangulation violated defendant’s due process rights. The court held that assault by strangulation under section 113(a)(8) is a general intent crime, and defendant's intoxication was thus irrelevant. The court found no plain error in the district court's instruction on the elements of the offense. The district court’s inclusion of the word “wounded” may have been superfluous, but if anything, the inclusion of “wounded” in the instruction required that the government meet a higher burden than was necessary because section (a)(8) does not require proof of a wound or injury. Accordingly, the court affirmed the conviction. View "United States v. LaMott" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction for involuntary manslaughter and for using a firearm in connection with a crime of violence. In this opinion, the court addressed whether involuntary manslaughter can be considered a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. 924(c). After Leocal v. Ashcroft and Fernandez-Ruiz v. Gonzales, a crime of violence requires a mental state higher than recklessness - it requires intentional conduct. Involuntary manslaughter under 18 U.S.C. 1112, requiring a lesser mental state of gross negligence, prohibits conduct that cannot be considered a crime of violence under section 924(c)(3). Under the categorical approach, therefore, involuntary manslaughter cannot be a crime of violence. United States v. Springfield’s opposing rule is clearly irreconcilable with the reasoning and results of Leocal and Fernandez-Ruiz and is no longer good law. Accordingly, defendant's section 924(c) count of conviction for using a firearm in connection with a crime of violence is reversed. View "United States v. Benally" on Justia Law

The United States Supreme Court held in Riley v. California, that the Fourth Amendment requires law enforcement officers to obtain a warrant before they may search an arrestee’s cell phone. The court held that binding appellate precedent at the time of the searches in defendant's case, which was two years before the Riley decision, provided a reasonable basis to believe the searches were constitutional. Therefore, the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule applies to the evidence obtained from those searches. The court adopted its sister circuits’ test for evaluating harmlessness in the context of a conditional guilty plea and concluded that defendant must be given an opportunity to vacate his guilty plea if he so wishes because the Government has not met its burden of establishing harmlessness under that test. The court held that the standard that governs harmless error review in Rule 11(a)(2) appeals is whether the government has proved beyond reasonable doubt that the erroneously denied suppression motion did not contribute to the defendant’s decision to plead guilty. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. View "United States v. Lustig" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction for various drug trafficking and money laundering offenses. The court joined its sister circuits in holding explicitly that Luce applies to in limine rulings under Fed. R. Evid. 404(b). That is, in order to appeal a Rule 404(b) pretrial ruling, the evidence subject to that ruling must be presented at trial. In this case, defendant's prior conviction was never introduced at trial because he chose not to testify. Therefore, the court held that Luce barred defendant's claim on appeal and affirmed the district court's judgment as to this issue. The court also affirmed the district court’s denial of defendant's motion to sever counts because he has failed to show any prejudice from joinder. View "United States v. Prigge" on Justia Law

Defendant, then a 67-year-old retired engineer turned tax preparer, was convicted of 32 federal offenses arising from a tax fraud scheme. Defendant was sentenced to fifteen years in prison and ordered to pay just over $500,000 in restitution. The court held that 18 U.S.C. 1546(a) does not apply to U.S. passports or U.S. passport cards. Thus, the district court erred by denying defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal as to Counts 33 and 34. The court concluded that the district court clearly erred in holding that the conduct at issue in the second case, where defendant was not convicted, was sufficiently “related” to the conduct at issue in the first case to warrant inclusion of losses in the second case in the order for restitution pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 3663A(a)(2). Consequently, the court concluded that although ordering restitution for related conduct that did not result in a conviction was within “statutory bounds,” the order for restitution, here, was an abuse of discretion. The United States concedes, and the court agreed, that the wrong version of USSG 2B1.1(b)(2)(C) was used and that this error requires remand to resolve the determination of the number of victims; the primary flaw with the “intended loss” finding, here, is that the district court improperly considered the intended loss from the second case, even though the second case did not involve “relevant conduct,” under USSG 1B1.3(a)(2); the United States nowhere identifies evidence establishing - or identified by the district court as the basis for a finding - that specific challenged amounts of intended loss in the first case were, in fact, actual or intended losses; the district court erroneously applied the identity theft specific offense characteristic under USSG 2B1.1(b)(11)(C); the district court properly imposed the “sophisticated means” enhancement under USSG 2B1.1(b)(9)(C); because the court vacated defendant's conviction on Count 33, no cross-reference is applicable and the district court must recalculate the sentence on remand; the district court properly applied the enhancement for “abuse of trust” under USSG 3B1.3; and the district court properly applied an "obstruction of justice" enhancement under USSG 3C1.1. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded. View "United States v. Thomsen" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction and sentence for tax related charges. The court concluded that ample evidence supported the guilty verdicts on the levy counts where the jury found that defendant's partnership draws were remuneration paid for professional services (legal services), defined on a yearly basis (based on the year’s profits), and payable at regular intervals (monthly), rendering them a “salary" under 26 U.S.C. 6331(e); the court rejected defendant's argument that the district court erred in not dismissing the levy counts because they exceeded the three-year statute of limitations, and held that the six-year statute of limitations applies to violations of 26 U.S.C. 7206(4); and the district court properly rejected defendant's res judicata argument that the government should be precluded from pursuing a criminal action concerning the assets and tax liabilities the bankruptcy court already discharged, and the court held that the IRS in a bankruptcy action and the United States government in a criminal action are not in privity. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. The court resolved defendant's other arguments in a concurrently-filed memorandum disposition. View "United States v. Wandland" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of charges related to his involvement in a gang shooting that left one person dead and two injured. Defendant contends that officers were wrong to continue to interrogate him after he invoked his right to remain silent, and that his incriminating statements should not have been used against him. The court held that any reasonable jurist would have to conclude that when defendant said he did not want to talk “no more,” he meant it; the California Court of Appeal’s decision is both contrary to and an unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court law, and it is based on an unreasonable determination of the facts; by allowing the state to use defendant's post-invocation statements against him, even to argue that his initial invocation was ambiguous, is contrary to clearly established Supreme Court case law; and, given the pivotal role defendant’s statements played at trial, the trial court’s error was not harmless. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment of the district court and remanded with instructions to grant the writ. View "Jones v. Harrington" on Justia Law