Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant, then a 67-year-old retired engineer turned tax preparer, was convicted of 32 federal offenses arising from a tax fraud scheme. Defendant was sentenced to fifteen years in prison and ordered to pay just over $500,000 in restitution. The court held that 18 U.S.C. 1546(a) does not apply to U.S. passports or U.S. passport cards. Thus, the district court erred by denying defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal as to Counts 33 and 34. The court concluded that the district court clearly erred in holding that the conduct at issue in the second case, where defendant was not convicted, was sufficiently “related” to the conduct at issue in the first case to warrant inclusion of losses in the second case in the order for restitution pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 3663A(a)(2). Consequently, the court concluded that although ordering restitution for related conduct that did not result in a conviction was within “statutory bounds,” the order for restitution, here, was an abuse of discretion. The United States concedes, and the court agreed, that the wrong version of USSG 2B1.1(b)(2)(C) was used and that this error requires remand to resolve the determination of the number of victims; the primary flaw with the “intended loss” finding, here, is that the district court improperly considered the intended loss from the second case, even though the second case did not involve “relevant conduct,” under USSG 1B1.3(a)(2); the United States nowhere identifies evidence establishing - or identified by the district court as the basis for a finding - that specific challenged amounts of intended loss in the first case were, in fact, actual or intended losses; the district court erroneously applied the identity theft specific offense characteristic under USSG 2B1.1(b)(11)(C); the district court properly imposed the “sophisticated means” enhancement under USSG 2B1.1(b)(9)(C); because the court vacated defendant's conviction on Count 33, no cross-reference is applicable and the district court must recalculate the sentence on remand; the district court properly applied the enhancement for “abuse of trust” under USSG 3B1.3; and the district court properly applied an "obstruction of justice" enhancement under USSG 3C1.1. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded. View "United States v. Thomsen" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction and sentence for tax related charges. The court concluded that ample evidence supported the guilty verdicts on the levy counts where the jury found that defendant's partnership draws were remuneration paid for professional services (legal services), defined on a yearly basis (based on the year’s profits), and payable at regular intervals (monthly), rendering them a “salary" under 26 U.S.C. 6331(e); the court rejected defendant's argument that the district court erred in not dismissing the levy counts because they exceeded the three-year statute of limitations, and held that the six-year statute of limitations applies to violations of 26 U.S.C. 7206(4); and the district court properly rejected defendant's res judicata argument that the government should be precluded from pursuing a criminal action concerning the assets and tax liabilities the bankruptcy court already discharged, and the court held that the IRS in a bankruptcy action and the United States government in a criminal action are not in privity. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. The court resolved defendant's other arguments in a concurrently-filed memorandum disposition. View "United States v. Wandland" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of charges related to his involvement in a gang shooting that left one person dead and two injured. Defendant contends that officers were wrong to continue to interrogate him after he invoked his right to remain silent, and that his incriminating statements should not have been used against him. The court held that any reasonable jurist would have to conclude that when defendant said he did not want to talk “no more,” he meant it; the California Court of Appeal’s decision is both contrary to and an unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court law, and it is based on an unreasonable determination of the facts; by allowing the state to use defendant's post-invocation statements against him, even to argue that his initial invocation was ambiguous, is contrary to clearly established Supreme Court case law; and, given the pivotal role defendant’s statements played at trial, the trial court’s error was not harmless. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment of the district court and remanded with instructions to grant the writ. View "Jones v. Harrington" on Justia Law

Petitioner, convicted of triple homicide and sentenced to death, appealed the district court's denial of his petition for habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. 2254. The court concluded that the procedural bar doctrine does not prevent the court from reaching the merits of petitioner's claims; the state court's conclusion that defense counsel was not constitutionally ineffective by failing to call into question the credibility of key prosecution witnesses was a reasonable application of Strickland v. Washington; the state court's summary denial of petitioner's Brady v. Maryland claims was not unreasonable where petitioner failed to establish that the State suppressed the information that underpins his certified Brady claims; the state court's denial of petitioner's witness intimidation claim was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of Webb v. Texas; the state court did not misapply federal law by rejecting petitioner's Napue v. Illinois claim; and the court rejected petitioner's other claims of error regarding the trial court's refusal to strike a juror for cause, exclusion of deceased witness's statements, prosecutorial misconduct during closing arguments, and penalty phase admission of a prior murder. Finally, the court rejected petitioner's claim of cumulative error and actual innocence. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Ayala v. Chappell" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute and conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute. Principally at issue is whether the district judge was entitled to make a drug quantity finding in excess of that found by the jury in its special verdict. The court concluded that the Apprendi v. New Jersey line of cases is beside the point because defendant is not complaining that the district court raised the maximum statutory sentence. The court concluded that the district court cannot attribute more than that amount to defendant without contradicting the jury on a fact it found as a result of its deliberations. District judges have many powers, but contradicting juries as to findings of facts they have been asked to make is not among them. The court also concluded that, because the hearsay statements of two witnesses does not meet the court's “minimal indicia of reliability” standard, the district court was not justified in relying on them in determining defendant’s sentence. Absent these statements, there is no evidence indicating that defendant exercised some control over others and the application of the organizer enhancement is clearly erroneous. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded for resentencing. View "United States v. Pimentel-Lopez" on Justia Law

Defendant plead guilty to unlawful possession in violation of 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1) and then appealed the denial of his motion to suppress evidence of a handgun that was found during an inventory search in the air filter compartment of a vehicle occupied by defendant. The court concluded that the LVMPD officers’ decision to impound the vehicle was permissible under the Fourth Amendment because it was consistent with LVMPD policy and served legitimate caretaking purposes. The court also concluded that the inventory search of the vehicle did not violate the Fourth Amendment; in fulfilling his duty to search all containers, the officer acted within the parameters of LVMPD policy when he unlatched the air filter compartment; and therefore the district court properly denied defendant's motion to exclude evidence of the firearm. Furthermore, there was no violation of defendant's due process when the district court's order accepted the magistrate judge's recommendation and denied defendant's motion to suppress. Finally, the court assumed without deciding that Johnson v. United States's holding nullifies USSG 4B1.2(a)(2)'s identically worded residual clause. Therefore, the court accepted the government's concession that the district court sentenced defendant to a provision that is unconstitutionally vague. This renders defendant's sentence illegal, and thus the waiver of his plea agreement does not bar this appeal. Because the government agrees that defendant's prior convictions do not justify the imposition of USSG 2K2.1(a)(2)’s crime-of-violence enhancement absent the residual clause, the court vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing. View "United States v. Torres" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to possession of drugs with intent to distribute, as well as being a felon in possession of a firearm, and was sentenced to 57-months in prison. The court concluded that the district court did not procedurally err at sentencing where the district court read all relevant materials, understood the proper role of the guidelines, considered the relevant factors under 18 U.S.C. 3553(a), and decided to vary upward from the Guidelines range based on defendant’s particular circumstances. In United States v. Vongxay, the court held that felons are categorically different from the individuals who have a fundamental right to bear arms. The court concluded that its decision in Vongxay forecloses defendant’s Second Amendment argument. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's denial of defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment. The court noted that there are good reasons to be skeptical of the constitutional correctness of categorical, lifetime bans on firearm possession by all “felons.” In this case, although defendant is right that misprision is not a violent crime, he is wrong about it being “purely” passive. The court is hard pressed to conclude that a crime that has always been a federal felony cannot serve as the basis of a felon firearm ban, simply because its actus reus may appear innocuous. View "United States v. Phillips" on Justia Law

Defendant conspired with former Korn/Ferry employees whose user accounts had been terminated, but who nonetheless accessed trade secrets in a proprietary database through the back door when the front door had been firmly closed. The court concluded that defendant knowingly and with intent to defraud Korn/Ferry blatantly circumvented the affirmative revocation of his computer system access. This access falls squarely within the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act's (CFAA), 18 U.S.C. 1030, prohibition on access “without authorization.” The court concluded that “without authorization” is an unambiguous, non-technical term that, given its plain and ordinary meaning, means accessing a protected computer without permission. Therefore, the court affirmed defendant’s conviction for violations of section 1030(a)(4) of the CFAA. The court also affirmed defendant's convictions under the Economic Espionage Act (EEA), 18 U.S.C. 1832(a)(2) -(a)(4), for downloading, receiving and possessing trade secrets in the form of source lists from the former employer's database. The court vacated in part and remanded the restitution order for reconsideration of the reasonableness of the attorneys’ fees award. View "United States v. Nosal" on Justia Law

Petitioner challenged the denial of his petition for habeas relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2254. Petitioner pleaded guilty to one felony count of causing bodily injury while driving under the influence and one felony count of unlawful possession of a firearm, as well as admitting a single prior strike conviction and four prison priors. The court found that, in this case, the government was bound by its agreement in open court that punishment could be no greater than 14 years, 4 months in prison, in light of Ricketts v. Adamson. The court concluded that petitioner entered a binding, judicially approved plea agreement and stood convicted; the prosecution breached the court-approved plea agreement by attempting to amend the complaint; and allowing petitioner to withdraw his guilty plea was no remedy at all where the Superior Court unreasonably applied clearly established federal law pursuant to Santobello v. New York by failing to order specific performance of petitioner’s plea agreement. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Cuero v. Cate" on Justia Law

Defendant, a former mortgage loan officer and real estate broker, appealed his convictions and sentence for nine counts of wire fraud and one count of aggravated theft. Defendant's convictions stemmed from his involvement in a complex mortgage fraud scheme. The court held that lender negligence in verifying loan application information, or even intentional disregard of the information, is not a defense to fraud, and so evidence of such negligence or intentional disregard is inadmissible as a defense against charges of mortgage fraud. The court also held that, when a lender requests specific information in its loan applications, that information is objectively material as a matter of law, regardless of the lenders’ policies or practices with respect to use of that information. Accordingly, the court affirmed the convictions. View "United States v. Lindsey" on Justia Law