Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Petitioner, convicted of, inter alia, first-degree murder and sentenced to death, brought a federal habeas petition, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC) during the guilt and penalty phases of his trial. The district court granted his habeas petition as to the penalty phase and denied it as to his conviction. The court affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), 28 U.S.C. 2254. Following remand and further proceedings, the district court denied petitioner's remaining claims. Petitioner presents two IAC claims in this appeal. The court concluded that, whether or not these claims have merit, they are foreclosed by the Supreme Court’s decision in Visciotti IV, so the court may not grant habeas relief. Petitioner also contends that the trial judge’s closure of the courtroom for six-and-a-half days during the death qualification portion of voir dire violated this Sixth Amendment right. The court could not conclude that counsel’s failure to object to the closure of the death qualification voir dire constituted deficient performance. Therefore, petitioner failed to demonstrate cause to excuse his default of the public trial claim. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Visciotti v. Martel" on Justia Law

Defendant was indicted under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. 1962(c) and (d), for continuing crimes that, according to the government, spanned defendant’s eighteenth birthday. Defendant argues that the Juvenile Delinquency Act (JDA), 18 U.S.C. 5031, prohibits consideration of his pre-majority conduct as proof of the substantive crimes. The district court instructed the jury that it could convict defendant only if it found that defendant continued his participation after turning 18, and the jury’s special verdict form makes clear that the jury found that defendant, in fact, continued his participation after turning 18. The court held that the district court’s instruction, which comported with the law of most circuits that have addressed this issue, was not erroneous. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Camez" on Justia Law

Defendant, a native of China, was convicted of visa fraud, making a false statement, and conspiracy to defraud the United States. On appeal, defendant argues that she has been deprived of her constitutional right to an independent federal judiciary because the Northern Mariana Islands District Court (NMI District Court) is not properly established under the Constitution. The court concluded that the NMI District Court was established by Congress pursuant to its authority under Article IV of the Constitution; Congress clearly intended that the NMI District Court have jurisdiction over criminal cases; the language of 48 U.S.C. 1821 and 1822 clearly shows that Congress intentionally created the NMI District Court and gave it jurisdiction over criminal prosecutions; Congress did so based on the authority conferred on it by Article IV, Section 3, Clause 2 of the Constitution; and defendant's challenge to the NMI District Court’s authority fails completely in light of Supreme Court precedent that has rejected challenges similar to hers. The court rejected defendant's remaining challenges and affirmed the conviction. View "United States v. Xiaoying Tang Dowai" on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to aiding and abetting the maintenance of a drug-involved premise and was sentenced to three years of probation. As a condition of probation, the district court required that defendant refrain from unlawful use of a controlled substance and submit to periodic drug testing. Congress later enacted an omnibus appropriations bill that included a rider regarding using certain funds to prosecute individuals for engaging in conduct permitted by state medical marijuana laws. Defendant moved the district court to modify his conditions of probation on the ground that the appropriations rider required that he be permitted to use marijuana for medical purposes in compliance with California’s Compassionate Use Act, Cal. Health & Safety Code 11362.5, during his probationary term. The district court denied the motion. The court held that the congressional appropriations rider at issue here does not impact the ability of a federal district court to restrict the use of medical marijuana as a condition of probation. Because the district court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to modify the conditions of defendant's probation to allow him to possess and use marijuana for medical purposes in violation of federal law, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Nixon" on Justia Law

Defendants Kaplan and Strycharske were convicted of charges related to their quest to manufacture homemade hash oil and the resulting fire that severely injured six victims and killed one victim due to complications arising out of her injuries. On appeal, defendants challenged their 36-month sentence and final judgment of restitution in the amount of $2,771,929 on the ground that the district court erred by calculating the restitution award using replacement value instead of fair market value. The court joined its sister circuits in concluding that fair market value generally provides the best measure to ensure restitution in the “full amount” of the victim’s loss, but that “replacement value” is an appropriate measure of destroyed property under 18 U.S.C. 3663A(b)(1)(B) where the fair market value is either difficult to determine or would otherwise be an inadequate or inferior measure of the value necessary to make the victim whole. In this case, the court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in using replacement value to calculate the value of destroyed personal belongings like clothes, furniture, and home appliances. The court rejected Strycharske's contentions that the district court made clearly erroneous findings of fact when it stated the apartment contained 64 cans of butane and that an open flame was involved; that the district court made a highly inflammatory analogy that prejudiced his sentencing; and that his sentence is substantively unreasonable. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Kaplan" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to three counts of wire fraud and mail fraud. On appeal, defendant challenged the restitution order and a forfeiture money judgment, both in the amount of $2,232,894. The court concluded that, as a preliminary matter, the circumstances surrounding the signing and entry of the plea agreement support the conclusion that defendant entered into the agreement knowingly and voluntarily. The court also concluded that the plea agreement shows that it provided sufficient information from which defendant could have derived an accurate estimate of the amount of restitution for which he was liable; the plain language of the plea agreement clearly states the minimum amounts of restitution that defendant would have to pay rather than the maximum agreed-upon restitution amount, and the district court’s imposition of a larger amount of restitution was not in conflict with the plea agreement; the award of restitution is not an illegal sentence in this case and the district court did not err in ordering restitution for all losses caused by the schemes to defraud, and the order was not illegal; and the court rejected defendant's arguments as to the forfeiture order and concluded that it did not constitute an illegal sentence. Accordingly, the court dismissed the appeal. View "United States v. Lo" on Justia Law

The government appealed the district court's grant of defendant's motion to dismiss evidence of the crack cocaine in his pockets and the firearm in his vehicle. The court concluded that, based on the totality of the circumstances surrounding the stop, the officers had reasonable suspicion to briefly detain defendant and the district court erred in concluding otherwise; the officers had probable cause to arrest defendant and performed a valid search incident to arrest of defendant's person - which lawfully extended to the insides of defendant's pockets - after apprehending defendant for obstruction under Nevada Revised Statute 171.123; the court rejected defendant's contention that the government waived its argument that the officers had probable cause to arrest him for violating the Nevada statute; the government, having advanced its probable cause theory before the district court, is able to make a more precise argument on appeal as to why the officers had probable cause; and, in this case, the officers had probable cause to believe that evidence of contraband would be found in defendant's vehicle. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "United States v. Williams" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction for possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1). At both his first trial and his subsequent re-trial, defendant testified that before being stopped at a checkpoint, he had given a ride to three teenagers he did not know as a favor to his cousin’s husband, Christian Rios Campos. Rios was a known drug smuggler who recruited juveniles, and defendant's primary defense was that the teenagers had planted the drugs in the car without his knowledge. On appeal, defendant argued, inter alia, that the district court abused its discretion by denying his pretrial motion for discovery relating to the constitutionality of the San Clemente checkpoint, and the district court abused its discretion by denying his motion for discovery on Rios’s drug smuggling operation. The court agreed with defendant that the district court abused its discretion in denying discovery that could have revealed an unconstitutional seizure and led to the suppression of the evidence that illicit drugs were found in defendant's car. In this case, whether the primary purpose of the checkpoint has evolved from controlling immigration to detecting“ordinary criminal wrongdoing,” is a question that is subject to discovery under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16(a)(1)(E). Therefore, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings on this issue. The court also reversed the district court’s denial of discovery of the government’s investigation into Rios’s drug smuggling operation. After reviewing documents submitted by the government, the court disagreed both with the district court’s characterization of the documents and with its application of the law. Therefore, the court reversed the denial of defendant's discovery motion, vacated the conviction, and remanded with instructions to grant the motion. Finally, the court affirmed the district court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress; rejected defendant's challenge to a jury instruction; and concluded that defendant's knowledge of the type and quantity of the drugs found in his car is not an element under 21 U.S.C. 841. View "United States v. Soto-Zuniga" on Justia Law

Defendant, a urologist, appeals his felony conviction for conspiracy to commit adulteration in violation of 21 U.S.C. 331(k) with the intent to defraud or mislead. Defendant's conviction stemmed from his reuse of single-use plastic needle guides during prostate biopsy exams. The court concluded that the district court did not err in determining that a physician's use of a consumable, single-use device on a paying patient satisfies the "held for sale" element under section 331(k) of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. 331(k); in this case, defendant's use of the guides in the course of treating his urology patients constituted a "sale" under section 331(k); and thus the district court did not err in denying the motion to dismiss the indictment. The court also concluded that there was sufficient evidence to support the conviction that defendant conspired to commit adulteration in violation of section 331(k) and to support the special finding that he intended to defraud his patients, the public, the FDA, and the Medical Board; the district court properly rejected defendant's proposed jury instructions because his proposed “theory of the case” instructions merely duplicated what the jury was already told, and there was no plain error in the district court’s refusal to give the “practice of medicine” instruction; the district court did not err in refusing to dismiss the indictment where it contained the elements of defendant's fraud in adequate detail and any error in omitting the materiality element was harmless; and defendant waived challenges to the jury instructions and special verdict form as they relate to the felony conviction. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Kaplan" on Justia Law

Federal agents, acting pursuant to the Wiretap Act, 18 U.S.C. 2510-22, secured a wiretap order for a San Diego phone number based on evidence that Ignacio Escamilla Estrada (Escamilla) was using the number in a drug smuggling and distribution conspiracy. At some point during a seven-day period, the agents realized that Escamilla was not using the phone. Agents continued listening, however, believing at least initially that the people speaking on the phone might have been part of the Escamilla conspiracy. Appellant Michael Carey was eventually identified as a speaker in some of the phone calls, and he was then charged with conspiracy to distribute cocaine. The district court denied Carey's motion to suppress. The court saw no reason to depart from principles requiring cessation of a wiretap once the government knows or reasonably should know that the person speaking on the tapped line is not involved in the target conspiracy. Once the officers know or should know they are listening to conversations outside the scope of the wiretap order, they must discontinue monitoring the wiretap until they secure a new wiretap order, if possible. Applying this rule, the court noted that Carey does not challenge the validity of the wiretap order as to Escamilla, so the agents were justified in initially listening to the conversations at issue. But because the order did not authorize agents to listen to Carey or his associates, the government may only use evidence obtained in accordance with the “plain hearing” doctrine discussed above. The record does not indicate what evidence was obtained before the agents knew or should have known that they were listening to calls outside of the Escamilla conspiracy. The court vacated and remanded to allow the parties to present more evidence on remand to determine whether any evidence should be suppressed under the proper legal standard. View "United States v. Carey" on Justia Law