Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs filed suit against defendants after the shooting death of Bernie Villegas. On appeal, plaintiffs challenged the district court's grant of summary judgment to defendants. The court concluded that a reasonable jury could draw the following factual conclusions: (1) the officers, responding to a call about a suspected drug dealer armed with a shotgun and loitering in the visitor parking area of an apartment complex, came upon Villegas already holding a long gun; (2) Villegas was ordered to put his hands up, and as he was complying, the officers ordered him to drop his gun; (3) without providing a warning or sufficient time to comply, or observing Villegas pointing the long gun toward the officers or making any move toward the trigger, Officer Bennallack resorted to deadly force. Viewing the facts in this light, the court concluded that the deadly force was not objectively reasonable. Thus, the district court erred in holding that Bennallack’s use of deadly force was justified as a matter of law and in granting summary judgment on that basis. The court concluded, however, that it was not clearly established at the time that using deadly force in this situation, even viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, would constitute excessive force under the Fourth Amendment. Therefore, Bennallack is immune from liability under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for his use of deadly force. The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment as to this claim. The court concluded that the district court erred in holding that the use of deadly force was objectively reasonable as a matter of law. Therefore, the court reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment on the state law claims and remanded them for further proceedings. View "C. V. v. City of Anaheim" on Justia Law

Petitioner appealed the dismissal of his 28 U.S.C. 2241 habeas petition challenging the Bureau of Prisons' denial of a discretionary nunc pro tunc designation of a state prison for service of his federal sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 3621(b). The court concluded that the district court had jurisdiction to consider petitioner's claims that the BOP violated the Constitution, exceeded its statutory authority, or acted contrary to established federal law. Therefore, the court held that the district court erred by dismissing the petition for lack of jurisdiction. The court also held that the BOP acted contrary to 18 U.S.C. 3621(b)(4), which directs the BOP, when designating a prisoner to a facility in which to serve his sentence, to consider “any statement by the court that imposed the sentence.” In this case, it is undisputed that the BOP relied on a letter from a judge who not only was not the sentencing judge, but who had been formally recused from the case due to an actual conflict – namely, his connection to the victim of the crime. The court concluded that the BOP acted contrary to section 3621(b)(4) and due process by relying on the letter. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for the district court to grant the petition with directions for the BOP to reconsider the nunc pro tunc designation request. View "Rodriguez v. Copenhaver" on Justia Law

Petitioner, an Oregon state prisoner, appealed the district court's dismissal of his federal habeas petition with prejudice after concluding that petitioner had not fairly presented his claims to the Oregon state court first. The court concluded that petitioner fairly presented to the Oregon courts his claims that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by unduly pressuring him into accepting the no contest plea, and that his decision to enter the plea and waive his right to a jury trial was not knowingly and voluntarily made. In this case, petitioner attempted to present his claims in proper form by filing Section B of a Balfour brief and expressly incorporating his post-conviction relief (PCR) petition by reference under the heading "Argument." That petitioner may have done this under the wrong heading is surely less serious error than the one found excusable in Farmer v. Baldwin. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Carillo-Carillo v. Coursey" on Justia Law

Defendant, CEO of the Clinic, a federally funded health care facility located on the Tribe's Rocky Boy Reservation, was convicted of converting federal funds allocated to the Clinic for personal use, using federal funds for personal benefit, and misapplying Clinic funds. The district court sentenced defendant to one year and one day of prison, followed by two years of supervised release, and ordered $15,000 in restitution to the Tribe. At issue on appeal is a question of first impression for the court: whether the district court committed clear error by including the salary loss in calculating the loss defendant inflicted on the Tribe under USSG 2B1.1. The court concluded that the public accountability principle underscores that time has value. It was thus not clear error for the district court to include the estimated value of the time that defendant should have reported as annual leave in calculating the total losses defendant inflicted on the Tribe. Defendant abused her status as an exempt employee by submitting fraudulent time sheets and falsely claiming to be working or traveling rather than taking annual leave when she visited her husband. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Tadios" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed the denial of a minor role reduction at sentencing pursuant to U.S.S.G. 3B1.2(b) after pleading guilty to importation of methamphetamine. About a year after defendant was sentenced, the Sentencing Commission issued Amendment 794, which amended the commentary to U.S.S.G. 3B1.2. The court held that the Amendment resolves a circuit split and the language of the Amendment indicates that the Commission intended it to be a clarifying amendment. Therefore, the court held that the Amendment applied retroactively in direct appeals. Because the record is unclear as to whether the district court considered all the factors identified in Amendment 794, the court reversed and remanded with directions for the district court to resentence defendant under the newly amended section 3B1.2. On remand, the district court should consider the factors identified in Amendment 794. View "United States v. Quintero-Levya" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to commit securities fraud and was sentenced to 60 months in prison followed by a three-year term of supervised release. At issue is two of the supervised release conditions the district court imposed: one prohibiting him from using the Internet without prior approval from his probation officer, the other precluding him from residing in certain counties upon his release from prison. The court concluded that the facts of this case do not permit imposition of a total ban on Internet access where defendant’s use of the Internet played only a tangential role in his commission of the underlying fraud offense. When a total ban on Internet access cannot be justified, as is the case here, the court has held that a proviso for probation-officer approval does not cure the problem. Because the Internet-use restriction as currently drafted affected defendant's sentence and may not lawfully be imposed, it necessarily affects his substantial rights and the perceived fairness of the judicial proceedings. Therefore, the court vacated the restriction and remanded for the district court to craft a more narrowly tailored condition if it concludes that such a condition is warranted and valid. The court also concluded that simply declaring that a defendant is likely to resume a life of crime if he returns to a given area is not enough to impose a residency restriction, unless the reasons are obvious from the record. In this case, the record does not make clear why a residency restriction, if one is indeed warranted, should encompass the two out of four counties at issue. Further, the court could not uphold the residency restriction based on the community's need to heal. Therefore, the court vacated the residency restriction and remanded. View "United States v. LaCoste" on Justia Law

John Kirkland moved the bankruptcy court to compel arbitration of a bankruptcy trustee's adversary proceeding. The bankruptcy court denied John’s motion to compel arbitration and the district court affirmed. The court concluded that the bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to compel arbitration where the trustee's fraudulent conveyance, subordination, and disallowance causes of action were core proceedings, thereby giving the bankruptcy court discretion to weigh the competing bankruptcy and arbitration interests at stake. The bankruptcy court properly applied In re Thorpe Insulation Co., to determine that the arbitration provisions at issue conflicted with Bankruptcy Code purposes of having bankruptcy law issues decided by bankruptcy courts; of centralizing resolution of bankruptcy disputes; and of protecting parties from piecemeal litigation. The court rejected the trustee's claims regarding enforceability, and the Kirklands' claims regarding the plain language of some of the arbitration agreements. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Kirkland v. Rund" on Justia Law

Petitioner, convicted of murdering his infant daughter, appealed the district court's grant of the state's motion to dismiss his second federal habeas petition. In regard to petitioner's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel concerning errors related to the use of expert testimony, the court concluded that these claims have already been adjudicated and petitioner's new arguments failed to present a distinct claim for relief. In regard to petitioner's due process challenge based on false testimony, the court concluded that petitioner cannot obtain relief under 28 U.S.C. 2244(b)(2)(B)(ii) on the theory that the prosecution introduced false testimony at trial where he presents a battle between experts who have different opinions about how the baby died. Finally, in regard to claims based on changes in scientific knowledge, the court joined the Third Circuit in recognizing that habeas petitioners can allege a constitutional violation from the introduction of flawed expert testimony at trial if they show that the introduction of this evidence “undermined the fundamental fairness of the entire trial.” In this case, petitioner failed to show that permitting the prosecution’s experts to testify based on a triad-only theory of shaken baby syndrome (SBS) was so extremely unfair that it violated the fundamental conceptions of justice. Petitioner failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that no reasonable factfinder would have found him guilty but for the introduction of purportedly flawed SBS testimony. Nor could petitioner obtain relief if the court were to decouple his claim of actual innocence from any due process violation and repackage it as a freestanding “actual innocence” claim. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Gimenez v. Ochoa" on Justia Law

Petitioner appealed the district court’s denial of his motion to dismiss an information charging him with being found in the United States after removal, in violation of 8 U.S.C. 1326. Petitioner argued that his underlying deportation was invalid because his prior conviction for possession for sale of a controlled substance in violation of California Health & Safety Code 11378 was not an aggravated felony. The court concluded that petitioner's removal order was validly premised on his conviction for violating Section 11378 where the district court properly applied the categorical approach to section 11378 and petitioner's overbreadth arguments are unavailing. The court correctly concluded that although section 11378 was not categorically an aggravated felony, application of the modified categorical approach resulted in a determination that petitioner was indeed convicted of an aggravated felony. Petitioner’s reliance on the federal regulation excluding a particular product containing L-meth from inclusion in the federal schedules is not persuasive, because petitioner failed to show a “realistic probability” of prosecution for possession of the excluded product. The court also concluded, for the same reasons, that the district court correctly imposed a sentencing enhancement for drug trafficking. Accordingly, the court affirmed the criminal judgment and remanded for correction of the judgment. View "United States v. Vega-Ortiz" on Justia Law

A jury convicted petitioner of unlawful possession but acquitted him on two charged counts of second degree assault. The jury, however, impliedly acquitted petitioner on the first degree assault, and convicted him instead of the lesser-included offense of second degree assault. The Washington Court of Appeals reversed the conviction and, on remand, petitioner pled guilty to second degree assault. Petitioner subsequently filed a 28 U.S.C. 2254 habeas petition, arguing that he did not validly waive counsel and that the State violated double jeopardy principles on remand. The district court initially dismissed the habeas petition, but then granted a motion for reconsideration, vacated its prior judgment, and granted habeas relief. The court held that a motion for reconsideration pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) filed within twenty-eight days of judgment that raises a new claim, including one based on newly discovered evidence or an intervening change in substantive law, is subject to AEDPA’s second-or-successive petition bar. However, a timely motion for reconsideration that asks the district court to reconsider a previously adjudicated claim on grounds already raised should not be construed as a second or successive habeas petition subject to AEDPA’s additional restrictions. In this case, the court held that petitioner's motion for reconsideration properly asked the district court to reconsider the merits of two claims that were raised in his initial habeas petition. Therefore, the court concluded that the district court had jurisdiction to consider petitioner's post-judgment motion in the first instance without seeking pre-certification by the Court of Appeals under 28 U.S.C. 2244(b)(3)(A). On the merits, the court held that the district court abused its discretion by granting reconsideration and awarding habeas relief on his waiver of counsel claim. Finally, the district court erred by granting petitioner habeas relief on his double jeopardy claim. Accordingly, the court reversed, vacated, and remanded with instructions. View "Rishor v. Ferguson" on Justia Law