Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

The State challenged the district court's grant of habeas relief to petitioner, finding that his state-court guilty plea was based on a violation of his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel. The court held that Tollett v. Henderson does not bar petitioner's ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Tollett, properly understood, provided that although freestanding constitutional claims are unavailable to habeas petitioners who plead guilty, claims of pre-plea ineffective assistance of counsel are cognizable on federal habeas review when the action, or inaction, of counsel prevents petitioner from making an informed choice whether to plead. The court explained that if the deputies unconstitutionally searched petitioner's home, counsel's failure to move to suppress the fruits of that search prevented petitioner from making the informed choice to which he was entitled. The court further held that the state court could reasonably conclude that counsel did not provide ineffective assistance in failing to move to suppress the firearms and ammunition. The court nonetheless concluded that the state habeas courts were not unreasonable in denying the writ where it would have been reasonable for the state courts to conclude that a motion to suppress, if brought, would likely have been denied. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's grant of habeas corpus. View "Mahrt v. Beard" on Justia Law

Defendant, a former mortgage loan officer and real estate broker, appealed his convictions and sentence for nine counts of wire fraud and one count of aggravated theft. Defendant's convictions stemmed from his involvement in a complex mortgage fraud scheme. The court held that negligence is not a defense to wire fraud, and evidence of lender negligence is not admissible as a defense to mortgage fraud; intentional disregard of relevant information is not a defense to wire fraud, and evidence of intentional disregard by lenders is not admissible as a defense to mortgage fraud; evidence of individual lender behavior is not admissible to disprove materiality, but evidence of general lending standards in the mortgage industry is admissible to disprove materiality; and the district court did not deny defendant the opportunity to present a complete defense. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. The court concurrently filed a separate memorandum disposition rejecting other challenges to the convictions and sentences. View "United States v. Lindsey" on Justia Law

The government challenged the district court's grant of defendant's motion to suppress statements he made during a custodial interrogation. Defendant claimed that the Miranda warnings he received were deficient because they did not tell him of his right to consult with an attorney before questioning. The court concluded that Miranda warnings need not follow a precise formulation. In this case, the Miranda warnings given to defendant adequately conveyed that he had the right to consult with an attorney before questioning even though they did not explicitly inform him of that right. The court explained that the right was reasonably inferred. Accordingly, the court reversed the suppression of defendant's statements. View "United States v. Loucious" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of illegal entry in violation of 8 U.S.C. 1325 and illegal reentry in violation of 8 U.S.C. 1326, predicated on his expedited removal in 2012. The court concluded that defendant had no Fifth Amendment due process right to hire counsel in the expedited removal proceeding and that he was not prejudiced by the government’s failure to inform him of the possibility of withdrawal relief. Because defendant's 2012 removal was not fundamentally unfair, the court affirmed the section 1326 conviction and sentence for illegal reentry. Because the revocation of defendant's revocation of his supervised release was premised on the section 1326 conviction, the court also affirmed the district court's revocation. View "United States v. Peralta-Sanchez" on Justia Law

Petitioner, convicted of attempted murders while he was under the influence of drug and alcohol, appealed the dismissal of his habeas petition. The court concluded that petitioner's petition was only partially exhausted and he should have been allowed to delete the unexhausted claims and proceed on the exhausted claims if his motion to stay and abey the case were denied. The court did not remand the case to allow petitioner the option of deleting his unexhausted claims because the district court should have granted his request to stay his case. Here, petitioner has established good cause because he was not represented by counsel in his state postconviction proceeding; at least one of petitioner's claims is not "plainly meritless;" and the state concedes that he has not engaged in intentionally dilatory litigation tactics. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded with instructions. View "Dixon v. Baker" on Justia Law

Defendant, a 45-year-old man, was convicted of production and possession of child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. 2251(a) after he took sexually explicit photos of a 16-year-old girl (J.B.). The court adopted the plain meaning of the term "use," and agreed with the district court that the evidence presented by the government sufficiently established that defendant used or employed J.B. to produce sexually explicit images. The court found defendant's theory that he was not the man depicted in the photographs unconvincing where, among other things, J.B. identified defendant as the man in the photographs and testified that no one else took the photos. Therefore, there was sufficient evidence to support the guilty verdict. The court concluded that, although defendant's sexual relationship with J.B. was legal in Washington, the production of pornography stemming from that relationship was not. The court rejected defendant's constitutional challenges of overbreadth, vagueness, violation of the Tenth Amendment, and violation of the Commerce Clause. Finally, the court rejected defendant's evidentiary challenges. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Laursen" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute marijuana. On appeal, defendant argues that the government failed to meet its burden under the Lopez-Alvarez test to evaluate whether the government has met its burden under the corpus delicti doctrine. The court concluded that the government satisfied the first prong by introducing sufficient corroborating evidence that the core conduct of defendant's crime actually occurred. The court also concluded that the government introduced sufficient corroborating evidence to satisfy the second prong. Therefore, defendant's confession was adequately corroborated under the corpus delicti doctrine. The court explained that, because the confession is sufficiently corroborated, viewing all the evidence (including the confession) in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant knowingly entered into an unlawful agreement to serve as a scout for marijuana traffickers. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Niebla-Torres" on Justia Law

Petitioner seeks review of the IJ and BIA's conclusion that he was ineligible for cancellation of removal, and order of removal. Petitioner's removal was based on his 1998 conviction for delivery of a controlled substance (heroin) under Oregon Revised Statutes 475.992(1)(a). The court concluded that section 475.992(1)(a) is overbroad in its definition of “delivery,” and the modified categorical approach may not be applied because section 475.992(1)(a) is indivisible with respect to whether an “attempt” is accomplished by solicitation. Therefore, the court held that a conviction for delivering heroin under section 475.992(1)(a) is not an aggravated felony. The court granted the petition for review and remanded. View "Sandoval v. Yates" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his sentence after being convicted of two counts of abusive sexual contact in violation of 18 U.S.C. 2244(a)(5), and two counts of committing a felony offense involving a minor in violation of 18 U.S.C. 2260A. The court concluded that the Guidelines do not contain any instruction that precludes a district court from applying USSG 4B1.5 in calculating the Guidelines sentencing range for a section 2244(a)(5) conviction where a defendant has also been convicted under section 2260A, but rather instructs district courts to determine the Guidelines sentencing range for the section 2244(a)(5) count independently of section 2260A. Therefore, the district court did not procedurally err in calculating the applicable Guidelines range and the court affirmed the judgment. The court disposed of defendant's remaining challenges in an unpublished disposition filed concurrently with this opinion. View "United States v. Joey" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to one count of illegal reentry following deportation. The district court applied a sixteen-level sentencing enhancement under USSG 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii), concluding that defendant's prior conviction under section 273.6(d) of the California Penal Code for a violation of a protective order involving an act of violence or a credible threat of violence was a categorical crime of violence. The court affirmed defendant's 46 month sentence, holding that a violation of California Penal Code 273.6(d) is a categorical crime of violence for purposes of USSG 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii). View "United States v. Acevedo-De La Cruz" on Justia Law