Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant appealed the denial of his motion to reduce his sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2). The court affirmed the judgment, concluding that the district court properly calculated the guideline range that applied to defendant at sentencing by using the criminal history category applicable to defendant before consideration of a downward departure under USSG 4A1.3. Therefore, defendant was not eligible for a sentence reduction under section 3582(c). View "United States v. Ornelas" on Justia Law

Defendant, convicted of crimes related to his involvement in a cocaine trafficking conspiracy, appealed the denial of a motion to modify his sentence under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2). The court held that the district court correctly concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to modify defendant's sentence in 2013. In this case, the district court was correct to find that defendant was responsible for more than 8.4 kilograms of crack cocaine. Defendant’s applicable Guidelines range under the drug quantity table, as modified by Amendment 750, would therefore be the same as the Guidelines range before the Amendment. Therefore, the Amendment did not have the effect of lowering defendant's applicable guideline range and modifying defendant's sentence would not be consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Commission. The court also held that the district court did not err when it relied on factual findings from the 2001 sentencing hearing where defendant cites no authority for his contrary assertion that the 2013 court should have ignored factual findings in the 2001 sentencing proceeding because of a possible Rule 32 violation. Finally, the court held that Amendment 782 does not provide a basis for reversing the district court’s denial of defendant's motion because Amendment 782 went into effect after the district court denied defendant's motion in 2013 based on the pre-Amendment 782 drug quantity table. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Spears" on Justia Law

Petitioner, convicted of two murders and sentenced to death, challenged the district court's denial of his habeas petition. The court concluded that the Arizona Supreme Court did not act unreasonably in rejecting petitioner’s Sixth Amendment confrontation claim where his argument is foreclosed by Williams v. New York, which held that the Confrontation Clause does not bar courts from considering unconfronted statements during sentencing proceedings; the court rejected petitioner's claims in relation to the prosecution's rebuttal evidence and concluded that the district court did not err in finding that he suffered no constitutional violation when the prosecution introduced substantial evidence of petitioner's prior crimes during the penalty-phase hearings; any (E)(2) vagueness challenge fails because both the trial court and Arizona Supreme Court applied the narrowed definition of the (E)(2) aggravator to petitioner’s case; the application of the (E)(2) aggravator was in no way contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law; neither the state trial court’s decision to give the (E)(6) narrowing instruction, nor the Arizona Supreme Court’s (E)(6) analysis, was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement; and petitioner's ineffective assistance of counsel claim was procedurally defaulted. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Smith v. Ryan" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit against defendants after the shooting death of Bernie Villegas. On appeal, plaintiffs challenged the district court's grant of summary judgment to defendants. The court concluded that a reasonable jury could draw the following factual conclusions: (1) the officers, responding to a call about a suspected drug dealer armed with a shotgun and loitering in the visitor parking area of an apartment complex, came upon Villegas already holding a long gun; (2) Villegas was ordered to put his hands up, and as he was complying, the officers ordered him to drop his gun; (3) without providing a warning or sufficient time to comply, or observing Villegas pointing the long gun toward the officers or making any move toward the trigger, Officer Bennallack resorted to deadly force. Viewing the facts in this light, the court concluded that the deadly force was not objectively reasonable. Thus, the district court erred in holding that Bennallack’s use of deadly force was justified as a matter of law and in granting summary judgment on that basis. The court concluded, however, that it was not clearly established at the time that using deadly force in this situation, even viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, would constitute excessive force under the Fourth Amendment. Therefore, Bennallack is immune from liability under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for his use of deadly force. The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment as to this claim. The court concluded that the district court erred in holding that the use of deadly force was objectively reasonable as a matter of law. Therefore, the court reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment on the state law claims and remanded them for further proceedings. View "C. V. v. City of Anaheim" on Justia Law

Petitioner appealed the dismissal of his 28 U.S.C. 2241 habeas petition challenging the Bureau of Prisons' denial of a discretionary nunc pro tunc designation of a state prison for service of his federal sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 3621(b). The court concluded that the district court had jurisdiction to consider petitioner's claims that the BOP violated the Constitution, exceeded its statutory authority, or acted contrary to established federal law. Therefore, the court held that the district court erred by dismissing the petition for lack of jurisdiction. The court also held that the BOP acted contrary to 18 U.S.C. 3621(b)(4), which directs the BOP, when designating a prisoner to a facility in which to serve his sentence, to consider “any statement by the court that imposed the sentence.” In this case, it is undisputed that the BOP relied on a letter from a judge who not only was not the sentencing judge, but who had been formally recused from the case due to an actual conflict – namely, his connection to the victim of the crime. The court concluded that the BOP acted contrary to section 3621(b)(4) and due process by relying on the letter. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for the district court to grant the petition with directions for the BOP to reconsider the nunc pro tunc designation request. View "Rodriguez v. Copenhaver" on Justia Law

Petitioner, an Oregon state prisoner, appealed the district court's dismissal of his federal habeas petition with prejudice after concluding that petitioner had not fairly presented his claims to the Oregon state court first. The court concluded that petitioner fairly presented to the Oregon courts his claims that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by unduly pressuring him into accepting the no contest plea, and that his decision to enter the plea and waive his right to a jury trial was not knowingly and voluntarily made. In this case, petitioner attempted to present his claims in proper form by filing Section B of a Balfour brief and expressly incorporating his post-conviction relief (PCR) petition by reference under the heading "Argument." That petitioner may have done this under the wrong heading is surely less serious error than the one found excusable in Farmer v. Baldwin. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Carillo-Carillo v. Coursey" on Justia Law

Defendant, CEO of the Clinic, a federally funded health care facility located on the Tribe's Rocky Boy Reservation, was convicted of converting federal funds allocated to the Clinic for personal use, using federal funds for personal benefit, and misapplying Clinic funds. The district court sentenced defendant to one year and one day of prison, followed by two years of supervised release, and ordered $15,000 in restitution to the Tribe. At issue on appeal is a question of first impression for the court: whether the district court committed clear error by including the salary loss in calculating the loss defendant inflicted on the Tribe under USSG 2B1.1. The court concluded that the public accountability principle underscores that time has value. It was thus not clear error for the district court to include the estimated value of the time that defendant should have reported as annual leave in calculating the total losses defendant inflicted on the Tribe. Defendant abused her status as an exempt employee by submitting fraudulent time sheets and falsely claiming to be working or traveling rather than taking annual leave when she visited her husband. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Tadios" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed the denial of a minor role reduction at sentencing pursuant to U.S.S.G. 3B1.2(b) after pleading guilty to importation of methamphetamine. About a year after defendant was sentenced, the Sentencing Commission issued Amendment 794, which amended the commentary to U.S.S.G. 3B1.2. The court held that the Amendment resolves a circuit split and the language of the Amendment indicates that the Commission intended it to be a clarifying amendment. Therefore, the court held that the Amendment applied retroactively in direct appeals. Because the record is unclear as to whether the district court considered all the factors identified in Amendment 794, the court reversed and remanded with directions for the district court to resentence defendant under the newly amended section 3B1.2. On remand, the district court should consider the factors identified in Amendment 794. View "United States v. Quintero-Levya" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to commit securities fraud and was sentenced to 60 months in prison followed by a three-year term of supervised release. At issue is two of the supervised release conditions the district court imposed: one prohibiting him from using the Internet without prior approval from his probation officer, the other precluding him from residing in certain counties upon his release from prison. The court concluded that the facts of this case do not permit imposition of a total ban on Internet access where defendant’s use of the Internet played only a tangential role in his commission of the underlying fraud offense. When a total ban on Internet access cannot be justified, as is the case here, the court has held that a proviso for probation-officer approval does not cure the problem. Because the Internet-use restriction as currently drafted affected defendant's sentence and may not lawfully be imposed, it necessarily affects his substantial rights and the perceived fairness of the judicial proceedings. Therefore, the court vacated the restriction and remanded for the district court to craft a more narrowly tailored condition if it concludes that such a condition is warranted and valid. The court also concluded that simply declaring that a defendant is likely to resume a life of crime if he returns to a given area is not enough to impose a residency restriction, unless the reasons are obvious from the record. In this case, the record does not make clear why a residency restriction, if one is indeed warranted, should encompass the two out of four counties at issue. Further, the court could not uphold the residency restriction based on the community's need to heal. Therefore, the court vacated the residency restriction and remanded. View "United States v. LaCoste" on Justia Law

John Kirkland moved the bankruptcy court to compel arbitration of a bankruptcy trustee's adversary proceeding. The bankruptcy court denied John’s motion to compel arbitration and the district court affirmed. The court concluded that the bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to compel arbitration where the trustee's fraudulent conveyance, subordination, and disallowance causes of action were core proceedings, thereby giving the bankruptcy court discretion to weigh the competing bankruptcy and arbitration interests at stake. The bankruptcy court properly applied In re Thorpe Insulation Co., to determine that the arbitration provisions at issue conflicted with Bankruptcy Code purposes of having bankruptcy law issues decided by bankruptcy courts; of centralizing resolution of bankruptcy disputes; and of protecting parties from piecemeal litigation. The court rejected the trustee's claims regarding enforceability, and the Kirklands' claims regarding the plain language of some of the arbitration agreements. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Kirkland v. Rund" on Justia Law