Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant, 16 years old at the time of the offenses, was convicted of felony murder and related charges resulting in a mandatory life sentence without the possibility of parole. Miller v. Alabama subsequently held unconstitutional for juvenile offenders mandatory terms of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. The district court refused to appoint a neuropsychological expert under 18 U.S.C. 3006A(e) on resentencing. The court concluded that, under these circumstances, a reasonably competent attorney would have found the services of the requested expert necessary to provide adequate representation at defendant’s resentencing. By precluding defendant from developing this potential mitigating evidence, the district court abused its discretion. The court also concluded that a reasonable attorney would have considered an up-to-date neuropsychological evaluation necessary had defendant been a nonindigent defendant. And because a current evaluation could have provided mitigating evidence in support of a lesser sentence, defendant was sufficiently prejudiced by the failure to appoint a psychological expert before resentencing. Therefore, the court vacated defendant’s sentence and remanded for resentencing. The court further concluded that defendant has not shown the district court erred by calculating the Guidelines’ recommended base offense level as 43; defendant has not demonstrated that the district court committed prejudicial error when it considered the PSR’s calculation of criminal history points attributed to his juvenile offenses; and, even assuming that defendant’s objection to the district court’s calculation of his criminal history category based on his juvenile offenses was forfeited, as opposed to waived, and assuming the district court committed plain error by attributing criminal history points to three of his juvenile offenses, defendant has not shown prejudice as a result of the error. View "United States v. Pete" on Justia Law

Petitioner, convicted of first-degree murder and sexual conduct with a minor, appealed the district court's denial of his federal habeas petition based on ineffective assistance of counsel at the guilt and penalty phases of trial. Applying a highly deferential standard under the Antiterrorism and Death Penalty Act, 28 U.S.C. 2254, the court concluded that, given the inherently disturbing nature of the technical theory counsel adopted, for lack of an available alternative, to defend against the felony murder charge, as well as its counter-intuitive nature, it was reasonable to tailor the defense as an argument to the court in the form of a motion for acquittal, and, when the motion was denied and closing arguments remained, not press the theory to the jury. Assuming, without deciding, that counsel’s conduct was at times constitutionally deficient, he did not fail entirely to advocate for petitioner. Therefore, the state court reasonably determined that counsel's conduct did not constitute abandonment, and that Strickland v. Washington applies to the question of prejudice. The court also rejected petitioner's claims that counsel at sentencing was ineffective for failing fully to prepare and present mitigating evidence concerning his mental health and personal history. The court concurrently filed an order with this opinion. View "Gallegos v. Ryan" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed the district court's denial of his motion to dismiss the indictment. Shortly after the indictment was returned, the United States initiated its effort to extradite defendant from Canada for trial. After almost five years, Canada approved the extradition. The district court found 32.5 months of the delay was attributable to Canada, 26.4 months of the delay was attributable to the United States, and 16 months resulted from defendant’s fighting the extradition. With respect to the delay attributable to the United States alone, the district court held that the United States “pursued extradition with reasonable diligence” and that any prejudice caused by the delay was not severe enough to have denied defendant his right to a speedy trial. After weighing the Barker v. Wingo factors, the court agreed with the district court that defendant was not deprived of his right to a speedy trial. The court noted, however, that the U.S. Attorney's offices would do well to adopt systems of controls that would track the status of extradition requests so as to ensure the timely submission of extradition materials to the Justice Department and foreign governments. Such a system would likely have avoided much of the initial 9.6 month delay present in this case. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Alexander" on Justia Law

Defendant, convicted of drug trafficking charges, challenged the district court's denial of his motion to suppress the drugs found in his car. Unable to contest the existence of reasonable suspicion, defendant challenges the legality of the stop by contending that the stop violated the Fourth Amendment because the officer who pulled him over deliberately lied when stating the reason for the stop, and the reason the officer gave was not itself supported by reasonable suspicion. The court concluded that so long as the facts known to the officer establish reasonable suspicion to justify an investigatory stop, the stop is lawful even if the officer falsely cites as the basis for the stop a ground that is not supported by reasonable suspicion. In light of the information obtained during the stop, the court concluded that the officers had probable cause to seize defendant's car. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Magallon-Lopez" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed her conviction and sentence for one count of sex trafficking by force, fraud, or coercion, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1591(a). Defendant forced into prostitution a Chinese woman who had been tricked into flying to Saipan on promises of a work visa and a legal job, when in fact the victim received only a tourist visa, was effectively imprisoned, and was told repeatedly that she had nowhere to turn and must engage in prostitution. The court concluded that the jury instructions were not erroneous. In this case, the district court did not err in failing to give an instruction requiring the jury to find that the coercion was the but-for-cause of the victim's sex act. The court also concluded that the commerce element of section 1519(a)(1) has no mens rea requirement and thus the district court did not err in failing to give an instruction requiring the jury to find that defendant knew her actions affected interstate or foreign commerce. The court further concluded that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's finding of an effect on interstate commerce; the district court did not err by denying defendant's motion to admit evidence that the victims engaged in prostitution after the indictment period, under Federal Rule of Evidence 412; and the district court did not abuse its discretion by imposing a two-level enhancement under USSG 3A1.1(b)(1) because defendant knew the victim of the offense was a vulnerable victim. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Backman" on Justia Law

The government appealed defendant's sentence for illegal reentry, contending that the district court miscalculated the Sentencing Guidelines range applicable to defendant because the district court concluded that defendant's 2009 burglary conviction under California Penal Code 459 did not qualify as a “crime of violence” as defined in 18 U.S.C.16(b). After the government filed its appeal, the court held in Dimaya v. Lynch that the definition of violence that appears in section 16(b) is unconstitutionally vague. The court held that section 16(b), as incorporated in USSG 2L1.2(b)(1)(C), is void for vagueness because the court was bound by Dimaya's holding and because the government offers the same arguments in favor of section 16(b)'s constitutionality that the court rejected in that decision. Accordingly, the court affirmed the sentence. View "United States v. Hernandez-Lara" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed her 210 month sentence after pleading guilty to sex trafficking of children. The court concluded that an enhancement under USSG 2G1.3(b)(4)(A) is applicable in this case even though defendant did not engage in a sex act with a minor because her offense involved the commission of sex acts; the district court did not engage in impermissible double-counting by applying an enhancement under USSG 2G1.3(b)(2)(B) where defendant unduly influenced two homeless runaway 15-year-old girls and threatened to throw them out on the street if they did not engage in sex acts in exchange for providing them shelter; and the district court permissibly declined to depart downward for reduced mental capacity where defendant's reduced mental capacity resulted in part from the voluntary use of illegal drugs. Accordingly, the court affirmed the sentence. View "United States v. Basa" on Justia Law

Petitioner, convicted of first-degree murder, appealed the denial of his motion for relief from judgment under Fed. R. Civ. Pro 60(b) after the district court's dismissal of his habeas petition as time-barred. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in holding that petitioner failed to demonstrate that he was entitled to Rule 60(b) relief under a theory of “actual innocence.” In this case, petitioner failed to cite any cases where actual innocence was held to constitute an “extraordinary circumstance” for Rule 60(b)(6) purposes. Assuming arguendo that the “Schlup gateway” is available to support a Rule 60(b) motion, petitioner has fallen well short of raising sufficient doubt about his guilt to undermine confidence in the result of the trial. Further, the declarations petitioner seeks to offer as evidence of actual innocence are not "new" for purposes of Rule 60(b) because they were available when he filed his initial habeas petition. The court also concluded that the district court abused its discretion in finding that petitioner was not abandoned by his counsel, Gregory Mitts, where Mitts was grossly negligent in his representation; the district court did not make findings with respect to whether petitioner was reasonably diligent; and, therefore, the court remanded for the district court to determine this issue in the first instance. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. View "Brooks v. Yates" on Justia Law

In this interlocutory appeal, the government challenged the district court's suppression of two handguns seized from defendant's patio. It is undisputed that the officers seized the two handguns during a warrantless search of defendant’s home. The “knock and talk” exception to the warrant requirement does not apply when officers encroach upon the curtilage of a home with the intent to arrest the occupant. In this case, the district court found, as a matter of fact, that the officers’ purpose in knocking on defendant’s door was to find and arrest him, and the court saw no reason to disturb that finding. Thus, the officers violated defendant’s Fourth Amendment right to be free from unlawful searches when they stood on his porch and knocked on his front door. And since this unconstitutional conduct caused the allegedly exigent circumstance - the crashing noises in the backyard - that circumstance cannot justify the search resulting in the seizure of the two handguns. Furthermore, the officers lacked a reasonable ground for believing that there was a danger that would have justified a protective sweep of defendant’s home because, by the time the officers conducted the sweep of defendant’s home, he had already been handcuffed and placed in a police vehicle. The court also concluded that the inevitable discovery exception does not apply when officers have probable cause to apply for a warrant but simply fail to do so. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment and remanded for further proceedings. View "United States v. Lundin" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction and sentence for conspiracy and possession with intent to distribute 500 grams of a controlled substance. The court concluded that the district court's stated reason for rejecting defendant's plea was inapt. In this case, armed with defendant's admission of guilt and the government's offer of proof, the district court had all it needed to fulfill its duty under Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(3), which is to determine that there is a factual basis for the plea. Therefore, the court vacated the convictions and remanded so that defendant may plead guilty pursuant to the terms of his original plea agreement. Although the district court must give defendant the opportunity to plead guilty under the terms of his original plea agreement, that doesn’t mean he is required to so plead. Defendant could choose to hold out for a better deal or to go to trial anew. In regard to defendant's claims of trial errors, the court concluded that the district court's rulings were not within the area of permissible discretion when it prevented defendant from questioning three of the government's cooperating witnesses about the Rule 35 terms of their plea agreements. Finally, the court concluded that, because the assets at issue belonged to the government, they were not available for payment from or on behalf of defendant; the district court had no authority to redirect money earmarked for the Justice Department’s fund; nor could the district judge achieve such a result by amending the original judgment under Rule 35(a), as he attempted to do at the same time he filed the sua sponte order. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded to a different judge in order to preserve the appearance of justice. View "United States v. Nickle" on Justia Law