Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Petitioner, sentenced to death for robbery and murder, seeks habeas corpus relief based on the California Supreme Court’s rejection of his claim of self-representation pursuant to Faretta v. California. The district court granted relief to petitioner and the State appealed. Because petitioner filed his federal habeas corpus petition before the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act's effective date, the court applied the former version of 28 U.S.C. 2254 and pre-AEDPA law. The court concluded that the trial court’s repeated denials of petitioner's Faretta requests and the California Supreme Court’s decision affirming those denials were contrary to the court's decisions in Fritz v. Spalding and Armant v. Marquez. In this case, it was appropriate for the district court to determine the timeliness of petitioner's Faretta motions in the first instance because neither court made any finding that petitioner's requests were a mere delay tactic. The court further concluded that the district court did not have to refer to the California Supreme Court's finding because the California postconviction proceedings did not ask whether petitioner intended to delay, only whether petitioner's attorney thought that was petitioner's intent. The court agreed with petitioner that the district court was not required to presume that his requests were a mere delay tactic because, under section 2254(d)(1), the merits of that factual dispute were not resolved in the state postconviction hearing and, under section 2254(d)(2) and (d)(6), he was denied a full, fair, and adequate state court hearing on the issue. Finally, the court concluded that the district court did not clearly err in finding that petitioner’s Faretta requests were made for legitimate, not purely dilatory, reasons. The court affirmed the judgment. View "Burton v. Davis" on Justia Law

Defendant, a non-Indian, appealed his conviction under the federal murder statute, 18 U.S.C. 111, for the murder of the victim on the Tohono O’odham Indian reservation in Arizona. The court concluded that section 1111 was applicable to defendant under the Indian General Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. 1152, which makes federal criminal law applicable in federal enclaves when the defendant is a non-Indian and the victim is an Indian, because the government adduced sufficient evidence to establish that the victim in this case was an Indian. The court held that the evidence introduced at trial, taken in the light most favorable to the government, was sufficient to establish that defendant acted with premeditation and, therefore, the court affirmed defendant's conviction for first degree premeditated murder. Because the district court erred in defining the term “burglary” in section 1111 by reference to Arizona’s third-degree burglary statute, and this error was not harmless, the court vacated defendant's conviction for felony murder. View "United States v. Reza-Ramos" on Justia Law

Petitioner, convicted of seven felony counts related to a robbery and burglary using a deadly weapon, appealed the denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief, claiming violation of his due process right to a fair and impartial jury, where a police vehicle followed Juror No. 2, a known holdout against a guilty verdict, for approximately seven miles, on the second day of deliberations, in a highly publicized trial involving multiple police victims. The court held that the state court's decision was contrary to Mattox v. United States because the state court improperly limited its inquiry to whether the external contact amounted to a “communication” and did not investigate the prejudicial effect of the police tail. Therefore, the court reviewed de novo the question whether the extrinsic contact could have influenced the verdict and prejudiced petitioner. The court concluded that, because the trial court prevented petitioner from offering evidence to demonstrate prejudice, remand for an evidentiary hearing and further fact finding was necessary. View "Tarango v. McDaniel" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm, contending that his Fourth Amendment right to be free of unreasonable searches and seizures was violated when probation officers conducted two warrantless, suspicionless searches of his cell phone. The court rejected the government's contention that defendant waived his Fourth Amendment rights where acceptance of the terms of probation, including suspicionless searches of his person and property, is one factor that bears on the reasonableness of the search, but it is not in itself dispositive. The court concluded that defendant had a privacy interest in his cell phone and the data it contained and that privacy interest was substantial in light of the broad amount of data contained in, or accessible through, his cell phone. Although defendant's privacy was somewhat diminished in light of his status as a probationer, it was not diminished or waived because he accepted as a condition of his probation a clear and unequivocal search provision authorizing cell phone searches (he did not) or because he subscribed to cell phone service using a different first name (he did). After balancing defendant's privacy interest and the government's interest in combating recidivism, the court concluded that the circumstances in this case were unreasonable. Further, the exception to the exclusionary rule in Davis v. United States for binding appellate precedent is inapplicable in this case. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "United States v. Lara" on Justia Law

Defendant conditionally plead guilty to possession of a firearm and ammunition, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), and one count of possession of an unregistered firearm, in violation of 26 U.S.C. 5861(d). The district court sentenced defendant under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. 924(e), determining that defendant had three prior violent felony convictions. The court held that a conviction for felony riot under a Washington state statute, Wash. Rev. Code 9A.84.010, is not a violent felony for purposes of the ACCA sentencing enhancement because section 9A.84.010 is overinclusive and indivisible with respect to the term "force." Therefore, defendant's convictions under that statute are not predicate offenses supporting the application of the ACCA enhancement. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "United States v. Werle" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction for possession with intent to distribute more than 50 grams of methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1). The court concluded that the evidence presented at trial is sufficient to sustain the conviction under a constructive possession theory. However, the court concluded that, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, no reasonable factfinder could have determined beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant possessed more than 50 grams of methamphetamine. The court stated that it would be a bridge too far to allow a jury to extrapolate from comparison drugs that were not from activity related to the defendant or a conspiracy in which the defendant is involved. A 90% level of purity would more than suffice to support the jury’s quantity determination, if adequately connected to the drugs concerning which defendant had constructive possession. However, the government failed to include evidence connecting that purity level to defendant. Finally, the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that a mistrial was not necessary where an FBI agent mentioned the name of a gang and the district court, among other things, immediately sustained the objection and ordered the jury to disregard it. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for resentencing. View "United States v. Lemus" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction for possession with the intent to distribute marijuana, arguing that the district court erred by failing to ensure that his stipulation was knowing and voluntary. Defendant also challenged his sentence, contending that the district court erred in dismissing his court-appointed interpreter contrary to the provisions of the Court Interpreters Act, 28 U.S.C. 1827(f)(1). In this opinion, the court held that the district court dismissed the interpreter without adhering to the procedures required by the Act where defendant did not validly waive his right to an interpreter. Accordingly, the court vacated the sentence and remanded for a new sentencing hearing. The court affirmed the conviction in a memorandum disposition. View "United States v. Murguia-Rodriquez" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed her sentence of 46 months after pleading guilty to conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute heroin. The court concluded that the government did not breach defendant's plea agreement by not objecting when the district court granted only a two-level departure for fast track (rather than the four-level departure in the agreement). The court concluded that no plain error occurred where, unlike the plea agreement in United States v. Camarillo-Tello, defendant's plea agreement does not indicate the government “will recommend” the four-level departure for fast track. Rather, paragraph eight of her plea agreement provides “the parties stipulate and agree that the following guideline calculations are appropriate for the charge for which the defendant is pleading guilty.” That language is sufficiently distinct from the language obligating government action in Camarillo-Tello for the court to conclude no plain error occurred here. Therefore. the court enforced the appellate waiver and dismissed the appeal because the government did not breach defendant's plea agreement. View "United States v. Hernandez-Castro" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 to enjoin the application of Propositions 89 and 9 as to them. Proposition 89 amended the California Constitution to vest in the Governor constitutional authority to reverse, affirm, or modify grants of parole as to inmates convicted of murder. Proposition 9 amended the California Penal Code to increase the default period of time after which a prisoner would be scheduled for a parole hearing, after the denial of parole. California inmates who were sentenced to life terms with the possibility of parole for murders committed before the passage of the two Propositions contend that applying the Propositions to them creates a significant risk that their periods of incarceration will be longer than they would have been before the passage of the Propositions. The district court found in favor of plaintiffs. The court concluded that Johnson v. Gomez controls where Proposition 89 remains only a transfer of decisionmaking power, which does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause. Therefore, the district court erred in finding that Johnson does not control the outcome of plaintiffs' challenge to Proposition 89 and the court reversed the district court's findings and injunction as to Proposition 89. The court also concluded that the district court committed legal error, among other things, by basing its findings principally on speculation and inference, rather than concrete evidence demonstrating that the petition to advance process failed to afford relief from the classwide risk of lengthened incarceration posed by Proposition 9. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Gilman v. Brown" on Justia Law

Petitioner, on trial for first degree murder of a police officer, challenged the prosecutor’s decision to excuse nine black prospective jurors. Applying the doubly deferential standard for reviewing a Batson v. Kentucky determination, the court concluded that the California Court of Appeal’s decision was not based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. The court also concluded that the trial court’s decision to preclude petitioner from responding to the prosecutor’s race-neutral explanation for his strikes was harmless. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's grant of habeas relief. View "Sifuentes v. Brazelton" on Justia Law