Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Petitioner, convicted of first-degree murder with a special circumstance for committing the murder during the commission of a kidnapping, appealed the denial of his habeas petition. Based on an erroneous jury instruction regarding the element of asportation, the jury also found true the special circumstance that petitioner committed the murder during the commission of a kidnapping. Applying Chapman v. California, the state court found that the instructional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt under state law. The court concluded that the state court’s harmless-error determination was not an objectively unreasonable application of Chapman where the error did not prejudice petitioner. Accordingly, the court affirmed the denial of habeas relief. View "Rademaker v. Paramo" on Justia Law

After defendant pleaded guilty in two separate federal drug distribution cases, the district court, in a consolidated sentencing proceeding, imposed the mandatory minimum sentence for each plea, and ordered that the sentences be served consecutively. Defendant subsequently moved for modification of his sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2), based on Amendment 782 to the Sentencing Guidelines. The court concluded that the consecutive nature of the sentences is not modifiable according to section 3582(c)(2) because it was not “based on” the Guideline range, notwithstanding the fact that it might have been if the district court had chosen to impose a different sentence. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's denial of the motion. View "United States v. Aguilar-Canche" on Justia Law

Petitioner, convicted of second degree murder, appealed the denial of habeas relief. In Tarango v. McDaniel, the court stated that Mattox v. United States “compels a criminal trial court to consider the prejudicial effect of any external contact that has a ‘tendency’ to influence the verdict.” The court held further that a tendency to influence the verdict exists per se and triggers a presumption of prejudice whenever there is “unauthorized external contact between a juror and a government agent, whose official position ‘beyond question carries great weight with a jury.’” Because the court is bound by Tarango, the court assumed that petitioner was entitled to a presumption of prejudice under clearly established federal law by a juror's alleged misconduct. Even assuming a presumption of prejudice applies in petitioner's case, however, the court concluded that the California Court of Appeal’s analysis did not unreasonably apply clearly established federal law by concluding the government had rebutted the presumption. The court also concluded that, because the Court of Appeal did not act contrary to or unreasonably apply clearly established federal law when analyzing prejudice, petitioner is not entitled to relief on this ground; the court rejected petitioner's argument that the Court of Appeal unreasonably applied clearly established federal law when it concluded that the state trial court was within its discretion in refusing petitioner's request for an additional evidentiary hearing to investigate his juror misconduct claim; and petitioner is not entitled to relief where the trial court did not unreasonably deny his request for a third continuance where the trial judge had several reasons for denying the motion that were neither unreasonable or arbitrary. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Godoy v. Spearman" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed her convictions for money laundering, arguing that the prosecutor’s errors before the grand jury constitute structural error, requiring reversal. Defendant also argues that the government’s failure to disclose impeachment evidence about a hostile defense witness mandates a new trial. The court held that where the intentional misconduct by the prosecution goes to a witness’s credibility, it is not structural error. While the court shared concerns that its holding could encourage prosecutorial misconduct, United States v. Mechanik makes clear that something other than dismissal - such as a state bar inquiry or an investigation by the Office of Professional Responsibility - is the proper recourse under these facts. The court also concluded that the prosecution's actions at trial - asking the district court ex parte to decide in camera whether the witness's informant activity need be disclosed - were not improper. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Harmon" on Justia Law

In these ten consolidated cases, appellants moved to dismiss their indictments for infractions of the Controlled Substances Act (CSA), 21 U.S.C. 801 et seq., or to enjoin their prosecutions on the grounds that the DOJ is prohibited from spending funds to prosecute them. At issue is whether criminal defendants may avoid prosecution for various federal marijuana offenses on the basis of a congressional appropriations rider that prohibits the DOJ from spending funds to prevent states’ implementation of their own medical marijuana laws. See the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-113, 542, 129 Stat. 2242, 2332-33. The court concluded that is has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1292(a)(1) to consider the interlocutory appeals from these direct denials of requests for injunctions. The court also concluded that appellants have standing to invoke separation-of-powers provisions of the Constitution to challenge their criminal prosecutions. The court concluded that section 542 prohibits the federal government only from preventing the implementation of those specific rules of state law that authorize the use, distribution, possession, or cultivation of medical marijuana. The DOJ does not prevent the implementation of rules authorizing conduct when it prosecutes individuals who engage in conduct unauthorized under state medical marijuana laws. Individuals who do not strictly comply with all state-law conditions regarding the use, distribution, possession, and cultivation of medical marijuana have engaged in conduct that is unauthorized, and prosecuting such individuals does not violate section 542. Therefore, the court remanded to the district court for further consideration. View "United States v. McIntosh" on Justia Law

After defendant pled guilty to one count of illegal reentry after deportation, the district court applied a sixteen-level sentencing enhancement to defendant's base offense level because of his prior manslaughter conviction under Florida law. The court held that, in light of United States Supreme Court guidance, manslaughter, as defined by Florida Statute 782.07, does not constitute a crime of violence under USSG 2L1.2(b)(1)(A). Under Florida's jurisprudence, manslaughter, which does not require a mens rea of at least recklessness, punishes more than only generic contemporary manslaughter. Accordingly, the court vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing. View "United States v. Mendoza-Padilla" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm. Defendant argued that the district court improperly excluded 81 days that he maintains amounted to an “unreasonable” delay under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. 3161(h)(1)(F), which governs the exclusion of transportation-related periods of delay. The court concluded that all of the days were properly excluded because defendant was incompetent to stand trial during the relevant period. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Romero" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction for possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute and his 120-month sentence. The court rejected defendant's contention that the district court erred by denying his request for an evidentiary hearing on his motion to suppress, denying his Batson challenge without conducting an appropriate Batson analysis, and denying a minor-role reduction. The court also rejected defendant's contention that the government withheld evidence, resulting in prejudice both at trial and at sentencing. The court agreed with defendant, however, that the district court plainly erred by applying an obstruction of justice enhancement to his sentence without making the express findings required by United States v. Castro-Ponce. Finally, the court concluded that there is no basis to reverse on direct appeal where counsel opted to chose not to raise a valid objection regarding defendant’s contention that the government failed to disclose its suspicion that the defendant was a longtime pedestrian narcotics smuggler, resulting in prejudice at trial and at sentencing. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Herrera-Rivera" on Justia Law

William Washington, a California state prisoner, filed suit against defendants, alleging violations of his Eighth Amendment right to adequate medical care and safe prison conditions. At issue is the application of the Prison Litigation Reform Act's (PLRA), 28 U.S.C. 1915(g), three-strikes rule to Washington's suit. The court held that a dismissal pursuant to Heck v. Humphrey may constitute a PLRA strike for failure to state a claim when Heck's bar to relief is obvious from the face of the complaint, and the entirety of the complaint is dismissed for a qualifying reason under the PLRA. Applying this legal framework to the instant case, the court concluded that the Heck dismissal in No. 2:09-CV-3052, does not constitute a PLRA strike. The court held that a dismissal due to Younger v. Harris abstention, similar to a dismissal under Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, is not a strike under the PLRA. As a result, Washington’s two prior dismissals under Younger, Nos. 2:12-CV-5873 and 2:12-CV-7429, do not constitute strikes. In Washington’s case, his two mandamus petitions, Nos. 2:10-CV-54 and 2:10-CV-964, directly challenged underlying criminal proceedings, and are more properly construed as appeals of criminal case habeas claims challenging a criminal conviction and lie outside the scope of the PLRA. Because the district court improperly assessed the existence of prior strikes against Washington, the court reversed and remanded for the district court to assess whether Washington is otherwise entitled to proceed with his action in forma pauperis. View "Washington v. LA Cnty. Sheriff's Dep't" on Justia Law

Adonai El-Shaddai, while incarcerated in California, filed at least eleven lawsuits against prison officials prior to filing this case. At issue is whether these previous cases amount to at least three “strikes” under the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PLRA), 28 U.S.C. 1915(g), such that El-Shaddai is barred from proceeding in forma pauperis (IFP) in this and future cases. The court held that El-Shaddai has not incurred three strikes because only one of the prior actions was dismissed on the grounds that it was frivolous, malicious, or failed to state a claim. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's contrary decision and remanded for the district court to assess whether El-Shaddai is otherwise entitled to proceed in forma pauperis. View "El-Shaddai v. Wang" on Justia Law