Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Petitioner, convicted of two counts of first degree murder and one count of conspiracy to commit murder to collect life insurance proceeds, challenged the district court's denial of his petition for habeas relief. While the California Supreme Court concluded that trial counsel rendered deficient performance by failing to investigate and present evidence that Calvin Boyd, a key prosecution witness at petitioner's trial, was likely the actual killer, the state court determined that petitioner was not prejudiced under Strickland v. Washington because there was substantial evidence to convict him under an aid-and-abet or conspiracy theory. The court concluded that the petition satisfies the “contrary to” clause of 28 U.S.C. 2254(d)(1) because the California Supreme Court employed a standard of review which was significantly harsher than the clearly established test from Strickland. Because the state court used the wrong standard, the court need not defer to that decision. Under de novo review, the court concluded that petitioner was clearly prejudiced in the guilt phase by counsel's deficient performance. Had counsel properly investigated and presented evidence that Boyd actually committed the murders, there is a substantial probability the jury would have come to a different conclusion. Therefore, petitioner is entitled to habeas relief because the California Supreme Court applied a standard contrary to clearly established law and because his attorney’s deficient performance was prejudicial at the guilt phase. Assuming, however, that the California Supreme Court did correctly conceptualize and apply the Strickland prejudice standard but simply camouflaged that understanding with a different - and incorrect - phrasing of the legal standard, the court still concluded that its application was unreasonable. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded with instructions to grant habeas relief. View "Hardy v. Chappell" on Justia Law

Defendant plead guilty to one count of unauthorized use of access devices for his use of fraudulent credit cards at a Target store in Colorado and at Nordstrom stores in California to buy items worth almost $150,000. The district court imposed restitution under the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act of 1996 (MVRA), 18 U.S.C. 3663A, without objection, for both the Nordstrom charges and the Target charges. Defendant argued for the first time on appeal that the district court improperly ordered restitution with respect to the Target charges. Applying plain error review to non-jurisdictional arguments raised for the first time on appeal, the court concluded that the Target charges occurred in July 2011 - within the indictment period. In this case, defendant did not plead guilty only to the Nordstrom allegations, he plead guilty to Count One of the indictment. The fraudulent Target charges fit within the scope of that count, and defendant does not contest that he actually engaged in criminal conduct at the Target store in Colorado that meets the terms of the indictment. Because the Nordstrom charges indisputably were sufficient to establish a factual basis for defendant’s crime, the government was not required to mention the Target charges at the plea colloquy. But the court need not and did not decide definitively whether the district court erred, because any error was not plain. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's restitution order. View "United States v. Zhou" on Justia Law

Petitioner, convicted of murdering two teenage boys with intent to inflict torture, appealed the denial of his 28 U.S.C. 2254 petition for habeas relief. Petitioner committed the murders when he was 15 years old. Petitioner contends his counsel performed deficiently by failing to challenge the prosecution’s statements as either improper comments on petitioner's decision not to testify, in violation of Griffin v. California, or improper shifting of the burden of proof to the defense. The court concluded that, because there was no actual prosecutorial error, defense counsel’s decision to rebut the prosecution’s comments directly rather than object at trial or on appeal was adequate, and this strategy did not undermine the reliability of petitioner’s conviction. Petitioner also contends that his sentence violates the Eighth Amendment because it is the "functional equivalent" of a mandatory life-without-parole sentence, and he was a juvenile offender. The court concluded that there is a reasonable argument petitioner’s sentence is constitutional because it actually allows for the possibility of parole. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's judgment. View "Demirdjian v. Gipson" on Justia Law

Defendant plead guilty to soliciting the murders of two of his associates. The district court granted the government's motion under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 35(b) to reduce defendant's sentence because he provided substantial post-sentencing assistance to the government. The district court did not rule explicitly on which version of the facts - the admissions in Doe’s plea agreement or the various accounts Doe later provided to the government - was accurate when it granted the government’s Rule 35(b) motion. Doe did not object to the court’s evaluation of the evidence during the Rule 35(b) hearing. On appeal, defendant argues that the district court committed plain error by failing to explicitly determine the true facts under Rule 32(i)(3). The court concluded that there was no error, let alone plain error, because Rule 35 does not incorporate Rule 32’s requirement that the court make findings on disputed or controverted matters. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Doe" on Justia Law

Petitioner appealed the denial of his petition for habeas relief, challenging his 2007 second-degree murder conviction. The court concluded that petitioner correctly alleged that the prosecution concealed evidence that could have bolstered his self-defense claim, in violation of Brady v. Maryland. However, the court concluded that the extremely deferential standard of review does not mandate relief because petitioner was not sufficiently prejudiced. The court also concluded that there was no Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) error in rejecting a claim under Napue v. Illinois. Even when combined with the Brady violations, there is no reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have been different. Accordingly, the court affirmed the denial of habeas relief. View "Reis-Campos v. Biter" on Justia Law

Petitioner pleaded guilty to second-degree murder and was sentenced to 15 years to life. Petitioner successfully petitioned to withdraw her guilty plea about five years later when she established that the sentencing court failed to inform her that she would receive a mandatory term of lifetime parole as a direct consequence of her plea. At her subsequent trial, petitioner was convicted of first-degree murder, first-degree burglary, and the special circumstance that the murder was committed in the course of a burglary. She was sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. The district court then denied petitioner's 28 U.S.C. 2254 habeas petition and issued a certificate of appealability (COA) on the question of specific performance of her plea agreement. The court assumed without deciding that the State promised petitioner release after seven and a half years and that the State breached that promise. Nevertheless, the court concluded that petitioner is not entitled to specific performance of her plea agreement because she voluntarily chose to withdraw her guilty plea, thereby voiding her plea agreement. There is thus no plea agreement to enforce. Under these circumstances, there is no precedent suggesting that petitioner was denied due process by denying her specific performance. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Fox v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of transporting a stolen vehicle, being a felon in possession of a firearm, possessing counterfeit credit cards and possessing counterfeiting devices. Defendant was sentenced to 137 months in prison and ordered to pay restitution. The government subsequently conceded that certain detention facility documents were not in the record. Given the government's concession, the court allowed the Assistant U.S. Attorney 48 hours to consider whether to confess error. The government responded by requesting a remand to allow the district court to consider a more fully developed record. At issue on appeal is whether a remand for resentencing should be on an open or closed record. The court concluded that when the government does not have occasion to tender a fully developed argument, the court remands for resentencing on an open record. In this case, defendant specifically objected to the proposed sentence on three separate occasions, the government was on notice of the factual deficiencies in its papers and had opportunities to supplement the record, and the government chose not to do so, preferring to rest on evidence that it later conceded was insufficient to support its position. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded. View "United States v. Pridgette" on Justia Law

Defendants Smith, Long, Thompson, Manzo, Craig, Leavins (collectly, the "Joint Appellants"), and Sexton each appealed their convictions for obstruction of justice and conspiracy to obstruct justice. Long and Craig also appealed their convictions for making false statements, and Craig and Leavins appealed their sentences. Furthermore, the Joint Appellants and Sexton raise numerous challenges to the jury instructions. The Joint Appellants and Sexton were all members of the LASD, and were convicted for their roles in interfering with a federal investigation into civil rights abuses at Los Angeles County jails. The court concluded that the district court’s use of the phrase “grand jury investigation,” rather than “grand jury proceeding,” was neither misleading nor an abuse of discretion in these circumstances; the court rejected the claim that a defendant’s unlawful purpose to obstruct justice must be sole or primary; the evidence was sufficient to suggest various motives for the Joint Appellants’ and Sexton’s conduct, so it was appropriate for the court to give an instruction regarding dual purposes; the court rejected the Joint Appellants' challenge to the adequacy of the good faith instruction; the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing an additional innocent intent instruction; in light of the clear instruction regarding the Joint Appellants’ authority to investigate, any error in the instruction regarding whether or not federal agents actually violated California law was undoubtedly harmless; and the court rejected Craig and Long's challenge to the instructions for the false statement counts. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Smith" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of assault by strangulation in violation of 18 U.S.C. 113. At issue is whether the jury was properly instructed to disregard defendant’s voluntary intoxication, which requires the court to determine whether section 113(a)(8) is a general or specific intent crime. Also at issue is whether the district court’s instruction to the jury on assault by strangulation violated defendant’s due process rights. The court held that assault by strangulation under section 113(a)(8) is a general intent crime, and defendant's intoxication was thus irrelevant. The court found no plain error in the district court's instruction on the elements of the offense. The district court’s inclusion of the word “wounded” may have been superfluous, but if anything, the inclusion of “wounded” in the instruction required that the government meet a higher burden than was necessary because section (a)(8) does not require proof of a wound or injury. Accordingly, the court affirmed the conviction. View "United States v. LaMott" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction for involuntary manslaughter and for using a firearm in connection with a crime of violence. In this opinion, the court addressed whether involuntary manslaughter can be considered a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. 924(c). After Leocal v. Ashcroft and Fernandez-Ruiz v. Gonzales, a crime of violence requires a mental state higher than recklessness - it requires intentional conduct. Involuntary manslaughter under 18 U.S.C. 1112, requiring a lesser mental state of gross negligence, prohibits conduct that cannot be considered a crime of violence under section 924(c)(3). Under the categorical approach, therefore, involuntary manslaughter cannot be a crime of violence. United States v. Springfield’s opposing rule is clearly irreconcilable with the reasoning and results of Leocal and Fernandez-Ruiz and is no longer good law. Accordingly, defendant's section 924(c) count of conviction for using a firearm in connection with a crime of violence is reversed. View "United States v. Benally" on Justia Law