Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Petitioner, convicted of first-degree murder, appealed the denial of his motion for relief from judgment under Fed. R. Civ. Pro 60(b) after the district court's dismissal of his habeas petition as time-barred. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in holding that petitioner failed to demonstrate that he was entitled to Rule 60(b) relief under a theory of “actual innocence.” In this case, petitioner failed to cite any cases where actual innocence was held to constitute an “extraordinary circumstance” for Rule 60(b)(6) purposes. Assuming arguendo that the “Schlup gateway” is available to support a Rule 60(b) motion, petitioner has fallen well short of raising sufficient doubt about his guilt to undermine confidence in the result of the trial. Further, the declarations petitioner seeks to offer as evidence of actual innocence are not "new" for purposes of Rule 60(b) because they were available when he filed his initial habeas petition. The court also concluded that the district court abused its discretion in finding that petitioner was not abandoned by his counsel, Gregory Mitts, where Mitts was grossly negligent in his representation; the district court did not make findings with respect to whether petitioner was reasonably diligent; and, therefore, the court remanded for the district court to determine this issue in the first instance. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. View "Brooks v. Yates" on Justia Law

In this interlocutory appeal, the government challenged the district court's suppression of two handguns seized from defendant's patio. It is undisputed that the officers seized the two handguns during a warrantless search of defendant’s home. The “knock and talk” exception to the warrant requirement does not apply when officers encroach upon the curtilage of a home with the intent to arrest the occupant. In this case, the district court found, as a matter of fact, that the officers’ purpose in knocking on defendant’s door was to find and arrest him, and the court saw no reason to disturb that finding. Thus, the officers violated defendant’s Fourth Amendment right to be free from unlawful searches when they stood on his porch and knocked on his front door. And since this unconstitutional conduct caused the allegedly exigent circumstance - the crashing noises in the backyard - that circumstance cannot justify the search resulting in the seizure of the two handguns. Furthermore, the officers lacked a reasonable ground for believing that there was a danger that would have justified a protective sweep of defendant’s home because, by the time the officers conducted the sweep of defendant’s home, he had already been handcuffed and placed in a police vehicle. The court also concluded that the inevitable discovery exception does not apply when officers have probable cause to apply for a warrant but simply fail to do so. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment and remanded for further proceedings. View "United States v. Lundin" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction and sentence for conspiracy and possession with intent to distribute 500 grams of a controlled substance. The court concluded that the district court's stated reason for rejecting defendant's plea was inapt. In this case, armed with defendant's admission of guilt and the government's offer of proof, the district court had all it needed to fulfill its duty under Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(3), which is to determine that there is a factual basis for the plea. Therefore, the court vacated the convictions and remanded so that defendant may plead guilty pursuant to the terms of his original plea agreement. Although the district court must give defendant the opportunity to plead guilty under the terms of his original plea agreement, that doesn’t mean he is required to so plead. Defendant could choose to hold out for a better deal or to go to trial anew. In regard to defendant's claims of trial errors, the court concluded that the district court's rulings were not within the area of permissible discretion when it prevented defendant from questioning three of the government's cooperating witnesses about the Rule 35 terms of their plea agreements. Finally, the court concluded that, because the assets at issue belonged to the government, they were not available for payment from or on behalf of defendant; the district court had no authority to redirect money earmarked for the Justice Department’s fund; nor could the district judge achieve such a result by amending the original judgment under Rule 35(a), as he attempted to do at the same time he filed the sua sponte order. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded to a different judge in order to preserve the appearance of justice. View "United States v. Nickle" on Justia Law

Petitioner, sentenced to death for robbery and murder, seeks habeas corpus relief based on the California Supreme Court’s rejection of his claim of self-representation pursuant to Faretta v. California. The district court granted relief to petitioner and the State appealed. Because petitioner filed his federal habeas corpus petition before the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act's effective date, the court applied the former version of 28 U.S.C. 2254 and pre-AEDPA law. The court concluded that the trial court’s repeated denials of petitioner's Faretta requests and the California Supreme Court’s decision affirming those denials were contrary to the court's decisions in Fritz v. Spalding and Armant v. Marquez. In this case, it was appropriate for the district court to determine the timeliness of petitioner's Faretta motions in the first instance because neither court made any finding that petitioner's requests were a mere delay tactic. The court further concluded that the district court did not have to refer to the California Supreme Court's finding because the California postconviction proceedings did not ask whether petitioner intended to delay, only whether petitioner's attorney thought that was petitioner's intent. The court agreed with petitioner that the district court was not required to presume that his requests were a mere delay tactic because, under section 2254(d)(1), the merits of that factual dispute were not resolved in the state postconviction hearing and, under section 2254(d)(2) and (d)(6), he was denied a full, fair, and adequate state court hearing on the issue. Finally, the court concluded that the district court did not clearly err in finding that petitioner’s Faretta requests were made for legitimate, not purely dilatory, reasons. The court affirmed the judgment. View "Burton v. Davis" on Justia Law

Defendant, a non-Indian, appealed his conviction under the federal murder statute, 18 U.S.C. 111, for the murder of the victim on the Tohono O’odham Indian reservation in Arizona. The court concluded that section 1111 was applicable to defendant under the Indian General Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. 1152, which makes federal criminal law applicable in federal enclaves when the defendant is a non-Indian and the victim is an Indian, because the government adduced sufficient evidence to establish that the victim in this case was an Indian. The court held that the evidence introduced at trial, taken in the light most favorable to the government, was sufficient to establish that defendant acted with premeditation and, therefore, the court affirmed defendant's conviction for first degree premeditated murder. Because the district court erred in defining the term “burglary” in section 1111 by reference to Arizona’s third-degree burglary statute, and this error was not harmless, the court vacated defendant's conviction for felony murder. View "United States v. Reza-Ramos" on Justia Law

Petitioner, convicted of seven felony counts related to a robbery and burglary using a deadly weapon, appealed the denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief, claiming violation of his due process right to a fair and impartial jury, where a police vehicle followed Juror No. 2, a known holdout against a guilty verdict, for approximately seven miles, on the second day of deliberations, in a highly publicized trial involving multiple police victims. The court held that the state court's decision was contrary to Mattox v. United States because the state court improperly limited its inquiry to whether the external contact amounted to a “communication” and did not investigate the prejudicial effect of the police tail. Therefore, the court reviewed de novo the question whether the extrinsic contact could have influenced the verdict and prejudiced petitioner. The court concluded that, because the trial court prevented petitioner from offering evidence to demonstrate prejudice, remand for an evidentiary hearing and further fact finding was necessary. View "Tarango v. McDaniel" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm, contending that his Fourth Amendment right to be free of unreasonable searches and seizures was violated when probation officers conducted two warrantless, suspicionless searches of his cell phone. The court rejected the government's contention that defendant waived his Fourth Amendment rights where acceptance of the terms of probation, including suspicionless searches of his person and property, is one factor that bears on the reasonableness of the search, but it is not in itself dispositive. The court concluded that defendant had a privacy interest in his cell phone and the data it contained and that privacy interest was substantial in light of the broad amount of data contained in, or accessible through, his cell phone. Although defendant's privacy was somewhat diminished in light of his status as a probationer, it was not diminished or waived because he accepted as a condition of his probation a clear and unequivocal search provision authorizing cell phone searches (he did not) or because he subscribed to cell phone service using a different first name (he did). After balancing defendant's privacy interest and the government's interest in combating recidivism, the court concluded that the circumstances in this case were unreasonable. Further, the exception to the exclusionary rule in Davis v. United States for binding appellate precedent is inapplicable in this case. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "United States v. Lara" on Justia Law

Defendant conditionally plead guilty to possession of a firearm and ammunition, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), and one count of possession of an unregistered firearm, in violation of 26 U.S.C. 5861(d). The district court sentenced defendant under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. 924(e), determining that defendant had three prior violent felony convictions. The court held that a conviction for felony riot under a Washington state statute, Wash. Rev. Code 9A.84.010, is not a violent felony for purposes of the ACCA sentencing enhancement because section 9A.84.010 is overinclusive and indivisible with respect to the term "force." Therefore, defendant's convictions under that statute are not predicate offenses supporting the application of the ACCA enhancement. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "United States v. Werle" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction for possession with intent to distribute more than 50 grams of methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1). The court concluded that the evidence presented at trial is sufficient to sustain the conviction under a constructive possession theory. However, the court concluded that, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, no reasonable factfinder could have determined beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant possessed more than 50 grams of methamphetamine. The court stated that it would be a bridge too far to allow a jury to extrapolate from comparison drugs that were not from activity related to the defendant or a conspiracy in which the defendant is involved. A 90% level of purity would more than suffice to support the jury’s quantity determination, if adequately connected to the drugs concerning which defendant had constructive possession. However, the government failed to include evidence connecting that purity level to defendant. Finally, the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that a mistrial was not necessary where an FBI agent mentioned the name of a gang and the district court, among other things, immediately sustained the objection and ordered the jury to disregard it. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for resentencing. View "United States v. Lemus" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction for possession with the intent to distribute marijuana, arguing that the district court erred by failing to ensure that his stipulation was knowing and voluntary. Defendant also challenged his sentence, contending that the district court erred in dismissing his court-appointed interpreter contrary to the provisions of the Court Interpreters Act, 28 U.S.C. 1827(f)(1). In this opinion, the court held that the district court dismissed the interpreter without adhering to the procedures required by the Act where defendant did not validly waive his right to an interpreter. Accordingly, the court vacated the sentence and remanded for a new sentencing hearing. The court affirmed the conviction in a memorandum disposition. View "United States v. Murguia-Rodriquez" on Justia Law