Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Petitioner, convicted of attempted carjacking, appealed the district court's dismissal of his habeas petition, contending that his conviction was tainted because the jurors' verdict was influenced by something other than evidence admitted during the trial. At trial, the victim professed not to be able to identify defendant and testified that he was drunk and angry at the time of the initial identification. While he testified, a woman sat as a spectator shaking her head. Some of the jurors observed that action, and later said that they believed that the woman was the victim’s mother and that she was directing him not to identify defendant. The court concluded that there is no clearly established federal law sufficiently related to the facts of defendant's case upon which he can rely to support his claim. Therefore, the California Court of Appeal’s decision in defendant's case could not have unreasonably applied clearly established federal law given the lack of holdings from the Supreme Court regarding the potentially prejudicial effect of spectators' courtroom conduct of the kind involved here. The general principles that a jury decides a case based on the evidence produced at trial, and that the rights of confrontation and cross-examination are fundamental to a fair trial, are not sufficient to support a conclusion that the California Court of Appeal unreasonably applied clearly established Supreme Court precedent in concluding that juror misconduct did not occur in this case. Accordingly, the court affirmed the denial of habeas relief. View "Turner v. McEwen" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to both bringing an unlawful alien into the United States and aiding and abetting an offense against the United States. On appeal, defendant challenged the district court's application of a six-point upward adjustment to his offense level for “recklessly creating a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury to another person" under USSG 2L1.1(b)(6). The court concluded that the district court did not clearly err in finding that transporting a person by strapping her inside a dashboard was neither safe nor comfortable but rather “extremely precarious” and dangerous, and that this conduct met the criteria of Application Note 5, which indicates that section 2L1.1(b)(6) applies to a “wide variety of conduct,” including but not limited to the listed examples. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Bernardo" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction for illegal reentry, arguing that he was in a delusional state. Defendant believed he was being chased by Mexican gangs, and with the specific intent solely to place himself into the protective custody of United States officials, illegally reentered the United States. In United States v. Lombera-Valdovinos, the court held that it was impossible to convict a previously deported alien for attempted illegal reentry when he crosses the border with the intent only to be imprisoned because attempted illegal reentry is a specific intent crime that requires proof of intent to enter the country free from official restraint. In this case, it is not clear beyond a reasonable doubt that the district court would have found defendant guilty absent its misapprehension of the specific intent element. Because the district court found defendant guilty under an erroneous legal standard, the court vacated the conviction and remanded for a new trial. View "United States v. Argueta-Rosales" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction of two counts of attempted illegal reentry. Defendant did not testify at trial but snuck in his recollection of events by using an expert witness as a conduit for his own words. Principally at issue is whether it was proper to allow the government to impeach the expert with statements that defendant made voluntarily but that were not Miranda compliant. The court concluded that the district court properly admitted defendant's statements to the expert to impeach defendant's account of the events at issue. Because defendant does not challenge the district court’s finding that his statements to the Border Patrol officers were voluntary and reliable, the district court did not err by admitting these statements. The court also concluded that the district court did not err in denying defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal on the June 21 count where a jury could reasonably find that defendant had taken a substantial step by crossing the border and waiting in line for about an hour and a half to reach the inspection station, and that defendant had the specific intent to enter without the express consent of the Attorney General. The court rejected defendant's claim that the prosecutor vindictively added a second charge; the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying an adverse-inference jury instruction relating to the destruction of the port-of-entry video; and because the petition for certiorari granted in Mathis v. United States is directly relevant to the court's resolution of defendant's challenge to his sentence enhancement, the court deferred the resolution of this issue pending the Supreme Court's decision in Mathis. The court affirmed the conviction. View "United States v. Rosales-Aguilar" on Justia Law

Defendant was found guilty of unlawful possession of a firearm and sentenced under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. 924(e). The court agreed with defendant that his prior 1990 conviction for armed robbery under a Massachusetts statute is an offense that does not have “as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another.” Under the categorical approach, a conviction under the Massachusetts statute does not qualify as a violent felony under the ACCA’s force clause. Given that neither this conviction nor defendant’s 1989 conviction for assault and battery by dangerous weapon qualifies as a violent felony, the district court erred by sentencing him as an armed career offender. View "United States v. Parnell" on Justia Law

Defendant, 16 years old at the time of the offenses, was convicted of felony murder and related charges resulting in a mandatory life sentence without the possibility of parole. Miller v. Alabama subsequently held unconstitutional for juvenile offenders mandatory terms of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. The district court refused to appoint a neuropsychological expert under 18 U.S.C. 3006A(e) on resentencing. The court concluded that, under these circumstances, a reasonably competent attorney would have found the services of the requested expert necessary to provide adequate representation at defendant’s resentencing. By precluding defendant from developing this potential mitigating evidence, the district court abused its discretion. The court also concluded that a reasonable attorney would have considered an up-to-date neuropsychological evaluation necessary had defendant been a nonindigent defendant. And because a current evaluation could have provided mitigating evidence in support of a lesser sentence, defendant was sufficiently prejudiced by the failure to appoint a psychological expert before resentencing. Therefore, the court vacated defendant’s sentence and remanded for resentencing. The court further concluded that defendant has not shown the district court erred by calculating the Guidelines’ recommended base offense level as 43; defendant has not demonstrated that the district court committed prejudicial error when it considered the PSR’s calculation of criminal history points attributed to his juvenile offenses; and, even assuming that defendant’s objection to the district court’s calculation of his criminal history category based on his juvenile offenses was forfeited, as opposed to waived, and assuming the district court committed plain error by attributing criminal history points to three of his juvenile offenses, defendant has not shown prejudice as a result of the error. View "United States v. Pete" on Justia Law

Petitioner, convicted of first-degree murder and sexual conduct with a minor, appealed the district court's denial of his federal habeas petition based on ineffective assistance of counsel at the guilt and penalty phases of trial. Applying a highly deferential standard under the Antiterrorism and Death Penalty Act, 28 U.S.C. 2254, the court concluded that, given the inherently disturbing nature of the technical theory counsel adopted, for lack of an available alternative, to defend against the felony murder charge, as well as its counter-intuitive nature, it was reasonable to tailor the defense as an argument to the court in the form of a motion for acquittal, and, when the motion was denied and closing arguments remained, not press the theory to the jury. Assuming, without deciding, that counsel’s conduct was at times constitutionally deficient, he did not fail entirely to advocate for petitioner. Therefore, the state court reasonably determined that counsel's conduct did not constitute abandonment, and that Strickland v. Washington applies to the question of prejudice. The court also rejected petitioner's claims that counsel at sentencing was ineffective for failing fully to prepare and present mitigating evidence concerning his mental health and personal history. The court concurrently filed an order with this opinion. View "Gallegos v. Ryan" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed the district court's denial of his motion to dismiss the indictment. Shortly after the indictment was returned, the United States initiated its effort to extradite defendant from Canada for trial. After almost five years, Canada approved the extradition. The district court found 32.5 months of the delay was attributable to Canada, 26.4 months of the delay was attributable to the United States, and 16 months resulted from defendant’s fighting the extradition. With respect to the delay attributable to the United States alone, the district court held that the United States “pursued extradition with reasonable diligence” and that any prejudice caused by the delay was not severe enough to have denied defendant his right to a speedy trial. After weighing the Barker v. Wingo factors, the court agreed with the district court that defendant was not deprived of his right to a speedy trial. The court noted, however, that the U.S. Attorney's offices would do well to adopt systems of controls that would track the status of extradition requests so as to ensure the timely submission of extradition materials to the Justice Department and foreign governments. Such a system would likely have avoided much of the initial 9.6 month delay present in this case. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Alexander" on Justia Law

Defendant, convicted of drug trafficking charges, challenged the district court's denial of his motion to suppress the drugs found in his car. Unable to contest the existence of reasonable suspicion, defendant challenges the legality of the stop by contending that the stop violated the Fourth Amendment because the officer who pulled him over deliberately lied when stating the reason for the stop, and the reason the officer gave was not itself supported by reasonable suspicion. The court concluded that so long as the facts known to the officer establish reasonable suspicion to justify an investigatory stop, the stop is lawful even if the officer falsely cites as the basis for the stop a ground that is not supported by reasonable suspicion. In light of the information obtained during the stop, the court concluded that the officers had probable cause to seize defendant's car. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Magallon-Lopez" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed her conviction and sentence for one count of sex trafficking by force, fraud, or coercion, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1591(a). Defendant forced into prostitution a Chinese woman who had been tricked into flying to Saipan on promises of a work visa and a legal job, when in fact the victim received only a tourist visa, was effectively imprisoned, and was told repeatedly that she had nowhere to turn and must engage in prostitution. The court concluded that the jury instructions were not erroneous. In this case, the district court did not err in failing to give an instruction requiring the jury to find that the coercion was the but-for-cause of the victim's sex act. The court also concluded that the commerce element of section 1519(a)(1) has no mens rea requirement and thus the district court did not err in failing to give an instruction requiring the jury to find that defendant knew her actions affected interstate or foreign commerce. The court further concluded that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's finding of an effect on interstate commerce; the district court did not err by denying defendant's motion to admit evidence that the victims engaged in prostitution after the indictment period, under Federal Rule of Evidence 412; and the district court did not abuse its discretion by imposing a two-level enhancement under USSG 3A1.1(b)(1) because defendant knew the victim of the offense was a vulnerable victim. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Backman" on Justia Law