Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Petitioner, convicted of armed carjacking, appealed the district court's dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), 28 U.S.C. 2254. The court agreed with the district court that the petition is untimely and that petitioner is not entitled to equitable tolling because he did not act diligently in waiting fourteen months before inquiring into the status of his petition. Accordingly, the court affirmed the dismissal of the petition as time-barred. View "Fue v. Biter" on Justia Law

The district court granted a motion for acquittal after the jury rendered a guilty verdict against defendant on two counts of sexual abuse of a severely disabled woman under 18 U.S.C. 2242(2)(B). The district court found insufficient evidence that the victim was “physically incapable” of resisting or declining to participate in the sexual assault by defendant. The court concluded that a defendant may be convicted under section 2242(2)(B) where the victim had some awareness of the situation and - while not completely physically helpless - was physically hampered due to sleep, intoxication, or drug use and thereby rendered physically incapable. The court held that - to the extent a defendant raises a factual dispute regarding consent as a defense under section 2242(2)(B) - the jury is the appropriate fact-finder to weigh the question when evaluating the victim’s physical incapacity to decline participation or communicate her unwillingness to engage in the alleged sexual abuse. The district court erred by taking the question out of the jury’s domain after it had rendered a guilty verdict against defendant. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded. View "United States v. James" on Justia Law

Petitioner was convicted of first degree murder and other charges and sentenced to death. This court subsequently found that the Arizona Supreme Court had erred in not considering certain mitigation evidence, because it found such evidence was not connected to petitioner’s actions at the time of the murder. The court reversed and remanded to the district court to issue a conditional writ ordering petitioner's release from his death sentence unless the State were to initiate proceedings either to correct the constitutional error or to vacate the death sentence and impose a lesser sentence. The district court so ordered and the state court affirmed the death sentence. Petitioner then moved the district court for an unconditional writ of habeas corpus, arguing that the Arizona Supreme Court was powerless to correct the constitutional error, because the law had changed since Styers I. Petitioner made a Ring v. Arizona claim before the state court, arguing that the conditional writ of habeas corpus required that petitioner be re-sentenced and that a jury must find the aggravating factors rendering him eligible for the death penalty. The state court denied the claim on the ground that petitioner's sentence was final. The U.S. Supreme Court has never held that the issuance of a conditional writ of habeas corpus necessarily renders non-final a conviction or sentence that was predicated on constitutional error, and the conditional writ of habeas corpus in this case did not vacate petitioner’s death sentence. Therefore, the court concluded that the state court's determination that petitioner's sentence remained final at the time of the second independent review was not contrary to federal law as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States. Finally, the state court considered the mitigating evidence and decided to give it little weight. Neither Tennard v. Dretke, nor Eddings v. Oklahoma, requires more. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Styers v. Ryan" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction of seven counts of making false statements to a bank in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1014, and six counts of aggravated identity theft in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1028(a). Defendant's convictions stemmed from a tax evasion scheme in which defendant used false identities to open bank accounts in order to obtain cashier's checks to buy gold. The court joined the Fourth Circuit in holding that section 1014 does not contain any requirement of a risk of loss. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Taylor" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction and sentence for conspiracy to distribute heroin, distribution of heroin, possession of heroin with intent to distribute, and a special finding that the quantity of heroin was at least one kilogram. Applying the Jackson v. Virginia standard, the court concluded that the district court did not err in declining to apply the multiplier method given the facts of this case; the district court did not err in disregarding the circumstantial evidence of the secret storage compartment in defendant’s vehicle, capable of holding 30 pounds of drugs; and the testimonial and physical evidence cannot support a finding of one kilogram. Therefore, the court affirmed as to this issue. The court concluded, however, that the district court erred by concluding that the pattern of transactions constituted circumstantial evidence that defendants must have agreed to distribute as much heroin as they could and that the distribution would have continued in a similar fashion; it would be speculative to infer that defendants agreed to any future transactions such that they would reach the one kilogram mark; and the court's conclusion is further supported by the Fourth Circuit's holding in United States v. Hickman. Because this error was not harmless, the court reversed the jury’s quantity finding, vacated defendant’s sentence on all counts, and remanded for resentencing. Finally, the court affirmed the district court's evidentiary ruling permitting the government to ask defendant's sister about his prior state convictions for drug trafficking and escape. View "United States v. Navarrette-Aguilar" on Justia Law

Defendant, an undocumented alien, was convicted in 2009 of violating California narcotics laws and was subsequently placed in administrative removal proceedings. Defendant was subsequently ordered removed in 2010 and was criminally charged with illegal reentry in 2011. The district court denied defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment and defendant was convicted of illegal reentry. The court held that the ICE agent who conducted defendant’s administrative removal proceeding violated her due process rights by telling her that an attorney would not have been able to help her when she was facially eligible for a U-visa, a form of hardship relief available to a person convicted of an aggravated felony. The court also held that defendant was prejudiced by the due process violation because it was plausible that defendant would have obtained a U-visa had she applied for one in 2010, notwithstanding the fact that she had already been placed in administrative removal proceedings. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded with instructions to dismiss the indictment and vacated the conviction. View "United States v. Cisneros-Rodriguez" on Justia Law

In Appeal No. 15-50033, the government challenged the district court’s pretrial order granting motions in limine to exclude certain pieces of evidence in a case in which Defendant DeCinces, Mazzo, and others are charged with insider-trading offenses relating to the stock of Advanced Medical Optics. In Appeal No. 15-50058, Mazzo challenged the district court’s order denying his motion to dismiss a securities fraud charge under 18 U.S.C. 1348 for failing to state an offense and for violating the Double Jeopardy Clause. In regard to Appeal No. 15-50033, the court concluded that it has jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. 3731 to entertain the government's interlocutory appeal where the district court's order granting the motions in limine was sufficiently final, and the district court abused its discretion when it granted the motions in limine excluding the IntraLase and Bausch and Lomb evidence. In regard to Appeal No. 15-50058, the court concluded that it lacked pendant appellate jurisdiction over Mazzo's interlocutory appeal, and the court lacked jurisdiction over Mazzo's interlocutory appeal under the collateral order doctrine. Accordingly, the court reversed the grant of defendants' motions in limine in Appeal No. 15-50033 and dismissed Appeal No. 15-50058. View "United States v. DeCinces" on Justia Law

Petitioner was convicted of one count of forcible rape of a minor and eight counts of committing lewd and lascivious acts on a minor. The court affirmed the district court's grant of petitioner's writ of habeas corpus where an interrogating officer read him his Miranda rights and confirmed that petitioner understood those rights. The officer then asked if petitioner wanted to talk to him and petitioner answered, "no." The court held that 28 U.S.C. 2254(d) does not bar habeas review of petitioner’s Miranda claim, and the court concluded, on de novo review, that petitioner’s constitutional rights were violated when his interrogation tape was played and his apology letter was read at trial. In this case, the state court's decision that the "no" response was ambiguous and equivocal in light of other statements is both contrary to and an unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court law, and it is based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. The court further concluded that the error was not harmless. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of the writ of habeas corpus. View "Garcia v. Long" on Justia Law

Defendant, a non-Indian who lives on tribal land with his common-law wife, was convicted of two counts of being a felon in possession of a firearm. The district court applied a 4-level sentencing enhancement for defendant's use of a firearm in connection with another felony offense, as well as his condition of supervised release permitting searches of his computers and other electronic devices by a U.S. Probation Officer. The court held that due to the Assimilative Crimes Ac (ACA), 18 U.S.C. 13, 1152, it does not matter whether the requisite felony offense occurred on tribal lands or within the state’s jurisdiction in order to apply an enhancement for discharging a firearm under U.S.S.G. 2K2.1(b)(6)(B); so long as a district court makes a properly supported factual finding from the record before it, establishing some nexus between computer use and the need for the sentence imposed to accomplish deterrence, protection of the public, or rehabilitation of the defendant, it is not an abuse of discretion for the district court to impose a condition of supervised release permitting the search of a defendant’s personal computers; and the court affirmed the judgment because the district court made such a permissible factual finding establishing nexus in this case, and because defendant is subject to punishment for committing the felony offense of disorderly conduct involving weapons in connection with his felon in possession conviction. View "United States v. Bare" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his sentence after pleading guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm. The district court found that defendant had three prior convictions for violent felonies pursuant to the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(2)(B); two robbery convictions under California Penal Code (CPC) 211, and one assault-with-a-deadly-weapon conviction under Nevada Revised Statutes (NRS) 200.471. Defendant challenged the district court’s imposition of the mandatory minimum sentence, contending that his prior convictions are not “violent felony” convictions as defined by the ACCA. The court held that a violation of CPC 211 is not a “violent felony” under the ACCA because it criminalizes conduct not included within the ACCA’s definition of “violent felony." Therefore, the district court incorrectly determined that it was required to apply the mandatory minimum sentence. Accordingly, the court vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing. View "United States v. Dixon" on Justia Law