Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Petitioner, convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to death, appealed the district court's denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The court rejected petitioner's argument that he was denied due process when a prosecution investigation destroyed the defense strategy tape; petitioner's confrontation rights were not violated when the trial court admitted various statements from petitioner's sister; petitioner's confrontation rights were not violated by the introduction at trial of multi-level hearsay testimony; the court rejected petitioner's ineffective assistance of counsel claims and petitioner's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel at the sentencing phase; and petitioner's right to an impartial jury was not violated when the trial court failed to dismiss a juror who admitted to hearing a news report that suggested petitioner would hurt his guards if he were given the death penalty. Because the California Supreme Court's decision was reasonable, the court affirmed the district court's judgment. View "Zapien v. Martel" on Justia Law

After the district court conducted two competency hearings, the district court found defendant incompetent to stand trial and referred defendant to a federal medical center for further evaluation. On appeal, defendant challenged the second commitment order, arguing that the second competency hearing violated his constitutional rights. The court held that, as a person whose competence to stand trial was in question, defendant could not legally waive his right to counsel; thus he was entitled to be represented by an attorney at his competency hearing. Therefore, the district court was required to provide defendant with an attorney during his competency proceedings. Applying the meaningful adversarial testing standard, the court concluded that the district court's appointment of amicus counsel satisfied this requirement of the right to counsel. Accordingly, defendant was sufficiently represented by counsel at the competency hearing to overcome his denial of counsel claim. The court further concluded that any potential abuse of discretion in not allowing defendant to speak at a hearing on supplemental briefing was harmless, there are no clear procedural violations under 18 U.S.C. 4241, and there is no reason to reassign this case to a different district court judge. The court affirmed the judgment and remanded. View "United States v. Kowalczyk" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted for distribution of child pornography and possession of child pornography. On appeal, defendant challenged the district court's restitution order. The court agreed that the district court erred when it failed to disaggregate losses caused to the victim due to the crimes perpetrated against her by the original abuser and those caused to her by others who possessed or distributed images of the abuse which were made by the original abuser. Accordingly, the court vacated the restitution order and remanded for further proceedings. View "United States v. Galan" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitioned for review of the BIA's finding of removeability and determination that he was ineligible for cancellation of removal because he had been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude (CIMT) for which a sentence of one year or longer may be imposed pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 1229b(b). The court affirmed the BIA’s finding that petitioner's violation of Nev. Rev. Stat. 205.690(2) and 199.480, possession of a credit card or debit card without the consent of the cardholder, is a categorical CIMT. Further, petitioner is not entitled to a petty offense exception in section 1182(a)(2)(A)(ii) because the exception is only available to aliens whose CIMT conviction did not have a maximum possible penalty of imprisonment for a year or more. The court concluded that a conspiracy conviction under Nev. Rev. Stat. 199.480 is a gross misdemeanor potentially punishable by one year imprisonment, and is covered by section 1227(a)(2)(A)(i)(I). Although petitioner was not sentenced to a year imprisonment, the court deferred to the BIA’s reasonable approach of considering the sentence that could have been imposed, not the actual sentence. Finally, the court concluded that petitioner's reliance on the Fourth Circuit decision in Soliman v. Gonzales is unavailing. Accordingly, the court dismissed the petition for review. View "Mancilla-Delafuente v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Petitioner was convicted of two murders and sentenced to death. Petitioner's first habeas petition, arguing that the prosecutor excluded an African-American prospective juror on account of her race, was denied by the district court, but this court remanded in light of Cook v. LaMarque, which clarified that a peremptory challenge violates the Equal Protection Clause if it is “motivated in substantial part” by race “regardless of whether the strike would have issued if race had played no role.” On remand, the district court found that the prosecutor was substantially motivated by race and granted petitioner habeas relief. On appeal, the state raised several challenges. The court affirmed the judgment, concluding that Cook merely clarified the standard of proof for Batson claims, but it did not set forth a new rule for purposes of Teague v. Lane; the California Supreme Court’s decision is not owed deference under the Antiterrorism and Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), 28 U.S.C. 2254, because it was contrary to clearly established federal law, and the presumption of correctness afforded to the state trial court’s factual findings is rebutted by clear and convincing evidence; the district court was not required to conduct its own evidentiary hearing, because it did not reject the magistrate judge’s credibility determination; and the district court’s finding that the prosecutor was substantially motivated by race was not clearly erroneous View "Crittenden v. Chappell" on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to bank fraud after stealing $264,824.10 from her employer, RBS. On appeal, defendant challenged the district court's restitution order. The court concluded that the textual reach of 18 U.S.C. 3663A(b)(4) manifestly covers the entirety of the attorneys’ fees awarded to RBS, not just those incurred leading up to and during the grand jury proceedings; the district court was manifestly aware of the law governing an award of attorneys’ fees; the district court properly concluded that RBS’s taxes and penalties were foreseeable and directly and proximately caused by defendant’s embezzlement, with no break in the chain of causation; the negotiated amount of the IRS’s abatement did not relieve the district court of its responsibility to determine the amount of loss; and in reducing RBS' requested attorneys' fees, the district court did not conclude in making this reduction that the fees incurred were not reasonably necessary, just that the billing rate charged was too high. The court also concluded that there was no statutory error and no violation of due process. The court rejected defendant's remaining argument under Paroline v. United States. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Eyraud" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his two-year sentence for violating his supervised release conditions. The court held, consistent with the rule adopted by other circuits, that “a sentence is not final—and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 35(a) does not apply—when there is no formal break in the proceedings from which to logically and reasonably conclude that sentencing had finished. . . .” In this case, the court held that the district court’s initial, twelve-month-and-a-day sentence was not a binding sentence within the meaning of Rule 35. Accordingly, neither 18 U.S.C. 3582(c) nor Rule 35 deprived the district court of jurisdiction to alter defendant's sentence due to his apparently disrespectful conduct during the ongoing sentencing hearing. The court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Ochoa" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his convictions and sentence for bankruptcy fraud, conspiracy to defraud the United States, scheme to commit wire fraud against the United States and the Blackfeet Indian Tribe, and conspiracy to submit false claims. Defendant's conviction on Count 1 rested on a charge for which the jury instructions did not match the indictment. At issue is whether an error in jury instructions here amounted to “plain error” under Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b). The court overruled United States v. Caldwell to the extent that it held that the failure to instruct the jury on an essential element of the crime is per se prejudicial. The court held that Caldwell is inconsistent with the subsequent Supreme Court decision in Neder v. United States, which does not permit a jury instruction error to be considered a structural error. In this case, although defendant did not object to the invalid jury instructions at trial regarding Count 1, he has not intentionally relinquished or abandoned his ability to challenge them on appeal, and such error was plain or obvious because the jury instructions clearly do not match the indictment. However, the court concluded that the prosecution adequately proved the missing element of the crime, and that there is not a “reasonable probability” that the error in jury instructions affected the outcome. Accordingly, the court concluded that there was no plain error affecting defendant's substantial rights. The court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Conti" on Justia Law

Defendant and his two cousins were convicted of various crimes arising out of their attempt to rob a federal officer, who was posing as a buyer of illegal firearms. The court rejected defendant's contention that no reasonable jury could have rejected his claim of self-defense with respect to the assault charge under 18 U.S.C. 111(b) where the evidence does not support defendant's version of events so decisively that a rational jury would have been compelled to believe him; there was sufficient evidence to support the robbery conviction under 18 U.S.C. 2114(a) where the agent actually had the buy money in his charge, control, or custody; there was sufficient evidence to convict defendant of conspiracy under 18 U.S.C. 371 where the jury could reasonably have concluded that the scope of the conspirators’ agreement was not limited to assaulting and robbing an acquaintance; and the court concluded that defendant did not need to know that the buy money the agent had in his custody belonged to the United States. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Mobley" on Justia Law